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TREASURY FOR THE FREE
WORLD

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TREASURY FOR THE FREE WORLD

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INTRODUCTION BY ERNEST HEMINGWAY
EDITED BY BEN RAE BURN

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To
Peggy Justman
(aged one and a half)
and her generation
with the hope that it will
come to pass in time for them

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FOREWORD

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RNEST HEMINGWAY Now that the wars are over and the dead are dead and we have bought whatever it is we have it is a good time to publish books like this.

We have come out of the time when obedience, the acceptance of discipline, intelligent courage and resolution were most important into that more difficult time when it is a man's duty to understand his world rather than simply fight for it.

To understand we must study. We must study not simply what we wish to believe. That will always be skillfully presented for us. We must try to examine our world with the impartiality of a physician. This will be hard work and will involve reading much that is unpleasant to accept. But it is one of a man's first duties now.

It will be our duty, when we have sufficient valid knowledge, to disagree, to protest, even to revolt and to rebel and still work always toward finding a way for all men to live together on this earth.

It has been necessary to fight. It has been necessary to kill, to maim, to burn and to destroy. Certainly for a country whose continent has never been bombed we have done our share of bombing. We have possibly killed more civilians of other countries than all our enemies did in all the famous massacres we so deplore. There is really very little favorable difference to a man or a woman between being burned alive or stood against a wall and shot.

We have waged war in the most ferocious and ruthless way that it has ever been waged. We waged it against fierce and ruthless enemies that it was necessary to destroy. Now we have destroyed one of our enemies and forced the capitulation of the other. For the moment we are the strongest power in the world. It is very important that we do not become the most hated.

It would be easy for us, if we do not learn to understand the world and appreciate the rights, privileges and duties of all other countries and

peoples, to represent in our power the same danger to the world that Fascism did.

We have invented the sling and the pebble that will kill all giants; including ourselves. It is simple idiocy to think that the Soviet Union will not possess and perfect the same weapon.

This is no time for any nation to have any trace of the mentality of the bully. It is no time for any nation to become hated. It is no time for any nation even to swagger. Certainly it is no time for any nation to jostle. It is no time for any nation to be anything but just.

In this new world all of the partners will have to relinquish. It will be as necessary to relinquish as it was necessary to fight. No nation who holds land or dominion over people where it has no just right to it can continue to do so if there is to be an enduring peace. The problems this brings up can not be examined in this foreword. But we must examine them and examine them intelligently, impartially and closing our eyes to nothing.

This book has one advantage. The various articles are not full of the knowledge after the fact of the use of the release of atomic energy. We need to study and understand certain basic problems of our world as they were before Hiroshima to be able to continue, intelligently, to discover how some of them have changed and how they can be settled justly now that a new weapon has become a property of a part of the world. We must study them more carefully than ever now and remember that no weapon has ever settled a moral problem. It can impose a solution but it cannot guarantee it to be a just one. You can wipe out your opponents. But if you do it unjustly you become eligible for being wiped out yourself.

In Germany our military courts have sentenced a sixty year old German woman to be hanged as one of a mob which brutally murdered American aviators who had parachuted to the ground in Germany. Why hang her? Why not burn her at the stake if we wish to make martyrs?

For the Germans know whether any sixty year old German women were ever killed by fighter pilots, on their way back from missions, coming down to strafe German villages. As far as I know we never hanged any pilots for going down on the deck and doing a little strafing. German civilians, strafed in Germany, feel much the same about it as Spanish civilians strafed in Spain by Germans or as American civilians would feel if the Germans had ever been able to strafe them.

Say you've been down on the deck; sometimes there were comic incidents. Often they looked comic from the air. Nothing blew up like ambulances (which proved the Germans carried munitions in them). Always plenty comic instances when you have command of the air. Comic to you. I believe in shooting up everything, myself, and getting it over with.

(You shouldn't say that. That's too much like war.) But you cannot expect them not to be excited if you fall into their hands.

Air-Marshall Harris is on record as to what he wished to do to the German people. We were fighting the German people as well as the German army. The Germans fought the British people as well as the British army. The German army fought the Russian people and the Russian people fought back. That is war and to fight a war any other way is playing dolls.

But the secret of future peace is not in hanging sixty year old women because they killed fliers in hot blood. Hang or shoot those who starved and beat and tortured in cold blood. Hang or shoot those who planned the war and would plan another. Hang or shoot deliberate war criminals. Deal with the S.S. and the voluntary Party members as they should be dealt with. But do not make martyrs of sixty year old women who killed in anger against force which had become so strong it no longer had any conscience or any feeling of evil doing.

To win a war you have to do things that are inconceivable in peace and that are often hateful to those who do them. That is they are hateful for a while. Afterwards some people get used to them. Some get to like them. Everyone wants to do everything, no matter what, to get it over with. Once you are involved in a war you have to win it by any means.

The military, in order to maintain their status and certain safeguards of their status, would like to have war fought by rules. The air-forces steadily smashed through all these rules and developed a realistic war in which nations fought nations; not armies armies.

An aggressive war is the great crime against everything good in the world. A defensive war, which must necessarily turn to aggressive at the earliest moment, is the necessary great counter-crime. But never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime. Ask the infantry and ask the dead.

We have fought this war and won it. Now let us not be sanctimonious; nor hypocritical; nor vengeful nor stupid. Let us make our enemies incapable of ever making war again, let us re-educate them, and let us learn to live in peace and justice with all countries and all peoples in this world. To do this we must educate and re-educate. But first we must educate ourselves.

Ernest Hemingway

*San Francisco de Paula, Cuba
September 1945*

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

WHILE this book was being prepared, the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima—and the world changed.

The full impact of that event will not be felt for a long time. Its far reaching implications are too vast for our present understanding. But we do know that old concepts were exploded in that awful convulsion, old grooves of thought shattered; and if any doubts still remained that the continued isolation of countries was impossible, they were blown out of existence forever.

Isolation is gone, but its causes are still very much with us; they are just operating in other directions. It seems obvious that you cannot talk of international treaties and agreements if each nation is going to be a law unto itself. But the diplomats are still applying, to the work they are trying to do, the obsolete notions that have made for war, not peace.

When the war was on we were told it was our war, urged to understand all that was at stake and to co-operate to do everything possible to win it. But the councils of peace are far too exclusive. It is necessary for us to become more keenly aware that the problems they are discussing are our problems and—if past performances in the cause of peace are any standard—we had better become more active in their solution.

To do that we must be informed (it is at least as important now as during the regime of the Office of War Information) about all the issues and the possible consequences to us and the rest of the world. We may then know exactly what we want; and decide, finally, how to get it.

This book grew out of the conviction that ignorance or confusion constitutes the greatest danger to democracy in this time; that our fundamental need for the fullest information on all the questions involved must be filled immediately. It will be seen from the list of contributors that the book is no mere compilation of theoretical discussions. Some of the writers are in supreme positions as leaders of their countries. Others occupy places of decisive influence in the shaping of policies which will affect our

futures; and many, though not wearers of official titles, are among the world's intellectual leaders, whose views will weigh heavily in the ultimate decisions for they are heeded with respect by governments and parliaments and by millions of awakening citizens in all the countries of the earth.

The brief section of poetry is included because it is worth remembering that the poets throughout history have always been years ahead of their time in wisdom, in sympathy and in vision. I regret that there was not space for more.

Whatever their differences, the men who have contributed to the book are all profoundly aware of the increasingly rapid evolution of our world. That is why some of the ideas they express are being constantly confirmed by events.

The time for us to take these lessons to heart is now. Before it is again too late—as it was too late in 1920, when the men who died in the war we have just won were still children or still unborn.

Defeat, though it carries the poison of resentment, is a great teacher and there will be many in the countries that have tasted its bitters who will learn from it. But the lessons will not come to us by such inevitable means. We have been successful and success, as an English writer once said, touches nothing that it does not vulgarize. We must learn, despite the dangers of power and despite the professional haters, that the people everywhere are our brothers; that our lives depend upon their freedom; that race prejudice is as fatal in the long run to those who feel it and foment it as to those who are its victims. Without this basic understanding at least, lasting peace is impossible.

And in working toward peace, we must no longer be misled by the politicians who assure us that with the wisdom of age comes a desirable conservatism. Such bland assurances, disguised by the deceptive quality that half-truths possess, have led us again and again to disaster. They would like us to forget what we had before the war: the men, standing in lines that stretched across our fertile country, waiting for bread; the children stunted by malnutrition; and the many other statistics of slow death that do not appear in casualty lists in the peacetime press. But we must not forget them, or we can expect to have it all again. Nothing cripples thought like fear, and fear is what drives these defenders of old crimes that go by the name of *status quo*.

From here on in, gentlemen, we suspect you. We suspect anybody who talks about going back to our way of life but means going back to what we had before the fighting. That was not peace. That was the residue of one war, piling up to create another. We must not have it again.

A new world is in birth, a world whose new and expanding powers can be used more easily to make war than to make peace. We are not merely

its spectators but its guardians, too. We can shape its direction. And if the leaders of any nation attempt to forestall progress by keeping alive ancient injustices, fortifying them with complicated forms and fixed laws and all the other moldering props of self-interest—that nation is doomed, if only by disintegration.

You cannot accept “one world” and divide it into enemies and allies. The moral lesson has at last emerged as the only practical one; emerged, paradoxically, from the use of the deadliest boomerang man has yet devised. In this small world of the atomic bomb there is no room for friendly nations and enemy nations. We must first learn this and then live up to the knowledge, or face a future far more terrible than the past. The choice is ours. This book is presented in the hope that it will help us make that choice wisely.

Ben Raeburn

The material in this book, now enlarged and revised, originates from the files of FREE WORLD, the publication which has become a focal point for the ideas of international leaders and statesmen on the urgent problems of our time.

I here want to express my gratitude, for their aid in preparing this volume, to Louis Dolivet, Samson Trop, Harry Craven, George O'Neill, Edward Moskowitz, Harold Schiff, Barbara Leighton and Miriam Gilbert.

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TREASURY FOR THE FREE
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
AMERICA LOOKS AT THE FREE WORLD

Farewell the plumed troop and the big wars
That make ambition virtue.

—Shakespeare

AMERICA LOOKS AT THE FREE WORLD

FREEDOM FROM AND FREEDOM FOR



ILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

The idea of freedom is as old as the fact of oppression. It has often been as simple. But it no longer is.

Historically, freedom has generally meant "freedom from" or "freedom against." The fight for freedom has in the main been an "against" movement. This has been the case even when the people involved have believed with deep faith in vivid, positive ideas of freedom.

The most obvious example of positive idealists being forced to assume that role is perhaps that of the Christian martyrs under the Roman Empire. The great English historian Arnold Toynbee has called the Christian the revolutionary proletarian of the Roman Empire. As Gibbon said, the Bishops had as much to do with overthrowing the cruel and decadent Empire as the barbarians. Yet Christianity clearly was anything but a negative movement. No religion and no philosophy has ever revealed a more detailed picture of the Good Life.

The point is that the Christians were not free to win the Good Life under the tyranny of the Empire. To be sure, the slaves who became converts tried to render unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's. But under the Caesars they could not be loyal slaves and free souls at the same time.

In order to attain the positive and spiritual ideals of Christianity, the slaves had to rise in revolt against the injustices of this world. The fact of oppression made the idea of freedom a negative one. Being negative, it was relatively simple.

Then there is the immortal Charles Dickens whose work is one of the great bonds between British and American culture. Dickens was chiefly a literary craftsman rather than a preacher or a teacher. He was in the entertainment business. *David Copperfield* is hard to put down once you start reading. And *Bleak House* (perhaps it is not discreet of me to mention this satire on pettifogging lawyers) matches almost any detective story written in recent years.

But after all tribute has been paid to Dickens the artist, the fact remains that his work also constituted an important chapter in the history of freedom. He may not have planned it that way. Dickens wanted to

write about people—about families, about sentiment, about all the memories and hopes that make life warm and happy, especially for children when they are beginning to look hopefully out upon the world. Dickens was sentimental. This is precisely why his books were bombs exploding upon entrenched tyranny. He could not write about children and forget the unfortunate ones like Oliver Twist. He could not write about Oliver Twist without making all the world weep and cry out for reform.

The freedom for children which Dickens especially demanded—and was instrumental in winning—was simple and negative. It was freedom from a devastating form of oppression.

There is a difference between freedom from abuse and the freedom that comes from using the liberty which is won from tyranny for the realization of a new ideal of human rights.

For us there can be no more eloquent or pointed illustration of that difference than slavery. No one had a better right to criticize America than Dickens. For the audience he found here made him as much an American as an Englishman. In 1842 he called the America of slave days the “false Republic.” And he helped us right a great wrong. In his *American Notes* he called slave-owning Americans who lived in the society proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence “lights of freedom.” He said they “cut pleasant posies in the shrinking flesh, [and] learn to write with pens of red hot iron on the human face. . . . Shall we whimper over legends of the tortures practiced on each other by the Pagan Indians and smile upon the cruelties of Christian men!”

No doubt Dickens exaggerated. But twenty years later the Emancipation Proclamation ended slavery.

The evils Dickens denounced needed only to be described. The freedom he advocated became clear for all to see—so clear that all were inspired to protest and then to march.

The distinction between the freedom that is negative and the more complex and elusive freedom which victory over tyranny gives us an opportunity to win is an important one. Walter Lippmann pointed out its significance in his *Preface to Politics*. The Emancipation Proclamation, he said, “broke a legal bond but not a social one. The process of Negro emancipation is infinitely slower and it is not accomplished yet. . . . I do not think the Abolitionists saw facts truly when they disbanded their organization a few years after the Civil War. They found too much comfort in a change of legal status. Profound economic forces brought about the beginning of the end of chattel slavery. But the reality of freedom was not achieved by proclamation. For that the revolution had to go on. The industrial life of the nation had to change its character, social customs had to be replaced, the whole outlook of men had to be transformed.” That was in 1913. Today, a generation later, and three generations after Lincoln’s martyrdom in the

cause of freedom, that truth stands out in bold relief. The moral is clear: negative freedom—the freedom to win a new freedom—is precious and indispensable. But it is not enough.

It is idle to deplore the fact that the military war can win us no more than a military victory. We should thank God that high success on the fields of battle has come to us. But we must not expect force to yield us more than force ever can—freedom from violence and slavery, freedom from dependence on force, the freedom to become free.

In the mobilization of the armed forces of the United Nations against the armed forces of slavery, the gallantry of our men, their courage and efficiency were established beyond doubt. Our forces had to be as tough as the forces of our enemies. The record shows that they were. But our strength has not been in our armed forces alone. We have had to mobilize against the ideological, as well as the military, forces of the enemy. The real reserves of Fascism are the ideological storm-troopers in the political war that follows military victory.

We know that democracy can organize and discipline itself. Our achievement from Pearl Harbor to the present proves this. But that achievement has been the product of a crisis—a crisis which suddenly threatened our freedoms. Democracy was born out of the struggle for those freedoms. In the last few years we have succeeded in accomplishing a miracle of organization to protect those freedoms. No such dramatic and compelling crisis will threaten America in the political war we are now facing. Our safety will not be directly imperiled. On the contrary, life will be normal again. Our liberties will not be in question. The problem facing us will no longer be whether we can rise to a dramatic crisis. It will be whether we can plan and organize in the absence of pressure and imminent danger. It will be whether we can make a truly Free World out of the freedoms we have saved for ourselves and proclaimed for those who have been enslaved.

America's contribution to a Free World is related, in large measure, to America's ability to make democracy work at home. Nothing is more essential to world peace and prosperity than a free, fully employed America. If we turn out to be poor managers of our own affairs, we will have inferior credentials to present abroad. Only if we manage sensible solutions of our own problems and demonstrate in a continuously successful way the practical operation of our democratic system, will we have earned the right and be able to offer constructive leadership in world affairs.

Free and tolerant democracy is not safe in any nation half at work and half idle. Free and tolerant democracy is not safe in a world half at work and half idle. No world settlement that affords nations only a place on relief rolls will provide the basis for a just and durable peace.

I have been re-reading recently some of the early lectures of Sun Yat-sen, in which he unfolded his vision of a free and democratic China. As of

that day—some twenty years ago—his program called upon his own people to realize their own capacities, to control their destinies in their own land, to be free from even a benevolent tutelage of foreign powers. His vision was not of an isolated China or an imperialistic China, but of a free China in a free, cooperative world.

Some time ago, I listened for some hours to the exciting story of the outstanding work of Dr. Y. C. James Yen in bringing into the huts and villages of China many practical phases of that broad democratic program. The Chinese leaders of yesterday and today have produced the great Republic of China. And that Republic has demonstrated its new vigor by withstanding for so many years the ravages of the brutal invader. There is tremendous strength in freedom. The rebirth of China is a living example of the vitality of the ideal of freedom and of democratic principles.

China can do for China, France for France, America for America, what no other nation can do. What may accord with the spirit and self-interest of one country might not be wise or practical elsewhere. Each people has a genius of its own. I hope we Americans remain true to our own genius and our own traditions. I hope we Americans do not deny that opportunity to others.

Let us pledge ourselves to fight against our own short-sightedness and complacency. Let us pledge ourselves to spread the gospel that America's national interest is dependent upon the security and prosperity of the rest of the world; that the peoples we sorely needed as allies in time of war, we will need as friends in time of peace.

We must pledge ourselves to fight a political war on a world battle front against the ideological storm-troopers being trained by Fascism now for the next chapter of the old war—the war to prevent democracy (that is, humanity) from achieving positive freedom.

CARTELS: BARRIER TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONY

H

ARLEY M. KILGORE Great and sure strides have been taken at Potsdam, San Francisco, Yalta, Cairo, Moscow, Teheran, Bretton Woods, and Dumbarton Oaks in working out the measures that will guarantee a durable peace. Leaders of the United Nations have agreed on the need for a permanent world security organization that will complete the destruction of the forces which caused World War II, forestall by military action any future aggression, and wage peace through economic and social cooperation.

A quarter-century ago the opportunity to build an enduring peace after military victory was argued away and lost. In the 25 years since the peace treaty of 1920 the world has suffered 25,000,000 military casualties, and the end is not yet. To these must be added millions upon millions of civilian casualties. The experience of these past 25 years is vividly recalled by the American people as their representatives proceed, in concert with those of our allies, to establish the machinery of enduring peace.

The problem of international cartels—long the subject of extensive investigation and heated debate—must be re-examined in the light of our country's compelling interest in the building of international economic and political cooperation in order to establish an enduring peace.

Economic aggression by the Axis Powers went hand in hand with their military preparations for the present war. Our plans for peace will succeed only if international economic collaboration by the sovereign governments goes hand in hand with political and military collaboration.

The United States must take leadership in promoting economic harmony among the nations. Through economic cooperation some nations will secure for the first time the economic benefits of industrialization. Others will make rapid recovery from the devastation of war. At the same time that we take the initiative in promoting world peace, the United States will be making provision for full use of the greatest industrial machine in the history of mankind.

Great new business opportunities will be realized only if governmental machinery for international cooperation establishes a sound basis for developing world markets. Such machinery is essential to provide the safe-

guards enabling American business to make sales and investments abroad several times greater than in the past.

The real cooperation of sovereign nations in the field of commerce and trade necessarily spells the end of the cartel system, which has in the past proved an insuperable barrier to international harmony. The outlawing of the international cartel system is a necessary first step to clear the way for a new expansionist era in foreign economic relations. On this subject Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to Cordell Hull, then Secretary of State, as follows:

The history of the use of the I. G. Farben trust by the Nazis reads like a detective story. Defeat of the Nazi armies will have to be followed by the eradication of these weapons of economic warfare. But more than elimination of the political activities of German cartels will be required. Cartel practices which restrict the free flow of goods in foreign commerce will have to be curbed. With international trade involved, this end can be achieved only through collaborative action by the United Nations.

The international cartel system developed in the years between the two world wars when the countries of the world were increasingly dependent upon each other for raw materials, equipment, and market for finished goods. There was no machinery for harmonizing and bringing order into the day-to-day economic relationships of nations because there was generally no effective machinery for international cooperation. After the carnage of World War I, the peoples of the world earnestly desired such cooperation but efforts to set up effective machinery failed. Our own country, which came out of World War I as the most powerful nation, stood aloof from attempts to establish international security.

Inaction by national governments left a vacuum in foreign economic relationships. Individual businesses which consumed the raw materials and sold the finished goods moved into the vacuum. A few big concerns in the important branches of industry reached out across national boundaries and made international economic treaties of their own.

The failure to formulate a national and international policy deprived our businessmen of any broad frame of reference for the conduct of international commercial relations. They had no guides to action or criteria of success other than immediate self-interest and profits narrowly pursued. The arrangements they made with foreign industrialists therefore were designed to meet a limited and short-sighted objective—to safeguard profits and investments by eliminating competition.

For two decades, cartel agreements appeared to satisfy this requirement. They protected the monopoly position of the cartel members at home. They eliminated international competition and assured a "stable" if restricted market for the cartel participants by allocating territories, fix-

ing prices and conditions of sale, defining export quotas, regulating the introduction of new materials, processes, and products, limiting plant expansion and controlling the kinds of business activity in which members might engage.

The decade which saw the rise of the international cartel system appeared to be a period free of foreign entanglements. The evidence shows, however, that the cartel system itself was a network of the most compromising ties among the big businesses of the world. The United States economy was involved in unofficial but nonetheless intricate and dangerous foreign entanglements.

The impelling motivation of the German firms was aggressive. The First World War changed the political form of the German Government, but it did not alter the control and structure of German industry. The Treaty of Versailles was designed to prevent Germany from renewing aggression. But in the absence of effective international machinery, the terms of the treaty could not be enforced.

At the end of the First World War Germany was outwardly a defeated nation. It was assumed that the sources of her military strength had been dried up when she was disarmed. But this was not the case. The war had greatly expanded the industries on which Germany had depended to supply the armaments, munitions, and raw materials for the German war machine. The armistice did not reduce the productive capacity of these industries, nor did it alter their high degree of concentration or impair their position of dominance in the German economy.

The role which the cartels played in abetting Hitler's seizure of power has been recounted at length in testimony before Congress. The German Government became a silent partner in the multitude of cartel agreements among German, American, British, French and other concerns with which German industry had established cartel relations.

Using their cartel affiliates or subsidiaries, German industrialists built up a network which impaired the production of other nations, obtained sources of foreign exchange for Germany, gathered economic intelligence and spread nazi propaganda.

The democratic nations must not again be misled into believing that German industry is politically "neutral," or that German aggression is the preoccupation solely of political fanatics. To crush German imperialism permanently and thus permit a peaceful and democratic Germany to arise, the structure and control of Germany industry must be so altered that it cannot serve again the purposes of war.

The elimination of German aggressive forces requires also the liquidation throughout the world of the economic outposts of Nazism. This undertaking demands cooperative action by the United Nations. Acting in concert, the United Nations should advise and carry out the most effective

measures for destroying nazi elements in their own countries, as well as in neutral and liberated territories. No country can be safe while the seeds of Nazism remain implanted anywhere. One of the first tasks of the Allied Military Commission in Germany should be to analyze thoroughly German interests abroad, in order to obtain a complete inventory of German property, particularly holdings whose true ownership has been masked through the instrumentality of Swiss, or Dutch, or South American companies. All German property in the United Nations, including the liberated nations, should be confiscated, and nazi cloaks and collaborators divested of their holdings and their management powers.

The German industrial group has been the mainstay of the international cartel system. In their agreements with American and British companies, the German cartelist specifically provided that in the event of war cartel arrangements would be resumed when hostilities were terminated. Any efforts to retain the international cartel system will therefore help to keep in power the German militarist-industrialist clique who have already planned and launched two world wars.

Any proposal which would vest in private monopolies the power to make international economic agreements must be considered the antithesis of genuine democracy and international collaboration. Such action would be an abdication of sovereignty on the part of national governments. It would permit the economy of nations to be subverted by groups who are responsible to no public control. It would advance us far along the road to economic restrictions and war.

A cartel system dominated by American or British interests would eventually produce the same undesirable results as the one exploited by the Germans. It would jeopardize peace and jobs in the postwar world and soon bring us face to face with the possibility of a third even more destructive world war.

Standing athwart the achievement of international goals of world prosperity and enduring peace is the international cartel system as it existed before the war and, indeed, as it still exists—underground and only partially suspended. The extensive testimony before Congressional committees has established beyond question that the international cartel system has been subversive of political security, full production and employment, and the expansion of world trade. These effects have not been incidental to the operation of the cartel system but have arisen out of their essential character. Private restrictive economic agreements designed to maximize profits inevitably minimize political security, jobs, and world trade.

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RANK KINGDON Peace, if this be any comfort to her, has this much in common with God, that many speak her name and few take her demands seriously. Many a man has won a reputation for piety by being thoroughly negative, and thus never doing anything, which includes never doing anything which can be laid to him as blame. He could be accused of no sin because he could be accused of no action. He never fought a thief, or accused an exploiter of the public's trust, or raised his voice or hand against any living man, therefore he proved that he loved everybody, and was reputed to be godly indeed. "I never heard him say a harsh word against anybody" is an encomium I have often heard, but it always leaves me wondering why the man of whom it is said has never met some of the people I have known, to describe whom commendation would be about as adequate as a lead pencil to depict a sunset. I have a persistent conviction that doing the will of God sometimes involves taking a positive stand, and even occasionally taking thought, and that one's godliness is not necessarily directly in ratio to one's inaction.

The reason for this homily is that I have been continually confronted by public men who demanded of me to answer why I have been opposed to them when all they sought during the past few years was peace. They love peace. They want the United States to live in peace. Peace is their evensong and their matin. Therefore, during recent years they have spoken and voted against any action on the part of the United States that would involve it in anything going on anywhere else in the world. They have served peace, they claim, by a vigorous advocacy of doing nothing. Their logic seems to be: peace is the absence of war; we cannot make war if we are unprepared for it; therefore let us stay unprepared for war and, *ipso facto*, we are at peace. They refused to vote for the extension of the Selective Service Act, thus preventing us from having a trained army; therefore they are the men of peace, for obviously if we do not have an army we cannot have war. They tried to safeguard every American home against losing its loved ones, they argue, because they insisted that the United States should call no man from civilian life into the armed services. But they ignored every voice that cried of our danger from those who kill and enslave civilians as well as soldiers.

These patriots who stood on platforms and beat their breasts with vir-

tuous thumps, affirming that their muddle-headedness was no more than a sincere attempt to save us from the agony of war, were mistaken in only one point: we do not live in this round world alone. Old Daniel Webster could stand on the floor of the Senate, thrust his fingers in his waistcoat and thank God that we are not as other men, especially those involved in the bitter feuds of ancient Europe, but that we have the two oceans to separate us forever from the battles that sow the other continents with blood. But his phrases are as outworn as his smallclothes. No modern Senator can echo him with any sense; not the "Gentleman" from Montana, nor the senior Senator from Ohio. We simply do not live in Daniel Webster's world. We are a part of the ache and tragedy of all humanity. The bombs that detonated on Madrid shook our own floors, and the guns firing on Shanghai rattled our own windows.

We do not make peace in our time by confronting with an umbrella the man with a sword. We make peace only by disarming him. Once the spark is fanned to flame in our day, every man's house is threatened, and the fire will not die until all households are united to put out the blaze and to subdue the arsonist. The trouble with all those who thought that we could stay at peace while the rest of the world warred was that they did not understand the kind of world in which we are living. They were nineteenth-century men unable to cope with a twentieth-century world. Even while they professed to love peace they betrayed her.

No falser peace could be contemplated than one leaving the issue undecided between the men of freedom and the tyrants. This is why no man is fit to lead us in the making of the peace who did not enter with all his heart into the winning of the war. The peace of the appeaser is not peace at all. It is the interlude between wars. The more clearly a man has seen the nature of the war the more lucidly will he comprehend the necessary nature of the peace. A bad peace will generate new and more terrible wars.

There are those, for example, who see this as no more than a struggle for power between nations. They will look upon any peace as good if it assures in their eyes the supremacy of their own nations in the post-war period. They see Germany, the nation, as the devil in the situation, and will be satisfied with any peace that reduces Germany to a broken or a satellite state. Vansittart in Britain is the prime example of their ilk. He maintains that we shall solve our problems if only we break Germany up into little ineffective states. Let us cut this monster into small pieces, he says, and never again shall it be able to threaten the peace of the nations. To those who are moved by vengeance this sounds like a reasonable end for the people that they hate. Actually, however, it can project but two outcomes. First is the end that they think, consciously or subconsciously, it will serve, namely the continuance of their nations in their present positions of superiority. Men find it sweet to belong to peoples that are powerful among

the nations, and such men look upon the rise of another state as a kind of impertinence that must be punished, or as a threat that at all costs must be destroyed. When they talk about preserving civilization they mean keeping the *status quo*, and when they appeal to morality they intend to praise a system that keeps them in the place of dominance. They are nationalists of the old order with all the obstinacy and shortsightedness of members of a specially privileged group. The outcome they hope for, therefore, is one in which they will be able to enforce their will upon a world at their feet. Temporarily they may have such a world. What they, in common with all Bourbons, cannot grasp is that such a world cannot last. To dismember Germany is to deny history. She is what she is, and what she is she will be. The triumphs of Bismarck and his successors are too deeply grooved into the flesh and blood of the whole German people for any dismemberment of Germany to produce anything but a restless and festering discontent. They will rebel at any partition in exactly the same way as any other people would rebel at it. So the second outcome of a policy aimed at perpetuating the old divisions of power would be the creation of an area of permanent discontent in the very heart of Europe.

To affirm this is not to assert that nationalism as we have known it must be continued in the post-war world, but it is to recognize that nationhood as a fact in human experience cannot be ignored. The paradox of the peace in a certain sense is that it has both to recognize nationalism and to disarm it. I try to make the distinction in my own thinking by saying that nationality must survive but that nationalism must not. What I mean is that the social experiences through which men identify themselves with specific groups are not only historically real but culturally dynamic. Occasionally an individual comes along who is able to identify himself with all humanity and to find the full satisfaction of his personality in this wide frame of reference, but such people are rare even among men of genius. Most inspired men find their spark in a local habitation and a home, and in speaking for the particular place they know, express something which belongs to universal experience. Shakespeare was an Englishman, Goethe a German, and Burns a Scotsman. They were men of localities. What in them rose to the level of genius, in most men is the highest inspiration they know. Nationality is one expression of the diversity that gives both character and color to human living. In this sense nationality should be preserved. Outrage is done to actual motivations of the spirit when national bonds are denied. Such dismemberment works violence upon people to such a degree that they will be continuously in revolt against it. Instead, therefore, of a program for the dismemberment of Germany being one that gives promise of peace it is actually only an assurance of continuous war.

The trouble with Vansittart is that he has seen the evil of our times, but

he has called it by its wrong name. It is not Germany that has to be dismembered, but nationalism as contrasted with nationality that has to be disarmed. By nationalism I mean the distortion of pride in nationality into a desire to dominate all other nations in the struggle for power. It is nationality turned into a weapon of selfishness, of group advantage over all other groups. As such, nationalism has been the root of many fallacies that have brought our society to chaos. National sovereignty, the unlimited right of any people to do what it thinks best for its own advantage, even to the starting of wars, is one. Economic nationalism, that has prevented the free flow of trade through all quarters of the world, is another. Colonization, with its twin evils of ignorance and special privilege, is a third. The whole mischievous theory of strategic boundary lines is a fourth. Just to mention these is to make clear that Germany has followed the evil logic of nationalism with a blinder faith than other nations, but we shall not cure the evil by cutting up its chief exponent. That we can do only by modifying the thing itself.

Evidence for this assertion may be found in the fact that those who fight Germany for nationalistic reasons themselves fall into the snare of the fallacies of nazism. Vansittart is basically accepting the nazi philosophy when he advocates dismembering his fallen foe and reducing his victims to the level of chattel slaves. This is exactly what Germany did to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France. He is false to his own repugnance of the methods of the Nazis when he adopts them for his own in dealing with the Nazis, yet he is logical if he proceeds on the same premise of nationalism on which they proceed. We are agreed that we cannot build a good peace in a nazi world. We must recognize that we cannot do any better in any chauvinistically nationalist world, because it amounts to the very same thing.

The same tendency of those who think nationally to go over to the nazi philosophy is evident among the group who talk about the Germans being endemically brutal. Brutality is no monopoly of the Germans. To contrast them to their disadvantage with the so-called heirs of the Mediterranean tradition is to overlook the patent fact that fascism got its start in Italy under a gangster whose record is less bloody than Hitler's only to the extent that his resources were poorer. Hitler went to school to Mussolini, and both found their textbook in Machiavelli. To divide humanity into Germans and non-Germans, with all the virtues on our side, and with evil in the blood-stream of the Germans, is exactly the same kind of mental process that led the Nazis to divide the world into Jews and non-Jews. A racial theory of that unscientific kind gains no validity because the terms are changed. It is dangerous and stupid prejudice on both sides. The German people are people. They have not been isolated in history. Their blood flows in the veins of every nation in Europe; therefore, to treat them as a

“race” apart is false to history, to anthropology, and to good sense. A peace that is founded upon any such nonsense will be as unjust and unproductive as would be a peace that is based on the inferiority of any other “race.”

Nobody could even think in these unrealistic terms unless he had first fallen victim to the virus of nationalism. The question of a good peace comes down to what we can do about this basic poison. How can we preserve the values of nationality yet save ourselves from the evils of nationalism? This looks like a stupendous question. As a matter of fact, it is not as difficult as it seems. This is not the first time that men have had to find a way of reconciling these alternatives. Seven hundred years ago, Switzerland confronted it and brought into being the Confederation that has lasted ever since. We ourselves had to find an answer to the same problem and we produced the United States. Great Britain has had to deal with the demands of her colonies to be recognized as equal partners in the Empire and has evolved the British Commonwealth of Nations. Each of these unions differs from the others, which shows that not only can the dilemma be solved but that there is more than one way of doing it.

To say that these are not adequate examples because of the homogeneity of the peoples involved, or because of the limitations of territory taken in, is to convict oneself of lack of historical imagination. Switzerland has even overcome the difficulty of diverse languages, for its people speak three different tongues in three different sections. Our own histories have a way of obscuring the bitterness of the events leading up to the Union in their depiction of its glorious attainment. It would do us all good to go back at this stage and remind ourselves of the intense rivalry of the colonies, of their economic warfare, of their threats against each other, and of the trepidation of the smaller ones in the presence of their larger neighbors. Perhaps we have forgotten that Vermont refused at first to come into the Union at all. The Constitutional Convention only just succeeded as it was, and even so strong a Union man as Jefferson would not consent to its conclusions until they were modified by the Bill of Rights. One fact pointed up by the British Commonwealth is that recent warfare does not prevent federal cooperation, for South Africa took her place among the Dominions within a decade of the Boer War.

As for the objection that these instances refer to peoples within relatively restricted areas, we can certainly affirm that modern communications have brought all the nations into closer proximity than that among the thirteen colonies when the Union was formed. They came together because they had the will to do so, a will steeled by the realization expressed in Franklin’s familiar phrase that if they did not hang together they would hang separately. Surely it takes no profound philosopher to see that if the nations do not stand together now they will fall together in a civil war of

civilization. The federal principle, however it may be implemented, is the proved foundation for an international structure that conserves national values and curbs nationalistic ambitions.

The central decision which has to be made for such a federation of nations is where sovereignty shall lie. No nation, least of all the most powerful nations, is going to give any promise of accepting a restriction upon its own sovereignty unless it knows exactly where sovereignty will rest and what its own safeguard within that sovereignty shall be. There are three decisive controls that count in this connection. They are the making and administration of the law, the courts of justice, and the army. Who shall legislate international law? Who shall sit on international courts? Who shall command international armies?

With the victory of the United Nations, the actual power is in the hands of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China. The United States is likely to emerge as the dominant one of this group. In the immediate post-war period passions burn with intense desire for revenge, and the young men who return from the army are likely to be the most inflamed of us all. Is it going to be possible in such a time for us to plan calmly for an international order? I doubt it. I venture to say that a peace quickly made will be one ineptly planned. And a peace ineptly planned, as we have all learned to our dismay, is no peace at all, but an outrider of future wars. Therefore, knowing ourselves as well as we do, we should already rid ourselves of the picture of the kind of peace conference that remains in our minds from the last war. Our first job is to feed and rehabilitate a broken Europe, and to calm down in the process to the point where we can be as wise in our generation as the framers of the Constitution were in theirs. We have to define the answers to a world society's demand for proper laws, fair justice, and adequate policing.

On the legislative side, we shall undoubtedly keep our present national legislatures to continue their work within the national scenes. Each country should be left free as far as possible to formulate its own statutes and organization. There will, however, have to be an international congress to begin the development of a body of accepted international law. Such a congress will get its representation partly on the basis of the populations of nations and partly on that of the recognition of the parity of states as states. The formula to reconcile these cannot be a simple one. We found one by giving the House of Representatives a population basis and allowing every state equal representation in the Senate. Should the international congress be bicameral this arrangement might be copied. In a unicameral arrangement a formula might be found that provided for a Cabinet in which certain nations would be always represented and others by rotation.

The tradition of an international court already exists and its plan could be taken over with few modifications. Our own experience has shown that

such a court wins its own prestige by the character and justice of its decisions.

Events have their own way of educating us. In 1919, we shrank from any form of international commitment lest it involve a loss of sovereignty. Now we know that no commitment in peace means later involvement in war, and that unlimited sovereignty carries the threat of unlimited aggression on the one hand and total danger on the other. In so far as this has sunk in, we are already prepared for cooperation among the nations. When it has penetrated deeply enough, we shall seek an actual confederation. When that time comes, the concept of national sovereignty will exercise much less power over our minds. It will mark the hour at which the door of history will begin to swing on its hinges, for then we shall pass out of the shadows of a past which would dictate a bad peace into the real present in the light of which a good peace can be found.

A NEW PEACE FOR A NEW ERA

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IORELLO H. LA GUARDIA

As a diplomat, I have not been very much of a success. I have the very bad habit of telling the truth at all times and I find that occasionally when I do express myself or characterize any government or individual head of a government, I am charged with having bad manners. Yet, I do not apologize or take back anything that I said in 1937 or 1938. I told Cordell Hull not very long ago that, after all, my language was mild compared to his.

International affairs is a common topic of discussion in Europe because they have been living with it for centuries. Here it is a rare one. And because a great many of us do not understand it, discussion on the subject is shunned; and then we are prone always to take the easiest way and just say, "Oh, well, it is no concern of ours," and let it go at that.

After the last war, many of us who had been overseas really believed that we had accomplished something. We believed it with all our souls. I returned to Congress when I was discharged from the army and I took part in reducing the strength of our army and reducing the size of our navy. We really believed that we were entering a new era and we labored under that illusion for many years. I think that immediately following the armistice, the world believed that there would not be another war for centuries, and we all know what happened after that.

Now, the least we can do is to profit by the mistakes of the past and

utilize the experience, bitter as it may have been, in shaping the destinies of the people of the world after World War II. You will find, though it is not expressed at this time, a decided viewpoint in this country still existing to the effect that, with the war over, we should withdraw and take no part in European or Far Eastern affairs. That school of thought still persists in this country and it is bound to find an outlet at the very first opportunity. That is inevitable. So all of the information that can properly be brought to the American people on existing conditions and the hope of the world is very timely and useful.

Everyone agrees generally with the proper grouping of nations. I think it was President Wilson who stated that nations should be carved along easily recognizable lines of nationality. That is a general formula, but it is not enough. We have learned that language, culture, and ethnological background, in and of themselves, are not enough. It will be necessary in the new grouping to take into consideration the resources and the possible economy that might be carved out of any newly created or re-established country. Failure to do that puts the country at a terrible disadvantage and it becomes the prey of a larger and stronger and wealthier neighboring nation or must naturally become belligerent for its own existence.

I was in Paris immediately following the last war. I think it was in April. I went abroad with the Committee on Military Affairs of the House and I was visiting with Colonel House, who told me of a very interesting incident. There was a question of changing the borderline of one of the newly created governments, but they had no map of sufficiently small scale to indicate the change. It was only a few hundred meters. He just could not understand it, so he sent a surveyor to the particular place and found that the reason one country was asking for the change was that it just wanted to take one more sugar refinery away from the other. That illustrates the necessity of really taking into consideration the economy and the resources rather than fixing arbitrary lines at a given point.

I do not believe the problem in Europe is going to be as difficult as it was following the last war. We gained some very useful experience and a great deal was done in shaping the new countries and in breaking the hold of the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties. Czechoslovakia and Poland, of course, must be restored as such. No one would question that. Belgium and Holland, although small, come within the definition and, of course, should be restored. But with the added experience, a great deal can now be provided to establish, in the fullest sense of the word, the freedom from want advocated in the Atlantic Charter. The point I am trying to make is that no political or racial or historical background should suffice without economic security for the people of each country.

We can also go to the Balkans as an illustration. It is always most difficult to explain the Balkan problem to the American public. I think a good

start toward its solution was made in the organization of Yugoslavia. But after it was organized, Yugoslavia was ignored, and the politicians made a sorry mess of it. There is no question that Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia belong together. They have been kept apart for centuries by the Hapsburg policy of dividing. A new country was formed after the war and then abandoned. A country like that which has its traditional hatreds, artificially created among these people, requires some treatment and nursing until it can grow up and really understand that what it is fighting about is unimportant. A period of a few years must be allowed before the peoples of those countries have to decide their form of government.

Once the Balkan situation could be solved—and no one questions the right of Greece to its existence—then we must find and provide for the newly formed Balkan states proper outlets to the sea and proper means of communication and the opportunity of living without that fear of want. Hitler's plan took all of that into consideration. It was based on the exploitation of these countries for his own benefit. He frankly stated, "Oh, surely, Holland and Belgium will be recognized; surely, Poland and Czechoslovakia, too. You can have your language; you can have your art; you can have your music. But I will have the *Einfluss Sphäre* by controlling foreign affairs, defense, currency and commerce." That would have made a powerful nation and would have placed in the hands of whoever was at the head of that nation the domination of Europe and Africa and, of course, influence in South America. That was his plan.

We believe that all countries should and must govern themselves, and then we must provide mutual protection against exploitation. That requires, of course, a world standard of living. If one country has a very low standard, it cannot exist because it will be frozen out by tariffs of countries having a higher standard.

For years, as a young man, I prepared consular invoices. I served in the Consular Service forty years ago. That was 1903, 1904, 1905, and 1906. I still remember that part of the work in the Consular Service was to ascertain the cost of production, the cost of materials as separated from the cost of production, and the labor cost. In most instances our tariff was brought up to meet the difference in production costs. That did not help the workers of the country involved at all.

Now, what we must do is to bring up the standards of living in order to obtain some sort of equalization. Liberty in hunger is not completely satisfactory, just as abundance in slavery is not satisfactory. We cannot ignore—and there is where the rub is going to come—the economic protection of these countries.

Another big mistake or tradition which we must break is a reshuffling or a redistribution of colonial possessions. That should be a thing of the

past. To me, it does not make much difference if a colony is owned by one country or possessed by another country. It is just as tough on the people there.

The late Franklin D. Roosevelt pointed out—and I think there is the solution—that overpopulated countries must find expansion, but that this relief from overpopulation must take the form of emigration of those people and not the giving of colonies or new lands to those countries for exploitation. In other words, we must open up new countries, just as the Western Hemisphere was a new country for Europe and people from all countries of Europe came here. I think we did a pretty good job of it. We all did not come on the *Mayflower*. Some came in the steerage and their children became mayors. So places must be found in the world where people can go and form a new country, a new nation. There is still plenty of territory, and climate today is not such a barrier as it was a century ago. That solution, I believe, rather than maintaining the *status quo* of mandated countries and colonial possessions, is one of the hopes of the world.

This approach will require an amount of unselfishness that has rarely been found in international conferences. It is my hope that no attempt will be made to solve these problems too rapidly. There must be a period where we can readjust ourselves and again get a normal perspective. We have a great deal to do in getting food and medical supplies to millions and millions of people. We must all contribute that which we have in food, supplies, transportation, and personnel. We must see that millions of little children get as much of their childhood as is humanly possible. One of the saddest parts of the entire war was the hardship and suffering inflicted on children with insufficient nourishment and living in constant fear. There are some who have never learned to play or laugh. We must provide for these children at once in all countries, even in the countries of our enemies. We must not neglect them.

Then if we could possibly find some way—and I think a way may be found—for an armistice or a moratorium on politics, we should provide some sort of interim government in order to hold in abeyance the forces of conflict. This will give the people a chance to recover mentally and physically from the effects of the war and then to crystallize the natural, spontaneous public opinion on the adjustment of the problems that have been menacing the peace of the world for centuries. I think it should be made clear, and not forgotten, by the United Nations that we were dragged into this war, that it started with aggression, and that there should be no expectation on the part of Germany and Japan of having representatives sitting at any future conference of world adjustment. It will only mean a repetition with some very mild and innocuous changes if we do so.

Now, that may sound a little brutal, but I see no hope at all for the future peace of the world if we do anything to perpetuate the ideas or the

philosophy of the Axis Powers. We have to put such a finality to that that it will not recur for centuries and centuries to come.

WHAT PRICE FREEDOM?

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ALPH BARTON PERRY It is important to recognize that the world of peace and freedom which we of the United Nations have set out to create cannot be proved to be the route to every destination which a man or nation may choose. Men who prefer plunder to trade, or violence to peace, or domination to fraternity, or quick gains to long-range prosperity, or the good of the part to the good of the whole, cannot be expected to join our ranks, unless they are made to; and they cannot be made to, unless there are enough of the opposite mind to create the necessary force. Justice is not a mere enlightened injustice; and unjust men cannot be brought into line with justice unless just men rule. If in the name of justice we promise men the fruits of injustice, we may deceive them for a time, but they will find us out and turn upon us.

We must not rest the new world order upon a fraud, even a fraud designed to bring reinforcements to the side of the good. It would be a mistake to promise the brigand that the best way to secure the rewards of brigandage is to obey the Ten Commandments. Even if he were momentarily persuaded, he would make an unreliable ally. And that goes for every lesser form of narrow self-seeking. The champions of justice and humanity can promise good to the just and the humane, but it is a distinct kind of good, preferred only by those who relish it. To enjoy that good it is necessary to renounce other goods. Only those recruits can be counted on who have counted and accepted that cost.

Once this is recognized we can afford to recognize the further fact that the cost of justice in terms of narrower goods is diminishing. The gap between self-seeking and humanity grows smaller and smaller. There is less and less to be gained by selfishness even in its own terms. To an increasing extent the good of any man, or the satisfaction of any interest of any man, is dependent on the goods and satisfactions of every other man. To some this signifies the emergence of the plan of creation, the world having been originally so designed as to make the goods of all creatures reciprocal. To others it signifies a recent change in the conditions of human life brought about by natural causes. For the purpose of the present argument it does not matter which alternative is accepted. In either case the difference be-

tween the present situation and that which has prevailed throughout the greater part of human history is the cumulative effect of the advance of science and its technological applications.

The effect of this advance, broadly speaking, is to make men less dependent on their local physical environment. Man has become more mobile and more resourceful. He has departed more and more from the condition of the vegetable, which is rooted to one spot and limited to the pre-existing conditions of life with which it is in immediate contact. The powers of locomotion and manipulation which distinguish the animal from the vegetable have been steadily enlarged by that utilization of tools which distinguishes man from other animals. Using first his own two feet, and thereafter the horse, the sailing ship, the steam vehicle, the automobile, and finally the airplane, man has learned how to remove himself from one part of the earth's surface to another with increasing ease and speed. By the same improved means he can transport material goods. Satisfied at first to transport his written word, like his body and his commodities, at ever increasing speeds, he has recently learned to send the unwritten word by vibrations around the world in a time which now approaches zero. The result of these changes is to annihilate distance and bring all men into a closeness of contact that was once confined to groups inhabiting the same locality.

At the same time through irrigation, fertilization, industrialization, chemical synthesis, and mass production man has become less and less dependent upon the natural resources that lie ready at hand. What he lacks he can make. He is no longer dependent even upon local forms of power. Drawing upon the total resources of the earth's surface, breaking them down and recombining them, he can create material goods wherever he is, in accordance with the growing complexity of his interests, and on a scale commensurate with the volume of his needs.

These two changes, mobility and resourcefulness, reinforce one another. Man employs his increased resourcefulness to multiply his instruments of motion, and employs his mobility to bring himself and his resources together at whatever place and time he may choose. Man still remains a finite being, subject to the fatalities of birth and death, and dependent on his general natural environment. But both his habitation and his possessions have become global, rather than rooted, domestic, parochial, rural, urban, insular, or national. The change has occurred so rapidly that he has not had time to become regional, continental, or hemispherical before even these boundaries have become obsolete. Threads of connection now reach out from each individual man and group to the extremities of the earth—threads of communication, travel, transport, trade.

Whether they like it or not, men now belong to a world domain, a

world society, and a world economy. They can no longer suffer from, or profit by, aloofness. No man can say that any of his interests—his life, his security, his ambition, his prosperity, his vocation—are independent of those of any of his fellowmen, anywhere. The aggregate of mankind are bound, even by the most sordid self-interest, to pool their resources, combine their efforts, and take account of one another. The great outstanding problem is the creation of a political and moral solidarity that shall parallel man's other solidarities. The world domain, the world society, and the world economy are already historic facts. In space, communication, and resources there is already one all-comprehensive group of men living together on one continuous and narrow surface. Shall these also be one world polity and one moral world community?

Politics and morals are the arts by which men solve their problem of living together. This problem is now raised to global dimensions. The first step toward its solution is to recognize that this problem is created, and not solved, by mere proximity. If men's lives did not touch one another, and act and react upon one another, there would be no problem; or only the comparatively simple problem of getting along with oneself and one's God. When thrust into one another's presence men may, for the first time, have rivals and enemies. The several goods they seek bring them into collision with one another. They then have three options. They may treat one another as enemies, and destroy one another; or one may subjugate another; or they may become friends. Mere proximity and interdependence do not prescribe which of these courses shall be chosen.

The first world institution to get itself established was world war—in which rivalry and the combative emotions have divided men into two gigantic armed camps. Since the first world war was in fact succeeded by a second, more terrible than the first, and despite the lessons of the first, it cannot be said to be impossible that the second shall be succeeded, after a brief period of recuperation, by a third. It is not fantastic to imagine that when the terrestrial epic is finally written, it will tell how the members of the human race, possessing something of divine knowledge, but too little of divine pity or justice, destroyed themselves because their inventive brains created a situation in which they could not escape from one another.

To escape the effects of global anarchy men look in one or the other of two directions—world dominion, or a world-wide order of peace and freedom, based on justice. The first of these alternatives is not impossible. The same technological changes which have brought men together can be used for the purpose of a new and greater tyranny than history has previously known. He who controls the machines of communication and production can anticipate and stamp out resistance. The proximity and interdependence of men throughout the world can be used for their exploita-

tion by a small group of unscrupulous men heading up in one superior leader of their own "party." Such a modern and global tyrant will have all the riches of the earth at his command, and all of mankind as his lieutenants or servants.

The remaining alternative, to which we of the United Nations are committed—by hope, by faith, and by endeavor—is to extend to all mankind the system of joint partnership which has from time to time been achieved in varying degrees on a lesser scale in those societies which we call "democratic." This is what we are determined to make of man's new global solidarity. We see in that solidarity both a new threat of evil and a new possibility of good. Men are at the parting of the ways when in order to escape an unprecedented danger of destruction or slavery they must boldly seize an unprecedented opportunity of peace and freedom.

The more "practical" adherents of world order, to whom morality and piety are forms of weakness or sentimentality, accept the actual changes which modern technology has brought about in the condition of human life, and then appeal to any given individual in terms of his own private danger or his own hopes of private gain. And such is now the degree of human proximity and interdependence that such an appeal is in the great majority of cases a valid and warranted appeal. It is true of almost any given man alive today that his own personal advantage or that of his family, class, or nation is to be found in the establishment of a new organization of world affairs founded on justice and international law. It is true of almost any man that his chance of physical safety and security, his opportunity of livelihood, vocation, and personal development is enhanced by the creation of a world order that will bestow similar benefits on all men everywhere. It is right and proper that this appeal should be made, and it is doubtful if a sufficient support for the new order could be obtained without this appeal to enlightened self-interest.

But it is also true that this appeal carries no weight with men or groups whose interest is identified with differential advantages. If a man desires power *over* others, wealth *at the expense of* others, social position which *excludes* others, or any other form of special privilege which will enable him to enjoy a sense of superiority, then this appeal will be wasted upon him. If he holds to this selfish interest, enlightenment may well teach him to side with the enemy. It is true that in such a choice he will incur risks; but he is justified in taking them, especially if he enjoys taking risks. To convert him it is necessary to alter his self-interest so that it will coincide with that larger self-interest which coincides with the general interest. Or, he must shift the center from which he approaches the problems of life from "I," or from some narrower "we" of party, class, or nation, to a broader "we" which voices the needs and hopes of all mankind.

All that can be certainly claimed for a political world order is that it

will give the maximum of security to *everybody*. All that can be certainly claimed for a world economy is that it is an optimum economy, which provides the fullest measure of material goods and the maximum utilization of the earth's resources for *everybody*. All that can be certainly claimed for a world society is that it creates for *everybody* the largest opportunity of developing human potentialities through intercourse with the physical and social environment. The world order of peace and freedom founded on justice is the best for everybody; and it can be guaranteed to be the best for *anybody* only in so far as he adopts the good of everybody as his means or as his end.

Men are distinguished from plants and animals by the fact that their destiny is governed by their own judgment. They are expelled from the nursery of Mother Nature and must shift for themselves. It is this which gives grandeur to human life, but it is also this which creates its peculiar hazards, burdens, and bestiality. This is why human life points to high heaven or to the depths of hell. The present phase of history is man's greatest ordeal. He may perish from his passion, his blindness, and his selfishness: or he may save himself by his intelligence and good will.

To save himself man must have moral courage—not brute force, but patience, skill, imagination, intelligence, steadfastness, and fellow feeling. The way of failure is easy, the way of success is hard. To live justly with one's fellowman is harder than to fight or dominate him. It is easier to get on with a domestic animal than with one's wife or brother or neighbor. Slavery is easier for the slaveholder than is free labor for the employer—it requires physical strength but makes little demand upon his magnanimity or intelligence. It is easier to be an Oriental despot than the president of a modern democracy: the head lies easier. It is easier to make mistakes than to avoid them; it is easier to yield to the passions than to control them. It is easier to wrangle and dispute than to agree and co-operate.

After we have admired physical courage and endurance on the battle-field and rallied to the slogan of the enemy's "unconditional surrender," it is well to remember that other courage—the courage required for a just peace as well as for a just war, the courage to face and overcome the forces of moral inertia which retard man's ascent to decency, civilization, and piety, and threaten to drop him into the pit of destruction. We might have lost the war by timidity and irresolution, as well as by ignorance and lack of foresight. We can also lose the peace by moral defeatism, scepticism, and irresolution. We shall not lapse into peace and freedom by evasion, but we can achieve them if we put our heads together and support them with an alliance of bold hearts.

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REDERICK L. SCHUMAN "Go, seeker, if you will, throughout the land and you will find us burning in the night.... To every man his chance, to every man, regardless of his birth, his shining golden opportunity—to every man the right to live, to work, to be himself, and to become whatever thing his manhood and his vision can combine to make him—this, seeker, is the promise of America.*

Thus the late Thomas Wolfe gave voice once more in the last of his books to the faith of Americans. He believed, as his countrymen have always believed, in the worth of Man and in the worthiness of free men and women to build their lives after their hearts' desire. In all free times and in all free lands, classes and masses alike have championed this creed. And in the midst of adversity they have always known, all save the weakest and the least worthy of their birthright, that the cause of freedom is as timeless and deathless as the human spirit and that it must in the end prevail.

Yet man is mortal and most men cherish freedom less as an eternal value in the long march of mankind toward its destiny than as a temporal value of here and now. And in this year of testing only those who drug themselves with ignorant optimism can feel assurance that freedom's battle here and now is certain to be won. In the face of a decade of doubt, followed by seemingly endless defeats and retreats toward a disaster utterly dismal and possibly final, even the tough-minded and the stout-hearted are tempted to believe that freedom's future may be reconquered and enjoyed by some later generation but scarcely by those alive today.

If this should prove to be the case (and it is still for today's generation to say), the cause will lie in the very sources of past confusions and present catastrophes and in the continued inability of freemen to face the challenge of their time. Tyrants win triumphs and bewildered citizens seek safety in slavery only when liberty's disciples fail to meet and solve the problems put to them by a changing world. Liberty is an undying flame summoning Man to self-fulfillment. Somewhere the flame is always bright, even if only in the nostalgic memories and the despairing hopes of men. But it is like the gift of fire which Prometheus stole from the gods. It brings

* *You Can't Go Home Again* by Thomas Wolfe, Harper & Brothers, New York.

light and warmth only to those who know how to keep it burning. Men frequently become unworthy of this gift. They seldom reject it wilfully. But they often forget how to keep the flame alive within their midst. Their unsought interludes of darkness are caused by their failure to see clearly and in time that the earth turns, that storms of change must be faced unflinchingly, and that the beacon of liberty shines only upon those who are capable of constantly extending and enriching the heritage they are called upon to guard. The issue of today is not whether freedom shall forever perish from the earth, but whether the freemen of this generation have the wisdom and the will to reconquer their own right to liberty.

Their problem is not, in the ultimate test, a problem of making and using the physical weapons of war. Neither is it one of repeating magic words and calling men to go to battle in their name. "We have had enough speeches about freedom, peace, and democracy that mean nothing to the man in the street," said one of the women delegates at a conference of the British Labor Party. "What good do these speeches do people who have been bombed? What good do they do to women in food queues? What good do they do workers in factories?" Words have social meaning, ideals have vitality and promise, only as they are a tangible part of the daily lives of masses of men. The Goddess of Liberty is not yet, in Mussolini's ugly phrase, a "more or less putrescent corpse." But those who want to remain her worshipers are weary of verbiage and insistent that faith be followed by works. No works will save them from cynicism and despair save works which offer visible promise of salvation from evils that have become so unbearable that most of mankind regards escape from them as more important than freedom itself.

The common men and women of today are everywhere victims of the collapse of the Great Society. They are entangled and trapped in a vast breakdown of all the beams and girders of the ramshackle workshop and dwelling place which only yesterday was built without plan and without foresight. The things they want and need in order to restore their faith in freedom's future will never be won by arms alone nor by exhortations to patience and sacrifice nor yet by hastily improvised repairs of the wreckage. They will be won only by clear comprehension of the nature of the breakdown and by courageous efforts to rebuild swiftly and reintegrate wisely the broken fabric of a tragically disintegrated civilization.

Freedom has significance only for happy and hopeful peoples. Freedom has content only for communities of men and women who are whole and healthy personalities because they feel at one with their fellows and are part of a way of life that gives them assurance and opportunity. Freedom is dying today because its disciples have not yet learned how to use it in a strange new world as a means of restoring happiness and hope to people's lives. The world of the nineteenth century in which freedom

once thrived is gone beyond all recapture. As the dissolution of that world has proceeded step by step, freemen have defaulted in their duty of creating a better world and have helplessly watched the process of decay with neither the will nor the wit to arrest its fatal course.

The breaking of the world community has led to the breaking of nations, and the breaking of nations to the breaking of souls. The breakdown of order and sanity came first in the realm of world politics. Here the stubborn devotion of patriots to their tribal gods and to the stakes of the game of power among national sovereignties foredoomed all efforts to build a world policy geared to the needs of men dwelling willy-nilly in a world economy and a world society. The first World War shattered the world-wide framework of human relations in which freedom had hitherto flourished. The victory of 1918 gave freemen their chance to build a new order for all humanity. Under the leadership of irresponsible American isolationists and later of irresponsible Anglo-French appeasers, they spurned that chance and vainly sought safety in a narrower nationalism, a more imperious sovereignty, a more resolute avoidance of risks and responsibilities for organizing world peace. At the end of their road of retreat into the past lay the tragically needless misery of World War II.

Meanwhile the insecurities engendered by the disorder of war and by the worse disorder of a peace betrayed by its makers led to the breakdown of the world economy. The corruption of democracy by money and the schism of industrial communities into hostile camps of rich and poor was already well advanced before 1914. That schism became an open conflict of classes in the vanquished nations of 1919. A decade later the shattering of all the world's design for work and trade brought universal penury and strife within the social body of the Western nations. The poverty of the poor and the even more terrifying poverty of the rich drove all alike to desperate attempts to recover security through organized envy and greed. "While men walk the streets and cannot find work to earn bread for their hungry families," said Arthur Henderson in 1932, "the corn bins of the world are bursting with food that cannot be sold. Capital by countless millions is lying idle in banks waiting to be used. This vicious circle will not be broken by individual nations actuated by self-interest, but only when all countries unite and set aside every consideration of national interest and prestige." He might have added that safety and abundance would be had again only if all men within nations would unite and set aside every consideration of prejudice, pride, and selfish interest. But this was beyond the power of the fear-driven victims of the debacle so long as they struggled not to transform collectively the pattern of their common life but only to save themselves separately from the woes which the disintegration of that pattern brought upon them.

Fear is the negation of freedom. And fear has long since become the

dominant motivation of modern mankind. Fear of war and fear of want have driven tens of millions throughout our world into fear of their fellows, fear of themselves, fear of life itself. The war-breeding schisms in the family of nations, the want-breeding and hate-breeding schisms within the nation states have generated in all men and women throughout a maladjusted and broken world a fear-bred schism of the soul, transforming those whom it afflicts into blind and bewildered escapists. Such people can neither defend freedom, nor recover it once it is lost, nor rebuild their collective lives to give freedom a new future.

Fear and frustration beget aggression. Those who fear (and therefore hate) their world, and yet are incapable of remaking it into a world of cheer and promise, can find surcease from intolerable anguish of spirit only by desperately defensive expedients. Such devices are sometimes private, sometimes public. Those who turn their aggressions against themselves become neurotics or suicides. Those who save themselves by turning their aggressions against their private environment become sadists, criminals, and psychotics. Those who save themselves and their families and friends as well from unendurable anxiety by turning their aggressions against public symbols become revolutionists or reactionaries, passionate fanatics or traitors, preachers of nihilism or frenzied crusaders in colored shirts. Some flee from all responsibility, as millions of freemen have fled, and find reassurance in submitting to domestic tyrants or alien conquerors. Others find comfort and comradeship in joining with others as frantic as themselves in denouncing all liberty, persecuting scapegoats, worshiping ruthless power, ravaging neighboring communities with fire and sword, and conquering empires abroad in a catharsis of heroic violence. Democratic defeatism and appeasement, fascist intolerance and aggrandizement spring from a common source. Both represent ways of adjustment to anxieties too painful to be endured. This, and nothing more nor less than this, is the tragic pathology of our age.

The problem of the defense of freedom is a problem of the salvation of men from fear. Although they rule in part by terror, the tyrannical destroyers of freedom have won the loyalty of most of their subjects by rescuing them from fear through a new mass faith and through high adventures in subduing and refashioning the world. The freemen who still survive have found for themselves no peace from fear, since their every retreat raises more menacing foes against them. They have found no means for freedom's survival and resurrection, since they have hitherto chosen to shirk the task which the breakdown of their world imposes upon them. That task is one of revolutionizing and reintegrating the political and social context in which men live in order that freemen may conquer fear by reintegrating their split personalities and their divided communities into a new unity.

This challenge has never been met and can never be met by attempts to restore the world of yesterday. That world destroyed itself and destroyed the men and nations who sought to preserve it instead of seeking to rebuild it.

The engulfing tides of despotism and violence, against which Western freemen have thus far fought in vain, are but the terrifying symptoms of a deep disease which admits of no cure without treatment of its cause. Freedom's battle can be won only by freeing men from loneliness and fear and by making of freedom a priceless privilege for which men are willing to die heroically because it enables them to live heroically.

Nothing less than a dynamic and sweeping transformation of the liberal way of life, nothing less than an inflexible resolve to change the world and reshape society can work this miracle. With it, the war against tyranny could easily be won. Without it, no survival for the cause of freedom is remotely possible. Here and nowhere else lies the inmost secret of the strategy of victory.

“Freedom” is used as a mystic word to frighten contemptuous foes and to inspire followers and friends who are sick of words. It is never used, as a Cromwell, a Lincoln, a Danton, a Mazzini once used it, as a thing of glory to be built into the very structure of human living through life-giving deeds that alone can break with the empty past and point the way to a future worthy of mankind’s highest hopes.

It is admittedly all too easy for intellectuals to stand aside and criticize, and admittedly all too dangerous for democratic presidents and prime ministers to be bold or daring. To keep their leadership they must cope with the worries of the fearful and the fears of those without vision, with the eternal yesterdays who learn nothing and forget nothing, with the vast discord of clamorous voices striving after contrary things. They dare not have imagination, save too little and too late because they believe, mistakenly, that their followers have none. They dare not meet the fascist challenge of a New World Order and a New Society by proposing a democratic world revolution of their own, lest the wealthy be frightened of “socialism,” the patriots be frightened of “internationalism,” the stupid and the timid be frightened of action.

Yet the gravest of dangers is to distrust people who ask to be trusted and to hesitate and temporize in the face of foes who do neither. “The most dangerous thing in the world,” Lloyd George once remarked, “is to try to leap a chasm in two jumps.” In their own mad way the Caesars healed the schism in the souls of their subjects. They united their rich and poor, their isolationists and interventionists, in a common cause. They undertook the political unification of the world and the social transformation of its parts into an order which promised peace (of a kind) and security (of a kind) at the cost of freedom. The leaders of freemen, if they

would preserve freedom, can do no less than this. And if they would win the world they must do vastly more. Freemen will not forever follow leaders who have no faith in freemen's willingness to do what must be done. The spokesmen of freedom's cause have asked freemen to give all, dare all, risk all not in order to build a new heaven and a new earth in which freedom can live again, but in order to restore the negative and spurious "freedoms" of a world already in limbo. The "freedoms" of the two lost decades represented neither the freedom of Man nor the freedom of individual men and women. They were rather the freedoms of self-seeking aggregations of men to deny freedom to mankind and to men alike in the service of purposes utterly incompatible with contemporary human needs. Such was the freedom of "sovereign" nation-states to impede trade and hamper migration at the behest of monopolists, to take the sword at the behest of the profit-seekers and the power-hungry, to shirk responsibility for governing the Great Society at the behest of isolationists and pacifists. Such was the empty "self-determination" of national tribes and the vaunted "independence" of nation-states, dooming all alike to a common ruin behind their feeble defenses of tariff walls, neutrality pacts, Maginot lines, and isolationist illusions. Such was the freedom of the rich to exploit the poor; the freedom of the poor to make war on the rich; the freedom of minorities to paralyze the State; the freedom of majorities to coerce the helpless; the freedom of interest groups and pressure groups to make of government a hog trough and of politics a contemptible struggle for patronage and pelf. Such was the freedom of all men everywhere to turn their faces away from the exploitation or persecution of other men elsewhere, to ignore violations of the Rights of Man beyond the frontiers of "sovereign" land-patches, and to affirm in a thousand disgraceful deeds that they were not their brothers' keepers. Such in brief was the "freedom" of a whole culture, once among the fairest of Man's social artifacts, to pursue the paths of blindness, irresponsibility, and greed that have brought it to a deserved and shameful death.

These "freedoms" of yesterday when judged by their fruits—and they can be judged by no other test—were a formula for anarchy. Life under anarchy, in the words of Hobbes, is "poor, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short."

Under anarchy all are in theory free, and all are in reality slaves, hopelessly caught in the planless chaos of their own confusions. Where nation-states, social classes, business corporations, trade unions, religious sects, and political parties all enjoy "freedom" to do as they like under the guidance of a vicious "individualism" and an outmoded utilitarianism, the inevitable result is the abolition of freedom for all—first by the turmoil of purposes and interests bred by conflict and later by resolute barbarians sworn to the worship of discipline and order. Anarchy always cures itself,

the Great Society and the achievement of the Great Republic of Man, their cause is doomed and freedom's cause is lost. Tyrants will then achieve by force what freemen would not achieve by reason.

But if Britishers and Americans will but act together and call to their support all of freedom's exiles and all of tyranny's slaves; if they will but oppose world conquest with world liberation and world government; if they will but bring themselves to fight creative visions with nobler and more dynamic visions; if they will but dare to think and dream more boldly than their foes—then victory lies within their grasp and this epoch of misery and terror will be followed by an age of promise and fulfillment beyond the fairest expectations of today. The race is not to the good nor to the strong nor to the blindly brave but only to those who have courage to look ahead and not behind and to build the new and stop defending what is gone. Freemen may still avail themselves of this, their final chance. If they act too late, they will shame their ancestors, betray their posterity, and win the bitter contempt of generations yet unborn. If they act in time, they will save the future and secure eternal thanks from all men now on earth and from their children and their children's children in the days to come. The time to act is now.

AN ECONOMIC PROGRAM FOR AMERICA

J

JERRY VOORHIS Only two motives can impel men and women to heroic action and give them strength and courage to make such sacrifices as the winning of the total war has required. The first is the will to survive and to enable one's children and the institutions of one's country to live. Perhaps this is the strongest—certainly it is the most fundamental of all human instincts. It steeled the people of London to endure the terrible bombings of September, 1940, when only their enduring stood between Hitler and the conquest of all Europe. It gave the people of Russia the strength to fight the greatest defensive war in all history. It inspired the mountain fighters of Yugoslavia, the Norwegian seamen, the saboteurs of France. It enabled the Chinese to hold on through long years of most cruel war and suffering.

But there is another motive which to a high-spirited people can be almost as strong as the will to protect the very existence of one's home and the lives of one's family. That is the impulse of a great ideal and a great hope. And if we name over the possessions of mankind, material and

spiritual, and consider which of them we would keep if we could keep but one, most of us would choose to cherish hope even though we lost all other things. Moreover, the most profound difference between dictatorship and democracy lies in the fact that the people of a democracy can always hope that by dint of their own effort and devotion their problems can be solved and a new and better world can be built; whereas the people who must live under a dictator dare not either envision or strive for any change or improvement in the *status quo* but must with vehemence declare that they are living in the best of all possible countries under the best of all possible regimes.

Some of the blunders that followed the last war are vivid memories to many people. It is realized that this time we must build a lasting peace instead of breaking ground for another war. There is a greater determination, which must carry over into the peace, to take steps to prevent ruthless aggression from again raising its ugly head after the conflict has been won. But the more difficult question as to how to accomplish these things has been, on the whole, but little discussed. And most of the discussion that has taken place has been about machinery: "World Government," "Federated States," "Anglo-American Collaboration," "International Air Force," and the like! The deeper questions as to what sort of world order the "World Government" would preside over, the objectives for which "Anglo-American Collaboration" would exist, the sort of economic and political situation an "International Air Force" would seek to perpetuate—these things have not been dealt with sufficiently. And yet they are the very heart of the problem. The League of Nations failed not alone because the United States failed to join but also because the basic principles of lasting peace did not undergird it.

This article therefore will be an attempt to deal briefly with some of the things that must be done to lay the groundwork for lasting peace. It will deliberately omit discussion of the superstructure. It will outline the fundamental principles of post-war reconstruction instead of discussing by what means we are going to try to do we know not what.

The first principle must, of course, be the protection of all peoples against future attempts at aggression. If the United States accepts this principle with a whole heart—as we did not do at the close of the last war—half the battle will have been won. But unless this principle is clearly brought forth and accepted, the peace cannot last for long. "Remember Pearl Harbor" has challenged America. But "Remember Manchuria" and "Remember Ethiopia" and "Remember the Rhineland" are even more important in the after-victory period.

The second principle is that of the right to freedom for all people; for example, the right of the Chinese to have all nations—not just Japan—give up every extra-territorial "right" in China, and to receive equal treatment

at the council of nations. Surely if any people has earned that right it is the Chinese. India, too, has a right to have her internal problems considered as problems of a great nation, not problems of a "dependency" of a European power. Then there is the right of the inhabitants of every so-called "colony" to live under an administration seeking their welfare rather than the economic gain of another people. This can, with the application of a little wisdom, be accomplished under enlightened international control. For international control of colonial areas can logically aim only at the opening of these areas to the trade of all the world and to a building up of their economic life to a point where that trade will be generally of importance. Finally, there is the right of the peoples of Latin America to have the Good Neighbor Policy written indelibly into the national life of the United States. Upon this hinges the greatest single hope of the world for the development of a peaceful community of nations living side by side without distrust or fear and requiring no over-all police force to keep the peace between them.

But freedom is a word of many meanings and for the peoples of the various nations to be truly free requires the application of two corollary principles. The first is the principle of the right of every people to the fullest industrial development of which it is capable and to the nearest approach to a balanced economy which its resources make possible. And the second is the principle of mutually advantageous trade whereby the peoples of the world exchange the things they really want to exchange, and wherein certain nations are no longer referred to as markets, others as sources of raw material, and others as industrial nations, but where, instead, access to needed food and fiber and raw material is guaranteed in so far as any such guarantee is humanly possible.

With most of what has gone before there will probably be little disagreement in principle. But none of it is going to be possible, nor can any secure groundwork for lasting peace be laid, unless one further principle is established in the internal economies of the great nations of the world. This final principle upon which all else will depend and which, incidentally, was completely ignored at the peace table of Versailles is that the people of each nation shall be enabled at all times to consume an amount of goods and services equivalent to their production of goods and services. Unless this is achieved, there will be unemployment in America. We shall be afraid of imports, afraid of machines, afraid of the industrial progress of other nations. Unless we do this most fundamental thing, there will not be jobs for all our returning soldiers—but instead, a situation in which political demagogues and would-be dictators will flourish in the very nation that today is heart and sinew of the forces of freedom. An America so racked could not go to the peace table with either assurance or power. She could not effectively help to build the peace of the world.

Again and again the author has insisted that it is the duty of the Congress and the people of the United States to begin now to develop a democratically conceived program which will assure our own people—especially our producers—that we will replace the vast expenditures of the Government for the war with equivalent sources of consumer purchasing power. For the same reason the writer has been calling for the establishment now of a national commission to prepare for the fulfillment of this basic and all-important task.

The greatest future menace to freedom and hope for human kind will be, if we permit it to happen, a lack of assurance to the people of this nation of an adequate and sustained flow of consumer buying power in the markets of the country. Most of the huge governmental expenditures must be replaced by other sources of consumer income if we are to have jobs for the men who have returned and if we are to have a condition of economic health in our nation.

With our own people fully employed, with practical emphasis placed upon increasing effective demand rather than reducing supplies, with hope in the hearts of "little" people, and a full draft of purchasing power upon the capacity of our industry and agriculture to produce, our nation can and will be in a position to do a constructive job of leadership in time of peace. But if we permit the demand to fail, if consequently there is no incentive to conversion of industry back to peacetime production, if unemployment stalks the land with unrest and discontent and confusion in the people's minds, then we shall find it difficult indeed to gain support in America for the kind of farsighted peace-building policies which the times demand.

And again the hope of freedom in the world of tomorrow will depend directly upon maintaining a good enough economic condition to prevent movements for the establishment of communist or fascist dictatorship in America from gaining strength. There are those not altogether unfriendly to such totalitarian systems who for that very reason have and will continue to oppose vigorously any attempt to develop a program of democratic post-war reconstruction. There are others, however, who are afraid of what they call post-war planning because they think it will lead to socialism or to a great extension of governmental control over the lives of the people. On the contrary, the thing that is most likely to bring precisely that result is the present policy of drift. For if, with victory won, we have still failed to develop democratically an orderly program of transition to a peacetime economy of full employment, then indeed the only thing we shall be likely to do will be to accept some huge "emergency" proposal of the Chief Executive, based on an ever increasing volume of public works.

Upon what sort of program of action, then, can this hope of a free world be founded? It must be founded first upon clarity and absolute frankness

as to both methods and objectives. This is something we have not always had in recent years. A National Commission on Post-War Reconstruction could spend part of its time clearly defining the fields of activity in which the Government should engage in the post-war world and, on the other hand, the fields into which it definitely should not enter. Indeed, what is needed at present is to build up a great body of middle-of-the-road support for and understanding of a program for America which will start with the absolute necessity of full employment, a full market, and abundant production, but which will seek to accomplish these objectives by motivating full economic activity rather than directing it.

This last statement, upon which a whole political philosophy can be built, requires some expansion. And our first rule must be this: that when the supply of goods exceeds the effective demand, we will cure this by increasing the effective demand by adding to the money the people have to spend and we will never attempt to cure it by reducing the supply. An important, if not the most important, key to applying this rule is to recognize the central responsibility of Government for maintaining a constant relationship between the production of goods and services and the active demand for them. Nor should the Government be required, as it is today, to go constantly deeper and deeper into debt to accomplish this. The practical application of this principle must be that whatever amount of additional money-in-circulation is required in any given period to prevent deflation and unemployment from setting in and to maintain a balance between capacity to produce and money demand for goods, that amount of money, either in the form of credit or currency, and no more, shall be provided by Congress through a central monetary agency of that body without the incurrence of any additional public debt. Were this practice followed, the nation as a whole would have the opportunity of earning its way out of debt through the increase of its production of goods. But without this change in our financial and monetary methods, the one great economic question now is the carrying charges on the national debt. And should it be made to appear by our policies that only a continual increase in the interest-bearing debt can make full employment possible, then indeed there will be danger that even the most important Governmental programs will be subordinated to an effort to avoid such debt increase. If this consequence does not take place we might still face the danger of the advocacy of deliberate inflation, or even of repudiation as means of escape from a debt-service burden so onerous as to make any unsound appeal of this kind find willing listeners.

At the center of a full employment economy there must be a system of distribution of buying power to the consumers of the nation that will be dependable and sure—a virtual guarantee to producers that if they do go ahead and produce, the market will not fail. The social security system

must then be expanded to include all old people (except those of independent means), all the disabled, all widowed mothers, and similar groups which either cannot or should not be employed. It is through these groups primarily—by the direct payment of benefits, pensions, or whatever we wish to call them—that a sustained core of buying power, hence a sustained draft upon productive powers, can and should be achieved. These things clearly do not increase the Government's control nor give it directive power over the people and their economic life, but they can and will motivate full production by the use of the only fundamental motive that works in a free economy—an effective demand for goods and services.

In the third place, the tax system must be so devised as to encourage industry and production, to discourage hoarding, and to assist—largely through inheritance and estate taxes—in the breaking up of over-large accumulations of financial power which in themselves are stifling the small enterprise of others. As a source of revenue as yet untapped there should be put into effect—if necessary by constitutional amendment—a tax on socially created land and franchise values. Such a tax will tend to make resources more readily available to those who desire to actually use them for productive purposes. And as a corollary to the levying of such a tax there could and should take place a sharp reduction of taxes now levied against building and farm improvements and against farm land as such regardless of its location and just because it is a farm.

Revenue should be derived primarily from graduated individual income taxes and inheritance taxes, not from business taxes. But excess profits taxes should be retained as a means of equalizing business opportunities as well as to make possible a sharp reduction in normal taxes and surtaxes on legitimate business profits. And small business—earning, for example, less than \$15,000 a year—should be exempted.

Farmers must be assured a full market at a fair price for abundant balanced production. A nation-wide drive to end all malnutrition based on an expanded School Lunch and Stamp Plan program can be used for this purpose. And emphasis can be laid upon those products of which we need more production by saying that the products which are eligible for purchase with the stamps or for use in school lunches shall be all those which ought to be produced in substantial quantity for the sake of national health, rather than only those which have been produced in so-called "surplus."

Again, our hope for a free world depends directly upon a far more vigorous drive against monopoly power than we have ever had before. For wherever irresponsible power is gained by any group of men there is danger to freedom and to democracy itself. First, of course, there is industrial and financial monopoly, whose very existence is a denial of freedom to enterprise of smaller means and to the nation itself. Artificial control of price

or output by such monopoly is in a very real sense the arch-crime against an economy that wants to be free. There must be a most whole-hearted continuance and expansion of the work started by Thurman Arnold. And this time, the anti-trust division must have real support—instead of lip service or outright opposition—from other government officials. The corporation tax structure must be such as to deliberately give advantage to small competitive industries as opposed to huge monopolies.

Financial monopoly centers, of course, in the great New York City banks and the Bank of America of California. There should be an end to the spread of branch banking. And the privilege of creating the medium of exchange for this whole nation—the privilege upon which the whole inverted pyramid of financial monopoly rests—must be taken from private banks and restored to the people acting through Congress, where it belongs.

But there are other fields, too, where we must work. Measures will probably have to be taken to assure the effective control of labor organizations by the rank and file—especially where a closed shop exists. The closed shop must never be combined with what in effect is a closed union—where admission to membership in the organization is denied to qualified men or put beyond their reach by exorbitant initiation fees and dues. The day when labor organizations had to fight for their very existence is, let us hope, largely past in America, and we face a new situation in which it has become a duty of the Government to see that regular elections are held and full reports, financial and otherwise, given the union membership—as is already done by the best unions.

Finally, there must be avoided a vast aggregation of power in the hands of governmental agencies. As has been said, the Government must take up and perform vigorously the necessary task of motivating full production. But there must not be dependence upon the Government on the part of people in the prime of life who must desire above all things to be truly free and self-sufficient. Neither need there be governmental direction of economic activity except in fields of natural monopoly such as public utilities and electric power or in such activities as slum clearance, reclamation, flood control, and highway construction where private enterprise simply cannot cope with the job. This reduction of governmental power will not be easy to attain—especially in view of the tremendous powers the Government assumed during the war. But the better the job of assuring a continuous distribution of a full volume of buying power is done, the less will be the need or excuse for governmental direction or control.

Probably the very best answer that has yet been developed to private monopoly on the one hand and “big government” on the other is the co-operative. Here the people themselves—farmers, consumers, purchasers of insurance, credit union members, electric power users, have done things

for themselves without any aid, subsidy, or direction from the Government. They have met monopoly on its own ground and beaten it. They have brought an element of honest and effective competition into every line of business they have entered. Governmental subvention of the "Co-ops" would kill the movement. But at least we can say: "God bless them, may they grow and prosper."

Here then, in all too brief form, is a general sketch of the kind of program on which a genuine hope of freedom can be built. Public works there will have to be, for many will be sorely needed. But they should be limited to those which are financially, economically, and socially justifiable on their own merits. And our main reliance should be not upon them but rather upon the measures already sketched which will assure the producers of America that her consumers will continuously have the buying power necessary to sustain a full market for abundant output.

To be free the world of tomorrow must not be afraid of abundance, neither can it be allowed to fear unemployment. Nor must any nation fear the prosperity and welfare of other peoples. Upon our freedom from fear of these things our main best hope of freedom in its larger sense depends. And it is altogether possible for us to have that freedom. For we can conquer unemployment without governmental dictatorship if we really want to. May this hope become the inspiration of America as we fight forward to lasting peace.

No collection of contemporary American statements in the cause of freedom can ignore this historic speech by Henry Wallace. Delivered on May 8, 1942, it expressed a promise and a hope which reverberated throughout the European underground. Echoed in secret newspapers and leaflets, the announcement of "the century of the common man" by a Vice-President of the United States seemed to the enslaved peoples of Europe to carry the authority of a great power to whom they might look with new confidence in the future:

THE PRICE OF FREE WORLD VICTORY

H

HENRY A. WALLACE We, who in a formal or an informal way represent most of the free peoples of the world, are met here tonight in the interests of the millions in all the nations who have freedom in

their souls. To my mind this meeting has just one purpose—to let those millions in other countries know that here in the United States are 130 million men, women, and children who are in this war to the finish. Our American people are utterly resolved to go on until they can strike the relentless blows that will assure a complete victory and with it win a new day for the lovers of freedom everywhere on this earth.

This is a fight between a slave world and a free world. Just as the United States in 1862 could not remain half slave and half free, so in 1942 the world must make its decision for a complete victory one way or the other.

As we begin the final stages of this fight to the death between the free world and the slave world, it is worth while to refresh our minds about the march of freedom for the common man. The idea of freedom—the freedom that we in the United States know and love so well—is derived from the Bible with its extraordinary emphasis on the dignity of the individual. Democracy is the only true political expression of Christianity.

The prophets of the Old Testament were the first to preach social justice. But that which was sensed by the prophets many centuries before Christ was not given complete and powerful political expression until our nation was formed as a Federal Union a century and a half ago. Even then, the march of the common people had just begun. Most of them did not yet know how to read and write. There were no public schools to which all children could go. Men and women cannot be really free until they have plenty to eat, and time and ability to read and think and talk things over. Down the years, the people of the United States have moved steadily forward in the practice of democracy. Through universal education, they now can read and write and form opinions of their own. They have learned, and are still learning, the art of production—that is, how to make a living. They have learned, and are still learning, the art of self-government.

If we were to measure freedom by standards of nutrition, education, and self-government, we might rank the United States and certain nations of Western Europe very high. But this would not be fair to other nations where education has become widespread only in the last twenty years. In many nations, a generation ago, nine out of ten of the people could not read or write. Russia, for example, was changed from an illiterate to a literate nation within one generation and, in the process, Russia's appreciation of freedom was enormously enhanced. In China, the increase during the past thirty years in the ability of the people to read and write has been matched by their increased interest in real liberty.

Everywhere, reading and writing are accompanied by industrial progress, and industrial progress sooner or later inevitably brings a strong labor movement. From a long-time and fundamental point of view, there are no backward peoples which are lacking in mechanical sense. Russians, Chinese, and the Indians both of India and the Americas all learn to read and

write and operate machines just as well as your children and my children. Everywhere the common people are on the march. These people are learning to think and work together in labor movements, some of which may be extreme or impractical at first, but which eventually will settle down to serve effectively the interests of the common man.

When the freedom-loving people march—when the farmers have an opportunity to buy land at reasonable prices and to sell the produce of their land through their own organizations, when workers have the opportunity to form unions and bargain through them collectively, and when the children of all the people have an opportunity to attend schools which teach them truths of the real world in which they live—when these opportunities are open to everyone, then the world moves straight ahead.

But in countries where the ability to read and write has been recently acquired or where the people have had no long experience in governing themselves on the basis of their own thinking, it is easy for demagogues to arise and prostitute the mind of the common man to their own base ends. Such a demagogue may get financial help from some person of wealth who is unaware of what the end result will be. With this backing, the demagogue may dominate the minds of the people, and, from whatever degree of freedom they have, lead them backward into slavery. Herr Thyssen, the wealthy German steel man, little realized what he was doing when he gave Hitler enough money to enable him to play on the minds of the German people. The demagogue is the curse of the modern world; and of all the demagogues, the worst are those financed by well-meaning wealthy men who sincerely believe that their wealth is likely to be safer if they can hire men with political “it” to change the sign posts and lure the people back into slavery of the most degraded kind. Unfortunately for the wealthy men who finance movements of this sort, as well as for the people themselves, the successful demagogue is a powerful genie who, when once let out of his bottle, refuses to obey anyone’s command. As long as his spell holds, he defies God Himself, and Satan is turned loose upon the world.

Through the leaders of the nazi revolution, Satan now is trying to lead the common man of the whole world back into slavery and darkness. For the stark truth is that the violence preached by the Nazis is the devil’s own religion of darkness. So also is the doctrine that one race or one class is by heredity superior and that all other races or classes are supposed to be slaves. The belief in one Satan-inspired Führer, with his Quislings, his Lavals, and his Mussolinis—his *gauleiters* in every nation in the world—is the last and ultimate darkness. Is there any hell hotter than that of being a Quisling, unless it is that of being a Laval or a Mussolini?

In a twisted sense, there is something almost great in the figure of the Supreme Devil operating through a human form, in a Hitler who has the daring to spit straight into the eye of God and man. But the nazi system

has a heroic position for only one leader. By definition only one person is allowed to retain full sovereignty over his own soul. All the rest are "stooges"—they are "stooges" who have been mentally and politically degraded, and who feel that they can get square with the world only by mentally and politically degrading other people. These "stooges" are really psychopathic cases. Satan has turned loose upon us the insane.

The march of freedom of the past one hundred and fifty years has been a long-drawn-out people's revolution. In this great revolution of the people, there were the American revolution of 1775, the French revolution of 1792, the Latin American revolutions of the Bolivarian era, the German revolution of 1848, and the Russian revolution of 1917. Each spoke for the common man in terms of blood on the battlefield. Some went to excess. But the significant thing is that the people groped their way to the light. More of them learned to think and work together.

The people's revolution aims at peace and not at violence, but if the rights of the common man are attacked, it unleashes the ferocity of a she-bear who has lost a cub. When the nazi psychologists tell their master, Hitler, that we in the United States may be able to produce hundreds of thousands of planes, but that we have no will to fight, they are only fooling themselves and him. The truth is that when the rights of the American people are transgressed, as those rights have been transgressed, the American people will fight with a relentless fury which will drive the ancient Teutonic gods back cowering into their caves. The *Götterdämmerung* has come for Odin and his crew.

The people are on the march toward even fuller freedom than the most fortunate peoples of the earth have hitherto enjoyed. No nazi counter-revolution will stop it. The common man will smoke the Hitler "stooges" out into the open in the United States, in Latin America, and in India. He will destroy their influence. No Lavals, no Mussolinis will be tolerated in a free world.

The people, in their millennial and revolutionary march toward manifesting here on earth the dignity that is in every human soul, hold as their credo the four freedoms enunciated by President Roosevelt in his message to Congress on January 6, 1941. These four freedoms are the very core of the revolution for which the United Nations have taken their stand. We who live in the United States may think there is nothing very revolutionary about freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom from the fear of secret police. But when we begin to think about the significance of freedom from want for the average man, then we know that the revolution of the past one hundred and fifty years has not been completed, either here in the United States or in any other nation in the world. We know that this revolution cannot stop until freedom from want has actually been attained.

And now, as we move forward toward realizing the four freedoms of this people's revolution, I would like to speak about four duties. It is my belief that every freedom, every right, every privilege has its price, its corresponding duty without which it cannot be enjoyed. The four duties of the people's revolution, as I see them today, are these:

1. The duty to produce to the limit.
2. The duty to transport as rapidly as possible to the field of battle.
3. The duty to fight with all that is in us.
4. The duty to build a peace—just, charitable, and enduring. The fourth duty is that which inspires the other three.

We failed in our job after World War I. We did not know how to go about it to build an enduring world-wide peace. We did not have the nerve to follow through and prevent Germany from rearming. We did not insist that she "learn war no more." We did not build a peace treaty on the fundamental doctrine of the people's revolution. We did not strive wholeheartedly to create a world where there could be freedom from want for all the peoples. But by our very errors we learned much, and after this war we shall be in position to utilize our knowledge in building a world which is economically, politically and, I hope, spiritually sound.

Modern science, which is a by-product and an essential part of the people's revolution, has made it technologically possible to see that all of the people of the world get enough to eat. Half in fun and half seriously, I said the other day to Madame Litvinoff: "The object of this war is to make sure that everybody in the world has the privilege of drinking a quart of milk a day."

She replied: "Yes, even half a pint."

The peace must mean a better standard of living for the common man, not merely in the United States and England, but also in India, Russia, China, and Latin America—not merely in the United Nations, but also in Germany and Italy and Japan.

Some have spoken of the "American Century." I say that the century on which we are entering—the century which will come of this war—can be and must be the century of the common man. Perhaps it will be America's opportunity to suggest the freedoms and duties by which the common man must live. Everywhere the common man must learn to build his own industries with his own hands in a practical fashion. Everywhere the common man must learn to increase his productivity so that he and his children can eventually pay to the world community all that they have received. No nation will have the God-given right to exploit other nations. Older nations will have the privilege of helping younger nations get started on the path to industrialization, but there must be neither military nor economic imperialism. The methods of the nineteenth century will not work in the people's century which is now about to begin.

cupied areas of China and the Dutch East Indies. Everywhere the soul of man is letting the tyrant know that slavery of the body does not end resistance.

There can be no half measures. North, South, East, West and Middle West—the will of the American people is for complete victory.


No compromise with Satan is possible. We shall not rest until all the victims under the nazi yoke are freed. We shall fight for a complete peace as well as a complete victory.

The people's revolution is on the march, and the devil and all his angels cannot prevail against it. They cannot prevail, for on the side of the people is the Lord.

He giveth power to the faint; to them that have no might He increaseth strength . . . They that wait upon the Lord shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary; they shall walk and not be faint.

Strong in the strength of the Lord, we who fight in the people's cause will not stop until that cause is won.

THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER



RSON WELLES Before the year now generally called "Munich," perhaps a season or so earlier, there was a "treasure hunt" in Paris. Please visualize the celebrants not as Parisians but as notables, as they mostly were, of a very publicly gay wing of international society. You may know that a "treasure hunt" proposes a number of unlikely quests and when the list is imaginative it can be fun. Here was the treasure hunt for the history of the game. There was no limit to the mad invention of it. One item was something unmentionably intimate (that's all I know about it), a possession of the mistress of a cabinet minister. Another prize was a legal certificate of marriage binding between a couple who hadn't considered any such solemnity. There were a dozen more of these "treasures," all as extraordinary, and for a climax—nothing less than a cigar, still smoking, lit at the flame that burns forever by the tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Now, decency expects of a tomb that it guard for the lifetime of stone what was once the habitation of the spirit of man. The conscience of the world defends the Memorial of those who in the last war died for peace.

You agree we catch a glimpse here of something worse than mere bad taste picnicking on an old grave. Something perverse—wickeder than any

casual defilement of God's image. Only another bad peace could make anyone laugh at a dead soldier again.

Of course whoever lit his cigar from that flame may have thought the Unknown Soldier wasn't anybody he knew.

It's true there isn't anybody in particular to mourn for the man who is buried there, so everybody mourns for him. The mocker can't have remembered that he profaned his brother's grave. But how could he have forgotten? The sense of man's brotherhood is all that can sustain the human spirit for the loss of God. And this man had no God.

By what did he live? The loss of faith is the condition of despair. The alternative to despair is the worship of Caesar. What's sure is that the mocking of sacrifice cannot survive elsewhere but in that evil climate of the soul where fascism prepares its subjects. Very probably the man with the cigar was one of those pre-fabricated pagans who rode the joyless carrousel of the twenties and thirties. One of those, you know, who doubted if anything is ever really bad or really good. If he's alive he may have changed his mind. It's possible he's found something bad enough to fight. He may even hold that something good is real enough to defend.

I think we know those things but never say them enough.

Bad and good have been at war, God knows, since the first morning of the world. Men do the fighting; if they didn't this planet would be nothing better than a zoo. Faith is the tinder of man's greatness; so long as he shields it from despair he's going to keep the gift of fire.

There is one choice; no more. One choice and no exemptions.

The winners in World War II are those who believe it can be the last. The losers are those who suppose that war itself breeds without cure in the nature of all peoples. They are the same who fatten on war. They are the same who plan the next ones. The slaves doubt their kind's capacity to learn and change; the slavers curb with doubt the people's righteous will to abide by its own laws. They are all the same. We have this to be glad of: these who are of little faith, the blasphemers, experts in chaos, or the sick in spirit, these who can't, who won't affirm the plain, magnificent decency of human folk, all such—on this, our brightening world—are rallied in the shadows now under the banners of despair. Defeat is their profession and their destination. Victory rises today before the men of faith. This can be the last war. If it is we'll know the world's first peace.

No more of the old stalemates and manipulations then! The people want a government of all their nations, the chance to know each other better, to visit neighbors and make friends. They want open borders. They want everything printed in the newspapers so they know whether they like what's going on. They're tired of secrets and spies. They're tired of striped pants: the people want their own diplomats. And all these things the people are going to have unless they're cheated out of them.

If free men fighting now aren't going to be allowed to destroy fascism, if afterwards anything that looks like fascism is suffered to sit down among us, the cynics will be right again—an ordered world where everybody's free to prosper and improve is still a far-off dream.

The Fuehrer gave his sway a thousand years. His doom has already come. He's gone, but those who fought him know they may not win. That thousand years of his was a good guess. At least a thousand years waits on the chance of another war.

Another war means worse than the levelling of all the cities. We know that. It means retreat, a setback longer than the quarter of a century wasted since the Unknown Soldier died for us. A thousand years is a long march.

We are the ancestors of unknown soldiers who must go that bloody length again unless we, who are weary of marching, go on marching. Forward is the way—forward, beyond peace—on into the free world which depends on it.

A free world means just that; we must refuse all substitutes. A free world depends on that refusal.

Liberals have a lot to say nowadays about the danger of reaction. Reaction is no danger, it's a certainty. Maybe it won't amount to much; maybe it's going to be a tidal wave. Anyway the answer isn't written in the stars. It's up to the democratic man.

Within the separate democracies the serious failure of progressive influence could ruin international good health. If we allow provincialism to prejudice the efficiency of world organization, or if any of the leaders of the United Nations are permitted by the peoples they represent to use their armies for counter-revolution—then even this war has just started.

The ignorance of the masses is a wicked, poor apology for any democratic loss. Germany before Hitler was possessed of quite considerable political sophistication. Blame for the failure of the Popular Front lies not with the French working man. Progressive leadership must accept guilt now in just proportion to the gains of reaction.

The platitude of the day is even truer than most platitudes. No one doubts that we may win the war and lose the peace. I'd like to add that we may lose the peace before it's lost.

Dunkirk and Chungking and Stalingrad gave us hope. The democratic man has kept his faith.

He must stand fast now.

This time he daren't lose or nothing will be left—nothing even to make a start with. He must stand fast or they'll build a new war monument, not to the Unknown Soldier—but to the Unknown Cause.

Maybe they'll keep an enigmatic little flame alight there to show where freedom died, but nobody will start a cigar on that sepulcher; it wouldn't even be funny.

The alternative, of course, is civilization. A bookish, an uneasy word—that “civilization.” Our languages will bear us fairer names for it when we’ve struggled closer to what we would describe. Peace then will go as unremarked as the free air. Peace after all is no more than the victory of the farm over the wilderness—as probable as that—no more hard earned.

But never think our work is over when we’ve won that peace. We’ll know better. And even when the world is free we’ll know we’ve just begun.

“Here it is. Here is the peace,” we’ll say, standing in the midst of it like plowmen content with the good order of their fields; standing together, for mankind will be every man’s family when the tools of war are put away for good.

“Here is peace,” we’ll say to each other, proudly, undismayed. Nobody will confuse it with the millennium. Then the abundance of the human spirit will be ready for harvest and the children will see that even final peace is merely history’s first important date.

SHAPING TOMORROW'S WORLD

"Tis one and the same Nature that rolls on her course, and whoever has sufficiently considered the present state of things might certainly conclude as to both the future and the past.

—Montaigne

SHAPING TOMORROW'S WORLD

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

LOUIS DOLIVET Among the many extraordinary new things that happened during the war there is one which deserves particular attention because it will remain a permanent feature of our time, and that is the participation of large groups of people in planning the destinies not only of their own society but of the world as a whole.

Throughout the war, planning for the future was one of the secret weapons of the United Nations. It was secret to the enemy who by the very nature of his absurd theories of government was unable to conceive how a war effort could be anything but weakened by public discussion of the very foundations of society. It was also secret to the Allied governments themselves in the beginning. The amazing thing is that planning for the future and hopes for it became one of the most powerful psychological weapons in the hands of the Allies. It was a weapon which virtually galvanized public opinion, in the occupied as well as in the unoccupied countries. The Underground literature makes abundantly clear how much the various Resistance movements in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece, by means of slogans and short articles, were shaping the basic transformations which will take place in the postwar world. One article published in a French Resistance paper, dealing with a new European unity within the framework of an organized world, had repercussions all over the Continent. Immediately all Underground movements began to use this concept, thus forging an effective weapon of opposition to the "new European order" idea of Hitler Germany.

When the Nazis were planning the first European Settlement Conference in Vienna, first in 1942 and later in 1943, where all the puppets from Laval to Quisling were to come with their experts in a sort of caricature of an international conference, to proclaim to the world the birth of a German-led European Union, the Underground patiently denounced this kind of planning and countered with its own democratic planning.

In Latin America and Asia, planning for the future was a powerful weapon in winning sympathy for the Allies. In the freed countries, both for the armies and for the production fronts, it became a powerful lever

of morale. The newspapers, magazines, radio programs, at first hesitant to take it up, soon saw its tremendous news value. Books on the future of the world, from *Federal Union* to *One World*, achieved immense circulation, surpassing every previous record. Wallace's "Century of the Common Man" speech was translated into every language and dialect of the earth, and in a few months became one of the main credos of the common people everywhere.

However, this process of the acceptance of planning as a new political activity, as a new instrument of adult education and as an organic part of government, was a very slow one.

Here are pages of my political diary from those days of April 1942, when the great planning wave began to sweep the world:

May 1942: Potential Forces in Europe—Whether to plan now for the future is becoming a subject of great controversy. Some people are entirely opposed to any plans, good or bad. In their opinion the essential job is to win the war, and everything else will follow in due time. They fear that discussions about the future may distract efforts from the present gigantic task. Others think that the consideration of various plans for world order may create confusion and even hostility among partisans of different programs. Their argument is that some kind of unity exists already around the necessity of winning the war; a debate about what is to follow after the war might serve disunity or lead to such conclusions as the recent criticism that "Great Britain is going socialistic." A third category believes that the whole idea of a democratic war is just an invention, or an expression of wishful thinking on the part of the old incurable idealists who have always dreamed about a world utopia. This war, in their opinion, is just like all the other wars:—England and France went to war because they felt their security and influence were threatened by Hitler's policy; China is at war because she was invaded by Japan; Russia is at war because Germany has attacked her; and the United States is at war because of the Japanese attack. They grant that each of the two fighting groups has formed some kind of military alliance, but hold that it has no more importance than previous alliances. In their view, the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations, and all the other formulations and guarantees of a better world order are just passing documents of war.

The isolationists and those who do not wish this war to be a United Nations war, who secretly still hope that a stalemate or a negotiated peace will end it temporarily and thereby open the Western Hemisphere to fascism, are arguing with some apparent truth that the common man is not interested in the future. It is relatively easy to separate the fascist elements from the rest of those who are opposing the planning of the future. The fascist elements, being unable for the moment to attack the war effort

openly, are hiding their activities behind nationalistic and anti-United Nations propaganda. The same situation prevailed in France from September 1939 to July 1940, when all the collaborationists and Lavals played the superpatriotic card—but continued to attack Great Britain and the democratic elements. They were violently anti-labor. They were strongly opposed to any real planning of the future. It was only after the breakdown of France that they came out openly with their discovery of the beauties of the “New Order” and the duties of France as a member of the “European community fighting for its existence against the Anglo-Saxon plutocracies.” It was more or less the same with the various other Quislings in all the European countries.

It is necessary to recognize the universal character of fascism from the similarity of its methods everywhere. The people of the United Nations may well profit by these similar symptoms to distinguish between their true and false friends.

Where the situation becomes more complicated is when sincere democratic elements show a lack of interest or even an opposition to planning for the future. They are those who feel that at this moment, when three hundred million human beings in Europe are living under the most cruel system known to history, when other hundreds of millions in the Far East are subject to the ruthless rule of Japan (whom we accepted all too soon as a member of the civilized nations because it had successfully imitated occidental industrial methods), when the terrible threat for all mankind of this fate still exists, it is a frivolous intellectual speculation or at best a naïve and untimely dream to map out a truly new order.

But in fact, it is not a dream; it is not an escape from the paramount task that confronts every civilized being—which is to do everything possible to win this war. It is a vital part of our war strategy. It is the political war of the Democracies directed against the political war of the Axis.

Yes, the Axis Powers have gained a great number of triumphs due to their political war. With the exception of Great Britain and Russia, all the European nations have been the victims of the political war launched against them inside their own boundaries, even before Hitler came to power, by the emissaries of the National Socialist party which ostensibly sought support in its “campaign against communism and against the Jews.” This political war has not ceased with the military defeat of these countries; on the contrary, its attacks have been increased and accelerated. Side by side with the brutal oppression, torture, and assassination which constitute the essential German method of occupation, the propaganda of Goebbels as well as of the native fascist groups carries on the political war to quell public opinion and to disguise the real intentions of Hitler’s Germany.

One of the best weapons of political war the United Nations have in their hands is the democratic plans for the future. And this applies not

only to the subjugated countries, but also to the population of the fighting countries themselves. Despite the small groups mentioned before, more and more people are becoming aware of the real nature of this war. They understand that it is a war reaching far beyond national boundaries. They understand that it is a war of principles, a war for the survival and the advancement of the democratic way of life, a war against the dangers of domination by fascist barbarians. Because of the increase in the understanding of the nature of this war, the interest in the plans for the future has also immensely increased. Never before in history has such a large number of ordinary citizens participated in discussing the future world organization. Remarkable discussions are going on everywhere in this country, and there is almost no meeting in which the question of the future is not brought up in some way.

The United Nations idea is rapidly becoming an inspiring idea to the American people. It is this idea which gives assurance to everyone that it is not only a just war but also a war for world organization which will establish the welfare and security of all nations. In England, the discussion is constantly gaining ground. In the U.S.S.R. and in China, the humanitarian mission of these countries, the duty of freeing all peoples from the fascist yoke and of organizing for world collaboration are constantly underlined. In the occupied countries themselves, not only the promise of freedom from the invader, but also the promise of a democratic world order, is an important part of the propaganda of the different movements of resistance. And finally in Latin America, the supporters of the United States are making of the vision of a future democratic world organization one of the great weapons in the struggle against the well-financed fascist groups.

These are sufficient indications of how the discussion about the future is becoming one of the great psychological levers whereby the democratic forces can swing public opinion into more enthusiastic and more productive lines throughout the world. This new interest in world organization, reaching much larger groups than in any previous war, also indicates the superiority of thinking democratic citizens over the emotional fatalism of the fascist masses. In the long run, a citizen who believes in freedom and who is convinced that he is fighting for the betterment of humanity will make more readily whatever sacrifices are demanded of him than the disappointed fascist soldier who is promised a quick victory and the right to rule the world.

Once we admit the necessity of planning for the future—precisely as a weapon for the present—we reach one of the fundamental questions of our century: *what kind of world organization should follow this war?* From the very beginning I should like to warn the impatient and the ignorant. The impatient must understand that the answer to this question will require a great many serious efforts because it concerns the most difficult problems

that the human spirit has to face. They will have to be patient. The ignorant must become less ignorant; they must assimilate the vital knowledge of the history and the geography of our world, of the political and economic systems which govern it.

There is no more beautiful task than learning about the society in which we live or than teaching the average citizen—the worker and the farmer and the man in the street—about the immensity of the problem which he has to solve, and which can be solved in the interest of humanity only if he participates actively. Incidentally, here is one of the answers to the question which is asked by so many people: "What can I do?" The answer is, fulfill all the duties which are asked by the authorities but learn also the fundamental principles of democratic world society and disseminate them. Thus you will help build an iron morale in this country and all over the world.

The essential fact in the present situation is that we face a new human being, a human being who has accumulated and absorbed the glorious traditions of 150 years of struggle for human freedom, to whom the American Revolution or the abolition of slavery or the declaration of human rights or the French Revolution have become a great source of inspiration. The citizen of our century, while disappointed in the weakness of his leaders, did not lose his belief in these principles; and when he compares them with the contradictory, inhuman foundations of the totalitarians, his choice is clear. But he expects a positive appeal; he expects an appeal which goes much further than the fighting and destruction of evil; he expects a constructive appeal asking him to be a builder of a new world, to participate with his immense good will and understanding in the formation of a society in which the horrors of the present will be impossible. This constructive element must be included in the hope and in the wisdom of a democratic world organization.

Before going into the different plans of world organization it seems necessary to make first of all a summary survey of the essential political factors and conditions on the various continents.

The greatest changes following this war will take place on the European continent. It is there that the Nazis have abolished the existing political and economic order, have forced the migration for military, economic, and racial reasons of fifty million human beings, have disorganized industry, lowered the health and living standards of the people, reduced the birth rate, and generally shaken to the very foundations the institutions that formed European civilization. They have divided nations into Quislings and anti-Quislings; collaborationists and anti-collaborationists; pro-Germans and anti-Germans; pro-British or pro-Americans and anti-British or anti-Americans. They have set up a boundary of hatred not only between Germany and other peoples of Europe but inside of the nations themselves.

The normal democratic evolution in Europe, if it had not been inter-

rupted by dictatorship or fascist *coups d'état* and by the war, would have resulted in great political democracies in almost all of the countries. It is often forgotten that after the last war almost all the European countries formulated extremely liberal constitutions which were the beginnings of democratic regimes. And in some, for example, in Hungary, in Finland, and in the Baltic countries, socialist and communist tendencies were very strong. But because Great Britain, France, and the United States were uninterested in the internal conditions of this vital area, the democratic regimes of Austria, Germany, Greece, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia were overthrown by violence and replaced by dictatorships or by semi-fascist rule which later became fascist governments.

One of the great developments of that post-war period was the land reform which was initiated in almost all the agricultural countries of Europe. In contrast to their condition in the nineteenth century, the peasants became a well-organized political force, able to make their will felt and compel the adoption of initial measures in the long-overdue expropriation of the big landowners. Similarly, a powerful labor movement grew up in Belgium and Holland. The Scandinavian countries had well-established governments with strong socialist tendencies.

France saw the triumph of the Popular Front. If it had not been for the Spanish War, the threat from outside, the refusal of co-operation by international financial forces, and some weakness in action of its leaders, the Popular Front would still be in power today. There can be no doubt that the immense majority of the French people supported in all the decisive elections since 1924 the parties of the Left or those parties which pretended to have a progressive or leftist program. Though France had many rightist governments during that period, they came about, not because of shifts in public opinion, but because of the defects in the constitutional machinery of France, especially in the relations between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and because some members of the Left always flirted with the reactionary parties and thereby forced changes and temporary abandonment of power by leftist governments. The remarkable fact remains that in spite of the weakness of the leaders of the Left, the public constantly re-elected representatives of progressive tendencies to power. Social reform of the Popular Front, which exceeded the reforms of the New Deal in the United States, received the most enthusiastic popular support and the days of '36 are now regarded as "the good old days." There is no doubt that whatever government comes into power in France after the war, the social reforms not only will have to be accepted and enforced but will have to be strengthened.

In Italy, the fascist regime that replaced democracy by violent seizure of power has failed even more than in any other country. None of the economic and social promises of the Fascist party were kept. Even the war pro-

gram of Mussolini has not succeeded in absorbing the unemployed, as it did in Germany. The fact that Mussolini made Italy a secondary partner of the Axis and is now subject to the orders of Hitler has affected the psychology of the Italian people. Both the Pope and the King have lost their popularity because of their collaboration with Mussolini and now cannot rely on the support they would have had if they had opposed him. Without foreign help or foreign intervention both will be eliminated as political factors in post-war Italy. The growing resistance in that unhappy country clearly indicates a marked tendency toward liberal democracy which will co-operate with a democratic France and a democratic Spain in particular and will enter the general orbit of the democratic world organization. All of the Italian opponents of Mussolini favored in 1935 the fullest sanctions against Italy because they opposed the aggression against Ethiopia and also because they knew that effective sanctions would mean the end of Mussolini and the continued participation of Italy in the League of Nations.

Spain became a republic in 1931 as a result of the desires of the overwhelming majority of the Spanish people. The elections held in 1936 under the Conservative Prime Minister Portela Valladares brought triumph to the People's Front in spite of governmental pressure, in spite of the support which the Catholic Church and the great financial powers gave to the Conservative party led by Gil Robles. When the rebelling military clique under General Franco's leadership, with the armed support of Mussolini and Hitler, attacked the completely unprepared Popular Government, 95 per cent of the Spanish people were on the side of the Loyalists. The fact that after the defeat of the Loyalist Government, due only to the military intervention of Germany and Italy, Franco did not apply a generous policy to the liberal elements but created instead one of the most cruel types of fascist governments, as well as the fact that his administration is considered by the whole Spanish people as entirely inefficient and corrupt, has resulted in even greater sentiment for the People's Front than existed before the Civil War. The war in Spain is also extremely significant in that here for the first time a United Nations army fought for democracy. The volunteers came from more than twenty nations which had no territorial interest in Spain. They were the first crusaders for democratic Europe.

The essential characteristic of the Europe that followed the last war was the acceptance by public opinion of the principles of collective security and the League of Nations idea. Almost all the political parties which came into power in the countries of Europe during the thirties advocated these principles as their program of foreign policy. The Pan-European ideas were advocated by the greatest thinkers of the time. Briand's plan for a customs and economic union in Europe has established him as one of the great European statesmen. The Spanish Constitution even had an article proposing the submission of national legislation to international law. It is only

the constant weakness of the governments and their refusal to apply the principles of collective security against the successive aggressions of fascist powers that has disheartened the people of Europe, but it has not made them renounce these ideals.

Now, the social and international tendencies are strengthened rather than weakened by the radical transformation of European life imposed by Germany, by the fact that England has given constantly increasing representation to labor in its Coalition Cabinet, that the United States and her democratic President are bringing about a New Deal, and by the fact that the Soviet Union and revolutionary China are exerting their influence on the minds of great masses of men. One further argument in favor of this conception is the fact that the most important Quislings and collaborationists in Europe come from the Conservative and extreme Right parties, and in some countries, from the reactionary military cliques.

The final orientation of Europe will depend to a great extent on the program of world reconstruction which the great powers in the United Nations will have prepared. If this program is a return to the *status quo*, a program which attempts to re-establish moderate and conservative forces in power, then the revolutionary influences will fight against it and regional or local conflicts in the beginning and general conflicts later will be inevitable. If this program should be democratic and progressive, containing the elements of the essential changes in the political structure which are necessary to social welfare and collective security, then all the democratic forces will rally behind these proposals and we shall see a less violent reconstruction and rehabilitation of the European continent. The workers of Europe have a great tradition of struggle for progress—the farmers and the middle classes are joining them now—and their combined force must be taken into account.

The political war of the democracies in Europe must be based essentially on these factors, on the complete program of democracy and European unity. Of course, war strategy makes it necessary to appeal to nationalism on occasion, but this argument will move tens of thousands or a maximum of hundreds of thousands while the democratic ideal will inspire and mobilize tens and hundreds of millions.

July 1942: The Struggle for Ideas. Slowly but firmly, a decisive change is taking place in the attitude of the United Nations toward the planning for the future. From indifference and lack of interest or belief that planning is untimely they are shifting toward a more and more serious consideration of the fundamental principles of the democratic war and peace policy. This new attention to one of the decisive problems of this war is due to a better analysis of public opinion in the fighting countries as well as in the subjugated countries.

Naturally, the secret manner in which the United Nations are mobi-

lizing the underground forces in the subjugated countries cannot be revealed. There is so much danger involved—from the first step of planning help for the underground up to the consummation in concrete activities against the enemy—that many important facts relating to this war will have to be withheld until after the victory. But those who are in contact with the underground movements on behalf of the United Nations are beginning to understand the immense importance of the ideological argument in increasing resistance. A certain time was necessary for the intelligence and propaganda services of the United Nations to learn more about the nature of this war and about the nature of the popular resistance to the Axis. They saw, sometimes with surprise, acts of unsurpassable courage without being able to understand the motives of those who performed these acts. But later, they learned to understand this much: The underground is not a movement which the United Nations can buy with money.

The nucleus of this movement was formed by great popular organizations—trade unions, various political parties of the working class, teachers' organizations, co-operatives, non-sectarian Resistance and other groups interested in international co-operation. Some Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups, wherever they were not completely destroyed by the Germans, also participated in that activity. To this nucleus were added some military veteran groups, official elements, and a very small but significant percentage of the industrial element. Some of the best European brains were and are connected with these activities. From the beginning they have influenced the ideological basis of the resistance. These groups were joined in the course of fascist oppression and of battle by men and women who were never in politics. They are risking their lives in order to destroy the hated occupation and to re-establish the freedom of their country. But when they risk their lives, they think. They are thinking that all the promises which were made to them have broken down; that governments and generals have abandoned them; that all the taxes they have paid and all the military service they have rendered were insufficient to save them from slavery. They are thinking about the lessons of the past, about the first aggression against China, back in 1931, about the aggression against Ethiopia and Spain, about Munich and appeasement. And from that thinking come questions. They are asking themselves the logical question: "Is it worth while to risk our lives in order to have, a few years later, another war? Will we finally succeed in getting a society in which war and aggression, in which fascism and misery will be impossible?"

These two questions are today decisive in Europe as well as in subjugated countries everywhere. The answers may determine to a great extent the intensity of the anti-Axis revolt all over the world. Those who see in the movement of resistance an expression of nationalism in the old sense of that word, a nationalism opposed to international co-operation and to a

democratic world order, are entirely mistaken and are lacking in the fundamental knowledge of the underground.

There is no such thing as chauvinism—isolationism—in the French, Belgian, Norwegian, Polish, Czech, or other movements of resistance. Over there, they all know that they can be freed from the Axis yoke only with the help of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and the other United Nations. They know also that their only guarantee against future aggression lies in collaboration within a United Nations machinery.

There are still many factors which can influence decisively the European elements of resistance and which are not wholly brought into play. The organized labor and trade union movement had more than ten million supporters before the war in Europe and its existing international machinery, if utilized, would be extremely helpful. The co-operative movement which had organized over five million families in Europe in what is now occupied territory, the international women's organizations, and many others, with their numerous points of contact in Europe, could play a decisive part if the United Nations would call on them and integrate them into the general political war effort of the Democracies. All these organizations are vitally interested in the planning of the future. The interest of the United States and Great Britain in the ideological phase of organizing the anti-Axis revolt is full of promise for the future.

In the Axis countries there are many institutions which are planning for the future. They are planning with a view to an Axis victory; they are planning the exploitation of Europe and the world in favor of the Axis powers and their satellites; they are planning the use of terrorism as one of the prime means of controlling subjugated countries as well as their own populations. But they are making plans. After the attack on Russia, when Germany expected a quick victory, plans were laid for a European conference to be held in Vienna in the fall of 1941. The opening day of that conference was planned to coincide with the occupation of Moscow, and experts from the Axis and subjugated countries worked night and day in preparing the agenda. Naturally, the conference has never been held. Despite this postponement, the planning goes on and the propaganda about it serves to create a sense of order and direction for the nazi future and sympathy for the nazi cause. So-called scientific institutes in Germany and Italy are making plans for both the expected victory and the possible defeat. These institutions are studying the problems of economic reconstruction in Europe, the future of autarchy and the possibilities for cultural and commercial expansion. They are preparing plans and proposals to save for their countries all the rights and privileges they can get in case of eventual defeat. At the same time, the nazi masters are flattering their satellites by allowing the experts in Hungary, Rumania, Italy, and Spain to offer plans and recommendations for the future world order. Thus, for example,

there are in Hungary the Institute of Political Science of the Hungarian Society of Statistics and the Hungarian Society of Foreign Affairs; in Rumania, the Centre de Hautes Etudes Internationales; in Italy, the Istituto di Scienze Economiche attached to the Catholic University at Milan; and in Spain, the Istituto Francisco de Vitoria and the notorious Consejo de Hispanidad—all studying the problems of world reorganization.

In view of these facts, it becomes obvious that the United Nations need to mobilize the intellectual and scientific forces they have at their disposal. Yet many who reproached Great Britain last year for not formulating her peace aims are refusing to discuss these aims now that America is at war. In response to our first article in this series, we have been offered the argument that the United Nations will win automatically, if they only do what the Axis Powers are doing, by virtue of their superior resources. All this talk about a future world order is only propaganda, runs the argument; actually, what we have to do is to have twice the number of radio stations and twice the number of employees in Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry, and we shall silence them as we shall silence their batteries by using twice the number of guns. This naïve thinking about mechanical superiority cannot be applied to any theater of war. It certainly cannot be applied to political war. In the field of political war—which interests us particularly—such thinking is disastrous. The political motives which are guiding the Axis Powers are entirely opposed to the motives which guide the democratic nations, as this simple comparison shows.

Axis Motives

Domination
Lust for power
Destruction of religion
Racial superiority
National expansion and suppression of individual nations
War, the essential method of Axis nations
Concentration of economic power in the Axis countries

Violation of international law
Contempt for the human being as such
Organization of war efforts by destroying whatever freedom exists
Future slavery for all but Axis nations

Democratic Motives

Cooperation
Moral revolt against force and cruelty
Restoration of religious freedom
Racial equality
Freedom of occupied nations and emancipation of colonial peoples
War, a necessary evil; establishment of permanent peace, primary aim
Equitable distribution of raw materials and establishment of a democratic world economic system
Maintenance of international law
Deep belief in the inviolable rights of every human being
Greatest war efforts within the democratic system
Promise of a democratic world order

Looking at this scheme of essential differences it is quite evident that the political warfare of the United Nations, if it is to be successful, cannot be based on anything other than the persuasion and education of ever in-

creasing numbers of citizens as to the necessity of the destruction of the Axis, backed by the conviction that the Democracies are capable of preparing and realizing a democratic world order. In a fascist country the state counts on gaining public support for its plans through the terrorism of its police methods, through mass spying by members of the party, through the youth who have been brought up as fanatics by many years of propaganda. In a democratic country it is the deep conviction of the citizen that he is helping his country, that he is helping justice and freedom by destroying the Axis agents. This is his primary motive. In Germany there are many nazi spies in each building. Superintendents, elevator boys, janitors, air-raid wardens, chambermaids, streetcleaners are in most cases nazi agents. Almost each family has its nazi spy. In America or Britain there is no such situation. The only guarantee of fullest participation in the war effort and of controlling dangerous elements lies in the loyalty and the sense of responsibility of the democratic citizen.

It is fortunate that the last months have seen decisive progress toward thinking about the future. This new chapter of democratic thinking was begun by the famous speech delivered by Vice-President Wallace at the dinner of the Free World Association. Mr. Wallace's speech was followed by an address of historic importance by Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles. This speech is of great significance because many reactionary elements were sure that a responsible representative of the State Department would not go so far as to speak of a people's war, or to speak of the end of imperialism, or to underline the importance of a world society after the war. Mr. Welles did all these things, and he did even more by emphasizing the economic factors necessary to establish a just world order. In London the Labor Party held a national conference in which the climax of the discussion was centered around the problems of the world to come. And in England, too, the Ambassador of the United States, John G. Winant, has declared that the United Nations will have to make the same effort that they are making now to win the war, to "wipe out the social evils of poverty, sickness, and unemployment." He added, "We must move on to a great social offensive if we are to win the war completely."

Some time ago Governor Harold E. Stassen of Minnesota outlined a program for future world organization which contains the essential ideas of international co-operation. T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, based his first speech on Chinese war aims on the same idea. However eloquent and important, these views have not yet silenced those whose slogan today is, "Let us first win the war," and tomorrow will be, "Let us keep out of international entanglements."

Fortunately, a new weapon has been given to all who favor immediate planning for the future by one of the most admired women in the world. In a speech broadcast from Chungking, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek informed us

that if the Chinese people and the Chinese Army had not been induced "to believe that after victory the world system would be entirely altered; that we would be all free peoples; and that nations, strong or weak, would deal fairly and squarely with each other; . . . the war, as far as China is concerned, would have been over a long year ago." What Mme. Chiang said means simply that if her Government had failed to make planning for the future an important part of its whole conception of war morale, Chinese resistance might have collapsed and Japan, with China defeated or supporting Japanese aggression, would be ten times stronger today.

We must bear in mind that this is not an editorial written in the security of a New York newspaper office but the expression of one who has participated actively in the most extraordinary battles of this war, and who has seen bombs falling hundreds of times on undefended cities. Mme. Chiang declared that, if after this war there was to be no greater measure of freedom and happiness for human beings, she would be ashamed to face the soldiers and workers of China to whom during these four years of suffering and sacrifice she had promised a better world. "They would never believe me any more if this better world did not come." No more would the other peoples ever again believe the President of the United States or the Prime Minister of Great Britain or the President of the Council of Soviet Commissars. The promises made by the governments of the United Nations are signed checks which will have to be honored in the future. The claimants will be the peoples of the world. And those who consider such promises merely as propaganda to be ignored immediately after the war are terribly mistaken as to both the character of this propaganda and its political effects now and in the future.

August 1942: Potential Forces in Asia. We shall therefore examine with the utmost care the different plans of the future. We consider that every effort in this direction is in itself a symptom of progress, but we do not regard every plan for the future as a mark of that progress. Frequently, lack of vision, lack of courage, lack of knowledge of the immense changes which have taken place in the last twenty years are responsible for a conservatism which defeats all progress.

Even though the greatest changes have occurred and will take place in Europe, a close examination of Asia makes one grasp fully the historic importance of the eventual developments on that continent. Two great tendencies dominate Asia at present: (1) the will to national independence, and (2) revolutionary and socialist idealism.

Asiatic nationalism can be explained as a reaction against oppression by the white man. With the disappearance of that oppression most of the emotional elements of Asiatic nationalism will disappear. Until the beginning of this century, for example, China simply did not experience the

phenomenon of modern nationalism. The immensity of the country, its peculiar national structure and the character of its ancient culture, have resulted in a nationalism unlike the phenomenon of modern nationalism in the Western World. Sun Yat-sen, who introduced modern nationalism in China, taught only the most progressive conception of nationalism, the nationalism that is ready to co-operate with other nations for the good of humanity. He refused to teach them the stupid and dangerous nationalism of the aggressive chauvinists of other countries. And therefore the term, as we generally interpret it, cannot be applied to Asiatic nationalism, and particularly to Chinese nationalism. The latter is free from any aggressive imperialistic tendencies and is also free from the chauvinistic belief in national superiority. Its essential characteristic is the desire for equality with other nations and for improvement of international conditions by means of complete international co-operation. Sun Yat-sen and the nationalist movement he founded are really the first expression of the type of national consciousness which may be the basis for future international co-operation. While nationalism in other countries, especially at its outset, was characterized by xenophobia, by outbursts of violence against other nations, the doctrine and program of Sun Yat-sen divert national feeling into a desire for industrial, economic, and political co-operation with the Western Powers. The consummation of Sun Yat-sen's theories has found expression in the establishment by many famous Chinese scholars, headed by Wou Chi Hui, C. K. Chang, and Li Yu Ying, of an international organization called World Co-operation, in which many of the federalist principles which we are discussing today were seriously studied.

The Chinese will to independence is also of a special nature. It does not express itself in hatred against foreigners but merely in a desire to put an end to a situation which is no better for the dominating nations than for the dominated.

As for the revolutionary tendencies, these range from Confucian moralism through modern liberalism and socialism to certain aspects of the communist doctrine. They are directed primarily toward the creation of better economic and social conditions of the large masses of people. They are lacking that fanaticism or exclusivism which characterizes many Western revolutionary movements, and they aspire to the reconciliation of different social doctrines. Every new social and philosophical concept finds its way into Asia, owing to the receptivity of the Chinese people. Hence, these tendencies can play a constructive role in any concrete program of co-operation between the Orient and the Occident.

As for India, there is no doubt that the war is making a deep impression on the Indian way of life. The people are looking for help and co-operation to China, to America, to England herself, and to the rest of the world. The industrialization of India made great progress during the war, and that

country will serve increasingly as a resource center both for manpower and war materials. But the political situation of India is extremely complex, first of all because of the refusal of Gandhi to accept or to follow modern political methods and because of the difficulties existing between the All-India Congress and the Moslems. Certainly Nehru and his young followers who have absorbed the many doctrines of social progress and world democracy are capable of revolutionizing the old traditional political system of India. The problem is to know whether Nehru will be in a position to act freely toward that end or whether the British colonial administration will take repressive measures against him. The best bet from a point of view of world democracy would be for the United Nations to co-operate with the Nehru tendency and to make use of the help of Chinese democratic forces in the reorientation of Indian policies toward democratic, progressive, and modern concepts.

When Nehru came to Europe in 1928, the writer had occasion to discuss with him at great length the problems confronting India. Even at that time, while France and England were still at peace with Germany, the Indian leader foresaw that the solution of his country's problem would be an integral part of the world-wide struggle against fascism, the struggle which will be completed by a democratic victory that will spell the end of all imperialism.

Yet now, when the Chinese are valiantly battling the Japanese, there are many who are already beginning to speak about the danger of Asiatic nationalism. They are already afraid that China and India, once united, may become a danger to the white man. They do not understand that China and India can become immense factors in the winning of the war and in the building of a democratic world which will be able to raise the standard of living of all peoples. Of course, if the United Nations are incapable of creating a free world, then extreme nationalists in China and India will incite their people against the white man, and we may have a continental war. But there is no more danger of having a war with the people of Asia than there is danger of a war between the Americas or between America and Europe. The situations and the dangers are the same all over the world. The Asiatic problem is an integral part of the world problem. Its solution depends not only on the attitude of the peoples of Asia, but it depends equally on the ideals and actions of all the other peoples of the world.

August 1942: Potential Forces in the Americas. America is one of the main elements on which the immediate future of humanity depends. America has the greatest number of universities and schools, the greatest number of newspapers and radio stations, the greatest number of meetings

and round-table discussion groups, and yet it is one of the most difficult countries to know. Hitler has created an almost foolproof system of detecting and undermining public opinion in other countries, but he was mistaken in evaluating the degree of attachment to freedom which exists in America, an attachment greater than the attachment to peace. Germany was also mistaken in her judgment about the determination of America to destroy the Axis as a political system; she underestimated the strength of the Administration and she underestimated public opinion.

Friendly and pro-democratic observers have also made many mistakes in judging America. Quickly they went from one extreme to the other. They had overconfidence in America's capacity to wage, in a few weeks, a glorious and victorious war. They overestimated her immediate military, technical, economic, and political power, and when the day-by-day hardships and difficulties appeared after Pearl Harbor, they began to lack confidence in her ability to mobilize her forces fully and effectively. The truth lies between these two extremes. It is a country of immense potentialities, but it has to be organized systematically, like every other country in the world. War is, and has been, a surprise to the Democracies because essentially they were prepared for peace. The whole structure of the country must be adapted to the necessities of war. This adaptation takes time.

In this article we shall examine only those things which have a direct relation to international affairs and which might serve as a basis for an answer to the question: Is America thinking about the future and what kind of world order will American public opinion support? The three main characteristics that distinguish America from most other countries are: (1) America is a young, self-confident, and highly emotional country. It could therefore turn from immense enthusiasm in favor of world organization to disillusionment and retirement. (2) Its people, while including important sections representing almost all nationalities and cultures of the world, is united in its love of Americanism and constitutes a nation *sui generis*. As a result, the American nation as a whole is interested in the fate of humanity, but different sections, because of their origins, are primarily interested in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, etc. (3) America has only one great tradition, that of democracy, while most of the other countries have two conflicting traditions—one of democracy and one of dictatorship, tyranny, monarchy and of anti-democratic prejudices. It is this fact which is overlooked in comparing the political situation of the United States and of even such traditionally democratic countries as France. In France there was always an anti-democratic minority, opposed to the democratic form of government, which constituted an ever-present threat to French democracy.

This minority had a mixed allegiance, composed of a certain nationalistic loyalty, but also of blind subservience to forms of government which

existed before the Republic. Such an anti-democratic minority was of course more easily the victim of fascist propaganda, because of its hostility to the republican institutions.

The "oneness" of the American democratic tradition does not mean that there are no anti-democratic elements in America. The point is that these elements, however dangerous and powerful they may be, have no legal or historical foundation on which to base their propaganda against the democratic concept of government. As a result, while there were in America before Pearl Harbor (and probably will be, after victory has been achieved) almost perfect counterparts of Hitler, Mussolini, Petain, Laval and Quisling, whose publications were almost reproductions of *Der Stürmer*, or *Gringoire*, these ringleaders and agitators operated in a social vacuum, beneath a stigma of un-Americanism and illegality. In order to escape that stigma, the anti-democratic forces in America, not having the benefit of any past legality, were obliged to pay lip service to the Constitutional principles of the United States.

Most of the people who came to America left their own countries because of persecution or economic misery. The natural resources of America, the two oceans which were considered as insurmountable military barriers, created a favorable climate for isolationism. But fascism and modern military art have completely changed the situation. For the first time in modern history, the majority of Americans are taking cognizance of the law of interdependence and are realizing that the United States of America is a part of the world. The same majority, or even a larger one, are aware of the danger of fascism and are ready to make whatever sacrifices are necessary in order to destroy it. Fewer people, but still a majority, realize the necessity of world order, but they have only vague ideas about how it could and should be brought about.

Paradoxical though it may seem, the greatest problem confronting America is the practical sense of the average American. If all the other countries had a plan of their own providing perfect solutions in every case and outlining a smooth-running international machinery, something like an American factory, then everything would be simpler. People, of course, are not machines. They are subject to an infinite number of opinions and feelings and, therefore, purely technical solutions cannot be applied with success. America has not only to overcome isolationism but also to understand, without being discouraged, the historical realities of a humanity divided by wars, nationalism, economic interests, cultural diversities. The gravest mistake that America could make would be to see only the more apparent difficulties without discovering the immense desire for unity, freedom, economic welfare, and collective peace of the rest of humanity. In seeking out these uniting and progressive factors, particularly of Europe, America should take as a point of departure the enthusiasm with

which all the peoples of Europe greeted Wilson's arrival at the peace conference and their readiness to accept his conception as a basis for world order. They should take into account that since that period, nationalism and chauvinism have produced deep disillusionment as well as endless suffering and misery. There is a new humanity in the making which suffers everywhere but understands today even more than yesterday the necessities of a united and free world. The people are ready to go further than they were twenty-five years ago in the interests of world organization. Fortunately for America, and this is an essential characteristic of the situation, it has a Government composed of some of the best brains in the world, and the present President is even more a world figure than was Wilson. This Government has in its staff and in its ideas all the potentialities for a great American contribution toward world organization.

Two different schools of thought appear immediately when one looks into American forces discussing international problems. The first comprises the different varieties of isolationism. They range from the pro-fascist, anti-British, anti-European, anti-Russian, anti-Japanese, and even anti-Chinese to groups in favor of an Allied victory only because of Pearl Harbor but who wish, after the war, a strongly fortified and defensive militaristic America staying out of international entanglements. Their solution for post-war peace is the complete defeat and destruction of the military forces of Japan; defeat, but not destruction, of the political and economic structure of Germany which was responsible for fascism; and absolute security for the United States and a balance of power adjusted to avoid strengthening Great Britain or Soviet Russia. In one word, to them this war is similar to previous wars; America is fighting because she was attacked, and after victory, she will continue in her old policies. This conception will sooner or later result in isolationism.

The refusal to undertake planning for the future is as short-sighted and dangerous as was the policy of appeasement which was responsible for this war. The common argument in favor of appeasement was: Our first job is to preserve peace. The common argument against planning for the future is: Our first job is to win the war. Both arguments are justified as aims, but in fact they serve the contrary purpose. Appeasement brought war and, to many countries, temporary slavery. Anti-planning might endanger the victory and will certainly endanger the future of democracy and peace.

Why? Because democratic planning for the future is political war in the best sense of the word. It is the greatest moral factor at the disposal of the United Nations. It means better production, better fighting, and a greater revolt against the Axis all over the world. If we fail to give humanity the vision of a just world, a vision which is after all still the most powerful motive of the human soul, we endanger victory. We risk having less support for an eventual invading army in Europe and we risk the most success-

ful Axis propaganda all over the world. Therefore, anti-planning is a direct threat to the war effort of the Democracies.

Moreover, post-victory planning means that the United Nations will be able to undertake immediately the task of reconstruction; that is to say, no time will be lost in salvaging what will have remained after this terrible war. The common welfare of humanity, economic co-operation, the progress of science, peaceful resettlement of humanity—everything will depend on how the United Nations will have considered in advance the organization of the world and on how rapidly they will co-ordinate these plans with the aspirations of the subjugated countries. A prolonged period of groping in a starving world might be fatal and peace might fade more quickly than it was achieved.

The second school includes an even greater variety of opinions, all of which admit the vital necessity of America's participation in international affairs. One conception, which is the natural consequence of the breakdown of most of the European Democracies and of the fact that the United States is a decisive factor in this war, is the idea of American leadership. The American Century idea is a prototype of this school of thought. Not only Americans, but many prominent Europeans, discouraged by the failure of their own Democracies, think it would be the solution to all the difficulties. The promoters of this conception foresee a sort of master solution, worked out by the United States, which will have to be accepted by all other countries. Some people think that this conception constitutes the beginning of American neo-imperialism. This designation is not quite correct, for none of the old characteristics of imperialism are contained in this conception. These people do not want an imperial American government, and they do not advocate seeking or extending control over other nations. But there are some other characteristics which constitute neo-imperialist tendencies: for example, world control or world domination through financial and economic means. There is no doubt that this leadership idea could degenerate later into imperialistic tendencies, or could be considered as such by other nations.

Another conception could be regarded as the legalistic conception. It is based essentially on respect for international law and on some revised principles of the old Covenant of the League of Nations. It is interesting to note that even the most formulistic supporters of international law understand the necessity of taking into account social and economic problems. Based on conceptions of the Atlantic Charter, they are trying to create the legal background and basis for economic and social arrangements. This, a result of the Rooseveltian conception, goes much further into social and economic aspects of freedom than the Wilsonian conception, limited to policy and international law. Nevertheless, this conception does limit itself to classical notions of international relations and does not envision uni-

versal economic planning. For example, according to this plan, the United Nations, particularly the United States, ought to concern themselves after the war with policing and feeding the world and slowly, after consideration of the various problems, to prepare a general peace treaty as just as possible and based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The world resulting from this conception would not necessarily be a democratic world, but there would be respect for international law.

Then there is the labor movement, which in general is for a democratic world order but without very definite and precise ideas. The particular structure of the American labor movement, limiting its activities in the past to trade union questions, has always been considered a great weakness in the whole international labor movement. It was frequently used to discourage efforts for a stronger and more democratic international organization. Even today, the conservative and nationalistic elements inside the United Nations are constantly advancing the lack of interest of the American labor movement as an argument against a world democratic order. But lately there have been interesting tendencies inside the labor movement toward an increased interest in international affairs. The labor movement's participation in favor of active help to Great Britain was remarkably important, and in the past year this activity covers help to Russia and China. Mr. Wallace's speech at a dinner of *Free World* was received enthusiastically by the labor movement, and many leaders endorsed the views expressed by the Vice-President. Mr. Welles' Memorial Day address was received with equal interest. This is an interesting evolution, but it is only the beginning. Much will depend on the attitude of the American labor movement, not only because of its influence in the United States, but also because of its influence in the entire world labor movement. The voice of American labor representatives in the International Federation of Trade Unions, or in any other international labor council, will be as decisive as the American Government's voice in an international governmental conference.

Different industrial and commercial concerns have also established research institutions whose primary concern is to rationalize the existing economic and commercial methods. Those conceptions neglect completely the economic and social crises of Europe which have been instrumental in the rise of fascism. Refusing to consider the deep social changes to come if democracy is to survive, they are not answering many of the most urgent questions about social security.

The federalist tendencies are well known. They conceive world government as the solution to the problem of how to secure peace, freedom, and democracy to humanity. The federal system is considered by their promoters as the solution. Their constitutional ideas are strongly influenced by the American constitution. Undoubtedly the federal movement in the United States represents great progress in thinking about world organiza-

tion. It is an immense step away from the old nationalist conception and one toward constructive internationalism. But the idea as presented neglects important social, economic, and political problems. Many of the Democracies which were suggested in the beginning as the eventual founders of the new federation have achieved only a superficial and formulaistic degree of democracy. They have no economic democracy at all and in fact the life of the respective nations is controlled by the vested interests. Furthermore, many of those Democracies have refused to collaborate in any collective action against aggression, and some of them are even today neutral while a life-and-death struggle is going on between freedom and slavery. The federalist ideas, as expressed, have reduced the crisis of our present world to the lack of world government and have neglected completely many of the other essential causes of the weakening of democracy throughout the world. Without first eliminating the essential elements of crisis, the federal idea risks remaining a utopian hope. It is only through transformation and adaptation of our whole structure that the federal idea can become, not only a historic necessity, but a historic possibility.

The most interesting ideas are represented by American liberals. Nobody, not even they themselves, could give a precise definition of what they stand for or what their program is, but they are a great and hopeful force of the future. Without party prejudice, they apply liberal and progressive solutions to every issue as it presents itself. Here lies their limitation. Instead of constructing a great doctrine, they are working on day-to-day policies. Whenever one injustice is committed, the American liberals stand up as one man in the defense of the victim. They have, by doing so, written glorious pages in the history of freedom. But once this particular fight is over, they disappear—nobody knows where. The man in the street who was moved and convinced by their arguments writes letter after letter. He offers to join, but nobody is there to reply. They are organizing committees for the best causes in the world, but the committees disappear as quickly as they come.

The labor movement requires a great deal of attention. It requires countless meetings, much smaller but much more important than those organized by commercial agencies featuring returning foreign correspondents. Sooner or later American liberals will have to take this modest road which is the only one leading to the hearts and brains of the working man. American liberals will have to work out a complete constructive conception on international policy. Now, in reading their opinions, one goes sometimes from the greatest enthusiasm to complete despair. Recently one of them wrote about signing the peace. The governments of Finland, Rumania, and Hungary offered no difficulties to the writer. Even in Italy, he wrote, after the departure of Mussolini, the elements of a legal government will be found in the army and elsewhere. He would have been right one hun-

dred years ago, but he is wrong today. The above-mentioned governments are fascist or pseudo-fascist. They represent the fascist principles adapted to their countries. If democracy and peace are to survive, the peace treaty will not be signed with any of those governments, but with the peoples, after having guaranteed the existence and the continuation of a real democracy in those countries.

But this does not represent the general orientation of American liberals. Most of them are much more aware of the nature of fascism and their judgment is very sound. American liberals have conceived and worked out some new and creative methods of international democratic policy; for example, the Lend-Lease Act. But the lack of organizational continuity of the American liberals, the lack of capacity to create great popular organizations, and sometimes a sort of blasé attitude toward movements and organizations, is a serious weakness. And yet, there is nothing more beautiful than the sincerity and the courage of the American liberals. Their names are known and their ideas loved, not only in America, but everywhere where human beings fight for freedom and for justice.

Another remarkable factor is the many women's organizations which are becoming more interested every day in the establishment of a just world order. Free of all imperialistic and egoistic conceptions, they think of the future in terms of the common good for all peoples. The American woman in particular has stepped beyond all the other women in the world. In more and more fields of the life of the nation, the American woman is playing an important role. The women's organizations are among the best organized in the country. The discussions about future world organization held in different women's groups are showing a high degree of enlightenment and political maturity.

Altogether, the labor movement, the intellectuals, the student organizations, the different liberal groups, the women's organizations, and pro-league and pro-world-order organizations are an immense potential asset for America's participation in the building of a democratic world. They have more chance of successful action than ever before, and they are constantly encouraged by the growing interest of the general public. But they are not united and there is not even any co-ordination between them. They are often confused by the differences among Europeans and by the complexity of the problems of Asia and Africa. The fight in the United States between the interventionists and the isolationists will be very bitter and hard. On its outcome depends, to a great extent, the immediate future of humanity.

The progressive movements in other countries have a great task to fulfill in this order of ideas. They must work hard and establish quickly a common program of action. The faster they work, the better the relations between the occupied countries and the democratic representatives out-

side will be and the greater are the chances of full American participation in world organization. It is an urgent, mutual task because America's potential forces are the strongest, because her influence will be decisive, and because her responsibility is also the heaviest. Americans must realize that behind this war there is more than violation of international law, more than weakness in the Covenant of the League, more than personal failures and weaknesses of European prime ministers. It is an international civil war against every form of oppression and injustice, and a whole economic system is in the process of disappearing. Conditions of life in the United States of America are different. Changes will appear sooner in the rest of the world than here. The important thing is not to hinder them in the rest of the world, not to delay the course of history, but to understand the nature of this war. Conservative and classic solutions, whatever military guarantees might be taken, will be insufficient if the fundamental order is not changed, if chauvinism is not replaced by international democracy.

The American people have their hands on the wheel of destiny. If they turn it toward real progress, progress will come, and the second half of the twentieth century will inaugurate a new era in the history of humanity.

It is very hard to speak of Latin America as a whole despite the many similarities of language and of tradition. Every Latin American country has its own distinct problems and its own aspirations. There is, of course, a great sentiment of continental solidarity but for the moment this has not penetrated very deeply into popular psychology. The study of the economic and social problems of Latin America is a great temptation, but the limitations of space force us to sum up only those essential tendencies which are common to all the Latin American countries and which pertain to international affairs. This task is somewhat easier owing to the fact that there are more common elements in the international than in the national policies of Latin America.

First then, Latin America is the least involved continent in this war. Even the countries which have declared war against the Axis are not, for the time being, preparing expeditionary forces and are not fighting actively in the war. This situation can be partially attributed to problems of equipment and transportation but there are more important causes. If the desire for active participation had been expressed, means would have been found to overcome those difficulties as they were overcome by the Poles, Czechs, Free French, and others who had no arms and no equipment. The fact is that, despite the mortal danger which hangs over Latin America exactly as over the other countries, the Latin American peoples are not fully committed to participation in the war.

Four main characteristic attitudes can be found in Latin America toward the war and world organization: The first is based on the belief that the war concerns mainly the principal belligerents on both sides and that

Latin America has no other interest than to stay out as long as possible. This attitude of course does not exclude economic co-operation with the Democracies because they are the only ones with whom trade is still possible. The second and much more positive attitude reflects real consciousness of danger from the Axis and recognizes that some military facilities should be granted to the United States in order to secure common protection against the enemy. This military collaboration however is limited to problems of common defense without any plan of offensive action. The third attitude, openly in favor of a democratic victory, shows a real understanding of the causes of this war between freedom and fascism. The fourth, on the other hand, is in favor of an Axis victory with the hope that regimes similar to those of the fascist countries will be established.

This situation greatly facilitates open and secret Axis propaganda. In the midst of confusion a ceaseless political war, which becomes more important every day, is being waged between the pro-democratic and anti-democratic elements. The totalitarian propaganda has added to its usual arguments two new ones, particularly adapted to Latin America. The first consists of an infinite variety of charges against so-called Yankee imperialism. The second promises, in case of an Axis victory, a golden age of trade relations between Latin America and a Hitler-dominated Europe. In its usual strategy of making use of the existing economic and political difficulties in order to create trouble, the totalitarian propaganda attempts particularly to persuade the large German, Italian, and Japanese populations there to act as Fifth Columnists. The Axis Powers have not limited their activities to propaganda, but they have organized, or attempted to organize, sabotage terrorist and military organizations. Recent measures adopted by different governments, the splendid work done by many parliamentary investigation committees, and the beginning of co-ordination of police measures with the United States as a result of the Rio de Janeiro Conference have led to the destruction of some dangerous pro-Axis organizations, but they have not eliminated the danger itself.

The democratic forces have been handicapped by many difficulties from the beginning. First of all, their financial resources, coming mostly from the contributions of the poorer sections of the populations, were negligible in comparison with those of the pro-Axis organizations. Axis diplomatic funds, Axis-controlled banks, money extorted from Axis subjects in Latin America or stolen from the occupied countries in Europe, and even forged American dollars, were used to supply and help the anti-democratic forces. At the same time, the United Nations and particularly the United States used the utmost tact in pressing their viewpoint and refused to resort to such open interference as the Axis diplomacy.

But despite these difficulties, the Democracies had and have a powerful potential ally in the peoples of Latin America. The whole evolution in

Latin America, since the beginning of this century, and particularly since the last war, has created a great potential receptivity for democratic ideas. Despite their slight participation in the last war, the Latin American countries have undergone great changes as a consequence of it. The most important change was the economic transformation and a considerable industrialization of Latin America. Likewise, the political and social structure of Latin America was entirely transformed, thanks to the rise of the middle and the working classes.

In Chile, for example, after the last war, the political bloc constituted by the labor movement and the middle class brought to power Arturo Alessandri, who inaugurated an entirely new policy based on liberal tendencies. Progressive ideas influenced labor and social legislation as well as the whole constitutional organization of the country. But dictatorial aspirations were not dead, and only five years later General Carlos Ibanez established a dictatorship. His government was short-lived, however; the Left groups returned to power with a People's Front Government. In the recent election General Ibanez was defeated by Dr. Juan Antonio Rios, who had the support of all the Left groups. Very recently a National Democratic Front was formed linking the Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties and the Labor Confederation into one great movement aiming to consolidate democracy, to destroy nazi and fascist activities, and to work collectively for a severance of relations with the Axis Powers.

In Uruguay, too, great progress has been made since 1919 toward constitutional democracy. The powers of Parliament were extended, the powers of the chief executive limited, titles of nobility were abolished, and equality before the law, freedom of religion, and the right of trial by jury were established. Through the work of the National Labor Office, the conditions of the working man became much better, culminating in an eight-hour day as well as pensions and insurance for the workers. There too, however, Gabriel Terra established a dictatorship in 1933; but popular resistance ended it in 1938 and re-established democracy. In Argentina, electoral reforms were effected in 1912, and the coalition of the middle class and the workers made constant progress until the sickness of the late President Ortiz obliged him to resign in favor of Vice-President Castijo, whose pro-Axis leanings have made their impress on the political development and orientation of that country.

In Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and many other Latin American countries, similar transformations of great historical importance took place. One of the most interesting of these occurred in Mexico, where not only the whole political structure of the country was modified, but important measures of a new social economy were adopted. The revolutionary movement has not succeeded in all the Latin-American countries, but popular tendencies in favor of more democracy and more freedom cannot be denied anywhere.

French, Italian, and Spanish democratic or socialist doctrines have had immense influence. The literature and intellectual outlook of these Mediterranean countries have influenced the whole present adult generation far more than Anglo-Saxon culture. The persecutions by fascism in Europe have created a great sympathy for its victims. This was indicated most strongly during the Spanish Civil War, when the Loyalists had the most enthusiastic popular support for their cause from Latin America.

In this fight which is going on all over Latin America, planning for the future can be an immense weapon on the side of the Democracies. All the popular and intellectual aspirations point toward a democratic world order in which the Latin American countries will share fully. To found the planning program of the United Nations upon the idea of equality is the soundest means of quieting the fears of Yankee domination. The potential forces for a full co-operation with the Democracies are almost unlimited. Recently in the pages of *Free World*, Professor Artucio urged a Latin American expeditionary force of 500,000 men fighting side by side with the United Nations Army. The moral, political, and military value of such an army would be of immense importance. It would be an element of great encouragement to the anti-Axis forces all over the world, and it would be an element of terrible discouragement to the Axis forces everywhere. To utilize this reserve of power, the United Nations must determine to make democracy the fundamental war aim. No part of the world has known more heroism, even if sometimes futile, than the Latin American countries in their fight against tyrants and dictators. This fight is not over. It is up to the United Nations to make it a part of the world-wide struggle between slavery and freedom.

February 1943: The various United Nations information agencies, such as the Office of War Information of the United States, the British and Soviet information bureaus and other Allied propaganda centers are confirming the fact that the Underground in Europe is growing to immense proportions.

It becomes more and more evident that the overwhelming majority of the people want not only to get rid of the Nazis and their own fascists, but also a different regime from that of the past. The political line of the Underground is based on the promise that after the war the situation of the respective countries will be better from every point of view and particularly in the field of economic welfare.

The Underground is at the same time a patriotic and a social-economic revolutionary movement against the existing order. This can be understood clearly in studying its nature and structure. The Underground is a spontaneous movement which was born in the ranks of the people, particularly among the workers, in the form of small local committees. In the

beginning, these local committees were composed of people who knew each other well—neighbors, relatives, friends, etc. At first some of these groups were large, comprising as many as 50 to 60 people. But later the Resistance found that the bigger the number the greater the risk, because if even one member were arrested who could not withstand torture or who could not endure witnessing the torture of his wife and children, the whole group was threatened by his giving the names of his comrades to the Gestapo. Therefore, in 1941, the Underground almost all over Europe adopted the rule that maximum membership in a group would be between 5 and 9.

In the latter half of 1941, and particularly in 1942 and 1943, each of the various local groups elected representatives who together formed the local Councils for the various cities. The local Councils, in their turn, elected regional representatives who made up the regional or departmental Committee. The local and regional committees then elected representatives who formed the National Committee. The National Committee of the various Underground movements, such as Socialists, Communists, trade unions, women's groups and others, formed on a federal basis the Supreme Council of Resistance which in France, for example, was called the National Council of Resistance.

Thus the principle of democratic representation and of federation was as well respected as could be expected under the circumstances. The Resistance movements, while striving constantly for as large a national committee as possible, were nevertheless particularly influenced by the progressive left groups, and thus political and social reforms became an important part of their general program. Most of the Resistance movements promised radical changes after the war in the social structure of their countries. They particularly stressed full employment, national economic planning, control of the basic industries of the country, control of communications, credit, and insurance.

Around the middle of 1943 I met some representatives of the French Underground, among them M. André Philip, who was later to become a member of de Gaulle's cabinet in Algiers. Philip insisted on the importance of different study groups which he had organized, and which were functioning as a sort of Research Department in the Resistance movements. These study groups took up every important problem from constitutional plans to economic and social reforms. Every announcement by Allied leaders of a more progressive future after victory gave a tremendous impetus to strengthening the Underground. In this respect, many Underground leaders indicated that Vice-President Henry Wallace's famous "Century of the Common Man" speech, given May 8, 1942, at a dinner of the Free World Association had become almost the Bible of the European Underground movements. Every time the extremely clever propaganda of the

various puppets—Pierre Laval, Jacques Doriot, the French Goebbels Henriot, Van Mussert in Holland, Quisling in Norway, and others—tried to denounce the Allies as the representatives of plutocratic powers, the Underground opposed these attempts with the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, Wallace's "Century of the Common Man" theory, and various other statements.

The Underground realized right from the beginning that sabotage and military intelligence activities alone would attract only a small group of people, and that larger objectives had to be set. Planning for the future was chosen as the best method to attract public opinion on a large scale. This realization by the Underground had, as its effect, a widespread development of adult education on political and economic problems. Thousands of people who before the war had only a very elementary education in these problems were forced by circumstances to acquire knowledge of vital issues. In their turn these pioneers educated hundreds of thousands of others, and thus created an entirely new political atmosphere in Europe. These popular teachers in political science had the advantage over professional teachers in that their language was the language of the people. It was expressed in simple and direct form; it did not require any previous knowledge. Various Underground publications expressed this tendency best by abandoning their original form of slogans and advancing more and more into discussion of fundamental problems.

January 1944: After consultation with a great number of organizations, in the occupied countries—as far as such consultations were possible—as well as in the free countries, the International Free World Association adopted four principles as a basic prerequisite to the establishment of a durable peace.

The first principle adopted is *International Democracy*. Experience has conclusively proved that the most perfectly conceived national and international institutions cannot come into being without the establishment of international democracy. This means, in the first place, equality of all races and peoples. Of course, this principle does not exclude different functions of the various peoples within the framework of the United Nations. But these different functions will have to be fixed, not on the basis of racial or other discriminations, but according to the specific situations of the people involved. The specific functions fulfilled by each nation are equally important to humanity as a whole. Therefore, there must be no discrimination either economically or politically against any people, as for example in the distribution of raw materials or the admittance to political leadership of the world. International democracy means the end of colonial exploitation. Backward areas and people yet incapable of democratic self-government will benefit by an international administration which will be guided

by the interests of those peoples and by the interests of humanity as a whole. The democratic elements in the different existing colonial administrations, in so far as they exist, will of course be able to continue; but the old type of colonial administration for the purpose of exploitation by one country will definitely have to be abandoned if we do not want to see the return of colonial wars. Permanent peace is impossible without the abolition of colonies. The whole of humanity will benefit immensely by the opening of vast new resources through the new conditions created in backward areas. The democratic transformation of the colonial system will have two important consequences: (1) new rich areas will be opened to humanity and will increase its general welfare; (2) colonial administration, until now one of the most reactionary factors in international affairs, will disappear.

International democracy means further collective security—that is, an organized system making aggression impossible through the permanent pooling of the resources and power of all peoples against the aggressor. Collective security will bring an end to the system of military alliances which sooner or later lead to war. Collective security will guarantee the application of the rule of law in international relations.

The numerous military alliances of France after the last war did not prevent the temporary triumph of the aggressor. Only collective security will make disarmament possible—naturally, after a long period of re-education of the Axis nations and their satellites. The adoption of these principles will have as a logical consequence the end of the regime of absolute national sovereignty. Limitations will be required only in the field of military expansion and violation of international law. Civilized peoples will voluntarily renounce, as the individual citizen already has renounced, the rights to make war and commit crimes. Each nation will actually be more sovereign in the flowering of its national genius and culture, in the development of its particular way of life, and in the enjoyment of an economic prosperity corresponding to the achievements of modern science. The individual citizen will be called upon to bear fewer sacrifices and burdens for war effort.

International democracy will also constitute a first concrete step toward internationalism. Internationalism in our conception means not the negation of national units as cultural entities but the end of that aggressive nationalism which has made international co-operation impossible in the past and will stand in its way in the future. As far back as 1922, a peace congress met in The Hague under the auspices of the International Federation of Trade Unions and suggested educational measures against the "glorification of conquerors and conquests." The international labor movement and all the progressive forces were conscious of the fact that economic and military nationalism constitutes the greatest danger to

peace. No future peace settlement can be successful without the elimination of aggressive nationalism. Democracy itself is impossible in a nationalistic society.

The second principle is *Political Democracy*. This means that only governments which are a true expression of the will of the people can represent the people in the world organization. It means, further, that the participating countries will have to assure to the individual his essential rights without distinction of race and creed.

There is considerable opposition to this provision of democracy. Part of the opposition comes from people who cannot see how the international organization can intervene in internal affairs. The answer to this objection is that there is no case in recent history where free people have voted of their own free will in favor of a dictator. Therefore, international society will have to intervene only in rare cases in order to re-establish the right of the people to express their free will. Who will determine when the will of the people is violated? The World Court, through its special section on constitutionality. Furthermore, the experience of the last twenty years has proved that militaristic and fascist dictatorships inevitably lead to war.

The other part of the opposition comes from people who are troubled about Soviet Russia. But it is quite clear that Soviet Russia, despite being a political dictatorship, cannot be compared in any way to the totalitarian regimes in the Axis countries. First of all, the Soviet Russian doctrine considers aggression or domination of other peoples as counter-revolutionary, that is to say, as being opposed to the most vital interests of Soviet Russia herself. Secondly, Soviet Russia has realized one aspect of democracy, which is economic democracy. Every page in current Russian doctrine indicates the necessity of passing from a temporary period of dictatorship to democratic socialism and communism. Even though its practical application may be delayed, the Soviet constitution represents a very clear step forward toward this goal. Furthermore, no people except the Fascists could ignore the vital contribution of Soviet Russia to winning this war. Finally, Soviet Russia has proved in the past to be extremely co-operative in international affairs, and during her stay as a member of the League of Nations, her attitude was absolutely correct, apart from the war against Finland, which has to be considered in relation to the military and strategic advance of nazi Germany. Therefore, Soviet Russia can be and must be an important member of the international order to come.

The members of the international order will have to agree on a method of international democratic control which will necessitate a minimum of interference, but which will constitute a maximum guarantee for the free development of humanity.

The third principle is *Economic Democracy*. Economic democracy im-

plies the production and distribution of goods in the interest of the whole of humanity. It implies a certain regulation in the same way as political democracy regulates the relations between citizens. Changes in the distribution of wealth will follow necessarily in order to realize one of the four freedoms—freedom from want. Food, clothing, shelter, and medical care are essential to the existence of every individual, essential to every civilized society. In the international field this implies, apart from access to raw materials, regulation of immigration according to international necessity and according to absorption possibilities of various countries.

Economic democracy is the indispensable complement to political democracy. Without economic democracy, sooner or later the citizen loses his power to exercise his rights. Through monopolistic control of national life, peace is endangered because of the inevitable conflict of special interest groups.

The fourth principle is an *Association of Nations*. A full guarantee of peace and justice naturally requires the creation of a real association of nations. Such an association might include within its framework different continental or regional federations, but only as auxiliaries of the world machinery. The Association of Nations will guarantee collective security and have the necessary political, military, and economic powers to make good this guarantee. But in order to use repression as little as possible, the Association of Nations will need broad educational powers in order to spread the idea of world citizenship which will be the ultimate and supreme guarantee of peace. Past experience has proved also that in addition to government delegates, popular representatives should be elected in order to maintain a constant contact between the aspirations and needs of the people and the institution which will safeguard the rights of mankind.

Today, no one can predict whether the principles of a democratic world order will be adopted. Historical necessity points very clearly to the adoption of such an order. But frequently mankind is backward in the acceptance of historical necessities. War and misery are the result of such delay. Reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces are far from accepting disarmament. Even after the Axis defeat, we shall find them fighting against the new order under a variety of covers and pretenses. The initial advantage is with them, because international order is a new experience to humanity and because by virtue of the law of inertia the old order automatically attracts greater attention. Lack of education and ignorance of international affairs on the part of the immense majority of mankind is another great obstacle to progressive solutions. When we consider also the force of nationalism and the economic power of the reactionary interests, we realize how difficult the battle will be.

Existing conditions on various continents are different. We saw pre-

viously that the maximum changes will probably come on the European continent and in Asia, and the minimum in the Americas. The important objective is to release the immense forces in Europe and in Asia, and to encourage their development toward democracy in accordance with their traditions. This will involve the education of great masses of people on a scale of which we are not dreaming today. The spreading of knowledge to peoples which do not even know how to read is a primary condition for the establishment of a democratic world order. The organization of popular forces and unity within the democratic movement is a second vital and indispensable condition. When these conditions are fulfilled we shall be able to look ahead more confidently to the future of humanity.

May 1945: After more than one week of meetings at the United Nations Conference, it has grown very clear that the various delegations, particularly from the European countries, have brought with them a whole concept of human rights and economic aspirations which is completely new in the field of international diplomacy.

The vast difference in the very character of the delegations from previously occupied territories is clearly defined when compared with those at the meetings in Geneva and at other international meetings. The professional diplomats are in a minority. Many people who hold important positions in their national delegations are representatives of the Underground, or very young people—workers, women, farmer representatives, etc.—playing an important part in the policies of their countries.

In looking at the Assembly I was amazed to observe some of the faces of the delegates—men such as Bidault, the young Catholic progressive leader who had become one of the main leaders of the Underground, and who is head of the French delegation in San Francisco. I had previously met Bidault in 1937-38 when he was Foreign Editor of the Paris newspaper *L'Aube*. No one would have predicted that in a few years M. Bidault would represent the foreign policy of his country at an international conference. He is a man of modest temperament, of hesitant speech, but he has a strong will which could have been forged only under the extraordinary conditions of four years of enemy occupation.

In the other delegations one finds representatives of similar background, and a surprising number of people between 20 and 40 who previously had had no other functions than as technical consultants, and who are now political advisors. As the conference goes on, their methods tend to depart more and more from those of traditional diplomacy. Their language is less flowery, more direct. They are tactful, but do not hesitate to speak the truth.

The basic difference between this and previous conferences lies in the fact that these men are bound by political responsibility to their own peo-

ple and not only to their governments. None of them admits for a single moment the idea that the conference could fail. That would mean a personal failure. They would never be able to explain to public meetings at home why they, as individuals, had not done everything in their power to make the conference a success.

The most amazing demonstration of this new diplomacy, in which a representative no longer represents only the will of his chief of government but in which he is responsible to the people, came on Monday, April 30th, at one of the most critical sessions. That afternoon the unanimity among the four Big Powers was broken during the debate on Argentina's admission to the conference. Mr. Molotov strongly insisted on a postponement, while the American delegates, in line with the decisions of the Chapultepec conference, just as strongly insisted on the immediate admission of Argentina. Russia's demand for an adjournment was defeated by an overwhelming majority. That evening I spent long hours with the delegates from the various countries. They were gloomy. They were afraid that this might precipitate a dangerous stalemate among the major powers. But almost everyone, whether from Europe, Asia or America, insisted on the necessity of overcoming the crisis. During the next few days, May 1-2, one could sense throughout the whole conference the desire to resolve this difficulty. The atmosphere suddenly became more amiable, more courteous. The delegates showed a marked sensitivity to public opinion. Applause from the gallery, while it had no weight diplomatically and represented only a small portion of public opinion, was having an effect. And when an agreement was finally reached on the organization of the various committees, all the delegates manifested a great sense of relief. They were smilingly saying "Now we are once more on the road." The way in which this first crisis was overcome, before the eyes of the world public opinion and the assembled press and radio services of the world, marks a new development in international relations. Diplomacy ceases to be the privilege of only a few. It becomes something in which the people participate on a much larger scale. The atmosphere of strictly secluded meeting rooms is being replaced by that of the open meeting in which contradictions and opposing views are aired.

The four basic aspirations which have emerged from the war, namely, security, economic well-being, social betterment, and intellectual development, are being expressed by representatives from all parts of the world.

These representatives in many private conversations and meetings declared their conviction that in order to satisfy the peoples' aspirations, planning for a better world must and will remain after this war as the central function both of national governments and of the coming world organization. Some of the delegates illustrated this conviction by interesting examples of what has happened in liberated territories, particularly in

France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. Once a territory was liberated, the representatives of the Resistance movement, after having asked that measures of purge and punishment of war criminals be taken, immediately insisted on an over-all policy of economic and social planning in their countries.

As one Resistance leader put it to this writer, "In the Underground, our pamphlets which dealt with plans for the future were the most popular, and our study groups were probably the best recruiting centers we had. We have learned during this war that while cutting off fascist activities is a necessary prerequisite for the functioning of democracy, in the final analysis democracy can only survive if it successfully copes with all the needs of the citizens. This can only be achieved by planning."

While up to World War II the functions of government were largely of a regulatory and policing nature, there is today an inevitable and basic change taking place. The functions of government are being enlarged to embrace the economic and social fields. Policing is slowly giving way to creative planning and to administering of the wealth of the nation.

These new tendencies in the field of national government have their far-reaching counterparts in international relations. One of the main characteristics of San Francisco is the fact that the majority of the participating governments wanted an almost complete departure from the traditional concepts of international treaties, and insisted on writing into the new charter economic, social, educational and humanitarian objectives, which they hoped would achieve equal rank with security provisions.

When the student of history compares San Francisco to the conferences of The Hague, Versailles, and Geneva, he will find a radical difference, in that repressive and regulatory functions of international organization are merging into a much wider field of constructive measures to implement international cooperation and planning. Many delegates explained that the reason why they were so eager to reach an immediate agreement and to have a charter even before the war's end, was that they knew that the growing institutional character of inter-governmental functioning is the best guarantee for maintaining and deepening the unity which existed between the nations during the war.

This method of international planning will modify functionally the concept of national sovereignty, much more decisively than any rigid legal agreements. In other words, there are appearing strong tendencies to federate the activities of various nations before federating their governmental institutions. Herein can be discerned the shape of progress to come.

B

BERTRAND RUSSELL

In considering the problems of the post-war world, there are two questions which it is well to separate: First, what do we desire? Second, how much of what we desire has any considerable chance of being realized? The first is the simpler question, and I shall deal with it first.

We all hope that some way will be found of preventing the occurrence of another great war for a long period of time. It is obvious that, if civilization is to survive, we cannot do with a world war every twenty-five years. At the same time, there are some evils which we judge to be even worse than war; we do not choose to secure peace by submission to slavery. The problem is to find a way of securing world peace without sacrificing anything that reasonable people think worth fighting for.

“Liberty” is a good watchword, but is not sufficient as an international principle. There should be liberty to do certain kinds of things, but not certain other kinds. Primarily, there should be no liberty to make aggressive war. It is obvious that this requires some supernational authority with a preponderance of armed force and with a judicial body entrusted with the duty of pronouncing quickly whether, in a given case, aggression has taken place. It requires that most of the great powers shall be opposed to aggression, and shall be willing to punish it even when they are not directly concerned. All this could, at least for a time, be achieved without any formal or legal constitution, by a prolongation of the alliance of the United Nations, with the admission, gradually, of such other nations as agreed with their aims. But in the long run something more explicit would become necessary.

If peace is to be secure, formal provisions against aggression, however necessary, will not be sufficient. There must be a diminution of the motives for aggression. This would require various changes.

1. Colonial territory, not ready for self-government, should be internationalized. This applies especially to Africa. The private imperialisms of England, France, Belgium, and Portugal are out-of-date, and an encouragement to aggression on the part of countries which, like Germany, have no colonial possessions. The suggestion that the territories governed by white men in Africa should be given complete self-government at once is

one that can only be advocated by a theorist with no sense of reality. No doubt ultimate self-government should be the goal, and everything should be done to make it feasible as soon as possible; but in the meantime, joint administration by the civilized nations seems the nearest practicable approach to justice.

2. There should be free access for all to every important raw material. No government should have power to hinder foreign nationals from freely buying whatever a region produces. In the internationally administered colonial areas, there should be no favored nation as regards the investment of capital.

3. Certain places of great strategic importance, such as the Suez and Panama canals, Gibraltar, and Singapore, should belong directly to the international authority, which should garrison and maintain them. Perhaps the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be included in this provision.

I come now to two matters that are more delicate, since they concern, *prima facie*, the internal affairs of a nation rather than its international relations. The original international authority should consist of the United States, The British Commonwealth (i.e. Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions), the U.S.S.R., and China. They should form an alliance to which, from time to time, they could invite other States to adhere. One condition of adherence should be that the State in question either is a democracy or has a constitution accepted by a majority of its citizens in a plebiscite conducted by the Alliance; another should be that it does not contain any considerable geographically concentrated group which would prefer to be independent of it. These conditions having been fulfilled, and the State in question admitted to membership by the Alliance, its constitution should not thereafter be changed by force. It could, however, be changed by a plebiscite conducted by the Alliance, and such a plebiscite should be held whenever a sufficient demand for it had been proved, or, in any case, at periodical intervals, say every twenty-five years.

The reasons for this provision are two. First, civil wars may easily become international wars. This would have happened in the case of the Spanish Civil War but for the extreme policy of appeasement that prevailed in England and France. It might easily happen in a civil war between Communists and democrats, such as may break out in various countries in times of conflict. The prevention of civil war is therefore an essential part of the prevention of international war.

The second reason is that governments imposed by force are likely to be dangerously illiberal and nationalistic, and, since they owe their existence to internal lawlessness, they are not likely to have much respect for law in the relations between nations. It is only by means of respect for law that wars can be permanently prevented; it is, therefore, undesirable that

governments should consist of lawbreakers. Legal means of changing a constitution must exist, and be not too difficult; but illegal means must, when attempted, incur the active displeasure of the international authority.

Still more questionable, from a conventional standpoint, is a second influence which I shall advocate in the internal affairs of certain nations. Where a nation has proved itself aggressive, it should be compelled to have a system of education designed to curb excessive nationalism. Those who have been educated in Germany during the past fifteen years have been unfitted, perhaps permanently, for every kind of international co-operation except that of master and slave. Where the national system of education glorifies wars of conquest and teaches contempt for the rights of other nations, it must be regarded as part of the preparation for aggression, just as much as the manufacture of tanks or airplanes in defiance of international agreements. I hold, therefore, that any nation admitted to the Alliance should be obliged to adhere to certain educational principles and to allow international inspectors to see that these principles are carried out.

There should be important advantages in belonging to the Alliance. In the first place, protection against attack, for an attack on any member of the Alliance should be treated as an attack on the whole. There should also be economic advantages. The colonial regions would be available to members of the Alliance and to them only. There should be lower tariffs for goods passing from one country of the Alliance to another than for goods imported from outside the Alliance. In all such matters as loans, members of the Alliance should receive preferential treatment. The result would be that most nations would be anxious to qualify for membership. Membership should be a privilege, and there should be no undue haste to make it world-wide. Given continued co-operation among the present United Nations, the Alliance would, at least at first, be strong enough to prevent war. It could, therefore, impose in the interests of continued peace whatever conditions of membership seemed desirable to that end.

All this could be accomplished if the statesmen of the United Nations (including the United States Senate) considered it desirable. I have little doubt that it will be accomplished after two or three more world wars, for in the end people will get so tired of fighting that they will think a few minutes' thought less unpleasant than several years of war. But I hardly think they have reached that point yet. What I *expect* falls very far short of what I *desire*.

The practical obstacles are very grave. In the most powerful nations, the main obstacles are isolationism and pride of sovereignty. By "isolationism" I mean unwillingness to intervene in a dispute unless it quite obviously affects national interests. It is typified by Chamberlain's remark that Czechoslovakia was a long way off. Litvinov's dictum, "Peace is indivis-

ible," is one the truth of which nations learn slowly. The sheep that sees a wolf eating another sheep is thankful not to be the victim, and does not think of making a common front against wolves. In the case of nations, this attitude is backed up by collective conceit; each nation thinks that, while others may be sheep, itself is a lion, whom no wolf would dare to attack. The coming of World War II was obvious at least since 1933, but both in England and in America there was a futile hope of being able to preserve neutrality. Any war nowadays is sure to involve almost everybody; therefore, the only way to keep your own country at peace is to keep all countries at peace. But this is a hard lesson to learn.

We shall not get international government until governments of all countries, and a considerable section of the citizens in the leading Democracies, have become persuaded that the constant exercise of police power in every part of the world is the only way by which any important country can keep out of war. Until this is understood, the natural desire to relax after the effort of war will cause people to accept easy solutions and to fancy that nothing is needed beyond the temporary punishment of the defeated nations. The mood of America after the last war may well be its mood now after World War II, and if so, the work will all have to be done again before long.

Pride of sovereignty is an even graver obstacle. It is difficult to imagine America or Great Britain or Russia going to war in obedience to a majority decision of an international council, unless there were a strong national feeling on the side of the decision. But there can be no international authority without a limitation of national sovereignty. On this ground, I think the best that can be hoped is a prolongation of the present Alliance, involving only such obligations as diplomatists are accustomed to undertake toward allies. This, I think, is probable for the next few years, but there are weighty reasons for doubting its permanence.

It is obvious that the two greatest powers will now be the United States and the U.S.S.R. Great Britain will have to attach itself closely to one or the other, probably the United States. But with all danger from Germany and Japan at an end, is it to be supposed that there will be very hearty co-operation between Russia and the English-speaking world? What is to be the extent of Russia's influence in Europe? If a large section in Germany wishes to establish communism, will Russia, England and America find it quite easy to agree on a policy? At the end of the last war, Russia was a defeated country torn by civil war, and at Versailles its wishes could be ignored; this time it will be different.

The victory this time is not simply an Anglo-American victory. There is not only Russia, but behind Russia there is Asia. To fit Asia into any such international framework as America and England might desire will be difficult, if not impossible. I assume that India will be free, probably with

some form of Pakistan. Hindu India will wish to co-operate with the Chinese; Mohammedan India will wish to collaborate with its more western co-religionists. Neither party will wish to have any pact with white men, whether European or American. Toward white men, the mood will be one of strict isolationism.

Ever since the sixteenth century, the arrogance of white men has irritated Asia. The Japanese, for two hundred and fifty years, refused to admit any white men except a few Dutchmen; other Asiatic countries might have wished to do likewise, but were not strong enough. The Russo-Japanese War gave satisfaction to Asia as a proof that the supremacy of Europeans could be challenged. In the defeat of Japan, the victory has not been purely Western; a great part of the credit must go to China, which resisted Japan for years without outside help. India, whatever British Tories may hope, will not be satisfied with Dominion status, since every Indian nationalist feels that his country has more affinity with other Asiatic countries than with the English-speaking world. If—as is not unlikely—various federations are formed, India will want to belong, not to the British Federation, but to the East-Asian Federation. I neither hope nor expect that it will be possible to thwart India's wishes in this respect. Only a handful of reactionaries in England now have any wish to coerce India.

It is, however, of importance to the world, as well as to India, to find a peaceful solution of the Hindu-Moslem conflict. A civil war between Hindus and Moslems might easily become a world war, setting western against eastern Asia, and ultimately the U.S.S.R. against Great Britain. It should be part of the peace settlement to guard against such a catastrophe by insisting upon agreement among Indian political parties and guaranteeing any agreed constitution against lawless attempts to upset it by force. To any such guarantee Russia and China must be parties.

Asia may be expected, henceforth, to demand more complete equality than heretofore. It will require considerable tact and liberality if this demand is not to lead to a general hostility of Asiatics toward Europeans and Americans. They have certain large grievances. India, China, and Japan are over-populated and desperately poor; at the same time, they are severely restricted as to emigration, particularly to Australia and the United States. Neither Australia nor the United States is likely to alter its policy in this respect. But India and China are likely to increase their strength by industrialization, and sooner or later Japan will be allowed to revive.

I wish I could believe that we of the West shall adapt ourselves to this changed situation quickly enough to prevent a very dangerous division of the world into two hostile camps. This is, in my opinion, the greatest danger to world peace in the coming half-century. It is also a grave obstacle to the establishment of any effective supernational authority, since

any such authority would probably seem to India and China a mere device for prolonging white supremacy.

There are two opposite forces that tend to produce great wars. On the one hand, there is the overweening ambition of the strong; on the other hand, there is the discontent of the less fortunate nations. Japan comes under both heads. At first, after Commodore Perry's expedition, white men treated Japan as they treated China. But the Japanese soon managed to assert themselves, and having made the effort necessary to safeguard their independence, proceeded, as vigorous nations habitually do, to conquer others and inflict the evils which they had averted from themselves. This is the usual source of imperialism. British imperialism arose out of the struggle against Spain; German imperialism arose out of the struggle against Napoleon. Unless some method is found of curbing victors, there can be no end to this succession of nations seeking first liberty for themselves and then slavery for others. In World War II, there was not one victor, but four. This diminishes the danger of imperialism; it makes the immediate task of adjustment more difficult, but gives more hope of a settlement leaving no one power unduly preponderant. Given wise statesmanship, there is considerable hope that the imperialism of the strong may be kept in check.

The discontent of the weak, however, will present very difficult problems. There will be, of course, to begin with, the defeated nations. The world will not be tolerably secure until Germany and Japan have some measure of contentment without any chance of conquest, and this will probably require a generation of re-education. But there is another problem which will be more immediate, namely, what to do with the nations that Germany has conquered. Poland—to take the worst case—has been made to suffer appallingly, and is, presumably, filled with a passionate and vindictive hatred of the Germans. However deeply we may sympathize with Poland and however natural may be the vindictive feelings of Poles, it would be unwise to allow our sympathies to hurry us into unstatesmanlike acts of revenge. Some Poles, for instance, urge that East Prussia, a purely German region, should be given to Poland. This would merely reproduce on a larger scale the troubles at Danzig which precipitated the present war. There will be troubles also in the Balkans; the Yugoslavs will probably wish to be rewarded at the expense of the Hungarians and Bulgarians, and so on. In the Balkans the liberal principle of self-determination satisfies no one. There will have to be an imposed territorial settlement, with severity toward all who try to upset it. But the settlement itself should be as nearly just as the complicated racial situation allows.

Some principles which ought to be applied universally can, perhaps, be applied to the smaller nations. Small states, as the course of the war has shown, can only survive through the protection of great states, and in

return for such protection the small states should be required to accept certain obligations. They must accept whatever territorial settlement is arrived at, although, whatever it may be, each Balkan state will think it unfair to itself. They must be compelled, for certain purposes (especially tariffs), to unite in a federation with their neighbors. What is more difficult, they must be required, when the international authority judges it necessary, to accept the protection of a foreign garrison which should not be drawn from only one nation. We cannot risk again the piecemeal conquest of one small nation after another, while those who wish to save them from conquest are compelled to look on helplessly.

In conclusion: while there is not much hope of a settlement which will deal radically with the problem of future wars, there is some hope of a settlement which will prevent another large war for a considerable period of time. Much may be done to solve the problem of private imperialisms and the problem of small independent nations. There is every reason to expect that the settlement will do justice to Asia, and more particularly to India, by removing all outside control except possibly such control by an international authority as ought to exist everywhere. These hopes I believe to be not Utopian, and if realized, they will be the beginning of a new system through which the peace may gradually become secure.

SOUTH AMERICA

The desire for unity, the wish for peace, the longing for concord, deeply implanted in the human heart, have stirred the most powerful emotions of the race, and have been responsible for some of its noblest actions.

—Sir William Osler

SOUTH AMERICA

FUTURE CITIZENS OF LATIN AMERICA

H

UGO FERNANDEZ ARTUCIO

The present drama of Latin American youth constitutes a fact perceptible by mere intuition. Any traveller who has had an opportunity to visit the cities and hamlets south of the Rio Grande has doubtless observed young men leading a lamentable life of idleness, without education, without work, and without joy in living. These young people who have suffered so precociously the loss of all illusion, whose energies are dispersed in prejudices and deeds that are anti-social, these are the ones who fall such easy prey to politico-social movements which cultivate a "dynamic" philosophy. Through a neglect that has been brought about by complex sociological causes, contemporary Latin American youth is ripe for enlistment in the destructive and murderous cause of fascism.

Essentially three intervening factors create this situation: First, and fundamentally, it may be said that in general young men in Latin America do not have adequate opportunities for work which will at once absorb their superabundant energies and contribute to the formation of character at a period in their lives when, in the majority of cases, the material and moral possibilities of their adulthood are being limited and defined. In the second place, these youths spend the most precious years of their lives like shorn lambs in an untempered wind, with no far-seeing program of social solidarity to assist and to save them. And finally, even those who are in the privileged position of receiving a systematic education prove that in practice they lack the mental equipment to face the developing needs of the world of today. For to the confusion of ideas—political, religious and others—is added our modern method of news transmission with its ceaseless assault by a mass of material jammed full of intellectual and emotional content.

I wish to present a vivid and eloquent picture which illustrates these general assertions. For this purpose I take the example of Argentine youth, that is to say, of a new generation which would occupy the highest point on a graph of conditions of life, education, and work in all Latin America. In other words, I offer to the reader the least grave or least tragic example,

because Argentina, from the viewpoint of its material progress and of the exemplary character of many of its social and educational institutions, is the country which, among all the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Republics of Latin America, offers the least virulent conditions of a grave social malady.

I have taken as a basis for this somewhat delicate exposition two notable documents: a study by the Argentinian educator and sociologist, Ernesto Nelson, and an exposition of the motives behind a proposed law presented to the Argentinian Parliament by the Deputy and educator Don Americo Chioldi, recently an official visitor to this country. Finally, I have consulted official Argentinian statistics drawn up in 1938 by the engineer Alejandro Bunge.

Since the population of the Republic of Argentina at that time was estimated as 12,700,000, it is calculated that the number of youths between 15 and 19 years of age is about 1,100,000, of which 604,000 are males (580,000 natives and 24,000 foreigners) and 552,000 are females (535,000 natives and 17,000 foreigners). The youths between 20 and 24 years of age were about 1,100,000, maintaining the same proportions as above.

How do these 1,100,000 youths between 15 and 19 spend their time? In 1937, statistics established the figure of 35,000 for youths of that age employed by industry (25,064 males and 9,286 females) out of an industrial population for the entire country of 580,487. To this figure should be added the number of students, which is approximately 90,000, after deducting the figure of approximately 25,000 university students, since they are always over 19 years old. It is very difficult to establish the number of young people who work in the country, or in agriculture. The Argentinian technician mentioned above estimates the figure at approximately 150,000.

In short, of 1,100,000 young people between 15 and 19 years old, only 300,000 are regularly occupied at manual or intellectual tasks. The remaining 800,000 form an immense and suffering army, forsaken, condemned to enforced idleness, discouraged and skeptical—corroded by social bitterness, propitious material for the formation of bands of country vagabonds, of urban rogues, and perhaps for the formation of assault troops with which a native fascism is preparing to destroy the noble institutions which hold together the democratic tradition of the Argentine people.

Besides this question posed by the occupation of so small a part of the youth, there arises the dark problem of the essential lack of culture of those legions. May we be permitted on this point also to return to the example of Argentina, for the very reason that the Republic is, with the single exception of the Republic of Uruguay, the Latin American country containing the least number of illiterates.

Only 37 per cent of Argentinian youths have completed their primary schooling; only 13 per cent have finished grammar school; and only 8 per

cent complete their secondary education. When these figures are compared with the estimates in the preceding paragraphs, one arrives at the amazing conclusion that the Argentine Republic—the country which has less illiteracy than any other in all Latin America—produces annually 30,000 illiterates of the age of twenty.

“It is sad,” as Professor Ernesto Nelson truthfully says, “to verify such a condition in a brutally objective manner. For years this process has been repeating itself, and it necessarily and progressively lessens the proportion of cultivated people in the population. In the superposition of the social classes, our cultural stratum is extremely thin, and rests upon thick layers of ignorance and frustration.”

Now then, what happens to the youths who have the opportunity to study? A group of secondary teachers in Uruguay has asserted, on the basis of daily teaching experience, that during the last fifteen years young people have shown a markedly increasing tendency to abandon the study of the classics and a much more grave tendency to abandon the use of books. A “reading crisis” exists in Uruguayan teaching which has brought with it a sequel of vices that are serious from an intellectual point of view: parasitism of the student in regard to the teacher, evasion of responsibility by the student, and general lack of interest in the acquisition of a solid culture.

While traveling through South America under the auspices of the Council of Education of Uruguay, I had an opportunity through interviews with the teaching authorities in the majority of the Republics visited to note that the “Uruguayan” sickness is a continental sickness. As to its technical causes, I have arrived at the conclusion that teaching no longer offers young people, attracted as they are by the multiple incitements of present-day life, a motive, a deep center of interest which can compete with the many causes of distraction.

Apparently, teaching does not offer at present the “technical defenses” necessary in order to present itself as more attractive than any of the other centers of interest which surround the young. And what is more serious, it lacks homogeneous and carefully wrought ideals. Naturally, I am speaking of teaching in democratic countries, inasmuch as totalitarian countries offer “ideals”—as England offered them during the time of the reform of Ruskin, or as they existed in Europe and in America at the beginning of the century under the aegis of liberalism. Teaching in America today does not, as a rule, enable young people to form an idea of the world which satisfies their eager spiritual yearning. The problem was stated recently by a Latin American writer, the Minister of Education of the Republic of Colombia, Don Germán Arciniegas, in a talk given to a group of students from the United States and Latin America. He said that our cultural problem lies not merely in the extension of literacy to the great masses, but also in the

creation of a pedagogic instrument necessary to give to the man-to-be an idea that he belongs to an organic cycle, which includes the species and the cosmos, man and the earth.

The foregoing applies to those young people who have the opportunity to receive culture. How dark is the outlook when one thinks about the enormous masses who receive no culture and whose minds are like great tracts of land lying fallow. Their consequent material contribution to contemporary American social organization endangers our entire inherited tradition of democracy, and hence the very future of the southern part of the hemisphere.

More than half a century ago, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the great Argentinian pedagogue who was also president of the Republic, after having struggled all his life against tyranny, established, "Educate the sovereign," as the epitome of his thoughts on government. Educate the sovereign, yes, because that means enabling the people to exercise that attribute, sovereignty, which is the basis of the democratic conception of the modern state. That is a fundamental and urgent task which identifies itself with the defense of democracy in America. To approach it with courage, with decision and with understanding is one way of defeating totalitarianism.

ROMANCE OF POWER IN LATIN AMERICA

J

J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO When the plotters of the Third Reich, foreseeing that American aid to Britain might one day be a decisive factor in defeating Hitler, planned their vast program of propaganda and action in Latin America, they must have felt encouraged by history. They must have had in mind an entire century in which personal rule had been the dominant note in the political life of those nations that had broken their bonds with Spain and become independent.

Certainly nowhere else is the pattern of history richer in strong personalities. The power of fascination exercised over the masses by individual rulers was on occasion so great that a kind of popular complicity in the practice of violence was assured. This strange mixture of despotism and cheap popularity justifies the name given to that type of government, half-despotic and half-parliamentarian, so widespread in Latin America down to recent times: the name of "democratic Caesarism."

The first Caesar—first in power and greatness as well as chronologically

—was the brave, handsome, and ardent Simon Bolivar; “the man who freed one continent and filled another with his name,” as the children in the schools of Paris chanted a hundred and twenty years ago.

Bolivar was too subtle to indulge in the naïve worship of unlimited personal power. He had admired Napoleon to the point of idolatry. He had even made a romantic pilgrimage across the Alps, on foot and in the dead of winter, to follow the path of Napoleon’s Italian campaign. But once Napoleon made himself Emperor, Bolivar refused to be present at the coronation ceremony. Nevertheless, although he realized the inherent dangers of his formula, Bolivar proposed life tenure for the presidency in the republics he created. Going further, he suggested that the president should appoint his own successor in order to safeguard continuity of administration and still avoid hereditary rule, the arch-evil of the abominated Spanish monarchy.

From early youth Bolivar had benefited from the liberalism of his uncle, the Marquis de Palacios, who sent him to Europe to complete his education. In the drawing rooms of Paris, where fashionable society delighted in the philosophers of the eighteenth century, Bolivar had learned to think, and also to love. Later he was to be seen in the midst of his most violent battles seeking relaxation in dancing and feats of gallantry. His happiest day was that of August 6, 1813, when he entered Caracas in a triumphal carriage drawn by twelve young maidens, each more beautiful than the next. Throughout his life he mingled military with amorous conquests.

Bolivar’s opponents and detractors have accused him of attempting in his own person to foist an imperialist dictatorship on the vast lands of Latin America. It is possible that at one time, aware of the lack of political maturity in the men around him, he played with such an idea. But he held back. Even after the victory of Ayacucho, which lifted him to the highest pinnacle of fame, Bolivar was more concerned with organizing the young nations, created by his sword, on the solid basis of respect for liberty and the law than he was with consolidating his own position or emphasizing his indispensability. In his speeches and books he frequently referred to the “horror” that supreme power inspired in him. When the title of *Liberator*—the only one he ever accepted—was bestowed on him, he hastened to found the Order of the Liberators, designed to honor the officers who had distinguished themselves in the fight for independence. He endeavored to live up to his principles always. He freed the slaves and devoted his personal fortune to the financing of the war.

Bolivar’s keen, statesmanlike intuition made him tremble for the future of some of the nations he had liberated, nations that had gained their independence without having acquired the political wisdom essential for successful self-government. He foresaw them being involved in petty frontier squabbles, or in internal quarrels that would undermine the foundations of

his work. Justifiably anxious about the situation, he decided in 1826 to call the Congress of Panama. This was the first attempt ever made to create a kind of American League of Nations. The conference proceeded boldly to outline a superstate that would unite Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile in a single, vast republic bearing the name of the United States of the South. This sublime plan came to naught. The dying Bolívar breathed the disconsolate words: "I have ploughed in the sea."

Bolívar's death marked the disappearance of the greatest statesman of the era of independence. His intellectual make-up and his good taste saved him from committing the excesses which stained with infamy the troubled period following his great work of liberation. For many decades after his passing, the liberated nations failed to produce anyone capable of controlling their fiery turbulence, or of leading them into channels of sound, normal development.

In a certain sense Venezuela, Bolívar's native land, remained the most fortunate nation of all. For some time it was able to rely on the leadership of the *Libertador's* lieutenant, General José Antonio Páez.

Páez was without doubt the most picturesque and human of all the leaders in the unruly period that followed the death of Bolívar. Hard and unyielding in combat, he was unbounded in his personal courage. It was he who harangued his lancers in the Mata de la Miel with the threat: "Whoever of you does not bring back to me a dead man, I will have executed!" Yet he never failed to show mercy to a brave man; never humiliated a vanquished foe. This magnanimity was clearly illustrated in the peace conditions he set forth just prior to the surrender of Puerto Cabello, the last stronghold of Spanish resistance. This peace treaty was concluded a good century and a quarter ago, in an environment utterly lacking in juridical finesse, and signed by a half-literate general. Yet reading it today, one looks back nostalgically to an age when victory was attended by fair dealing and the generous granting of reasonable requests; when victory was not yet treated as an opportunity to show the world the virtues of "racial superiority." "I feel no hatred towards Spain," he writes in his *Memoirs*. "I have learned to love the people of Spain, just by fighting her noble and courageous sons." This respect for the enemy was shared by the majority of the fighters for independence.

In his own way Páez—the "Lion of Apure" his contemporaries called him—a product of the pampas with no training for outstanding military exploits except practice in taming fillies and enraging bulls by tugging at their tails, accomplished in his crossing of the Andes one of the most brilliant feats in the history of South America. He recruited his army from the men of the fields, among whom his prestige was immense, and whom he felt himself destined to lead and command. The lack of suitable war matériel did not worry this Indian leader. His limited vocabulary did not include

the word "impossible." Some of his men fought with pikes of *albarico*, a wood so very hard that points made of it did not break in battle. Others used rifles seized from the enemy; still others, steel lances. When the horses, wild colts tamed in the fury of the fray, fell exhausted, the men replaced them and went on fighting. Burning with a passionate enthusiasm for Bolívar, Páez brought his *llaneros* (plainsmen) from the scorched flatlands of the Orinoco to the snow-covered peaks of the Andes. But the majesty of the mountain-tops succeeded where the superior arms of the foe had failed. Páez and his men, overcome by superstitious dread, fell back. It was there that Páez, "when he saw himself alone, attacked; and when he attacked, triumphed." The chronicles of his day narrate how he unhorsed thirty cavalrymen in a single encounter, espied the target for his lance a league away, dislodged the royalists from their positions by sending herds of bulls down upon them, and pursued the enemy on horseback, finally capturing their artillery by the great rivers.

In time Páez was seized by the lust for power, which came to dominate him to such an extent that he even went through the agony of dressing like the foreign dignitaries. He struggled into tight-fitting trousers and lacquered boots. In his *Memoirs* he shows his sense of humor by quoting a British subject who described his evolution toward polite society: "When I served with him, Páez did not know how to read or write. Until the English arrived at the plains he did not know how to use a knife or fork. However, when he began to mingle with the officers of the British Legion, he imitated their customs, fashions, and dress. He behaved in everything like them in so far as the habits of his primitive education permitted."

From 1830 to 1846 Páez ruled over Caracas and its far-reaching territories as an absolute lord, the first dictator of Venezuela. Bolívar, who knew him well, must have had him in mind when he foresaw for his homeland, as well as for the sister republics, a dark era of dictatorships. Yet it cannot be denied that this uncouth "partisan" succeeded in making his country the most civilized state in South America. Some biographers attribute his principal achievements to the influence of Barbarita Nieves, his mulatto mistress. They point to the eclipse of his political wisdom after her death, which marked the beginning of the end of his power. But it is more likely that his sixteen years of dictatorship had served to enrage the same gauchos whom he had once converted to the cause of independence. They had worshipped and fought for that ideal as for a god, and now they found themselves once more a long way from freedom.

Out of the turbulent welter of internal disturbances that followed the national emancipation of Argentina emerged the tyrant Rosas, the most sinister figure in the whole gallery of American dictators. From 1829, when he assumed command of the Buenos Aires military district, until his defeat at Caseros in 1852—save for short intervals when he cleverly disappeared

from the political scene only to reappear more powerful and more intolerable than ever—Rosas was the law in Argentina.

His strategy in that preliminary stage which usually precedes a coup d'état did not lack originality, and it cast a revealing light on the most conspicuous elements of his character. Rosas had retired to his farm at Cerillos after a madcap career that had begun the night when, a mere youth, he left his parents' house, taking nothing with him—indeed, leaving even his shirt behind so as not to be indebted to anyone. He had risen, by application and good fortune, to the status of a well-to-do landowner. From this position he observed the impotence of Rivadavia, whose good intentions and lofty qualities of mind failed to achieve any semblance of order in the mad swirl of personal ambitions. Rosas saw how Buenos Aires was swiftly devouring, one after another, the men who hoped to govern the country by persuasion and by legal methods. The situation grew so bad that the governor of the province was changed twice in a single day. Rosas prepared for the moment when his hour would strike.

In repeated messages to General Puyrredón, in command of the province, he described and exaggerated the threat of an Indian attack on the farms. He offered to cooperate in protecting farm property if he were granted the arms needed to equip several guerrilla bands. In this way he succeeded in coming into possession of a nice little arsenal of war materials. This was the beginning of his power.

From daybreak to sunset Rosas gave his farm workers military instruction. Cerillos was made over into a vast private barracks. Some entered it through forced conscription; others came, delighted by the affability with which Rosas greeted those who had any accounts to settle with "the law." Deserters from the regular army, escaped jailbirds, criminals, suspected or convicted, all found in Don José Manuel de Rosas a powerful lord who could overlook human frailties. This charming quality accounted for the popularity which years later, in spite of his despotic methods, was to win for him by plebiscite "the sum total of public authority." The gauchos, absurdly desecrating a glorious name, were one day to extol him as "The Washington of the South."

Rosas now controlled his own private little army. It was recruited without benefit of a formulated party program, and set in motion without the aid of an elaborate propaganda apparatus, but its private character and the moral value of its first contingents made it, nevertheless, a forerunner of the Nazi Brownshirts.

About the middle of 1820 the turmoil in the Argentine capital boiled up again. Rosas prepared for action. He waited patiently until he was summoned. At last the provisional governor, Dorrego, utterly unable to cope with the situation, asked his aid. Rosas did not think it wise to show all his strength right from the start. He came to the rescue with six hundred

men. His cavalrymen, however, though small in numbers, distinguished themselves by their boldness and valor. Dorrego felt that he had chosen the right man and dispatched Rosas to Buenos Aires to restore order.

Unlike Bolivar, Rosas soon experienced the delights of "supreme power." He was smart enough to realize, however, that sometimes a brusque attempt to seize control offers less assurance of success than a cunning maneuver in which one appears to yield, little by little, to popular pressure. This was a trick that he perfected with the passage of time. He became a specialist in the art of feigning indifference to public office, and every five years appealed to Parliament to allow him to return to the tranquillity of his country estate. He was certain that the Chamber would unfailingly ask him to continue to sacrifice himself as head of the nation, and that the deputies would even accompany their plea with new honors and an increase in his budgetary allowance. In the final analysis his political tactics were based on this scheme. On the eve of each successive nomination—they occurred whenever he deemed it useful to commit the Chamber to a renewal of his mandate—he would skillfully make use of anyone and anything that would serve to further his purposes. Once renamed to his post as chief executive, let no dare come between him and his whims!

Once Rosas had given Buenos Aires its first proof of his harshness and his might, he returned to Cerillos, to play the role of the upright patriot who had agreed to forsake his private interests for a few months in order to serve his country. He assumed that it would not be long before Dorrego would call on him again—and he was right. In a very short time the governor made him captain general of Buenos Aires, in command of all the military forces in the province.

Once in power, Rosas practised the lowest and cruelest forms of "democratic Caesarism." Enamored of his own person to a degree bordering on insanity, haughty and disdainful towards his equals, he liked to climb down from his lofty heights and go to the people. He was fond of mingling incognito with workers and fishermen, with whom he often hunted, sang, and danced. But his greatest pleasure consisted in offending those who by virtue of birth and personal advantage were inclined to treat him as one of their own. In a certain sense he was a leveler. This sentiment flowed from his resentment at the rebuffs suffered in his younger days when he, the descendant of a family of Spanish *hidalgos*, had to earn his living by managing the estates of wealthy landlords. After the battle of Santa Cruz he caught sight of General Soler in dress uniform, his chest covered with medals. Rosas, although himself elegantly attired, affected to despise all pomp and splendor. Winking at the members of his entourage, he declared: "This gentleman has come here more to show off his decorations than to congratulate me. Pardon me, gentlemen. If you will entertain him for a few minutes, I will get ready to receive him fittingly." Five minutes

later the dictator appeared in the same costume in which his mother had brought him into the world.

At big social gatherings Rosas used to enter the drawing room surrounded by his jesters and dwarfs, and the society ladies of Buenos Aires had to kiss the hands of this bizarre retinue. One day a young woman refused. Rosas ordered a Negro dwarf to carry her outside, undress her, and horsewhip her.

He could slay with ridicule, and some of his political opponents fell before the blows of his macabre wit. He preferred, however, not to run any risk that his mordant sarcasm and moral punishments might fail. Transformed into the supreme public prosecutor and unchallengeable judge, he increased the severity of penalties and personally supervised their execution. The Buenos Aires police archives are full of orders by Rosas like the following: "Give Francisco Saldivias three hundred lashes with the whip and three years in the army as an added sentence." "Have Enrique Wemer shot at once for stealing a saddle-backed horse." "Let the heads of the executed — and — be publicly displayed at the road-crossing."

For twenty years this was the routine. In addition to these everyday administrative measures, Rosas arranged great mass assassinations, like that of Barranca Yaco. His conception of the law was that a penalty had to serve as an example. But he never allowed the victim of this purifying lesson to survive in order to digest its significance. It was the same attitude he had displayed on that day in Cerillos when a rooster burst in on his work-table, upset the inkwell, and so infuriated him that he ordered the immediate execution of all the poultry on the farm.

Often he mingled ferocity with courage, as on the occasion when, like a jackal, he pounced on Dr. Varela, the idolized leader of the Unitarios. When Varela's supporters joined in the struggle, he locked with his victim in hand-to-hand combat and carried his prey across the river, where he finished him off.

Rosas was a great "stage director" of terror. He prepared the execution of Camila O'Gorman down to the tiniest detail, skillfully creating suspense and sustained horror so that the three thousand spectators would later fill all Buenos Aires with tales of their fear and anguish. The first volley of the firing-squad did not hit the human target; the order had been given to "fire at random." One of the soldiers fainted; another let his rifle slip from nerveless fingers. Every moment intensified the horror of the occasion and heightened the emotion of the onlookers, just as Rosas had anticipated. The execution was a great success.

Rosas proved, too, to be a consummate actor in buying off an enemy whose reputation for honesty was impregnable. He would work on his man very subtly, very patiently, enjoying the sight of the other's unconscious

complicity. Then, at the moment of weakness or uncertainty, Rosas would let the gold drop into his hand. It was done noiselessly, as in a dream. The bribe was offered with a timid gesture, as if he feared to offend. Later, when he was again alone, Rosas would burst into loud guffaws. This curious intermingling of graciousness and horror lent an "extraordinary transcendency" to his despotic sway—to use the words of the Argentine historian, Ramos Mejía.

Sleeping barely four hours a night, Rosas had sufficient time to pay attention to the most trivial details. The houses of Buenos Aires could not be painted blue because that color recalled the flag of the revolution. Nor green, which was the color of the Unitarios. Nor black, which might have been taken as an allusion to the grief into which he had plunged the capital. Nor grey, because he did not like that color. So there was almost nothing left but red, as a tribute to the Federalists' banner.

Certain marriages could not be performed without his special permission. Servants complaining against their masters and women who had quarreled with their husbands appeared before him, and he settled their domestic disputes without appeal. A spy system in which female gossips played a major role kept him informed of everyone entering or leaving Buenos Aires. He knew what they had discussed, what news they had brought, and even if they had fulfilled their religious duties during their stay in the city.

At night Rosas passed the hours reading, by candlelight, reports from his delegates in the provinces, or dictating the sternest warning, precursor of worse to come, to some Church official who had consumed twenty more candles than usual during the past month. This matter of a wasted candle excited his rage the most, but he frequently dispatched similar admonitions to mill owners who wasted wheat in their mills. With some allowance for hyperbole it might be said that scarcely a human being stirred, hardly a cent was invested in the most remote provincial hamlet, that he did not know all about.

Rosas dignified this constant preoccupation with details by making it into a kind of "theory of government." "My last message," he once wrote to General San Martin, "may have seemed detailed. But consider how the European social edifice is crumbling [referring to the outcome of the French Revolution of 1848] because its statesmen, dwelling always in the loftier regions of high politics, have not lowered themselves to take so many trifling details into account. Yet these, if left unnoticed, gnaw at the most solid bastions of power." Apparently Rosas attributed the fall of Louis Philippe to the failure of his ministers to keep track of the candles consumed at the Cathedral of Notre Dame.

With the passing of the years popular discontent increased. Throughout the country there arose the dull rumble of revolt against the hateful

tyranny. On February 8, 1852, Rosas was routed at Caseros. Disguised as a sailor, he escaped on a British warship.

Like Argentina and Venezuela, Peru early knew the trials of dictatorship. Ten years after the Constitution of 1826, nothing was left of Bolívar's dream but a memory. Men molded by the struggle for independence had transferred their unquestionable courage and boldness to the plane of an ignoble squabble for personal power. Neither Gamarra nor Vivanco left behind more than a trail of routine violence.

In fact the wives of these first Peruvian dictators eclipse their mediocre husbands. Doña Cipriana Vivanco, a kind of half-Indian Valkyrie, sweeps across the stage of history on horseback, filling the chronicles of the period. Riding at the head of the troops, she displays her rage to her enemies and her beauty to her soldiers. Any one of her captains would die for her, even in peacetime, or, rather, in the intervals between her war-like incursions through the farmlands of Peru. Presiding over bullfights or governing the country, she displays a grace that kindles the minds of poets. In the popular songs of her generation she is the doughty Amazon who inflames the hearts and lends an almost voluptuous note of surrender to her tyranny.

The other countries of South America went through similar periods of dictatorship though they failed to produce tyrants of such conspicuous color and distinction. Bolivia, the ancient High-Peru, with its azure lakes cupped by towering mountains, won Bolívar's heart and it returned his affection by choosing to honor his name. But it was one of the nations which departed most radically from the trail blazed by the *Libertador*. The dictatorship of General Santa Cruz inaugurated a period of external wars and internal revolts, which went on and on until, unconsciously, Bolivians grew accustomed to the spectacle of generals succeeding one another in power. The only prerequisite was to win the cooperation of part of the military garrison. In Ecuador, Gabriel García Moreno ruled for many years, holding in one hand the Concordat, in the other the text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Chile had the good fortune to find General San Martín, a friend of Bolívar, and later, Portalés, who inspired the Constitution of 1833. These two were men of high ideals and balanced minds. They succeeded in establishing a respect for law and democratic institutions in the Chilean nation which has made it an example to the other Latin American countries.

Some of these early Latin American rulers appear somewhat comparable to the dictators of our own time, but to find a real prototype of the modern totalitarian dictator we must turn to Paraguay's Dr. José Gaspar de Francia.

Rosas and Páez came from the pampas, but Dr. de Francia emerged

from a monastery. He learned his theology in the cloistered environment of the College of Montserrat. He studied astronomy and mathematics, read the works of the eighteenth-century philosophers on the sly, and became so proficient in French that for the rest of his life he was very proud of his linguistic abilities. His weakness for everything French even induced him to change his name. For a long time he had signed himself França; then he began to use de Francia, which appealed more to his imagination and was less suggestive of his probable Portuguese ancestry.

If Rosas attained power because of the combative spirit of the cavalrymen he had recruited on his farm at Cerillos, de Francia owed his accession to his passion for study. The Municipal Council of Asunción, composed largely of illiterate patriots, was faced with the problem of signing a treaty with a delegation from Buenos Aires. In its perplexity it turned to the only one of its members who owned a few ponderous books and knew how to read them. At the same time the new constitution was drawn up on a model found in Rollin's *Roman History*, made available by Dr. de Francia. This spelled disaster for his colleagues. From that day on, he issued orders and made decisions. On one pretext or another he set about eliminating all potential rivals, either accusing them of neglecting national interests or physically exterminating them as obstacles on his path to dictatorship.

It was not long before Dr. de Francia held absolute power, even constituting his own ministry. He supervised the construction of new river harbors for defense, the sowing of farm land, and the administration of public funds. But his chief attention was devoted to the army, which he trained personally, studying the most modern textbooks on military strategy and tactics. His knowledge of mathematics he utilized to create an excellent artillery corps. Deeply suspicious, de Francia had no confidence in any of his soldiers, but he felt that he had found a formula for suppressing every potentiality of revolt in his troops: constant strenuous exercise and overwork. At the end of their day's military routine, officers and men alike were so thoroughly exhausted that their only thought was of sleep.

This preventive technique was not the only measure Dr. de Francia took to scotch the possibility of a plot. Whenever he went out on the street he was followed only by his escort; no officials, whatever their rank, or friends were allowed to accompany him. As a matter of fact, he had only one friend anyway: his barber, who every morning brought him the gossip from the street. When de Francia appeared in public, the people had to grovel face downward on the ground, their arms outstretched lest some weapon should suddenly gleam in the sunlight.

Dr. de Francia's asceticism was less the result of his monastery training than of a serious disease contracted during the years when his lean and

somber silhouette was a familiar sight in the red-light districts of the capital. No longer able to enjoy himself as he pleased, he decided that nobody should enjoy himself. Paraguayan society, aristocratic and elegant, accustomed to fiestas and gala balls at the Town Hall and the Governor's Residence, was now forced to lead an austere monastic existence. In a sense this was a relief for the ladies, since they lacked the glamorous clothes needed for a gay social life. The Dictator's policy of national self-sufficiency had deprived them of the gowns and fabrics which formerly came from Buenos Aires and Spain, and they were obliged to wear traditional clothes when they went to Mass. Their queer, old-fashioned dresses were the only souvenirs of the splendor of a bygone age.

Biographers of de Francia are inclined to compare him with Robespierre, and the two men obviously had psychological traits in common. Dr. de Francia's somber personality; his solitariness—the move to Ibiray when he felt he was not secluded enough at the Governor's Residence; the orders forbidding anyone to approach him; the hours spent on a little hill watching the stars through his telescope; the lack of confidence in all who surrounded him; the hatred his memory roused long after his death—all point to a kind of parallelism in the two tragic lives. In 1870 a hostile party entered the Temple of the Incarnation, removed the remains of the Dictator from the tomb at the foot of the altar, and tossed them into the river, imitating those obscure persons who one day entered the cemetery of Errancis in France and seized the corpse of the *Incorruptible*.

Dr. de Francia was perhaps an even lonelier figure than Robespierre. Unlike his French counterpart he never knew the charming peace of those intimate evenings on the Rue Saint-Honoré when the great revolutionary read Racine and Corneille to the daughters of Monsieur Duplay, who were lavish in their tender admiration of him. De Francia inspired no passion like that of the Countess de Chalabre, who watched the Tribune of the People descend from his presiding-chair after the stormy sessions of the Convention and then wiped the beads of perspiration from his brow with her dainty lace handkerchief. (Carlyle, for whom Dr. de Francia had a powerful attraction, regretted that "two Andalusian eyes had never helped soften the Dictator's melancholy existence.") Nor could he win the applause or the hearts of a stormy audience as Robespierre had in the fervid atmosphere of the Jacobin Club.

Robespierre attacked the Archbishop of Aix, the Monseigneur de Boisgelin, in the Assembly of the Estates-General and denounced the lust for wealth among the high prelates. On the eighth of Thermidor, the eve of the fatal day, he appeared before the Jacobins, seeking last-ditch support from these genuine representatives of the people against the intrigues of his enemies. Under similar circumstances Dr. de Francia would retire to his library and, alone, give vent to his rancor and wrath. On nights in

which he was seized with rage his old servant, quaking with fear, could hear him through the walls, shouting insults at the priests and cursing the Pope himself, since he could see the Supreme Pontiff in no other light than as a hated rival to the Supreme Dictator.

De Francia was a mystical believer in the State. He sacrificed everything to the State: the happiness of human beings as well as the welfare of the nation. He abhorred public appearances because he shrank from contact with his kind, and for that reason he left only two speeches. But these, like his messages and his acts, were steeped in totalitarian ideology. The State was placed above everything divine and human: centralized, absolute power was deified.

On the other hand, it must be said for de Francia that he did not deny the possibility that some day men would cease to be instruments of the State and would become free human beings. He even seemed to cherish the prospect. Bartolomé Mitre in his *Historia de Belgrano* relates that when the Belgrano-Echevarría mission was dismissed, Dr. de Francia gave its members a present to remember him by. It was the portrait of Benjamin Franklin which had hung in his office. And he accompanied his gift with the words: "This was the first democrat in the world, the model we ought to imitate. Within forty years perhaps [El Supremo was then sixty, and probably counted on living to be a hundred] these nations will have men the like of him. And only then shall we enjoy liberty. Today we are not ready for it."

Meanwhile, he believed that the only way to maintain a strong and united Paraguay was to isolate it from the world. To protect it against all contamination from the outside, to prevent its involvement in quarrels, he sealed its frontiers. The strictest system of autarchy replaced free trade. At the port of Asunción vessels rotted. People had to go barefoot because shoes, formerly imported, could now be made only in insignificant quantities. Dr. de Francia knew of these privations. He saw how hard it was to find substitutes (the notorious *ersatz* of a later day) for commodities previously imported from abroad. Yet he consoled himself by meditating that all this "strengthened the vital sources of nationalism."

The long series of despotisms that mar the history of South America might seem to give comfort to the agents of fascism in their plans to impose an even greater tyranny on that continent. But if they place much reliance on this aspect of Latin American history, they are due for a rude shock, because the story of the republics of the South is the story of Bolívar and San Martín as well as the story of Rosas and de Francia. It is the story of nations that hate tyranny the more for having endured so much of it, nations that have poured out their blood to attain freedom in the past and that, given genuine democratic leadership, stand ready to defend and extend that freedom. The dictatorships that have afflicted Latin America are

noteworthy not so much for their accomplishments as for the spirit of democracy which they unwittingly produced—a spirit that fascism's emissaries are now discovering to their sorrow.

SOUTH AMERICA'S NEW WORLD NAZIS

R

AY JOSEPHS To the *portenos* of big, bustling Buenos Aires, the nightly scene down at *Dock Sud* used to be just another metropolitan incident, no more exciting than watching the Staten Island Ferry pull out or seeing the Oakland boat being made ready to cross San Francisco Bay.

Every night at ten the whistle would blow, the gangplank would be drawn up and the old-fashioned multi-decked river boat would be tugged out to the muddy Rio de la Plata for the overnight journey to Montevideo. And a trip to "Monte" had about the same importance to Argentines as the Staten Island ride or the Golden Gate excursions to Manhattanites or San Franciscans.

The Montevideo boats still run but the journey isn't the same any more. The lights of the *Costanera* strung out along the long stone river embankment as you leave Buenos Aires and the traditional *toastados y cafe* served on the house just before arrival time the next morning haven't changed. But once you step onto the pier in Montevideo the contrast is sharp, dramatic, a little breath-taking.

You buy a newspaper and you read news. *La Mañana* likes the government; *El País* objects, but it's all there and a lot more besides. You step into a telephone booth, dial a number. You talk and hang up, conscious for the first time in months that no outsider has been wire-tapping. Your bags are inspected by the *Aduana* authorities. But no books are seized as seditious, no letters scrutinized as dangerous, no questions asked about family, friends or religion.

There is free air in tiny, democratic Uruguay. And more and more Argentines—those who can, of course—are taking the night boat to come over and breathe it. Montevideo has become a kind of refuge in a Latin America which under Berlin- and Madrid-inspired Argentine influence seems headed more and more down the totalitarian road.

It is typical of the Uruguayans that unlike many of their Good Neighbors, the more their freedom is threatened, the more they fight to assert it

and to protect and cherish it. I spent some time in Montevideo recently after the atmosphere for newspaper correspondents who wanted to file news, not official Argentine handouts, became unduly oppressive. It was like another world, like suddenly leaving an occupied camp for freedom. And it stands out all the more as I think back over events of those last months and recall my journey through Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Central America and Mexico en route back to the U. S. A. for the first time in almost five years.

Almost every country in the Americas has already been affected by what has happened in Argentina. But it is only a beginning. Latin America today is seething with discontent, with growing nationalist prides, with fears about the postwar and what the U. S. is going to do about it and with a curious mixture of emotions about what is going on in Argentina.

You sense it when you fly across the Andes to Santiago, Chile. You see the Argentine pattern already at work in land-locked, mountain-top Bolivia: military control of everything civilian, strait-jacket censorship, intolerance, anti-Semitism, Nazi- and Falangist-bred patriotism which expresses itself in hatred of *Tio Sam*, meaning the United States. Peru, full of lip service to democracy, is run like a feudal *hacienda* with no opposition tolerated. I was in Ecuador when the popular but uncertain Velasco Ibarra took over and in Colombia just before a group of Argentine-minded Army officers unsuccessfully attempted to install a military dictatorship in Bogota. The only reasonably quiet republic I found in Central America was Costa Rica. For I was able in a short space of weeks to eye-witness movements in Nicaragua, in Honduras, in Salvador and in Guatemala. In some, dictators were going out, in others they were coming in, but everywhere there were signs of disquiet that make the visions of peace in the Americas almost less secure than anywhere else.

There was a mistaken notion here in the States that all of these moves were dictated down to the last detail in Buenos Aires and that everything which happened in Buenos Aires was in turn handled via direct line to the Wilhelmstrasse. This was accompanied by an assumption that with Hitler beaten, all the troubles would stop. The fact is that while much of what has been taking place in Latin America today and will be happening *mañana* stems from the inspiration and covert help of Germany via the colonels' clique, there is a deeper reason. How it came to happen in Buenos Aires gives the clue as to the ways and means in which the rest of Latin America is involved. It also gives a dangerous warning of what lies ahead here, regardless of developments outside the Americas.

Many people have asked me if it is not true that the events of two years in Latin America somehow indicate the failure of our Good Neighbor policy. There is some truth in this point, but it is certainly not correct to blame everything on such a facile premise. It is not the Good Neighbor

idea that is to blame, so much as the fact that such a policy should have been devised and put into effect a long time ago and that it must needs be extended, broadened and made more sincere today.

The Germans in their operations in Argentina and in Latin America worked their technique the other way around. Their method was to win not merely the people who had the power—which is essentially the way our own State Department has operated—but also those who might eventually wish to seize the reins for their own advantage. In Argentina, for example, the Nazis and the German militarists before them started working a long time ago. Authenticated information, compiled by careful researchers, traces German plans back a hundred years or more. But the present-day effort roughly began before the first World War, kept Argentina neutral then, emerged again when the Prussian militarists and the Junkers found opportunities limited at home and began expanding their operations in Latin America.

Argentina offered the ideal field—it was the only country which had an almost pure European stock. It possessed rich agricultural and industrial possibilities. And it had an Army; an Army which was taught not only the goose-step but the political philosophy of Berlin. After the Nazis came into power, the cultivation of Argentina through General Wilhelm von Faupel's Ibero-American Institute began in earnest. The emphasis was in two directions. There was the military drive to convince the Argentines first of Nazi superiority and the value of a strong, centralized authoritarian system for the military itself. And the other to develop a strong nationalist group in Argentina which would operate against the Americans and the British. It was these forces which, in the main, brought about the June 4th coup and it is the same forces, so carefully cultivated and developed, which are now guiding the *Casa Rosada*, B. A.'s pink White House, and spreading through the rest of the Americas.

The desire for power and the hatred of the British and Americans which motivate many Army officials in Argentina and the other Latin republics means that the downfall of Hitler and Tojo will have little direct effect on totalitarianism in Latin America. What the colonels have acquired from Berlin and Rome and Madrid is a system which fits in perfectly with their personal plan, a plan to which they have been bred without fully realizing its source and which they intend to continue for as long as they can hold the power.

That this imposition of a freedom-crushing, aggressive Fascist state also provides a basis for the Nazis to move into Latin America, develop a foothold in this hemisphere and get ready for their next try at world conquest is only of incidental concern to the Argentine colonels.

The Nazis have always wanted it that way and not without reason. When the war began, Argentina which had always lived from the sale of

its meat and wheat to England and the Continent felt the war's sharp impact far more than did the U. S. Many of the rich, ultra-conservative cattle-raising *estancia*-owners had a natural sympathy toward Britain. It was a latent sympathy however and the British fumbled, and we belatedly began attempts to develop it further. The Nazis who had been carrying on their propaganda activities a long time immediately began their Latin blitz—on the Argentine military and on the extremists among the Argentine youth. Both groups could be sold on the idea that they would have something personal to gain under the authoritarian, and something to lose under the democratic, way. Artfully stimulated prejudices, nationalism and sovereignty were made the basis by which both the nationalists and white-haired, tight-lipped President Ramon S. Castillo long preserved Argentine neutrality. Neutrality, as sold in Argentina, means independence of action for a proud, sensitive people. In operation it meant non-cooperation with the rest of the Americas and giving the Nazis full rein to carry on espionage, sabotage and fifth columning.

It was a device like Hitler's devices that won support in Argentina because its appeal was direct and practical. True, the support was that of a minority and never that of a party like the National Socialists or the Fascisti. But it was an active, vocal minority which had something personal to gain. And since majority sentiment was predominantly the other way, Castillo early began the suppressions which eventually paved the way for the military to take over almost without a struggle. At the same time the vital corps of younger, ambitious Army officers were worked on. The United States was constantly pictured as arming Brazil for an attack on Argentina. Internal graft and dissension were fomented to their utmost to create public unrest—another Hitler technique. The advantages of Argentina's fence-sitting position were not hard to stress for in spite of everything Buenos Aires did to aid the Axis, the U. S. and Britain, although issuing detailed protesting memoranda, continued to buy and sell and trade, while Argentina grew richer and more prosperous through war.

Despite what most of the world thought in those first June days of 1943 it was obvious to some of us in Buenos Aires that throwing out Castillo was no move to break the Axis. Rather it was a fear that Castillo might "submit to Allied pressure." It was the Army's destiny to take over and rule that caused the colonels to move in. Those first days were full of airy promises and balcony-delivered double-talk to the crowds in tree-lined *Plaza Mayo* in Buenos Aires and to the diplomatic representatives of the embassies. As in Germany, the most presentable representatives of the colonels' clique were pushed forward to protest and promise to make us believe that soon—"just give us the recognition first, please"—steps would be taken against the Axis. Democracy fading under Castillo would be restored, to be sure, and only graft—which of course had had no public supporters—would be elimi-

nated before the country would be handed back to the people. I recall cabling long stories to my papers—through Montevideo—expressing the hope of realistic pro-democratic Argentines that no recognition would be granted on the basis of such promises. Pro-democratic Argentines apparently had no place in the judgment of Washington and London, however.

Then it began, step by step. First, as in the Reich, it was the press, already gagged by Castillo's State of Siege. Military censors moved into editors' chairs. They determined what could get into type and what must be put on the "dead hook." They stopped or ruthlessly blue-pencilled all outgoing cables. All this, of course, under the guise of maintaining neutrality and impartiality. The radio was next and with it the films. Then came the trade unions, the pro-democratic organizations and the political parties. The colonels' clique—the notorious G. O. U.—which put the program into execution first fumbled. Then getting renewed strength from the failure of the U. S. and Britain to do anything they seemed almost to be working from a Spanish edition of *Mein Kampf*. General Pedro P. Ramirez, who was put in as President to wave the flag and attend the innumerable Federal affairs, rubber-stamped decrees with such rapidity that stories even circulated that no paper could be left on his desk more than a moment lest it be signed and made into an official statute.

Official intervention spread into even the tiniest details of personal life. Telephone lines were tapped, mail opened, businesses obstructed or expropriated. All, as in Germany, in the interests of the State and for "the improvement of the people," who were not consulted. Even the slogans were similar to Der Fuehrer's. Everything was advertised as a drive against Communism—and that term became all-inclusive for anything the jingoistic colonels didn't like. Church and State, which despite Argentina's strong Catholicism had always been kept well apart, were linked with religious instruction made compulsory. The most reactionary, Falangist-influenced churchmen served as behind-scenes mentors with the leading pro-Nazi Army officers.

Anyone who dared oppose the regime was silenced. Taking seriously an official designed-for-export announcement that freedom of speech had been restored, a group of 150 of Argentina's most distinguished educators, scientists, doctors and lawyers put their names to a petition urging the colonels to reconsider their course. Every one was dismissed. And the last jam-packed lectures of some of the professors, men who had served for twenty-five years and brought world fame to Argentina, were as heart-rending as anything ever seen in the early book-burning days of the Reich. Labor leaders, teachers, civil service heads, all who could not be silenced by threats—and unfortunately too many could—were hustled off to Villa Devoto or down to concentration camps in remote Patagonia.

Argentina's break with the Axis changed none of this. When Ramirez

and his Foreign Minister sought to implement the action, they were forced out. In Ramirez' place came square-jawed Edelmiro J. Farrell. The real power, however, remained in the hands of the colonels' *junta*, and especially those of Juan M. Peron whose list of jobs began to run as big as that of Goering's medals. There have been both major and minor changes in the cabinet since; and more recently, under the sting of the bitterest White Paper denunciation our State Department has ever issued, other moves such as the supposed lifting of censorship and freeing of a certain few political prisoners designed to make the world believe that things aren't so bad in Argentina. Underneath however the terrorism and the plan to spread to the rest of the Americas gets stronger, not less.

I know the Argentine colonels, know what they want and how they have gone about getting it in Argentina and the countries south of the Rio Grande. Despite their ruthless suppression of democracy in their own country, their interference in Bolivia, in Paraguay and now most emphatically in Chile, despite their open aid to the Nazis, so bitterly denounced by Washington, they have to date succeeded in getting away with it because of the tolerance and the seemingly unable-to-move position of Argentina's biggest customers, Britain and the United States. Again and again we have issued notes, have cited facts and published warnings—but have failed to follow them up. We have talked economic sanctions and even tried to apply them in some small ways. Each time, however, we have withdrawn just when we should have advanced.

While not so long ago there was much controversy over whether anything ought to be done about Argentina, today that phase of the issue is no longer in debate. Argentina's vast rearmentament program, begun after we rightly refused to sell lend-lease weapons which Argentina wanted to buy for her own non-hemispheric defense purposes, is no longer a petty growth. It is a full-grown threat to Argentina's smaller, weaker neighbors and a potential time bomb certain to explode in the direction of Brazil and eventually of the U. S.

The activities of the Nazis in Argentina are not merely espionage through the open gateway of Buenos Aires. We have pretty well succeeded in neutralizing the operations carried on against us in the purely military sense. What the Nazis have filtered into Argentina via Spain and what Argentina has allowed to spread to the rest of Latin America is far more dangerous. For under the *pampa* soil the Nazis have buried the seeds of the next war.

There are those who have argued against sanctions for Argentina as interference in internal affairs. I disagree—and so do many of those pro-democratic Argentines still able to voice their opinions. The Argentine military regime came into power through outside influence. Cutting ourselves off from Argentina—refusing to buy her meat and wheat and forgetting

business and refusing to sell our products to her—is not interference, it is merely refusing to subsidize Fascism as we subsidized it in Spain and elsewhere.

Once we close the gate, the pinch will come in prosperous Argentina. The rich *estancieros* today may not like the military, but they tolerate them because they can continue to sell and profit. The middle-class—and Argentina is one of the few Latin countries that have one—objects, but its leaders have been bound and gagged and it has not suffered enough physically to rise up and do something drastic. Meanwhile the colonels win more and more Argentines to their way of thinking by an all-inclusive, Goebbels-patterned drive to make the people believe the U. S. A. is trying to crush and intimidate them, to rule them or to break them.

We are getting less popular day by day in Argentina. Elsewhere in Latin America the same thing is happening. Chileans and Bolivians and Ecuadorians seeing that Argentina has profited from her defiance of the U. S.—while they have suffered through cooperation—are realistically asking if they have been the suckers for *Tio Sam*. We are being blamed for imposing sanctions on Argentina anyway, even though we haven't imposed them . . . And the longer we leave the issue unsolved, the more difficult and dangerous it will be to solve tomorrow.

I have only been back in the U. S. for a short time. But what I have seen and heard and read convinces me the American people are not merely ready, but ahead of officialdom in wanting to do something to check the Fascist octopus now spreading in our own hemisphere.

It is not the first time that the American people have been more alive to such issues than their leaders.

EUROPE

This party will make the twentieth century.
There will issue from it first

the United States of Europe, then
the United States of the World.

—Victor Hugo

RELIEF FOR THE LIBERATED

H

HERBERT H. LEHMAN One of the basic freedoms without which the others become impossible is freedom from want. Only those who are free from want can be free from fear. Only those who are free from fear are likely to accord freedom of speech and of religion to their fellow men.

Recognizing that freedom from want is essential, the forty-four United and Associated Nations have joined together to help the liberated people establish this freedom surely and quickly. So that the post-war settlements and new arrangements in many fields—political and economic, educational and cultural—might be made in an atmosphere of calm and deliberation, not in one of desperation and chaos, the United Nations have banded together in a compact, setting up UNRRA—the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This compact pledges the uninvaded nations to help the liberated nations bind up the wounds of war and make the earliest possible start on getting normal peacetime supplies of the necessities of life to their people once again.

Obviously, the purpose is to put those necessities within the reach of liberated people so that they may not have to turn their sole attention to the struggle for immediate physical survival. If the peacetime international understandings are reached in that sort of an atmosphere they are not likely to be wisely formulated or to last very long. On the other hand, if the peace can be made in a world where the scarce goods of daily life are fairly shared among the nations, and those countries that have been devastated are given the help needed to start up again; a world where the hand of humanity helps to reunite broken families, and puts medical science at the service of the world to prevent epidemics—if the peace can be made in such a world it should have a much better chance to endure.

The broad policies that guide the healing ministrations of UNRRA to the war-stricken peoples are jointly set by all the nations through the Council.

In setting up the now existing policies, the Council took into account the fact that there would be several sources of relief to the liberated

peoples, and made provisions for UNRRA to serve as an equalizing force, making sure that the principle of equality prevailed as between nations in the provision of relief goods and services.

Here are the main lines of policy laid down by the nations for this program of international fair sharing:

First, the United Nations as a group respect and share the desire of every member nation to be free and self-determining.

Second, the United Nations know that every liberated nation will do its utmost out of its own resources to bring its people back to health and strength and reestablish its agriculture and industry.

Third, the United Nations know that not all of the liberated nations will have immediately to hand resources large enough to provide a fully adequate supply of goods and services for their people.

Fourth, to any liberated nation which lacks resources of its own to do a fully adequate job, the United Nations through UNRRA will extend a helping hand and, so far as its resources permit, make available out of the pooled resources of all 44 nations the required goods and services.

That is what UNRRA is about. It is a service agency set up to translate the good-will of the United Nations one toward another into the practicality of equal supplies of goods and services for relief and rehabilitation in each liberated nation.

Let me repeat that UNRRA is not the only resource that will be drawn on by the free nations of the world to reestablish decent, humane living in the liberated lands. It is the means of pooling the resources of all the nations so as to balance up supplies and opportunities fairly and squarely. Let me point out some of the other resources of supplies and services that will be brought into play before and along with the UNRRA operation.

In the first place, the armies of liberation will provide for the relief of the civilian population in the areas under military control. This is an obligation of international law. It is a matter of military necessity. Over and above that it is an expression of the humane policies of the United Nations. The United States War Department appropriation alone for 1945 sets aside over a half billion dollars to be used in bringing supplies and services to the freed peoples whose territories are temporarily under the military government of U. S. forces.

When the liberated peoples resume self-government, each nation will of course do all it can to bring in supplies that are needed from outside the country, to re-establish welfare services, to bring farm and factory production back to full volume. Those countries which have foreign exchange resources to buy the necessary goods in the markets of the world will use those resources. To the extent that their own resources are sufficient they will not draw on the United Nations' pool of supplies and funds

for relief. Such countries as France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, which do have some foreign exchange resources, will levy but lightly on the international fund for goods.

But these countries too will be the scene of many services carried on by our international agency in the interest of world health and humane treatment of unfortunate individuals. One is the UNRRA Displaced Persons operation. Through it, we will assist in the repatriation of great masses of unfortunate people, estimated at some 20 millions in Europe alone, who have been driven from their own countries by the nazi design for disrupting European civilization. This service will operate in most countries of Europe and many of Asia. So will our preventive medical program for stopping epidemics by cleaning up the smoldering plague spots of disease left behind by nazi design, and by helping apply continuous sanitation and quarantine measures. So probably will our program for joining with the voluntary relief agencies of the civilized world in helping the people nation by nation set up once again their own self-help organizations for aiding the weak and the stricken and the helpless.

But aside from these international services which will go on everywhere, the fundamental program for supplying the necessities of life will be drawn upon most heavily by the liberated nations which through nazi looting have lost their own foreign exchange resources. If the rest of the United Nations did not in this hour of need come to their aid, they would get less than their fair share of the imported goods they need to start on the road back. In the interests of humanity, then, the United Nations are financing UNRRA and directing that we take aid to each liberated nation which requires help in importing the necessities of life from the rest of the world.

To recapitulate the sources from which relief will come to the war-torn countries: When civilian governments take over those which have foreign exchange resources will use them to obtain the necessary imported supplies; those which do not have foreign exchange resources will draw on the UNRRA pool for imports; ex-enemy countries will have to pay for their imported goods themselves; certain international services such as handling repatriation of displaced persons and safeguarding against epidemics will be carried on wherever needed by UNRRA.

There has been misunderstanding about the role of UNRRA. Some apparently have assumed that it is to be the sole source of relief supplies and services. This has led some commentators to express surprise when they learned, for example, that the Government of France or Holland carried on conversations with Allied military authorities about relief supplies for use immediately in liberated areas; or that those governments would provide all or most of the relief supplies for their people after the military period. They should not be surprised, of course. As I have pointed out the UNRRA

program is one of equalizing and balancing up, not one of doing the whole relief and rehabilitation job.

In this process of equalization it is our duty to bring together the estimates of the relief supply requirements of the people in the lands which have foreign exchange resources to pay for imports as well as those in the lands which do not have such resources. We combine the requirements for all countries to be liberated into one submission to the Combined Boards. These latter are agencies set up to allocate the uses of the goods that are in short supply by the United States, United Kingdom and (in some cases) the Canadian Governments. These boards have the responsibility of determining how much of the world's supply of, let us say, wheat or textiles shall go to military uses, civilian uses in the producing countries, relief uses, or export to neutrals. The relief needs must be balanced up with all the needs. UNRRA submits the total relief needs to these boards.

To sum up, then: For humane reasons, for reasons of good hard-headed common sense, the United Nations are determined to see that all the lands released from tyranny shall have a speedy chance and an equal chance to start rebuilding a new and better world. They have pooled their resources so that the less fortunate nations will have that equal chance. They have set up a service agency—UNRRA—to make this policy a living reality.

That is what UNRRA is about. If it is successful, it will work itself out of existence in a relatively short time. Being successful, it will make possible the establishment of an improved order among the nations because they can go at the job in an atmosphere of relative security, not one of desperation and heartbreak.

The nations will make their new and long-range international economic and political and cultural arrangements through means other than UNRRA. They did not direct UNRRA to take part in the formation of the postwar understanding in these other fields. In fact, they specifically excluded UNRRA from exerting any influence on political, religious or other affairs. It is commissioned and directed to do a strictly limited, defined, and possible job. Other jobs presumably will be assigned by the nations to other international agencies.

To my mind, this realistic approach along the avenue of the possible to the specific problems of the postwar era holds promise. By several such approaches we may eventually arrive at the goal we seek—permanent adjustment of the world to the realities of modern science and engineering, and the eternal verities of justice and goodwill among men.

V

INCENT SHEEAN

To those who have fought and suffered for years to achieve our present degree of victory over Fascism it seems monstrous and almost unbelievable that the western democracies, vowed to muddle and confusion to the end, are still supporting General Franco's dictatorship in Spain. The Spanish Fascist state, modelled on those of Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, differs from them in only one important respect, which is that it did not openly make war upon us. Instead, it used its non-belligerency to obtain materials from us to pass on to our enemies; it harbored our enemy's espionage system and extended it to the Americas, including Washington; when we entered Africa in the opening phase of our campaigns across the Atlantic, this state mobilized its army and stood ready to attack us whenever Hitler should give the word. Correspondence between Hitler and Mussolini, which has come to light in the ruins of the parent or patron Fascist states, shows that Hitler was ready to give the word but was persuaded by Mussolini that Spain would be more useful posing as a "neutral." (*New York Times*, May 26, 1945.) And it is to be noted that the Spanish Fascist state never regarded itself as "neutral" at all until the victory of the allies in this war became overwhelmingly certain. Up to then it was, by its own proclamation and repeated declarations, merely "non-belligerent," with not the slightest pretense at neutrality. Indeed, to those who read the Spanish official press and listened to the Spanish official radio during 1940-43, it seemed that the Fascist offspring was far more venomous even than the parent stock. The Madrid radio vomited forth lies about us, invented victories for our enemies, lavished the most eloquent praise upon the individual Nazi leaders and at all times spoke in the tone of a full Axis partner and participant in the war. For years the output of our information services, British and American, was forbidden to be shown publicly in Spain, while the product of Dr. Goebbels' Propaganda-ministerium filled the eyes and mind of the Spanish people. The "exploits" of the Legion Azul in Russia, the Spanish infantry division sent as token participation in Hitler's attempt to conquer that country, were reported in the Madrid press as if they had been the crusades of the Cid Campeador.

Nazi visitors to Franco Spain were received with military honors

and public parades; our own ambassadors, British and American, were received coldly and as if on sufferance, without much chance of doing more than formally protest against the course of Franco's policy. And, what would have seemed an overt act in the days when Britannia ruled the waves, the Spanish Fascist government unceremoniously seized Tangier in the autumn of 1940, putting an end to the international régime agreed upon in the treaty of 1906, and treating both the British and the Americans with open contempt.

Such a series of insults has never been inflicted by a weak power upon two great nations. Why do the British and the Americans not only accept these insults, but actually continue to recognize, support and supply the Fascist dictatorship which hurled them at us?

The answer must be found in the realm of high politics, that realm to which—alas!—generations of British upper-class gentlemen have been bred and, more or less, trained. High politics—*la haute politique*—is a very different thing from realistic politics, *Realpolitik*. In high politics, as we see it through the histories and biographies and memoirs of the nineteenth century, the interests of the nations were in the hands of suave, elegant diplomatists who tried very hard to keep their minds pure—that is, to ignore difficulties, gloss over them, and above all never to recognize the existence of profound popular forces and tides. In high politics phrases like “balance of power” come into existence easily, and flourish like the green bay tree, because they take the place of any kind of thinking.

The present climate of high politics in London and Washington is strongly conditioned by that ominous phrase. It is quite obvious that to minds inhabiting these realms a sort of division of the world has taken place between the Russians and the western democracies. True, this division is a little frayed at the edges, and no man could say with any conviction how permanent even these edges may be; but it exists in the directing minds of foreign affairs and an attempt is being made to perpetuate it. The sheer folly of such an attempt ought to be apparent to any moderately intelligent child of nine or ten, but the daily newspaper daily informs us that it is being made, just the same.

What does this mean? It means that some Alexander Borgia has drawn a line about the world. So far as Europe is concerned this line runs somewhere down the middle from Scandinavia to Trieste. On the western side of this line lie nations which, willy-nilly, must come into the orbit of Great Britain, with the American government somewhat uneasily in support. From Trieste the line cuts down through the Adriatic and across the Epirus to the Dardanelles. (In this area the dangers are very obvious, but do not concern the subject of this paper.)

In other words, instead of working towards an agreement with the Russians and a necessary synthesis, at least in some areas, between social-

ism and capitalism, the western democracies are attempting to set up a system of power which will "balance" (i.e., oppose) the Russian system at every point. One would think such a scheme had no place outside the lunatic asylum, but it is being put into effect every day and its results fill the pages of our newspapers. And these very same people who create the situation then turn round and say blandly: "The Russians distrust us; they will not even allow us into their military areas."

It will, of course, break down, because it is anti-historical and without social or economic base. It will break down in France, Italy, Greece and other points along the line. No policy was ever more blatantly doomed to failure.

Even the people who create this policy do not believe in it; they merely wish to cling on a little longer to things as they used to be—unaware, perhaps, how profound the changes in these years have been.

All this is said merely to shed a little light on the paradox of our support of Fascist Spain. Spain lies geographically west of the new Borgia line. It is therefore in the orbit of Great Britain, uneasily and most insecurely supported by the United States. (The support of the United States will also ultimately be destroyed by this policy, along with everything else Great Britain possesses, if it is blindly persisted in for very much longer.) According to the childish view obtaining in the climate of "high politics," Spain must be kept immune from Russian influence. (As if any part of the world, including England, was immune to such influences!) To do this, a reactionary government with authoritarian methods is desirable. For the moment General Franco satisfies this desire, especially as he is making frantic efforts to shed his past.

It does, however, seem likely that internal pressures in England will render the present support of the Spanish dictator impractical after a while. It "looks bad." It shocks English liberals and angers British workmen. It even irritates a good many British Tories, among those who find it difficult to forget insults. If it is impractical to retain Franco, some shift or change might be found. There is a prince who would like to be king. With this king there could be an effective army dictatorship and some well-controlled simulacrum of democratic processes. But to throw open the polls for all the Spanish people to vote upon what they really want would be opening the door to socialism, anarchism, communism and all the other evils which the new Holy Alliance is devised to keep out. This, at any rate, is the theory.

In logic and common sense, forgetting all this nineteenth-century fol-de-rol about "balance of power," what we should do is withdraw our recognition of Franco and stop all supplies to Spain. The Spanish people would take care of the rest. And when the Spanish people had acquired a government of its own (supplanting that imposed by Hitler and Mussolini) we could resume normal relations with that government, whatever it might

be, respecting its independence and sovereignty as we wish our own to be respected.

Such a course will not be taken; it does not lie in the nature of those who govern England and lead along with them the foreign policy (at present) of the United States. They will ignore, perhaps until it is too late, the primary necessity of the present world and of the coming years, which is to make a synthesis between the two unlike or opposing systems—to compound and agree with the immense fact of the Soviet Union, so that we shall have a world not divided but united in the main purposes of production and peace.

They will also attempt at every turn to obfuscate liberal opinion in their own countries by saying that agreement with the Soviet Union is difficult or impossible because the Russians distrust us, are suspicious of us, and will not share their plans or secrets with us—attitudes which may indeed be true, but are created by the very nature of this Borgia policy.

So, in the result, since Spain lies within the area west of the Borgia line, we must not hope for too much from the western democracies. What may occur, but is unlikely in an exhausted and suffering people, is an indigenous revolt which will itself sweep Franco and his Fascism away and instal some kind of government responsive to the structure of thought and hope in the Spanish people. If this could be—if this could only be—the western world might indeed see an object example of that which was only crudely and hastily sketched out in the final years of the Spanish Republic, that is, a genuine attempt at the synthesis of the two systems which now divide the world.

In the meantime we who saw the glory of Madrid and the pride of the Ebro know that the first act of our present drama was by all odds the most quintessential, historically the most significant. That nations should, by material wealth and prowess, militarily defeat other nations, is nothing new in history and can by itself—without the intervention of other elements—have no permanent result. But that a whole people should take arms, weak and inadequate arms, and with them oppose the strength of Fascist-Nazi power at its height or near its height—this was an episode which will forever command the admiration of mankind. We cannot forget the million and a half Spaniards who died or were wounded in order to preserve us from the general war. Our own blindness and confusion, or that of our governmental leaders, kept us from taking advantage of that opportunity given us by the blood and suffering of Spain. We have since been compelled to give our own blood to pay for these errors. If the errors persist, the blood we have already given will be as nothing to that which will cover the earth.

And in the end we shall have to come to the same thing anyhow—which is a synthesis of our conflicting modes of thought and action. Spain

could be, by its nature and history, its recent history above all, a proving ground for such a synthesis if its people were allowed to exert their rights as citizens. And yet we, who have everything to gain by it, are precisely the powers which forbid it.

Terrible penalties have been exacted by the forces of history for this kind of error, and there is no doubt that the past supplies some very useful clues to the future in this respect. One thinks back to Munich—no further back than Munich—and the elements of policy do not seem to have altered much. We are treating Franco, in his great weakness, with the same delicacy we used towards Hitler in his strength, and giving him—as in that other case—what does not belong to us, in the hope that he will exclude the ghosts and specters which we fear. Why should we fear ghosts? Why can we not see the world as it is, accept it as it is, and deal with it as it is?

Echo answers.

ITALY'S PLACE AS AN ALLY

B

ENEDETTO CROCE

What I am about to state may sound like a paradox. It is no paradox, but, on the contrary, the simple truth. The hidden but essential point of all Italy's relations with international life today, the point which non-Italians fail to see, which many of us even dare not formulate clearly, is that Italy, formally defeated according to laws of war and peace, does not feel defeated. She cannot adapt herself to being considered among the defeated nations, but affirms her right to be considered among the victorious.

Everywhere throughout Europe to a greater or a lesser degree the dictatorial and fascist currents have displayed their strength, often successfully; the liberal currents have been shown to be weak. Only slowly have they been able to summon up once more the necessary vigor and resolution. Even Italian fascism aroused admiration and sighs of envy. Everywhere eminent men, including some who have come to be heroes of World War II, have rendered it homage and thus strengthened its prestige. Not only in Italy is this fact so firmly established that it cannot be doubted. Those peoples and those men who now set themselves up as our judges and instruments of our punishment would be wise to look back upon themselves.

Undoubtedly there are countries, and among them Italy, in which fascism succeeded in setting itself up and rendering itself master of the powers

and means of the state. But if we look attentively, even in those countries in which it did not have these consequences, it still influenced the actions of governments.

The truth is made evident in many books, reviews and newspapers, both English and American. There is no need to dwell upon the remissive attitude of the English conservatives toward the German, Italian and Spanish fascist leaders. In the unforeseen collapse of France, the influence of the thought and action of those who sought the health of their country in a restored regime of authority was far from negligible.

The Italian people, not conscious enough of the danger, not enough on their guard against the lies, the traps and displays of force exerted at the opportune moment, found themselves little by little deprived of political representation, of the right of association, of a free press and of juridical guarantees.

Hedged about on every side by this new and tyrannical power—did they stand aside resigned and inert? Let the names of those who died fighting against fascism answer for us; let those condemned by the Special Tribunal and those outlawed from administrative life answer for us. Let the exiles answer who wandered in foreign lands and those, far greater in number, who, as exiles in their own land, were shut out from every form of public life. I think again of the friends and young men I use to see on my many trips every year to Turin, Florence, Milan, Venetia. Even employees watched and threatened by fascism, even some police agents, if they had the opportunity, came to show their sympathy toward us and tried to render us some service.

The best teachers, when they were unable to do anything more for the pupils, read and interpreted our classical authors, filled with humanity and liberal thought. Our weapons were our classics, which fascism did not dare to banish from our schools.

But the greatest and bitterest battle Italians had to face was that in their own hearts. They had to tear from their bosoms the natural love of country and turn in sorrow to a desire, hastened by their vows, for defeat of Italy in the pitiless war waged side by side with Germany. That defeat alone could be for them the victory of restored independence and liberty.

This widespread feeling, even though in many still unexpressed, this aversion and repugnance for the Germans, who had become a symbol of evil in this world, warped even the enthusiasm and solidarity of our army. The bulletins of our war were the announcements of the English wireless, which were anxiously awaited. We tried again and again to induce the only power in the state which had in its hands the keys to a legal solution to use it. And at last we succeeded in this: without waiting for the Allied armies to overthrow it, fascism fell in Italy.

When the Allied armies advanced in Italy they found willing hearts and

hands ready to help them everywhere. They occupied our houses, they made use of the energies of our people and of what was still left of our industry and of our warehouses and supplies. They received offers of soldiers and volunteers and the effective cooperation of these latter in the struggle. We bowed down willingly for all that was called for by the necessity of the Allies' war, which was also our war.

We saw everywhere the spontaneous formation of groups of partisans in occupied Italy. At first they were of little note, but they grew in numbers and were assisted by arms and other materials. These partisans were Liberals, Catholics, Communists, men of every political color. The gratitude of the whole world should go to them without distinction, for they shed and continue to shed their blood for the cause of humanity.

Can we feel that we are defeated, when we know that in thought, sentiment, and action, we have had our share in the victorious war against nazism and fascism? Can we hear ourselves called, not allies, but *co-belligerents*? It is an ugly word which reminds us through association of the *non-belligerency* coined by fascism when it sent its soldiers to Spain, or prepared aggression against England and France.

Mr. Churchill and the late Mr. Roosevelt on many occasions addressed friendly words to us. But such men who will have saved the world from the slavery and barbarity which would have spread throughout it in the twentieth century have not yet pronounced the word for which we wait. Italians do not wish their liberty to be the acceptance of a gift, for they know from their long and painful history that liberty is conquered through martyrdom and war-sufferings. They won it this way in the past and in this way deserve it today with their share in the efforts of the Allies.

But if Italy feels certain that she stands among the victorious, where then—some will ask—are those whom the Allied Powers found opposed to them? Not certainly among the soldiers, who obeyed the call of duty through discipline and a sense of military honor, even when their hearts were divided and their spirits wavered. Nor, on the other hand, in that crowd of humble people to be found in all nations, laborious and endowed with private virtues though with little political discernment.

We have asked for and intend to exercise indulgence toward these people, for we know that they must not be subjected to too hard a trial and then be expected to stand firm. We know that the ultimate responsibility for their non-resistance lies with the governing classes or with those who usurped that role. These fascist usurpers were unscrupulous adventurers, who, when raised to the highest places, were able to thieve and parade at their ease. In this gang were a few men who in other periods had proved themselves capable and honest but who under the weight of a bad conscience had sunk to the level of the others. Scholars and literary men lost along with their inner dignity whatever capacity they had. Once, in the

darkest hour of fascist persecution, a foreigner asked me whether men of worth in the field of my own studies were still to be found in Italy. I replied that I was afraid to give him a list of names, because by doing so I might be supplying the fascist police with documents.

An old friend of mine, an authoritative English journalist now in Italy, recently raised the question of the terrible damage, the bitter fatigue and painful privations England has suffered and still suffers, which he thinks we do not fully appreciate. But Italians are intelligent and sensitive, and shuddered with horror when they thought of the abyss into which, for a short time in 1940, it appeared that England would be precipitated. We know England not only as the native land of the English but as one of the fundamental supports of the modern world. She is mistress of liberty as Rome was of law, educator of whole populations in all parts of the globe, courageous and measured, wary and nobly humane. Our hearts rose up with hers when she rose up resolved to fight, and adopted the most rigid form of civil life. All trembled and sorrowed for the ruin of her cities and the massacre of her citizens.

But we must not debate the greater or lesser sufferings of the various peoples. As in personal life, we always find when we look about us that there are losses and sorrows greater far than ours. What shall we say of the sufferings of Poland, Russia, Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia, and all the other countries invaded, sacked, martyred and massacred by the Germans?

Italy too has suffered, and suffers at seeing on the ground all she had built up politically in more than two centuries of unceasing labor. She has lost her patrimony of wealth so painfully put together, her sons tortured and shot by German fury, her cities and her countryside devastated by the battling armies. She has been struck to the heart by the destruction of her art treasure which the genius of the world had been pleased to make flower in this land.

What does Italy ask for? I read that question in an English paper recently, and I will answer it. Help, certainly, to set going our communications and key industries and to save ourselves from famine and the convulsions of famine. I do not doubt that this help will be given to the extent that is possible.

What we ask falls into two parts. The first, to be recognized legally as allies, which we are in fact, and to share with the other allied peoples in the councils of the new order in Europe. I will confess that it seems to me imprudent and precipitate to embark upon particular questions and debates of a territorial nature; but I cannot forget that, while fascism remained, the propagandists of the English wireless, exhorting us to shake off the hated un-Italian regime, assured us that the boundaries of Italy would never be touched.

These boundaries, marked by two lines from Dante, were won back for

Italy by the blood of hundreds of thousands of Italians in a great war fought side by side with the present allies. Those lands must be respected which are inhabited by Italians or which were redeemed for civilization by our labor. This is the feeling of all Italians, from the Liberals to the Catholics, from the Socialists to the Communists. As for the remaining territorial problems Italians will regard them with an eye to the sacred common end of a lasting peace.

The second thing Italy asks is early abolition or reform of the terms of the armistice. These bind and impede in its every movement the democratic Italian Government which was formed in Naples and in liberated Rome. Mr. Churchill in his trip to Italy had a favorable impression of the Government's members and the honest man and noble patriot who presided over it. But how can a government last if the forces necessary really to govern are withdrawn from it? It is the reciprocal interest of the Allied Powers and of ourselves that a remedy should be found for this kind of muddling interference.

The dreams of world domination of the German maniacs and Nazis were backed up by a great and compact nation which has often made a weighty attempt to realize them in fact.

May it be granted us to see the German maniac psychology overcome forever by the Germans themselves. There is an ancient theory of public law which says that liberty was born in the forests of Germany. Evidently the Germans left it in those forests. Their modern history shows no tradition of liberty, but on the contrary an extremely strong tradition of state authority and of government from on high, both bureaucratic and military. Their domination would have meant the end of liberty in Europe and the world, and a return to a dark age of barbarism. This a recent German writer prophesied in a famous book, read by other peoples with a mixture of curiosity and incredulity.

There are certain peoples who more than others are rich in traditions and liberal resolutions. Allow me to number the Italian people among them. The statement that the course of Italian history and the period of the Risorgimento show nationalistic or imperialistic tendencies is historically completely false. The Risorgimento established the cult of Rome and of the Italians as Rome's sons and heirs, but not in any political sense.

In their historical development the Italian people were in the Middle Ages the chief representative of communal liberty and of civilization. Later they fell into a period of absolute monarchies under foreign domination and preponderance, both Spanish and Austrian. But Italy modernized itself in the eighteenth century and passed on to acts of constitutional liberty and the plea for independence and Italian unity throughout the plots and wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era. The Italians took up these efforts once more in the attempted constitutional revolutions of

1820-21 and in the scattered movements of the following years, which grew into the revolutions and wars of 1848, and had their fulfilment in the wars of 1859-60 and 1866, and in the entry into Rome in 1870.

The liberty the Italian people had won for themselves was exercised in such a wise, sure and temperate fashion as to arouse the admiration of Gladstone when shortly after 1870 he came to visit once more the Italy he had known under native and foreign tyranny. In the last years of the nineteenth century, Italy flowered with an accelerated progress in every part of Italian life, until the moment came when in 1915-18 it had to fight, together with the peoples of the Entente, a mighty war for the liberation of Europe. Hopes for a freer and more vigorous Italian life were unhappily cut short by the invasion of the "Hyksos." This seems to me a convenient way of naming the fascist interregnum. But there is one fortunate difference: the barbarity of the Hyksos lasted in Egypt for more than two hundred years. The crude and truculent fascist rioting has worn itself out in little more than twenty years. We Italians never grew used to it, and were indeed slaves, but, as Vittorio Alfieri said, "fuming slaves."

Who dares therefore to set up Italy almost as a sister beside Germany, the Germany of Bismarck, William II and Hitler? It may be that the other nations (may Heaven prevent it!) will be seized by an attack of the fascist disease which so far they have not known; but Italy certainly will not, for the very reason that she has had it, and is absolutely vaccinated against any return of the infection. By the gifts of her spirit, her balanced intellect, and the sense of humanity which is innate in her, she will be an excellent and efficient component part of new Europe. For this reason she must be put in a position not inferior to that of every other country in Europe.

This world, which cannot die, will recover its strength sooner or later and once more begin to ascend. The writer is well advanced in years, but he hopes, before he closes his eyes in his last sleep, to see the heavenly rainbow appear, on Italy's and on the world's horizon.

THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S FIGHT TO LIVE

J

JOSIP BROZ TITO To give the world—deceived as it has been on every side—a clear picture of the real situation in Yugoslavia it is necessary briefly to review developments in Yugoslavia before its occupation by the enemy and up to the present time.

In his statement in the House of Commons about Yugoslavia's struggle

against the invaders ex-Prime Minister Churchill declared: "Communist elements had the honor of being the beginners, but as the movement has increased in strength and numbers a modifying and unifying process has taken place and national conceptions have supervened." These laconic words express a fact which constitutes the pride not only of the Communists but of all other patriots among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Long before the attack on Yugoslavia—especially after the occupation of Austria and despite the fact that they were working under the most difficult of conditions because they had been declared an illegal group—the Yugoslav Communists constantly warned against the terrible danger threatening the peoples of Yugoslavia from predatory German fascism. They made every effort to rally all of the patriotic forces of the country to repulse a possible attack on Yugoslavia. Their efforts were not in vain. Responding to repeated appeals the young people of Yugoslavia, especially high school students, young workers and the students in Belgrade University, prepared to face the hour of trial which Hitler's invasion brought upon the country.

What was the situation prevailing in the ruling circles of Yugoslavia? Both militarily and politically Yugoslavia was in a state of chaos. Leading positions on the general military staff were held by such traitors in the service of the Germans as General Nedich. Moreover Yugoslavia swarmed with German spies who had come as "tourists."

Corruption and embezzlement reigned supreme in all Ministries, especially in that of War. Out of a total state budget of 12,000,000 dinars 4,000,000 were allocated to war needs. And yet Yugoslavia was poorly armed and unprepared to defend itself. Nationality problems—particularly that of the Croats—became increasingly sharper. The compromise reached in the agreement between Macheck and Cvetkovich actually covered only the sharing of power. It did not by any means solve the Croat nationality question. After 1935, with the advent of Stoyadinovich to power, the rulers in Belgrade steadily strengthened their connections with Axis countries while simultaneously they drifted away from their old alliances—for example from the Little Entente and from their alliance with France and other countries. Everything was done to isolate Yugoslavia and to weaken her in order to make her an easy prey for the German invaders.

Yugoslavia was almost the only country in Europe whose rulers for twenty years ignored the people's demands that diplomatic relations be established with the Soviet Union. Recognition came only when the German invaders were loudly knocking on Yugoslavia's door.

March 27, 1941 will go down in the history of our people as one of our most memorable dates. Following the shameful signing of the "Tripartite Pact" and Yugoslavia's adherence to the Axis the regime of the traitor Prince Paul—in which Cvetkovich and Macheck played the leading roles—was overthrown. Monster demonstrations through Yugoslavia, particularly

in Belgrade, showed that the peoples of Yugoslavia preferred to make the greatest of sacrifices rather than become Axis slaves and see the glorious traditions of their ancestors betrayed.

But the new Simovich Government which succeeded the Cvetkovich Government proved unequal to its task because it failed to estimate the strength of the peoples correctly or to rely upon it. Furthermore it left intact the old corrupt state apparatus which not only was incompetent but openly sabotaged all measures necessary for the country's defense.

The ten days during which the invaders defeated our country constitute the most shameful period in its history. They brought out in bold relief all the rottenness, all the treachery hitherto covered up artificially. Were the peoples of Yugoslavia really willing to defend their country? Yes, they were. As soon as mobilization was announced, peasants, workers, young people and honest intellectuals rallied to the colors. Replying to a special summons from the leadership of the Communist party all party members fit for military service hastened to enroll. But this fighting ardor was in vain, for the politicians and the military leadership had betrayed the country. Volunteers were shifted from one recruiting station to another. Incorrect orders were given to troop trains. Soldiers were dispatched to the front without ammunition. When matters had reached the point of surrender the commanding general and other high-ranking officers ordered their soldiers —under threat of shooting—to lay down their arms. In hundreds of cases the soldiers refused to carry out these commands.

Yet entire divisions and armies surrendered to the Germans almost without a struggle and the men were driven off into German slavery. General Milan Nedich (the Serbian Quisling who forced his units, to their certain doom, to face German tanks without any anti-tank weapons) was one of the first officers to surrender his army to the Germans. Seeing this vile treachery, soldiers burst into tears of indignation and wherever they succeeded in escaping from the grip of the German troops of occupation they left for their homes, uttering imprecations.

Thereupon the most horrible days in the history of our peoples set in. The Croats were mercilessly tortured by the Ustashi, headed by the criminal Croatian Quisling, Dr. Ante Pavelich, a creature of Mussolini and Hitler who came to power in Croatia. A mass slaughter of Serbs was launched in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slavonia, Vojvodina and so on. Unfortunate peasants in these regions, together with their families, sought safety in the forests. But the Ustashi and the Germans savagely hunted these refugees down and destroyed them wherever they succeeded in locating them. The same terrible fate was suffered by all honest progressives in the country. Gradually people throughout Serbia began to offer resistance—at first unorganized—fighting for their lives with every means at their disposal. The same situation prevailed in Slovenia, where Germans and Hungarians began the

destruction of entire villages, shipping tens of thousands of townsmen and peasants off to work in Germany.

The leadership of the Communist party took every possible step to organize a popular uprising. As early as the autumn of 1940, and in strictest secrecy, a so-called Military Committee had been set up. This Committee was charged with the task of fostering a spirit of resistance among soldiers and officers of the Yugoslav Army in case of foreign attack and with taking over military leadership if the country should surrender. After the April surrender this Committee was broadened and became known as General Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia. Later this was reorganized into the High Command. Immediately following the surrender of Yugoslavia and the mass extermination of the Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia the Communist party sent its members to organize the refugees in the forest into guerrilla detachments.

Prior to the attack of the Hitlerite hordes against the Soviet Union, leaders of the Communist party in Yugoslavia had concluded an agreement with Dragoljub Jovanovich, leader of the Serbian Agrarian party, and with a group led by Dr. Ivan Ribar. On June 22, when the German armies suddenly invaded Russia, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist party held an urgent meeting with the Military Committee at which it was decided to start revolts throughout Yugoslavia.

The men present also decided to rename the Military Committee the General Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia and to place it in charge of operations throughout the country. This headquarters dispatched members to various provinces to supervise the organization of guerrilla detachments and to conduct operations. Moreover territorial units were organized to wreck telephone and telegraph communications and to attack stores and other military objectives. During that period the youth of Belgrade displayed a heroism which will constitute the pride of our peoples for many generations to come. In broad daylight young girls and lads of fourteen attacked German trucks, poured kerosene on them and destroyed them. Defying the gallows set up in Terasia Square, Belgrade, high school and university students and young workers carried out acts of sabotage with mounting vigor.

Whereas, before the attack on the Soviet, the only joint struggle (outside the cities) had been carried on in certain parts of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian mountains the guerrilla movement rapidly spread across the rest of the country after the Soviet Union had been invaded. By July 1941 the Valjevo, Kragujevac, Uzice, Homolj and other guerrilla detachments were already making forays against the enemy. Operating in groups of twenty to thirty men armed with one or two rifles and a few bombs they attacked small German groups and procured arms from the Germans whom they killed.

While the guerrilla movement grew and acquired a mass character in Serbia a general uprising of the people under the leadership of the Communists had already been organized in Montenegro by July 13, 1941. At a given signal ten thousand Montenegrins attacked Italian garrisons throughout Montenegro, occupied all towns with the exception of Cetinje and Podgorica, took some six thousand Italian soldiers and officers prisoner and captured rich booty.

Montenegrin patriots had begun their hard and bloody struggle against the several Italian divisions Mussolini had sent to suppress the revolt.

By August 1941 guerrilla detachments in Serbia had liberated Posavina as far as Obrenovac, and nearly all of Macva, and occupied the towns of Lajkovac, Jabljk, Krupanj, Loznica and Stolac. Early in September they captured Uzice, Cacak, Uzicka-Pozega, Gornji-Milanovac and other small localities. Thus, guerrillas liberated almost all of Western Serbia and a considerable part of Eastern Serbia.

Under the extremely difficult conditions which prevailed in August the Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia were moved from Belgrade to the small town of Krupanj and, later, to Uzice. At the beginning of September 1941 the first military conference was held in the Stolac mine, near Krupanj.

Notwithstanding all obstacles, delegates from Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and other regions were present. The conference arrived at far-reaching and important decisions. The principal headquarters were renamed High Command for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia; and divisional headquarters were set up for Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Montenegro (with commanders who were also members of the High Command). In addition to arriving at purely military decisions (such as, for example, the decision to collaborate with all other forces which had not sold themselves to the invaders) the conference adopted the Belgrade plan for clearing Western Serbia and mapped out a scheme for the conduct of military operations and for the establishment of bases in all other parts of Yugoslavia.

Although the principal headquarters for the guerrilla detachments were still located in Belgrade it was learned that Colonel Draja Mihailovich was hiding somewhere in the mountains of Ravna Gora with a group of officers who sought to escape capture by the enemy. Up to that moment Mihailovich had not fought in a single battle and Bosnian peasants who rebelled to defend their lives had never been under his command. As long ago as July 1941, I personally left instructions at the headquarters of the Valjevo guerrilla detachment to establish contact with Mihailovich and induce him to agree to collaborate with us in a joint struggle.

But he categorically refused to make any move against the Germans—first because he had no armed forces whatever at his command and, second,

because he feared reprisals. Our headquarters came into possession of an interesting document. Through this document a member of the Mihailovich group who is close to us informed us that Mihailovich was about to send to Bosnia some insubordinate officers who wanted to fight the invader. Among them was lieutenant Ratko Martinovich who along with a priest, Vlado Zechevich, had cooperated with us from the very earliest days of the German occupation, organizing detachments of Chetniks in the Krupanj areas. This document further revealed that Mihailovich had decided to kill Martinovich (with the aid of a criminal) when the latter crossed the Drina.

Immediately upon my arrival in liberated territory in August 1941 I went to see Mihailovich in Ravna Gora. He received me in Vojvoda Mishich's house in the village of Struganik instead of in his own eyrie of Ravna Gora. Also present at the meeting were Major Mishich and the notorious advocate of a greater Serbia, Dragisha Vasich. These conversations yielded poor results. Saying that the time was not yet ripe and advancing other excuses Mihailovich stubbornly refused to begin to war on the Germans. At that time he already commanded some detachments of Chetniks whom his officers had organized in territory liberated by the guerrillas in Western Serbia.

We got no further than to reach an oral agreement: that Mihailovich's Chetniks would maintain a loyal attitude toward the guerrillas and wouldn't attack them. Vojvoda Pechanat's Chetniks did.

Since for some unknown reason Mihailovich mistook me for a Russian and remained under that impression for some time he spoke quite openly about the Croats and the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Asked his opinion of the national problem he openly declared that Croats, Moslems and others must be mercilessly punished and that, after retribution had been exacted, they must be completely subordinated to the Serbs.

When I objected he replied that this program was fully justified inasmuch as all Croats were responsible for the Ustashi atrocities and that all who had sold out Yugoslavia to the Germans were Ustashi and traitors. In conclusion Draja promised to think it over and inform me how and when his units would begin the struggle.

In September our guerrilla forces, together with one detachment led by Rachich, besieged and attacked Sabac. This Rachich also won Mihailovich's disfavor at that time for joining us in the struggle. The attack didn't succeed. Germans quickly brought up two of their divisions, two or three Croat regiments and several units from D. Ljotich's Serbian fascist movement and began their first offensive—one which, with interruptions, lasted until the end of November. Fighting was most violent in Macva, Cer, Procerina, in the Jadar Valley and in Cavlak. Our units slowly retreated, stubbornly defending every inch of ground.

Before the German offensive was launched it was decided that peasants

from Macva should transfer as large stocks of grain as possible to highlands near Krupanj and Sokolska Planina. Thousands upon thousands of peasant carts moved in the direction of the mountains. Constantly shelled by German bombers the peasants sought safety in the forests. The Germans succeeded in occupying Loznica and the area stretching up to the Jadar Valley.

But with virtually no anti-tank weapons our men succeeded in destroying 20 German tanks. More than 1,000 enemy soldiers fell in these battles and an additional 600 were taken prisoners. Having encountered very strong resistance and suffered heavy losses the Germans didn't dare to continue the offensive in the highlands and began energetic preparations for offensive operations on a wide front, from Kraljevo in the direction of Valjevo up to the Drina River. Our guerrilla detachments again launched a counteroffensive and recaptured the greater part of Macva and Posavina, while the biggest guerrilla detachment—the Valjevo—completely encircled the German garrison in Valjevo.

Jointly with Mihailovich's Chetniks our units also encircled the town of Kraljevo and with the aid of heavy artillery and tanks broke into the town. As early as October some 1,200 of Mihailovich's Chetniks participated jointly with our units in the military operations at Kraljevo and Valjevo. This was accomplished because at the time of the offensive against us I sent a letter to Mihailovich from Krupanj indicating the danger that would result from our loss of the liberated territory. Mihailovich agreed and his units fought with us from October until November 1941. But even during this brief period of joint action the Chetniks under the command of Major Mishich fled to Valjevo from the battlefields after the first serious clashes with the Germans, leaving guerrilla units to fight alone. After our guerrilla units had liberated Cacak, Uzicka-Pozega and Gornji-Milanovac, Mihailovich's officers began an energetic mobilization of the peasantry in our liberated territory in the name of the King and under the slogan, "Those who join the Chetniks will remain in their homes while those who join the guerrillas will forfeit their lives in unequal battles at the front." Although the guerrillas freed Western Serbia the Chetnik command was granted permission to organize its units in liberated territory and to organize joint local Chetnik and guerrilla squads in Cacak, Uzice, Gornji-Milanovac and other towns.

During the liberation of Uzice we captured rich military prizes—for example 100 motor vehicles, an arsenal, a tannery, a branch of the People's Bank with some 55 million dinars in cash, etc. Our own growing arsenal produced 150 rifles and 40,000 to 50,000 cartridges daily (which we succeeded in stepping up to 420 rifles and 80,000 cartridges daily).

The successes achieved by our guerrillas evoked alarm among the Germans and Nedich's men on the one hand and envy on the part of Mihailo-

vich and his officers on the other. Even at that time, October 1941, they were secretly prepared to attack us with the object of wresting Uzice from us.

Nedich kept on sending more and more of his agents into the ranks of Mihailovich's Chetniks and these agents engaged in systematic provocation to produce an open clash between the guerrillas and the Mihailovich Chetniks. Capturing Uzicka-Pozega by force, they constantly harassed our railway communications at Cacak and Gornji-Milanovac and provoked clashes with us.

Our High Command did its utmost to avert such clashes and through Mitich, liaison staff officer, again proposed to Mihailovich that he negotiate an agreement. It was suggested to Mihailovich that negotiations be conducted in a neutral zone, near the township of Kosoric, but he constantly sought to evade them. After this I again went to Ravna Gora, accompanied by two members of the High Command, Sreten Zhujevich and Mitar Bakich. The draft proposal which I prepared covered ten points; but during the negotiations in the village of Brajici, near Ravna Gora (in the presence of some ten officers from Mihailovich's staff), we failed to reach agreement on the most important of the points—the matter of the joint command. We had proposed the formation of joint administrations based on the principle of the People's Liberation Committee. Agreement was most easily achieved on the matter of dividing deposits in the People's Bank and armaments produced by the Uzice arsenal and on the question of military commandants in the towns. On the day following negotiations we immediately handed over to Mihailovich 500 new rifles and 25,000 cartridges from our arsenal. It is noteworthy that Mihailovich rejected my proposal that the Britisher, Captain Hudson, who was in the adjoining room, participate in the discussions.

On the fourth day after the negotiations Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks attacked us at Uzicka-Pozega with the very same rifles and cartridges they had received from us. And at Uzicka-Pozega after this clash Blagojevich, commander of our Sumadja detachment who was returning from headquarters, was forced off his train and brutally murdered by Captain Glishich's men. Captain Glishich himself acted under Draja Mihailovich's orders.

Because I was totally unaware of Blagojevich's fate I sent a most vigorous protest to Mihailovich's headquarters demanding that the commander be set free immediately. The reply came that nothing was known about the arrest of the person named. At the same time we came into possession of important documents from the Chetnik local command in Kremnja instructing all mobilized Chetniks to report on November 2 at 5:00 A.M. at the forest ten kilometers from Uzice. At once it became clear to us that Mihailovich was preparing an armed attack on Uzice.

Our conclusion was confirmed by the fact that Mihailovich removed 800 of his Chetniks from Kraljevo, with the object (as we later learned) of delivering an attack at Cacak. These Chetniks not only opened the road to Kraljevo to the Germans; by deception (and for use in their own attack at Cacak) they deprived our units along this front of several heavy guns and a couple of tanks. We in turn were obliged to withdraw one of our units from the front at Valjevo to defend Uzice and Cacak. But subsequent events have clearly revealed that this attack was planned in agreement with Nedich, and even with the Germans, to time it with the German attack before Kraljevo and up the slopes of Turina.

Aware of the exact movements of the Chetnik units in the direction of Uzice we ordered our troops to deliver a counter-attack on November 2 at 4 A.M. Eight kilometers from Uzice at the intersection of three roads (Uzicka-Pozega, Uzice and Kosoric) our units met 800 Chetniks and, after a few hours of fighting, completely crushed them. Several hundred Chetniks including their commander were killed. We then issued orders for a general attack on Uzicka-Pozega, the Chetniks' principal base. After an extremely bloody battle which lasted all day our units occupied Uzicka-Pozega and rapidly began to press the Chetniks toward Ravna Gora.

Our units enveloped Ravna Gora from three sides—from the directions of Cacak, Gornji-Milanovac and Uzicka-Pozega. Seeing that he was encircled Mihailovich urgently dispatched liaison-officer Mitich to our headquarters imploring us to stop this bloody struggle.

Although the guerrilla troops were animated by bitter hatred for the Chetniks and wanted to put an end to this treacherous gang as soon as possible I agreed to stop the struggle on the following conditions:

1. Immediate withdrawal of Chetnik units to the Kameni-Cabrajic line.
2. Immediate formation of a joint commission to investigate the Uzicka-Pozega incident and other crimes.
3. Immediate formation of a commission to carry out final negotiations.

The Negotiations Commission met in Cacak but it was impossible to arrive at an agreement because Germans had succeeded in puncturing our front at Valjevo and Kraljevo and with the help of supporting tanks were rapidly advancing. Extremely violent and bloody fighting against the Germans developed all along the sector from Kraljevo to Drina. At that time Mihailovich's Chetniks were openly collaborating with Germans. One night at Gornji-Milanovac, for example, they deceived three hundred guerrillas, disarmed them, stripped them of their clothing in Ravna Gora and, after subjecting them to the most savage torture, dispatched them naked on a bitterly cold night to the Germans in Valjevo. Almost all of these heroes were brutally murdered by the Germans. At Mionica the Chetniks seized

seventeen nurses and a doctor, brutally murdered them and reported their "heroic" deed to the Germans. From that time on, close collaboration was established between Mihailovich's Chetniks and the German forces.

Throughout almost the whole of November our guerrilla fighters rebuffed the superior forces of the Germans and Nedich's men. The most violent battles were fought at the Valjevo sector near Vukovik, in the Pecki-Kupanj and Loznica sectors in Gornji-Milanovac and in the Kraljevo sector.

In this campaign the Germans used strong infantry forces, tanks and aircraft. Losses on both sides were very heavy. By November 25 the Germans succeeded in capturing Uzice and Cacak. The main body of our own forces retreated in the direction of Zlatibor and Ivanica and the last principal engagements were fought at the river Ujac between Sandjak and Serbia.

The greater part of the guerrilla forces filtered back in small detachments to the interior of Serbia, however, and from there continued their heroic struggle against the invaders and their henchmen. Out of the remainder were created our amazing First and Second Serbian Brigades—brigades which, together with Montenegrin brigades, have twice retraced a glorious path from Montenegro to Bosanska-Krajina.

From July 1941 on—while these events were taking place in Serbia and while the men and women of Serbia were engaged in superhuman struggle against invaders and domestic traitors—ceaseless fighting was in progress in Montenegro against the Italian invaders also. In December some 3,500 Montenegrin guerrillas attacked Plevlje, a strongly fortified town in Sandjak, held by an entire Italian division. With sweeping assaults our units broke through and in the course of violent fighting occupied a considerable section of the town. Some 2,000 Italian soldiers perished in the street fighting. But after two days of battle our units were obliged to withdraw from the town, for without heavy weapons they were unable to seize the fortifications from which the enemy artillery was constantly shelling the town. We too suffered heavily in this engagement.

Severe battles continued in Bosnia, particularly in Rogatica and Zvornik, and by October almost all of East Bosnia (including the towns of Rogatica, Vlasenica, Han-Pijesak and Srebrenica) had been cleared. Our troops were at the gates of Sarajevo, Romanija and Stambolchik. In Lika and at Kordun our troops likewise liberated much territory. In Bosanska-Krajina our troops had already occupied Drvar and a number of other localities during August. Here the fighting against Italians and Ustashi became very violent. And here too, even that early in the war, the Chetniks stabbed our units in the back. That was the period which marked the beginning of the glorious and epic Kozara fighting which will forever remain the most brilliant page in the annals of our struggle. There were also

severe clashes at Petrova Gora where the enemy undertook a number of violent offensive operations.

Action on a smaller scale began in the autumn in a number of other points in Croatia and Slovenia. Sabotage had gone on there continuously, however, from the very beginning. After our withdrawal from Serbia we occupied Nova Varos where our units had a chance for a respite. Then the High Command, with one unit of Serbian troops, started out in the direction of East Bosnia. En route they occupied the town of Rudo, where the first Serbian brigade was formed. (On the very day after its formation this brigade smashed three columns of Italians combined with Mihailovich's Chetniks who were advancing in the direction of Rudo.)

At about that time the position of the guerrilla movement in East Bosnia became very critical. Thus far friendly collaboration between guerrillas and Chetniks had been maintained in that part of the country. After the guerrillas had chalked up important successes in East Bosnia, however, officers sent in by Draja Mihailovich began to wreck the movement until gradually the elements which favored cessation of hostilities against the German and advocated warfare on the guerrillas gained the upper hand.

In East Bosnia Major Dangich and Major Todorovich were Mihailovich's chief deputies. Major Dangich was at that time in contact with the Germans and launched attacks against guerrilla detachments with the object of disarming them. Partly under the influence of the demoralizing propaganda of these officers, and partly under the compulsion of threats, peasants began to desert the guerrillas, going over to the Chetniks or returning to their homes. But the appearance of the First Serbian Brigade in Eastern Bosnia produced a radical change in the situation. As a strong unit, fit and disciplined, it rapidly acquired influence by virtue of its successes against the enemy and arrested the disintegration of guerrilla detachments. Those guerrillas who had gone over to the Chetniks returned to the fold, realizing that they had been misled by the lying propaganda which alleged that the guerrillas had been destroyed in Serbia. It is noteworthy, therefore, that in East Bosnia guerrilla detachments joined our First Serbian Brigade in the fighting which took place in December at Varos and Romanija.

Hardly had the guerrilla forces in East Bosnia again consolidated their ranks when the Germans launched a second offensive from four directions: from Zvornik, from Visegrad, from Sarajevo (along the Visegrad railway line) and from Sarajevo through Romanija. Into this campaign they threw strong German forces supported by Ustashi conscripts (Pavelich's regular units) and Chetniks. And before the offensive got under way the Chetnik headquarters in East Bosnia (with Todorovich and Dangich in command) issued the strictest of orders to the Chetniks not to fire a single shot against the Germans. Instead the Chetniks were either to get lost or to help the Germans.

Bitter cold and heavy snow hampered our forces in these battles. In view of the shortage of ammunition our troops were obliged to abandon Rogatica, Vlasenica and other places after five days of fighting. Carrying out a skillful maneuver the Bosnian guerrilla detachments again attacked the enemy from the rear. In the meantime our Serbian Brigade was divided into two parts. One of these retreated with the High Command via Glasinac to Mount Jahorina. The other, accompanied by the Brigade's staff, made a number of astonishing marches and reached Foca by moving past Sarajevo through the Sarajevo Valley. During this march, one of the most difficult in the war, with the thermometer dropping to minus 25 degrees centigrade, about 160 men suffered frostbite and many had to have their legs amputated.

The first column, jointly with the High Command, succeeded in checking the Germans and Ustashi on Mount Jahorina; and those Chetnik defenders of the sector who had been abandoned by their officers were placed under our command. A few days later Montenegrin troops and a battalion from the First Brigade occupied Foca, Gorazde and Cajnice. Thus a base was again secured, not only for rest and reorganization of units but also for mobilizing new reserves of manpower.

The whole of February, March and half of April were utilized for restoring order and regrouping those Chetnik units—more than 10,000 strong—which, disappointed in Chetnik leadership, had left and joined our command.

Thus, in addition to the guerrilla detachments, so-called volunteer units were formed and the High Command changed its name to High Command of the People's Liberation Guerrilla and Volunteer Detachments. Throughout the winter and up to the middle of April 1942 (when the enemy embarked upon his third offensive) our guerrilla and volunteer units were engaged in very severe fighting in the Jahorina Romanija sector; around Rogatice, which was encircled at Kalinovnik where the Italian garrison was likewise encircled; and especially in Montenegro, in the Kolasin Sinjajevina and Niksic Grahovo sectors. At that time our Serbian troops occupying the Prijepolje Nova-Varos sector reached Cajnice. There the First and Second Serbian Brigades were given the task of advancing toward Vlasenica to clear that territory of the Chetnik gangs led by Dangich and Rachich who were openly collaborating with the Germans. After a rapid advance our brigades reached Vlasenica and Srebrenica, where they completely smashed the Dangich units and hurled them across the Drina River into Serbia. En route the second Serbian Brigade completely destroyed the Chetnik staff in the Rogatica sector, near Borici.

This advance through deep snowdrifts around the highest mountain peak, Denetak, was brilliantly carried through by our troops. Then, because in April 1942 it became clearly evident that the Germans, Italians

and Ustashi were preparing for their third offensive, both brigades received urgent orders to return to the Gorazde Cajnice sector.

As I have already mentioned, very heavy engagements were in progress in Montenegro at this time—not only against the Italian invaders but also against the Chetniks under Mihailovich and Major Djurichich. How did matters come to such a pass?

Following the general popular uprising in July 1941 the greater part of Montenegro had been liberated. Numerous guerrilla detachments there attacked the forces of occupation constantly, menacing their communications.

Niksic was permanently encircled and the Italian invaders suffered tremendous losses in men and equipment. The Italians, who did their utmost to discover traitors among the Montenegrins, found them in the persons of Baja Stanishich and Major Djurichich. Moreover Draja Mihailovich sent a group of his officers to Montenegro in an effort to break the unity of the Montenegrins by creating detachments of Chetniks there. At that time Baja Stanishich still maintained contact with our general headquarters in Montenegro. Taking advantage of this fact he secretly created his own organizations within the guerrilla detachments and thus succeeded in bringing a considerable number of guerrillas under his influence and transforming them into Chetniks. His putsch occurred suddenly. Baja Stanishich, with a group of his guerrillas, split away and went over to the forces of occupation. In Vasojevici, Djurichich succeeded in mobilizing fairly strong forces and equipped them with Italian arms. Throughout February, March and almost the whole of April, and under the most difficult conditions, our Montenegrin guerrilla units fought the combined forces of Italians and domestic traitors. Therefore when the enemy launched his third offensive a considerable portion of our Montenegrin units were obliged to withdraw from Montenegro, fighting only rearguard actions.

The third enemy offensive was thoroughly prepared and was conducted with almost all of the Italian and German forces, plus the Ustashi and Chetniks. Beginning in Bosnia and Montenegro this offensive later spread to Slovenia, Dalmatia and Kozara. While the Italian Pusteria Division, as well as several Chetnik detachments from Serbia, was concentrated at Plevlje two other Italian divisions were concentrated at Niksic, Podgorica and Kolasin. Another division was located in Herzegovina, near Gacko and Nevesinje. In addition to the Germans, 30,000 Italian soldiers were concentrated in the Sarajevo Valley. While the Germans advanced on Trnov and from Sarajevo Kalinovnik, other enemy forces advanced from Plevlje toward Cajnice and Foca. In Romanija, Germans and Ustashi were advancing toward Rogatica from Gorazde. Beginning about the middle of March these battles continued until June 20. In the face of superior

enemy forces our troops gradually withdrew from Bosnia in the general direction of Montenegro. In the middle of May 1942, when the enemy occupied Foca, our troops began to retreat from Mount Sinjajevino and Niksic, across Durmitor, toward Pivska Planina and Herzegovina. The severest fighting during this offensive took place on the Goransko-Gacko sector. Strong Italian forces and Chetniks exerted pressure from three directions. To save our units from encirclement at Pivska Planina the High Command issued orders to retreat via Planina Volujak and Magljin toward the river Suteska and swiftly transferred our best units—the First and Second Serbian Brigades—to the Gacko sector and to the country around Golija to stem the rapid advance of the Italians who (with the object of cutting our retreat) were driving toward Gacko, Cemerna and the upper reaches of the Suteska River. These units handled their job splendidly although it involved severe losses. A strong force of heavy artillery concentrated at Gacko shelled our transports of the wounded who were being evacuated from Montenegro. But after several very bitter battles at the apex of the Herzegovina, Montenegro and Bosnia triangle all of our units, together with the wounded, reached the Tentiste-Kalinovnik sector. There, Montenegrin and Sandjak guerrilla detachments were regrouped into one Sandjak, one Herzegovinian and two Montenegrin shock brigades. This was the end of the third enemy offensive in this most important sector.

The Germans, who lacked adequate strength to continue the struggle in this area, concentrated their main forces against our heroic town of Kozara. Extremely severe battles ensued. The German objective was to destroy the uprisings centered in Bosanska-Krajina. The Italians were likewise unable to keep up the battle in this sector because it became urgently necessary for them to reinforce their units in Dalmatia and Slovenia since the popular uprisings had reached such proportions, especially in Slovenia where a sizable portion of the area had been liberated, that the enemy's most important communications were menaced. Moreover the enemy expected our forces on this sector to be so worn down by hunger and battle losses as to be unfit for major operations for some time. We left a few small guerrilla detachments in Montenegro, the Sixth Bosnian Shock Brigade and several guerrilla detachments in East Bosnia and a Montenegrin and a Herzegovinian brigade in the Tentiste-Kalinovnik sector to protect our hospitals and to conduct minor operations. The High Command decided to march with the remaining units of the First and Second Serbian, Third Sandjak and Fourth Montenegrin Brigades toward western Bosnia. In order to carry out this march through the difficult mountain regions of Treskavica, Belasnica and so on a detailed plan was worked out. This plan called for surprise raids on the Sarajevo Mostar line from Tarcina Trama in order to destroy all railway equipment and bridges. This operation, which was successfully carried out, resulted in the destruction of several

trains, all the bridges from Tarcina Trama, a kilometer stretch of railway, all stations and about forty locomotives, most of which were specially designed for use in the highlands. In addition our units occupied the towns of Konjic, Ostrozak and other places. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and several hundred enemy soldiers caught in trains were made prisoner.

The move against this railway was carried out from two directions. One column advanced via Iguman (near Sarajevo) and after completing its work on the railway proceeded toward Kresevo, Fojnica and Bugojno. The second column advanced toward Konjic and the railway station of Bradina. Then, when it had completed its attack on the railway in two days of bloody fighting, this column occupied the strongly fortified township of Prozor. After the first column occupied Gornji, both columns joined forces for further operations. Yet before our arrival, units from Bosanska-Krajina occupied the town of Prijedor to ease the situation of encircled Kozara.

The arrival of these units at Bosanska-Krajina greatly encouraged further uprisings not only in Bosanska-Krajina and Dalmatia but also in Croatia and Slovenia. With the aid of guerrilla detachments from Bosanska-Krajina our units, in addition to occupying Prozor and Gornji-Vakuf, also took the towns of Livno, Tomislavgrad, Jajce, Mrkonjicgrad and others. The capture of Livno was important especially in stimulating a popular uprising in Dalmatia, leading to the formation of new brigades and shock groups of guerrilla detachments from Krajina, Dalmatia, Lika, Croatia and Slovenia. The People's Liberation Army was formed then and the High Command was renamed the High Command of the People's Army of Liberation and Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia.

After the occupation of Bihać our troops began to fight their way through to Central Bosnia and after they had liberated a considerable part of its territory occupied Prnjavor, Kotar, Varos, Teslic and other towns. This marked the liberation of a considerable part of Central Bosnia, almost all of Bosanska-Krajina, part of Dalmatia, almost all of Lika, Kordun and the greater part of Slovenia. Incidentally, the greatest losses in this offensive were incurred at Kozara. The third enemy offensive, concluded in Slovenia, failed because the People's Army had so grown in strength and spirit.

During the autumn of 1942 the High Command sent one of its members to Macedonia, there to enlist guerrilla detachments and to coordinate operations with Greece and other neighboring countries. It also dispatched its chief of staff and ten officers to Slovenia to organize existing guerrilla detachments into regular units.

The major successes which the peoples of Yugoslavia had achieved as a result of their superhuman struggle up to the autumn of 1942 seriously alarmed the German and Italian invaders. As early as December, there-

fore, they began preparations for their fourth offensive. With the object of tightening the ring around our main forces, this fourth offensive began with a deep strategic envelopment. This time too, as on previous occasions, the enemy directed his main blow at the point where our High Command was stationed (a point from which the most remotely situated units were under direct control). The Germans concentrated their forces at Karlovac, Glina, Bosanska, Kostajnica and Banja-Luka. The Sarajevo concentration of enemy forces was effected later, when it was expected that most of our troops would be forced out of Bosanska-Krajina into the valley of the Neretva and Vrbas Rivers. As in Gospic-Ogulin and Knin and Sinj in Dalmatia, Italian divisions were concentrated for this offensive.

As far back as December 1942 we came into possession of documents revealing that Draja Mihailovich had concluded an agreement with the Germans to join forces with them in conducting a fourth offensive against us.

Throughout Montenegro, Sandjak, Serbia and Herzegovina energetic propaganda was conducted among the Chetniks to undertake an offensive against Bosanska-Krajina, where the Chetniks were to take over power in the towns and villages and to liquidate the guerrillas and Ustashi.

The fourth offensive began in January. The Germans advanced simultaneously on Karlovac from Slunj, Glina and other points in the Banija area while the Italians made repeated attempts to break through the liberated territory of Lika. The Italians were repulsed with heavy losses but, after fifteen days of fighting, the Germans (hurling great numbers of bombers and assault planes into the battle) succeeded in occupying the whole of Slunj and all towns as far as Kordun and Banija. More than fifty thousand refugees from Kordun and Banija who retreated with our troops (who were constantly engaged in bloody fighting) were ruthlessly bombed by the German villains. The number of victims was very great.

When the enemy approached Bihac the High Command moved to the Petrovac area.

There the High Command worked out the following plan: the Croatian forces were to remain in their territory in Lika to defend it. The Seventh Banja-Luka Division, stationed in the Slunj Bihac sector, was to fight a rearguard action to slow down the enemy's advance in liberated territory. The First Bosnian Corps, now transformed into the Third Corps, was to harass the enemy's rapid advance in the mountainous region of Grmec and Mrkonjicgrad. The First and Third Divisions were at that time stationed in Central Bosnia near the Sava River and the town of Dobojs, and the Second Division in the Livno sector in Dalmatia. The High Command decided to concentrate these three divisions immediately in a swift maneuver to smash weaker enemy garrisons in the valley of the Neretva and Vrbas Rivers and to straddle the railway line from the Ivan Sedlo mountain pass

to the town of Mostar, thus enabling our troops to retreat with some 4,000 wounded soldiers.

In addition the High Command decided, after the retreat across the Neretva River, to undertake a major operation in pursuit of Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks and to clear the vile henchmen of the invaders out of Montenegro and Sandjak as well as Herzegovina. To the Second Division was entrusted the task of launching a swift attack to capture the fortified town of Imotski and remaining points and of making an immediate thrust into the Neretva Valley near Mostar to cut communications between the Italian Command and its garrisons in Prozor, Konjic, Jablanica, Trama, etc. The Third Division was dispatched to take the strongly fortified town of Prozor, occupied by the Italians a month earlier. One brigade from the First Division was ordered to seize the Ivan Sedlo mountain pass, thus cutting the Konjica Sarajevo line. Two other brigades from the First Division were ordered to defend the road to Bugojno. As a result of uninterrupted marches the three divisions reached their destinations in record time. They were determined to take Prozor at all costs because it was situated along our line of communications.

After two days of bloody fighting, two brigades from the Third Division occupied the town, and the Italian garrison (about 1,000 strong) was completely wiped out. Extensive matériel was captured, especially supplies of food and ammunition, since the enemy had been preparing this town as a base for closing a ring around us as soon as the Germans should give the signal. The Second Division occupied Imotski, liquidated the Italian garrison at Drenica and rapidly forged ahead in the direction of Jablanica where the Italian regiment was stationed. After stiff fighting it captured Jablanica, destroyed almost all bridges spanning the Neretva and captured further supplies. The Ivan Sedlo mountain pass was also occupied but owing to the rapid intervention of superior German forces our brigades withdrew in the direction of Konjic (which they also failed to occupy during the first assault). The Italian Murge Division, which held the entire sector, was almost completely destroyed—only a few hundred men survived—and all its armaments fell into our hands.

The way had now been cleared for forcing the Neretva River. But our units on this sector were tied down by the wounded, who were still some hundreds of kilometers from us and who had to be evacuated. Under the most difficult conditions of adverse weather and muddy roads our trucks constantly carried the wounded to the Prozor sector, whence it would be necessary to dispatch them across the Neretva by truck as soon as Konjic should fall.

The bitter battle that developed in this sector lasted 37 days. The Germans rapidly brought up forces. In Bugojno the 369th Division, the 36th and units of the 114th were concentrated as well as strong forces of con-

scripts and Ustashi. The 11th Division, swollen by Ustashi and conscripts, was advancing from Sarajevo. Across Mount Pren, from Mostar and from Glavaticevo, the traitor Draja Mihailovich dispatched over 10,000 Chetniks who, together with the Italians, were to stab us in the back and block our way. But employing tactics of swift maneuvering along interior lines, we fought one of our most glorious battles for liberation there.

Battles between Donji-Vakuf and Prozor took on a dramatic character. The Germans had already succeeded in breaking through to a point two kilometers away from our wounded. Rapid intervention by the heroic Fourth Montenegrin and the Third Krajina Brigades saved our wounded. Fighting went on day and night. Our side put into action every weapon (such as heavy guns, tanks and other armaments) it had captured during the rout of the Italian divisions. In the bitterly cold weather prevailing in the mountains the Maklin and Radusa positions changed hands time and again. Fighting ceaselessly both day and night, soldiers, especially those of our Seventh Division, were so worn out that many died from sheer exhaustion in their forward positions. During this time forces of our Fourth Montenegrin Brigade and units of the Third Division were engaged in constant attacks on Konjic, while the greater part of the Third Division was ceaselessly engaged in stubborn fighting against Germans and Ustashi in the foothills of Bitovunje. Then, just as our units were occupying a section of the town on the left bank of the Neretva River, Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks struck our troops. Four of our divisions, along with 4,000 wounded, were under attack from all sides. Nevertheless the High Command decided to smash the enemy at all costs and to get the wounded across the Neretva. After many days of stubborn fighting and strong artillery action on our part our units crushed the Germans in the Gornji-Vakuf sector and sent them reeling back in the direction of Bugojno.

Before our units crossed over to the left bank of the Neretva the High Command issued orders to destroy all remaining bridges across the river—despite the fact that we still had to get our wounded and the army across. This strategem, designed to mislead the Germans into thinking that we had chosen to make our breach in a different direction, succeeded completely.

Near the ruined railway bridge all our wounded and also almost the whole of our army were able to cross over. In addition to the four divisions mentioned above, the Ninth Dalmatian Division, which had retreated from Dalmatia in the face of superior enemy forces, also crossed over to the left bank.

The wounded were taken across to the left bank of the Neretva. The enemy was crushed at Gornji-Vakuf and needed much time to effect reorganization. Completely routed on the left bank of the Neretva, the Chetniks and Italians beat a panicky retreat. Since, however, we had wrecked

all bridges before breaking through we had to destroy all our tanks and heavy guns.

But pursuit of Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks began immediately. Our forces advanced in two directions: toward Nevesinje in Herzegovina and toward Kalinovnik. In the mountain area near Glavaticevo and Kalinovnik, Mihailovich's Chetniks were again so completely smashed as to be rendered incapable of any further resistance. Many of them began to desert to our side. Many more in their panic shaved their beards and changed into peasant garb to prevent guerrillas from identifying them as Chetniks. After forced marches our units reached Drina, crossed the river in the face of heavy odds and smashed the Italian Taurinense Division on the right bank of the Drina. During a swift march Nevesinje and Gacko in Herzegovina were occupied, while in Montenegro our troops got as far as Kolasin.

The month of May was to be a month of rest for our glorious divisions. But while we were busy clearing the Chetniks out of Montenegro the Germans and Italians and Ustashi were already preparing for their fifth and most violent offensive against us. Our army countered this fifth offensive under the most difficult of conditions. Several thousand men were recuperating from typhus. Owing to exceptional rigors encountered en route, thousands of our wounded were completely exhausted and required a long rest. But the enemy gave us no respite and prepared his fifth offensive with the aim of destroying us. He was aware of the fact that the High Command and our best units were in Montenegro. This time, therefore, taking greater pains to prepare his offensive, he soon dispatched far stronger forces against us.

He transferred some of his divisions from Greece (for example the First Alpine Division) to this new campaign and also threw Bulgarians, Italians and followers of the puppets Nedich and Pavelich against us. The fifth—and likewise the severest—battle began. And again—though at the cost of tremendous sacrifice—our glorious units inflicted tremendous losses on the enemy and emerged without losing their fighting capacity. Because the world has already heard much about this fifth offensive and much will be written about it in days to come I shall not go into a description of its battles.

The fourth offensive was followed by our victorious campaign in Montenegro. This completely liquidated Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks. Since that time they have ceased to be of any military importance. During both the fourth and the fifth offensives the units which I have mentioned bore the main brunt of the war. But it was waged against a background of fighting throughout much of Yugoslavia. Guerrillas and brigades from the Sixth Corps in Slavonia harassed enemy communications incessantly. Fighting was also in progress in Slovenia, Dalmatia, Serbia and other places. Popular uprisings were spreading throughout the whole country.

Far from intimidating our people and our fighters, the great attacks which the troops of occupation launched against the main body of our forces had a stimulating effect. Feats of mass heroism performed in these battles will buttress our peoples' pride for many centuries to come.

The growth of the guerrilla detachments and People's Liberation Armies integrated the powers of our people. As early as 1941 People's Liberation Committees were set up in villages and towns in the liberated territories of Serbia, Montenegro, etc. They replaced all the old rural and other local administrations which had gone over to the service of the occupation authorities. Originally these committees had as their principal task the provision of supplies to guerrilla detachments but gradually they took over all the duties which rest upon local, communal, municipal and district authorities. In the autumn of 1942, when the greater part of Yugoslavia had been liberated, the necessity arose for establishing a central political body for all Yugoslavia to direct all these committees and to relieve the High Command of various political functions which had been constantly piling up through the force of circumstance. It was decided to convene an Anti-fascist Vece, or assembly, of the People's Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. It will be remembered that the Vece met on November 26, 1942 in the town of Bihac and was attended by delegates representing all the peoples of Yugoslavia. Far-reaching, historic decisions were adopted and an executive committee was elected. The Vece represented all anti-fascist parties and united all political trends, regardless of religion and nationality. The Vece was charged with mobilizing all means for helping the People's Liberation Army and with continuing to organize People's Liberation Committees, not only in liberated sectors but in territory still occupied by the enemy.

In addition to the Anti-fascist Vece of the People's Liberation Movement a body with similar functions, known as the Slovenian Liberation Front, was set up in Slovenia in 1941. In the spring of 1941 a regional Anti-fascist Vece was set up in Croatia and in the second half of the year regional Anti-fascist Veces of People's Liberation were also set up in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Sandjak, etc. Simultaneously throughout Serbia the People's Liberation Committees organized a regional committee as their central body. The difference in names is explained by the fact that because of the mass terror maintained by Axis occupation forces, by the followers of Nedich and by Mihailovich's Chetniks in Serbia it was impossible to hold general elections for this body.

On November 29, 1943 the Second Plenary Session of the Anti-fascist Vece of the People's Liberation Movement, held in the town of Jajce, was attended by twenty delegates from all parts of the country. This session likewise adopted far-reaching and historic decisions. The Anti-fascist Vece was transformed into the supreme legislative body of Yugoslavia, with all

the rights of a parliament. The presidium was elected—with 56 members and with Dr Ivan Ribar at its head. The Yugoslav National Liberation Committee was formed as the provisional people's government.

This Committee decided to annul and reconsider all agreements concluded by the refugee Yugoslav Government. It declared invalid any agreement which might be negotiated by that government in future and it further decided to forbid the return of King Peter the Second until the question of the monarchy and the over-all system of administration was finally determined after the war by the free will of the people. Finally, it decided that Yugoslavia was to be constituted a democratic federated union in which all peoples were to have equal rights. Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina were considered members of the federation.

This form of internal organization for Yugoslavia is not an abstract ideal but represents a solution based on the will of all Yugoslavians, a will tutored by the bitter experience of the past.

The attack on our country by German, Italian, Bulgarian and other invaders marked the beginning not only of the extermination of our peoples but also of a campaign of violence fanning up such flames of hatred among the various nationalities as to threaten all with a general conflagration. Under German instigation the Ustashi killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Mihailovich's Chetniks, incited by Germans and Italians, destroyed tens of thousands of Croats. Our people were menaced with unspeakable dangers and faced complete destruction. When our Serbian units reached Eastern Bosnia thousands of bodies of innocent women, children and aged Moslems were already resting at the body of the Drina River. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in Krajina, we found huge gullies filled with bodies of massacred Serbian women, children, old people. Immediately we dedicated ourselves to putting an end to this horrible carnage. We adopted the slogan, "Fraternity and Unity among the Yugoslav Peoples" and exerted every effort to prove to the enraged Serbian people and misled Chetniks that not all Croats were villains, that not all Moslems were vicious, that only some of those in Ustashi uniform were guilty of perpetrating crimes—and that those had been committed at the instigation of the Germans.

We used all the means at our disposal to prove to the unfortunate Moslem and Croat population that the villains responsible for these crimes were not the Serbs but a handful of Chetniks led by Mihailovich, Pechanats and Nedich. This work required tremendous effort on the part of our heroic brigades and guerrilla detachments which were engaged at the same time in a ruthless struggle against the forces of occupation and also against Ustashi and Chetnik criminals-tools in the hands of the occupation authorities. In this our efforts were crowned with success: as a result

of our superhuman struggle, lasting unity and brotherhood such as had never existed before the war have now been established among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Today Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and every other people are animated by one thought—that of preventing the revival of anything which in prewar Yugoslavia had contributed to the catastrophe; of punishing those chiefly responsible for bringing this terrible tragedy down upon our peoples; of building up a truly democratic, federated Yugoslavia in which the various peoples of Yugoslavia will live in friendship.

The tremendous enthusiasm which spread among the peoples of Yugoslavia (both in liberated and occupied areas) after the decisions reached at the second session of the Anti-fascist Vece were announced indicated that the principle which had guided us throughout our years of war—and which finally ended in the triumph of our cause—was sound. It demonstrated, too, that we were justified in starting a popular uprising at the very beginning of the war, before the enemy was able to put his infernal designs into practice.

During three months of 1941, with the aid of Ustashi villains, the Nazis succeeded in exterminating more than half a million Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Vojvodina.

Those who at home and abroad constantly preached that the time was not yet ripe were guilty of a real crime against our people, because they sacrificed their countrymen's lives to the murderous sword of the invaders. And for more than two years the world was deceived about the real state of affairs in Yugoslavia.

It is easy to understand how this confusion had complicated our struggle. Our fighters and the peasants in the villages gnashed their teeth when they heard the traitor Draja Mihailovich praised by various broadcasting stations and newspapers at the very time when he was fighting against us under the command of German officers. Let us take but one example, the battle for Konjic in which Mihailovich with his 1,800 Chetniks fought on the side of the Germans, Nedich's men, Bulgarians, etc. During this period foreign broadcasting stations reported that Mihailovich was attacking the enemy from the south, thereby helping the guerrillas. It would be hard in all history to find a parallel for the injustice thus visited upon our people while they were making such sacrifices.

An end has now been made to this lying deception. The traitor Mihailovich, along with Pavelich and Rupnik, has been nailed to the pillory of history. We are thankful to our allies for realizing, although belatedly, to whom aid must be given.

During three years of superhuman struggle we were called upon to fight under conditions for which there is hardly a precedent. A small citadel of democracy within Hitler's European Fortress, we were under

constant attack from overwhelming enemy forces bent upon destroying us. But what frustrated the realization of Hitler's plans? First, the unbending will of our peoples and their determination to die fighting rather than become slaves to the fascist invaders. Second, the profound faith in an Allied victory, brought nearer by the Soviet Union. Third, the emergence, in this gigantic and unequal combat, of our heroic People's Army of Liberation—an army increasingly tempered and seasoned.

Today we have our own true People's Government, developed in the process of this struggle and elected by popular vote.

Today we have a supreme legislative body, the Anti-fascist Vece of the People's Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. Its task is to prepare the re-organization of our country's institutions on the basis of truly democratic principles. We also have—and this is our greatest achievement—brotherhood and unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.

THE FUTURE OF THE SLAV COUNTRIES

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DUARD BENES Since the end of the eighteenth century the question of the liberation of the Slav peoples has been in the foreground of European policy. Not even the Russians (who were then the only free Slav people from a national point of view) were politically free under the czarist regime. The French Revolution, the American Revolution and the English constitutional revolution of the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century were signals to the Slav peoples to launch their own struggle for national freedom and for modern political freedom in general. The common sufferings of the Slav peoples and the fact that they were not free created among them the political concept of a Slavic community and of rendering each other mutual assistance. From the beginning of the nineteenth century this concept was the basis for the formulation of a series of interpretations of the so-called "Slavic policy."

Throughout the nineteenth century the political idea of the Slavic community remained in the theoretical domain. At first it was the Kollar concept of Slavic humanism (1837); during the first half of the nineteenth century it became the notion of Polish Messianism; immediately afterward (around 1845) it became the concept of Russian Slavophilism held by Kirejevsky, Chomjakov and Aksakov. Around 1880 theoretical Slavophilism became the basis for Danilevsky's practical, and extremely reactionary,

political concept of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Russianism. But since the plans laid to translate theoretical Pan-Slavism into political reality appeared impossible and inoperable, neo-Slavism—a bourgeois liberalism—came to life between 1900 and 1914. And although the theory of neo-Slavism was completely wrecked by the first World War, that war did pose anew the entire problem of liberty for all the Slavic peoples and therefore represented a new chapter in the history of the so-called Slavic movement. It did not, of course, solve all the problems facing the movement. The same thing has happened in the second World War.

On several occasions the so-called Slavic movement has played an important role in modern political history. But never—despite what has often been stated—has this movement been a decisive factor in determining the course of great events.

The thesis that the first World War was a conflict between the Germans and the Slavs—an idea which was purposely planted in public opinion and was even supported by political personages like Bethmann-Hollweg—is in line with propaganda on behalf of the prewar policy followed by Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. To assert such a thesis is to show a complete ignorance of the substance of events occurring at the beginning of the twentieth century. All one need do to perceive the erroneousness of the thesis is to peruse in detail the diplomatic archives in Vienna for the years 1906 to 1914 and to follow step by step the successive conflicts between Vienna and Petersburg during this period. Such a study leads to the immediate realization that the events of those years are evidence of the continuation of the general policy of Austria-Hungary and Russia toward the Balkans in connection with British policy in the Near East and German aspirations in Morocco, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. All this affected Franco-German relations also.

It is possible to maintain that the first World War had its origins within the framework of the expansionism and imperialism of the great powers at the beginning of the twentieth century—precipitated in the first place by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and by the series of phenomena in Central Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Asia Minor, North Africa and so on which accompanied the dissolution. Naturally a number of Slavic problems arose.

But it would be a ridiculous exaggeration to assert that the first World War was a war between the Germans and the Slavs, that it was caused by Pan-Slavist action, by neo-Slavic intrigues, by a Slavic expansionist policy, etc. In spreading this theory, German nationalists have attempted to find for themselves a partial alibi for their responsibility in beginning the war. The first World War covered much wider problems—Slavs, Germans, Latins, Anglo-Saxons, Magyars, Turks, Chinese and Japanese took part in it. Not only did it raise various and complicated Slav problems: it also

raised the problem of Austria, of Hungary and of Rumania; of the Dardanelles, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Arabia and Iraq; the question of Albania, the unification of Italy, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France; the settlement of Irish claims; the disposition of German colonies and of German aspirations in the Far East; the matter of Japanese expansion in China and so on—that is to say, a greater number of non-Slav than of Slav questions.

The war of 1914-1918 was the grandiose culmination of European evolution—from the humanism of the Renaissance and the Reformation (which led to the bourgeois individualism in European policy) on into the constitutionalism and parliamentarianism of the beginning of the twentieth century. The groundwork for this evolution was laid by Cartesian philosophy, English liberalist philosophy and the French Encyclopedists. With the British, American and French political revolutions the medieval concepts of aristocratic feudalism were destroyed and the first bases of modern constitutionalism and bourgeois liberalism were laid down. America and Western Europe have been influenced by this evolution. In the course of the political, economic and social conflicts of the nineteenth century the modern, liberal man, freed from the absolutist chains of the Middle Ages, was formed—man who has proclaimed the philosophy of mankind, respect for the human being, the philosophy of political and social equality, of economic, political and democratic liberty.

In spite of political changes Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey have never really gone through political and spiritual revolutions comparable to those which transformed the Western European nations and America. That is why, when the first World War broke out, the world was divided into two groups. On the one side were Germany and Austria-Hungary, both imbued with a dynastic, imperialist and militarist spirit; furthermore, in its political and social structure, Austria-Hungary had remained a medieval state. Allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary were Bulgaria, influenced by the Prussianized Coburg dynasty, and Turkey, with its Oriental philosophy and its governmental methods grounded in Moslem theocratic beliefs. On the other side the Allied group included those states of Western Europe which had been through the purifying and democratic revolutions of the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Russia was also among the Allies. But owing to the medieval absolutist power exercised over her by the czars, to the political immaturity produced by the inoperable form of her monarchy and her degenerate constitutionalism, and to the impossible social conditions and rotten bureaucracy impeding Russia she belonged, in spirit and in evolution, in political, economic and social structure to the Central powers. And, like all the powers in the German clan, Russia was ready for a revolution.

In its character, in its substance, the first World War was the outcome

of the imperialist fight for the Ottoman and Habsburg inheritance. And ideologically throughout all of Europe, except on Soviet territory, the war took on the character of a battle for bourgeois European democracy. Out of it emerged the political concepts of liberal democracy, of government of the people, by the people and for the people, and aspirations toward national self-determination. These concepts had the greatest significance for all of the Slav peoples of Europe because at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century they had been subjected (by the Germans, the Magyars and to some extent by the Turks) to the largest degree of oppression. For centuries the Germans had been their enemies and—as representatives of great empires, the Prussian and the Austrian—their most dangerous enemies. Anti-German and anti-Prussian trends among the Slav peoples were therefore very natural. From the standpoint of political liberty and of modern democracy the Slavs were the most victimized peoples of Europe. Up to the time of the war the Russians were fighting for their own domestic liberty; they were not even masters in their own country. The Poles were ruled by three absolutist states. The Czechs and the Slovaks, disunited and oppressed, were ruled by two absolutist powers.

As for the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians, it is unnecessary to talk about them so far as either national or political liberty is concerned.

Berlin, Vienna and Petrograd agreed on a common policy against democracy and the revolution which Western Europe had experienced; and from time to time they discussed the creation of a Holy Alliance in Central and Eastern Europe to maintain the old regime—which, in the final analysis, was entirely non-Slav. Fear of democracy, of socialism, of workers and of the revolution was the central idea underlying the policies pursued by these three monarchies at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.

But the anti-German coalition, the Allies, did not have—either before or during the first World War—a plan or a conscious policy concerning Slav questions. At the beginning of the war official French and British opinion was not thinking along such lines. French and British statesmen had neither the time nor the knowledge to dwell on this matter.

The role of czarist Russia (the only country which could play a decisive part) is clear enough today. Serbia was merely fighting for its existence. If Russia defended Serbia strongly it was above all because, in line with the tradition of the Russian Empire, she wanted to maintain her imperialist interests in the Balkans. Russia had no general conception of a Slavic policy for the war 1914–1918. On this question I refer readers to President T. G. Masaryk's book, *The Making of a State—Memories and Observations 1914–1918*. As to the Polish problem, official czarist Russia's attitude before the Revolution was extremely guarded; later on assistance

was refused to Poland; in the end the czarist policy became completely anti-Polish. The 1917 Revolution put an end to this anti-Polish policy—but the first attempt at Polish autonomy was made by an Austro-German group opposed to czarist Russia. Czarist Russia's attitude on Czechoslovakian matters is clearly described in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An examination of these archives reveals the fact that czarist Russia had no official plan for Czechs and Slovaks and that when the question of these peoples was raised in Western Europe Russia was most reticent on the subject. She was prejudiced against the Czechs for the mere reason that they were democrats, in rebellion against Austria-Hungary. In any event czarist Russia was without any preconceived Slavic plan for the Czechoslovaks. As a matter of fact she was without a broad political plan for Slavs.

This was as true of her attitude toward Yugoslav affairs as toward Czechoslovakian.

The Slavic interests of czarist Russia were identical with the interests of the orthodox Slavs, and the religious aspect played a much more important role than did ethnical or cultural aspects. But even this religious interest did not prevent czarist Russia from giving her lighthearted assent to the London Pact of April 1915 under whose terms Dalmatia was promised to Italy and a large orthodox population was sacrificed along with Slavic territory. Wherever the so-called Slavic policy was marked by progressive, democratic and revolutionary elements (as in the case of Czechoslovakia) czarist policy during the first World War was negative. It would be well advised to view the question of the participation of czarist Russia and of the first revolutionary regime of the Soviet Union, as well as the struggle of the not-yet-liberated Slavs for freedom—especially during the first World War—not through the prism of the political strife of the time but from a scientific and long-range historical standpoint.

For decades before the first and second World Wars there was talk about Slavophilism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Russianism and, later on, neo-Slavism—as if these were movements for the liberation of the Slavic peoples in which czarist Russia, out of a desire to free the Slavs, had played a decisive part. I have always opposed this concept because it reminds me of certain outmoded political institutions, classes, political parties, groups and persons. These theories were dangerous because even after the first World War several of them were misused to buttress untrue theories and to defend the fallen czarist regime's policies in some Slav countries.

This being said I want to recapitulate Russia's role in the liberation of the Slavic peoples during the first World War as follows:

1. For all the Slav peoples the first World War was the source of great progress. The Poles, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, liberated as a result of it, united and formed their own national states. The Bulgarians were

at least preserved as a national entity. Other Slavic peoples were included in the Soviet Union as federated Republics. Without doubt czarist Russia and the Russian people, by the great sacrifices they made, contributed in substantial measure to the general outcome of the first World War and consequently to the battle for the liberation of the Poles, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs. Czarist Russia entered the first World War for basically different objectives. But the Russian Revolution transformed czarist Russia into another country: into the Soviet Union which for the past twenty years has been doing a marvelous piece of work, has won for itself a position among the most powerful nations of the world—and by its heroic fight against the Germano-Prussian, Pan-Germanist reactionary forces (that is to say, German nazism and fascism) has demonstrated its success as a state and a system of government.

2. From the very outset of the first World War, political and military circles within the old Russian regime entertained vague ideas about the liberation of a few of the Slavic peoples. But this liberation was conceived, either directly or indirectly, in terms of an expansion of the czarist empire. And in the end even this policy was paralyzed by extremely reactionary and Germanophile currents which soon became aware of the danger of revolution inherent in a genuine Slavic policy which could undermine czarist Russia. For even before the first World War a true Slav policy could not have failed to be revolutionary in character.

That is why the Russian Revolution had such fundamental importance for the liberation of Slav peoples. By means of this revolution and the sacrifices made during its course the Russians gave the greatest of help to the other Slavic peoples. Poland especially would never have been entirely liberated without the Russian Revolution. This upheaval, coming soon after the announcement of President Wilson's Fourteen Points early in 1917, stimulated ideas of self-determination for the small nations.

Yet although the Slavs gained enormously from it, the first World War was not a conflict between Slavs and Germans. It solved many more non-Slav than Slav problems. True, the war unified and liberated the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, and Serbs and Croats and Slovenes. It brought to birth the great Russian Revolution out of which came a new Russia, the Soviet Union; and within that framework it solved the Slavic problem of the Ukraine and White Russia (though it should be noted that after the Polish-Soviet war certain portions of Russian territory were given to the Poles). It did not solve—instead it intensified—the conflict between the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians.

To sum up: up to and during the first World War there was no common policy, no effective collaboration among the Slav peoples. Moreover from the time of the French Revolution to the disappearance of the notion of neo-Slavism the prospects for the growth of the concept of a Slavic com-

munity and collaboration among its members were not very promising; for by its very nature the concept of a Slavic community could be rooted only in a democratic, radically popular, and politically and socially revolutionary philosophy. It was impossible for the Slavic groups—which were without governments and had not passed through the nineteenth-century political and social revolutions against established order—to achieve a Slavic community and collaboration among the oppressed Slav peoples, either within or across national boundaries. That is why a Slav community never existed and why it is only now that we are working for it.

Therefore there is one question we must ask ourselves clearly, reasonably, objectively, without passion and without prejudice: In this revolutionary period, in the midst of the profound changes—political, social and economic—through which all of the Slavs are passing, is it possible for a new Slavic community—revolutionary and popular—to emerge? And if we answer this question in the affirmative we must ask ourselves a second: How extensive will such a new Slavic community be and in which directions will it grow?

The liberation and unification of Poland, the conflict between Poland and the Soviet Union during the years 1920–21 and the defeat of Bulgaria in 1918 left two matters of tremendous international importance unresolved. In comparison with the period up to 1914 Polish-Russian relations have in a certain sense been more rather than less tense; it is now the Russians who have accused the Poles of having taken territory belonging to White Russians and Ukrainians and of having oppressed these two national groups. Likewise relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, strained by friction over Macedonia, have remained basically the same as before World War II.

From the standpoint of domestic policy within the Slavic nations various old problems have appeared under a new guise:

1. The problems of the White Russians and Ukrainians have been solved within the Soviet Union—proof that the policies adopted were capable of resolving this particular domestic Slavic problem.

2. Czechoslovakia was confronted with the question of the political and cultural unification of Czechs and Slovaks and with devising an administrative solution for Slovak matters. There was also the question of relationships between Sub-Carpathian Russia and the Czechoslovak Republic.

3. Yugoslavia was beset from the very outset by the grave problems of political and cultural unification of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs; and of administrative decentralization for Catholics, Orthodox and Moslems in a unified state.

4. Poland had to work out the relationship of its Ukrainian and White Russian groups to the Polish state and nation. Because of these minorities there was a latent conflict between Poland and the Soviet Union. Although

the points at issue were settled by the Treaty of Riga it was generally supposed that open conflict had merely been temporarily postponed. Immediately after 1921, moreover, there arose the question of how a liberated Slavic state should work out its relations with its own Slavic minorities.

5. Bulgaria was not faced by the problem of a Slavic minority within its borders. It was up to her, instead, to reconcile herself to the incorporation of Macedonia into Yugoslavia: to understand that a democratic Slavic point of view made it incumbent on Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to come together in a sort of federation or confederation of the two states.

Throughout the twenty years between the first and the second World Wars there was a struggle, on a national and international scale, to resolve these various Slavic problems, whether international or national. They could have been solved only by the adoption of truly democratic domestic policies (both social and economic in nature) and by common agreement on policy among the Slav peoples. But the time between the two wars was not really a period of peace: it was only an armistice. And the conflict of which the first World War had been an expression continued, though its outward expressions and manifestations were less violent.

The war of 1914-18—which had been inspired by American democratic and political ideas and in the end was deeply influenced by the social ideals of the Soviet Revolution—presented a peace which ought to have destroyed German militarism and Pan-Germanism; which ought to have freed the smaller nations and have democratized and reshaped Europe, both socially and economically. Monarchies were destroyed: in certain nations the feudal classes were eliminated: the peasants were liberated. Throughout Europe socialist parties began to have a voice in the decisions reached.

But to the reactionary elements of every hue this result of the first World War was unbearable. From 1921 on they began preparations for what later on took the shape of the fascist and nazi counter-revolution. As early as 1922 Mussolini marched on Rome; in 1923 Hitler tried his first Munich putsch; in Hungary Admiral Horthy had been in power since 1919. One after the other the democratic regimes in other European states collapsed: in 1926 Pilsudsky reinstated his regime; in 1927 the democratic constitution of Yugoslavia was abolished; in Bulgaria the forces of reaction gained ground steadily after the fall of Stamboliski. Most important of all, Italian fascism and German nazism became more and more of a national and international danger. After 1934 it was obvious that the European catastrophe and the new war being prepared by nazism and fascism were coming closer.

This fascist reaction had three aspects:

1. Fascism and nazism were the expression of a new and barbarous nationalism which in its ruthlessness, reactionary spirit and brutality sur-

passed anything which had ever up to that time appeared in the history of the modern world. From the international point of view it was above all else an expression of a feeling of revenge; from the Italian point of view it was an expression of dissatisfaction that Italian demands had not been fulfilled. In these respects nazism and fascism represented a return to the bourgeois nationalist imperialism of the first World War. In addition nazism took on the character of the most brutal Pan-Germanism ever to emerge in Germany: an automatic response to the independence which the small European nations had won at the expense of German imperialistic and expansionist plans.

2. Fascism and nazism were a reaction against all the democratic forms issuing from the French and American Revolutions. They were also a reaction against bourgeois democracy and—naturally—against all modern, democratic liberties stemming from the victory of the democratic powers in the war of 1914–18.

3. They were a reaction against the ideology of the Russian Revolution; against all attempts to establish a social and economic democracy.

In a word, this was a struggle between two irreconcilable ways of life. In this fight none of the Slavic peoples and none of the Slavic states would give way to fascism or nazism. None would compromise; for it is in the nature of the evolution of Slavic peoples to be victimized and destroyed if they yield in any way to ruthless physical force. For centuries they have been outraged by the enemy, within and without. Their liberty—their very existence—can be assured only by a regime stemming from the people: by a regime committed to democracy in its domestic and foreign policy.

Since 1934, therefore, every Slavic problem has been colored by its relationship to the fight for or against fascism and nazism. After 1932 Soviet Russia realized the approaching menace and drew closer to the Western democracies. In 1932, when the conflict in the Far East arose, Russia looked for collaboration with the democratic world. In 1934 the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations. It energetically opposed the fascist adventure in Ethiopia. Not only did the Soviet Union try to achieve an international agreement in Geneva: in the so-called Eastern Pact with Poland and Czechoslovakia it attempted to erect defenses against the imperialist-minded Fascists. Furthermore to preserve the peace and freedom of Europe it signed treaties of alliance with France and Czechoslovakia. After Hitler's direct assault on Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union was the only European power which kept its word and which, as early as 1938, wanted to overthrow Hitler and rid Europe of the nazi danger.

Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union brought all the Slavic countries with the exception of Bulgaria in line against the common enemy—against nazi and fascist forces of reaction. I look on World War II as an historic action to put a final stop to the Pan-German *Drang nach Osten*. This war has

been a vivid demonstration that there must be friendly and loyal collaboration among Poland, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia.

What are Slavic policy and the community and solidarity of the Slav peoples going to be like in the future? The problems facing the Slav peoples are not going to be solved by idealistic Slavic exhortations, by sentimental words about Slavism and our Slavic brothers; nor are they going to be solved by a resort to reactionary Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism of all sorts and shades, or by the bourgeois neo-Slavism in favor before the first World War (which hoped to reconcile czarism with the Habsburg Empire and wanted to oppose a Slavic imperialism to Hohenzollern imperialism).

The future of the Slav countries is indissolubly linked to a fight for freedom on behalf of all Slavic peoples. The future of every group is inseparable from the outlook for the great masses of the oppressed Slavic peoples. Some of these peoples (in Russia and Bulgaria) have suffered from tyranny and reactionary policies at home; others (Poland and Yugoslavia) from tyranny imposed from without; a few Slavic groups (in Poland and Czechoslovakia) have suffered on both counts. The Slavic community must inevitably, therefore, be a community committed to a revolutionary battle against all tyrannies and all forms of reaction. By nature every Slav people is extremely democratic, with a stronger natural inclination toward equalitarianism than is true of other European peoples. The first World War changed and measurably improved the status of national and political servitude in which Slav peoples had been held. Now the second World War has greatly simplified the basic problem confronting the Slavs and has brought it closer to a final solution. The Slav peoples will come out of this war free, with their own independent states.

If the Slav peoples have learned enough from their battle against the fascist forces of reaction, at home and abroad, to set up genuinely democratic regimes, if they decide to take radical steps to solve their domestic problems—political, social and economic—they will be drawn so much closer to each other that the conflicts which heretofore have kept them separated could easily be resolved. Without thought for the past, for national prestige, for national ambitions and bygone national rivalries, they will automatically cleave to a unified international policy. For the problem confronting each Slav people is the problem confronting the common man—the citizen who desires nothing except to solve his internal national difficulties democratically and to collaborate in peace and friendship with the other Slav nations.

This does not mean that the Slav peoples and states should not be independent or that they should form a solid bloc. On the contrary each should lead its own independent national and political life, with its own unique democratic institutions. All these ideas came into my mind when the Slav congress convened in Moscow in April 1942. My mind ran over the history

of previous Slav congresses, beginning with the congress of the revolutionary year 1848 in which the conservatives Palacky and Safaryk and the revolutionary Bakunin participated. As long ago as 1848 it was realized that the Slavs were faced with problems which called for revolutionary solutions. We are now living in a historic moment in which the problems confronting Slav peoples could be solved on a new political basis. I hope they will be thus solved. And I hope that they will want to work out all of Slavdom's international as well as internal problems on the basis of a new, democratic and popular Slav community.

In giving expression to this ideology for Slavdom I do not want to set forth a new ideology for a popular Pan-Slavism. I do not want to proclaim the formation of a new political bloc exclusively made up of all the Slav peoples. A bloc which shuts out all other peoples would threaten them and would constitute a new power in Europe. I believe, however, that the Slav peoples, if they really understand the historic significance of the great events of today, can attain political and national liberation and that they can guarantee its continuance by working together. Such collaboration would mark a new period in their national evolution.

Collaboration would not only be to their own interest. It would be to the advantage of the whole of Europe. For in Europe, despite Hitler's ruthless racial policies—destructive of all culture—the Slav peoples (with the Soviet Union, the greatest of them, at their head) will and should play an important role.

This new Slavism should be the expression of two of the profound ideas voiced by the great spirits of Slavic culture: Pushkin, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Gorky, Mickiewicz, Krasinski, Kollar, Palacky and Masaryk. These concepts are confidence in the capacity of the common man—that is to say in widespread political and social democracy; and belief in the fundamentally humanitarian nature of mankind. These two ideas describe the real Slavic program and the real Slavic policy of the future.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA LOOKS EAST AND WEST

J

JAN MASARYK

Each of my trips to the United States has been most gratifying to me because it has always enabled me to find confirmation for the belief that the ideals of free peoples are identical all over the world. But one trip, made especially to participate in the United

Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Conference, was particularly gratifying. This notable gathering proved to everyone—except those few who still refuse, and probably always will, to learn—that a cooperation which combines practical efficiency with great ideals is possible, I might almost say easy, among the members of the United Nations. Mutual understanding and growing harmony among the representatives of the various nations has marked almost all the meetings of the United Nations. The constant and confident cooperation of the American, British and Soviet delegations at Atlantic City was a particularly hopeful indication for the future. One felt that all put forth equal effort to make of the first great agency of the United Nations an effective and working instrument. At this very moment the Director General of the UNRRA, Governor Lehman, who was appointed to his high office by all the United Nations, is working out momentous problems with the efficient staff he has judiciously assembled.

The success of the enterprise is not merely of temporary importance; it will have great repercussions on the new forms of international organization which will follow rapidly as we approach the beginning of the great era of reconstruction. The work of this new United Nations agency must receive sympathy and cooperation not only from the American people but from the people of all the United Nations.

But the very success of the UNRRA makes it imperative at once to explore the many other fields in international cooperation which must be organized and developed. There is one field to which this writer has been giving much thought lately: the field of intellectual and cultural rehabilitation. Of course no one can forget the destruction of culture by the barbarians of the Axis countries which has been so great that it will take many years completely to reconstitute the great scientific, literary, artistic and intellectual forces of Europe. Millions of precious books have been burned; many invaluable treasures have been stolen. We must restore everything because we cannot afford to lose the inheritance we have received from many sources. Various countries are making preparations. They are wondering how to fill the vacuum created by many long years of occupation, by closed schools and laboratories, libraries and research centers.

This task is so huge and of such interest to all the peoples of the world that it cannot be undertaken by one country alone. Nations must make a coordinated effort, working in the same spirit of mutual aid in which the United Nations have together waged the war. I submit that to assure maximum results to that common effort a special United Nations Secretariat should be entrusted with the task. It should work with the UNRRA and benefit from the general plans formulated for the rehabilitation of Europe. However, the Department of Intellectual Rehabilitation would deal specifically with the cultural questions which do not quite fit into the Atlantic City program.

Such a common enterprise on the part of the United Nations would undoubtedly arouse great interest all over the world. It would prove that the United Nations are more than a political form: that they are also an instrument for the reconstruction of great moral and intellectual forces which the enemy tried to destroy. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, the universities and all higher schools were closed and scientific libraries were destroyed or deprived of all access to scientific literature. The people were not allowed to hear of the progress of education in other countries—they were kept in ignorance, for instance, of the Butler plan in Great Britain. Yet despite attempts to destroy thinking, which were made by the German forces of occupation, cultural and intellectual interests were kept alive in Czechoslovakia as well as in the other occupied countries—in fact a desire for learning and a curiosity about things of the mind are today stronger than ever.

The creative forces of the occupied countries are eagerly awaiting the opportunity to spread their wings with the liberation of Europe. The peoples have waited for freedom and food but they have also waited to live a cultural life again. Therefore it seems to me essential that we who have lived in freedom prepare the intellectual tools for our lately imprisoned brothers as vigorously and as effectively as possible. When we give them the tools there is no doubt in this writer's mind that they will use them to the best advantage. But the preparations we must make are of such gigantic dimensions and reach so far into the cultural inheritance of all peoples that we must coordinate them well with the basic framework of rehabilitation adopted by the United Nations.

Important progress has already been made in the over-all structure of the United Nations. It has been built by lend-lease, the Atlantic Charter, the Cairo, Moscow, Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. But the time is quickly approaching for the walls to be filled in, for the furnishings and gadgets to be ready.

Problems of an international character which will confront us point clearly to the urgency of establishing a Secretariat or some similar organization of the United Nations—a Secretariat which can handle cooperation among all the members of the United Nations, which can put technical efficiency at the disposal of all interested members and which can be entrusted to execute the decisions reached by the United Nations conferences. In the various bilateral and multilateral boards of the United Nations which have been at work up to this time we have had evidence of how much can be achieved by common effort. The establishment of a General Secretariat will bring still greater results.

It is impossible to give a detailed view of the functioning of the new General Secretariat. But its general framework could be conceived as an over-all institution, staffed by men and women from many countries who

are technically qualified for their work and sincerely devoted to the principles of democracy. The Secretariat would have many sections and would work with many organizations. One of these would be UNRRA, another Intellectual Rehabilitation. Others might be created in the fields of economics, health and so on. In this way, we shall create the basis at least for permanent international cooperation.

We should keep it clearly in mind that we shall be confronted with major political, economic and cultural difficulties, especially in Europe. It would be a great mistake to think we shall return to 1938, as if nothing had happened. Soviet Russia has at last become a great European power whose influence will be felt all over the world. I have always claimed that Russia is a great European power and that it was our duty many years ago to join hands with her and to cooperate. Of course there were many chicken-hearted people who indulged in not too brave wishful thinking and in futile hoping that Russia really did not belong to Europe. The short-sightedness of this ostrich policy has been so thoroughly explored as not to need elucidation from me.

In Czechoslovakia we are proud, and are going to remain proud, of our century-long connection with Western civilization; and we shall insist on continuing that association. But we are equally proud, and are going to be proud, that for a long time we were eager to be associated intimately with our great Slav neighbor to the East. As Mr. Benes so ably explained in London, that pride in association was the essence of the treaty we signed recently with Soviet Russia. We Czechoslovaks are people who think independently. We have our own way of life; and our record throughout the turbulent centuries of European history has proved that our ways are good ways—perhaps not all of them but usually the majority. We have met with full understanding in London, in Moscow and in Washington. By temperament and approach we are closely united with Russia, and we have been so for a long time. Living under the very shadow of the “furor teutonicus,” which we have always hated and now hate more than ever, we are Slavdom’s western outposts.

The new political alignment that has taken place before our very eyes does not in any way mean that we want to exclude anyone from European affairs. We expect cooperation with Great Britain of course; and we hope with all our hearts for a permanent resurrection of a strong republican democratic France, for that is a European necessity. In the twenty years of our independence we have scrupulously lived up to our treaties and international obligations. We shall do so again as Czechoslovakia is reborn.

Personally, and I speak only for myself, I am a little afraid of very distinct spheres of influence on the European Continent. Naturally certain cooperative groups are bound to be formed along geographical lines. There cannot be the slightest doubt, for instance, that cooperation between the

Slav nations (which have been attacked by Germany time and time again) is going to be stronger, more intimate and more lasting. I can also understand that Western nations may come together in groups for very similar reasons. But these groups must cooperate as Europeans; they must understand each other infinitely better than they have hitherto done; and there should be an end to the business of dividing or classifying peoples into good and not-so-good Europeans.

That brings me back to my original suggestion. The problems of the interdependence of all the countries inside and outside Europe should be studied carefully and jointly. The ignorance I still find, regarding the other fellow, is simply appalling. The tremendous successes achieved on Soviet Russia's war front were the result of a very grand cultural, national, patriotic reawakening—and they should be recognized as such. The underground movements in all occupied countries, the heroism of the Partisans and the grim determination of the men and women doomed to life in concentration camps and ghettos form a texture of which we should all be very proud.

If we can set up some organization free from preconceived or antediluvian ideas, then the new situation, the new Europe and the new world can be studied and cultural and intellectual achievements can be pooled, discussed and generally made use of. With this approach we can go a long way toward solving the complicated situation before us—which, if you look at it really closely, is not quite so complicated as it appears in these hectic days. How to go about setting up such an organization I know not and I leave it to those who do know. I just hope they will not lose time, for I feel that the spirit of Europe is calling to us to do our duty and to do it now.

The cable reprinted below is a document unique in the annals of war. Written by Charles de Gaulle at a time when he was comparatively unknown in his native land, it is intensely characteristic of his unconquerable spirit and confidence in the strength of the French people whom he rallied in exile and led to freedom with consummate skill and single-minded purpose.

REBIRTH OF LIBERAL FRANCE

C

HARLES DE GAULLE This war which has forced upon mankind such heavy and bloody sacrifices has no meaning and can have none unless a new world is to rise from its ruins and sufferings. A free world in which liberty is no longer a word but a reality and the essence of daily life for every man and every woman—that is what the soldiers on the war fronts and the heroes of resistance in enslaved Europe are demanding with all their might. And how can one think of this revived world without that nation which has made of liberty and human dignity the time-honored object of its thoughts and the vital objective of its activities? How can one imagine it without France?

At this moment the enemy and the traitors who assist the enemy have let loose over France a flood of repression and deportation. The young Frenchmen, the workers, the intellectuals are hunted, dragged from their hearthstones, thrown into concentration camps or prisons, and taken to Germany as slaves. Hitler and his accomplices wanted at any price to extinguish their fighting spirit. Nevertheless, that spirit flames up to light their every step. The French nation is still in this war. Not a single day passes without many and powerful blows struck at the enemy and at his war machine—mutinous conscripts escape deportation, workers sabotage production, patriots are uniting in the movements of resistance. The dictators of Berlin and Vichy believed that they would procure slaves; they find only rebels. The silent army of liberation remains in the land, awaiting the hour when the allies of France clutch the monster by the throat.

Since June, 1940, Frenchmen outside of metropolitan France have not ceased to fight to the utmost, faithful to her alliances and loyal to her ideal.

Her soldiers, her sailors, and her aviators have added glory to her name from Kouffra to Bir Hakeim, from Eritrea to Fezzan, from the Russian front to the Atlantic. With the English in Cyrenaica, with the Americans in the Pacific, with the Red Army in the East, alone with their flag in the mountains and sands of Tibesti and of southern Libya, striking the enemy with all their force, they showed him and forced him to recognize the determined will of the French people. The territories which have joined Fighting France have continued to put into the common fund of this world struggle their bases, their resources, and, on more than one occasion, the lifeblood of their people. Who, in considering these sacrifices, could pretend that France, in spite of everything, has not played her part in the war—and this at a time when her soil was invaded, her finest sons imprisoned and deported, and her very name defamed by lies and treason.

For some months now, the United Nations have again gradually assumed the offensive. An important part of the Empire, held in sham neutrality by the agents of the enemy, has again come into the war. Valiant French troops, voiding the shameful armistice, add in their turn the weight of their arms to those of the legions which have been fighting for almost three years under the symbol of the Cross of Lorraine.

France identifies herself with all those who are serving her; from the depths of her prison she acclaims these stirring exploits. The night may still be long, perhaps, but the suffering and weary are now sure that dawn will come. France intends to stand erect and strong in the sun of tomorrow. Thrice invaded in the course of one lifetime, she is conscious of what she has suffered as the vanguard of freedom. She knows that her humanistic and liberal tradition holds promise for the future. She is sure to be able, as master of her destiny and within a world at peace, to rebuild her house, to set up a more equitable and more effective republic, and to translate into action the great longing for dignity and perfection which inspires her.

Those who are our allies in this war can count on France as France counts on them. If she has firmly decided not to permit the loss of any of her rights, she is no less resolved to do her duty in the international community. Because the sacrifices, the sufferings, and the heroic exploits would be in vain if the people and the countries which are now uniting their efforts for the war fail to maintain that unity in building a world which would ultimately measure up to all the potentialities of man.

PIERRE COT Any ideas that we may have about the future of a European nation are necessarily provisional.

To all observers World War II appears to be the beginning of a vast political, economic, and social revolution which will upset the very foundations of the conditions of life in the old and new worlds. The war period must necessarily be followed by a period of violence and disorder during which a new European statutory base will be evolved. Three sets of forces have defeated fascism and national socialism: the Anglo-Saxon democratic forces; the nationalist and revolutionary forces which are working in Europe; and the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. At present it is impossible to foretell the respective influences that will be wielded by these forces on the peoples who were oppressed by fascism and how these different elements will, during peace time, be grouped and associated or dissociated in contributing to the organization of a new world.

For these reasons one must approach the problems of future European democracy with great caution.

Tentative studies, even if academic, devoted to these problems are certainly not useless. One may compare them to studies undertaken in peace time in preparation for war. Mobilization or campaign plans drawn up by governments or a general staff have to be changed frequently to keep pace with developments in the diplomatic or military situation; such plans nonetheless are the basis of all action and cannot be adapted or modified without numerous preliminary studies. In a similar manner enemies of fascism must constantly keep in mind the solution of problems which must inevitably arise; they must know what sort of new order they wish to establish and how it can be maintained. One would wish to be assured that the democratic governments will give as much attention to this preparatory work as did the totalitarian states to preparations for their aggressions.

Regarding France the situation is particularly complicated. A certain amount of investigating has been carried out and those who have worked in that field are aware of the difficulty of their task and of its necessity. The difficulty comes above all from the confusion characterizing the French political situation in its international and domestic aspects; a further difficulty is due to the inadequacy of authentic records relating to the social,

economic, and political development of the French people during the last twenty years; and an added difficulty is the lack of qualified research workers abroad, as there are more military men than sociologists, and more business men than politicians, among French emigrants. But the necessity for research is unquestionable; this is due to the politico-geographical position of France on the European continent; it is also due to the immense influence exerted by the French Revolution on the shaping of modern political thought and the formation of the modern state. The more I reflect the more I am of the opinion that it is almost impossible to ignore the French democratic tradition and what may be termed the French people's "revolutionary potential," in the work of freeing Europe not only of the fascist dictatorships but also of the fascist mentality.

The world needs not merely a France allied to Great Britain, a friend of American democracy, and associated with Soviet Russia. The world needs the France of the Revolution. It needs it to enable humanity to reach a new stage toward freedom; and I cannot see what, in the contemporary world, can replace the inspiring humanism of the French Revolution—a movement in which the civilizing spirit of humanism reached its peak.

It must first be stated clearly that there will be no democratic Europe without a democratic France, and that there will be no united, pacific Europe without European democracy.

Organizing peace is a more complicated problem than conducting a war. If we allow the establishment of a nationalist, imperialist France under a semi-totalitarian government with fascist principles, there will be little likelihood of seeing the organization of a peaceful and united Europe. The worst possible European peace plan would be one attempting to establish a political and military balance between a weakened, dismembered Germany and a militaristic France strengthened by alliances with Eastern European states and bolstered by the economic support of England and the United States. Such a system would repeat while aggravating the worst features of the 1919 settlements. Its danger would come not so much from French imperialism as from French nationalism. I mean by this that there would be little danger of the French army starting a war of conquest or revenge; but there would be grave danger that French policy (far more than under Poincaré or Laval) would oppose all attempts to organize along democratic and international lines, and would resist disarmament and curtailment of national sovereignty in particular. In such a Europe a new wave of Pan-Germanism would be inevitable; and French nationalism serving as a pretext for younger or more prolific nations, a war would start again after a few years of halting peace. The only hope of peace for Europe and the world lies in the establishment of democracy in all European countries.

It follows that Anglo-Saxon democracy would be insane to encourage

nationalist and militaristic tendencies which might show themselves in France. If I emphasize this point it is because in Anglo-Saxon conservative circles there is an unmistakable tendency to prefer the French nationalist elements to the democratic ones. This tendency is explained in part by the old British desire to balance French nationalism against German nationalism on the continent in order to neutralize them both. And above all the tendency is due to social conservatism. With some exceptions, the English and American conservatives fear French democracy because they fear the spirit of the French Revolution. They dread to see the French people take part in a great liberating economic and social movement: a New Deal on the European scale. They belong to the same circles which a few years ago welcomed Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco as the champions of order against bolshevism. But for the war, they would have approved Marshal Pétain's social and political reforms, including something very close to the support of anti-Semitism. They would be delighted, in the future, to see a pro-British military dictatorship succeed Pétain's and Darlan's pro-German dictatorship. They forget that the French nationalists are but a turbulent, unpopular, small minority which has more social and worldly influence than political importance.

What particular form of democracy will the French people choose? To put that question is to ask oneself what forms of democracy are best suited to both the French temperament and historical conditions in general.

Let us start by saying that not a single democrat dreams of returning to the imperfect 1939 forms of democracy. We should not forget that a complete recasting of institutions and habits has become necessary. In the period just before the outbreak of war the French Republic was virtually a democracy in name only.

To understand this point of view one must keep in sight three elements. First, one must not forget what may be termed the original defects of the French constitutional laws; the laws which governed us in 1939 were adopted in 1875 by a National Assembly subjected to the influence of a strong Royalist and Bonapartist minority; from the beginning these laws had suffered from a lack of the democratic principles. Second, one must keep in sight the evolution of these laws; that evolution had made them less and less democratic; in the electoral sphere their application had been manipulated so as to give more influence in public affairs to the rural voters because they were considered more conservative than the inhabitants of large towns and cities, who were judged more progressive. It was also in this manner that the Senate's powers, a body representing politically the most moderate elements in the nation, had grown at the expense of the powers of the Chamber of Deputies which represented, though imperfectly, the national will. The Senate was also the stronghold of social conservatives. Third, the regime had become less and less democratic because

the balance between the political and economic forces existing in 1875 had not impeded a process of modification to the profit of the economic forces. It was by grace of that balance that the liberal democracy had been able to function. By a process of concentration and hierarchism, as well as the evolution of capitalism, the economic forces had acquired sufficient power to enable them to overflow from the economic sphere into the political. They controlled the press and therefore public opinion. They weighed ever more heavily on the governmental and political machinery. France was subjected to an economic dictatorship which has been called the "Two Hundred Families."

I fully understand that this last phenomenon, namely the increasing power of economic forces, is not peculiar to France. Whenever the phenomenon has appeared democracy has been menaced; and the measure of the menace to democratic institutions is the concentration of economic powers. Furthermore, what was peculiar in the case of France in the first place was that the advance of economic power was accompanied by a recoil towards democratic institutions; it is also notable that the small minority which wielded economic power was formed chiefly of the foes of democracy—by the traditional enemies of the French Revolution and its spirit. Economic power was in the hands of the adversaries of democracy, thanks to the sum of economic, political, and historic circumstances, in 1939, on the eve of the second World War.

French democrats must therefore not return to the past but must march boldly toward the future. They will have to build a new democracy freed of all the encumbrances which harassed the Third Republic. There is no question here of tracing a blue print of the future democratic stronghold. I wish merely to offer a certain number of general observations, some of which deal with the political side of democracy and others with its social aspect.

The purpose of the first observation is to emphasize that in France there can be no question of reconciling democracy with monarchy. This remark is necessary because, particularly in England, there are a certain number of democrats who, though liberals, are yet conservative; they think that the restoration of parliamentary, liberal constitutional monarchies should be encouraged all over Continental Europe.

Perhaps in certain European countries there have been and can again exist liberal, parliamentary, and democratic monarchies. Although I do not know what the destiny of such monarchies might be elsewhere, one must be ignorant of French political history to suppose it is so simple in the nation where the French Revolution occurred. Owing to the formation of the nation and state, the monarchical tradition in France is an aristocratic and anti-democratic tradition, and the democratic tradition is a republican tradition. One may regret it or rejoice over it, but one must admit the facts.

Furthermore, in the last forty years the mere ditch which separated monarchists and democrats has become an abyss.

The second observation deals with presidential government. Here another danger for French democracy must be noted. In French political history presidential government has never been used except to strangle democracy; it has been the traditional doctrine of those who have aspired to dictatorship; Napoleon III made it serve him to destroy the Second Republic before Pétain used it to end the Third. In addition, all republicans and all democrats have condemned this doctrine on the same grounds as monarchy. Yet not long ago in certain French circles in London this old ally of dictatorship was offered as a means of rejuvenating and reinforcing democracy; but be it noted that those who voiced this view are, owing to their background and training, better fitted for the military arts than for political science. They pretended to borrow from the American Constitution the idea of a President of the Republic elected by the people and governing through the intermediary of ministers responsible to him alone. French partisans of presidential government forget, or are ignorant of the fact, that conditions and traditions of American public life are not similar to those in France.

For, in the first place, in the United States, presidential government has been able to function without endangering democracy, because the country is a federation of states and not a single state; up to the present the powers of the Federal Government have been counterbalanced by those of each state. And besides, there is no permanent or chronic risk of dictatorship in the American tradition. The United States is thus in an exceptional position. The situation in France is exactly the opposite. In the first place, because of her historical development and her configuration, France is not and cannot be a federated state; on the contrary, for several centuries she has been one of the world's most centralized states. On the other hand, experience has revealed that in France there is a permanent danger of personal power and dictatorship, especially in military circles. Tocqueville, who was a simple liberal and not a radical, wrote: "What threatens democracy is not anarchy, but dictatorship." In truth, French democracy has never been overthrown or menaced except by partisans of personal power or presidential government like Napoleon III, MacMahon, Boulanger, and Pétain.

From these two observations the reader will deduce that French democracy can accommodate itself to neither monarchy nor presidential government. But the character of these observations is mainly negative; they tell what must be avoided.

The third observation relates to the necessity of establishing a Republic with authority; that is to say, assure to a government which really represents the will of the people sufficient duration of tenure and the necessary

authority to enable it to break, in case of need, any resistance to that popular will. In writing this one might be uttering a banality. But such a government has scarcely ever existed in France; ministerial instability on one hand and weakness of the executive power on the other were the worst ills of the Third Republic. These faults came in great part from the Constitution itself, and above all, from the distortions that use and wont had inflicted on the Constitution. In order to govern, the French Cabinet needed to have the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. But these two assemblies, while having the same prerogatives, did not have a similar system of recruitment; the Chamber, elected by direct, universal suffrage, came near to representing the country at large, whereas the Senate was elected by indirect suffrage and by a method which systematically favored the bourgeois and conservative elements of the nation. This difference in recruitment resulted in a difference of political sentiment and opinion which had continued to grow more serious since 1918. This difference of views ended in what was practically a latent conflict between the two assemblies. As the Constitution provided no legal means of solving the conflict, the Government constantly was compelled to find a compromise between the two chambers. When it succeeded, it was to the detriment of its authority and governmental action. So very often, he who compromises ends in inaction. When the Government failed to find a compromise it had to adopt an attitude which inevitably placed it in opposition to the majority of either the Chamber or Senate. The consequences of this system were the constant paralysis of executive power and simultaneously constant ministerial crises. The disadvantages of ministerial instability have been frequently pointed out, and sometimes exaggerated, in the foreign press. In my opinion the disadvantages of governmental paralysis were at least as grave. For one thing, the masses were discouraged; they had a growing sense that their will was impotent against the resistance of the conservative minority and above all against the great economic interests; they reached the conclusion that, for them, democratic action always was merely a fraud. Furthermore, the Government's weakness in action led the Third Republic to a policy of "appeasement" towards the adversaries of the regime and of perpetual concessions to the enemies of democracy; this brought about the same fatal results as did international "appeasement" practiced towards the dictatorships.

To build a real democracy it is therefore necessary to adopt constitutional means of assuring that the people's will shall be transformed into government action. Such modes of procedure constitute what may be termed "authoritarian democracy." A democracy of this kind conforms to the best traditions of the French Revolution, which is the Jacobin tradition. Such a regime would, of course, respect and guarantee the essential rights of the individual, since it would be a democracy. But in times

of crisis such a regime should be able to transform itself into a "Majority Dictatorship," there being no danger of such a dictatorship's having the disadvantages of a fascist minority or a military clique dictatorship, either in the international field or at home. To establish a democratic government having authority it is not necessary to suppress parliamentary rule or enact laws by decree. Quite the contrary. It is not even certain that it is necessary to abandon the two-chamber principle. Political science and constitutional law provide for many modes of procedure which assure a government, responsible to the representatives of the people and functioning under their control, the powers which are essential. Without going into details or giving my views on the question of two-chamber government, I suggest that a development of the English system which would transform the Cabinet into something like a "Permanent House of Commons Committee" would furnish an excellent point of departure for those who will write the future French constitution.

The fourth observation deals with the colonial problem. In 1939, France possessed the second largest colonial world empire. It is certain that with fascism defeated all colonies should be ruled by an international body. The prayer of a democrat is that we shall no longer speak of French Colonies, or British Colonies, that the era of colonial conquest and exploitation shall be ended, that an international administration shall be given the responsibility of watching over the progressive emancipation of the "colonial" peoples by assuring them democratic education and practice in local government, to be followed by self-government. For European peoples less sovereignty and independence, and for African peoples more liberty—such must be the basis of the new democratic order. But France will have something to say regarding elaboration of the new colonial regime and will participate in the international administration.

It must be remembered that, according to General de Gaulle himself, that administration is not binding for the future. Also it is unnecessary to hide the grave faults, from a democratic point of view, that have been committed by French colonial policy for 150 years. That policy has had its noble aspects; French colonies were often well administered and developed. But they were not free. The French Revolution had promised the colonial peoples liberty and equality; those promises have not yet been kept. After having discarded the "Colonial Pact" policy, which was that of *l'Ancien Régime*, France practiced successively a policy of "assimilation," of "collaboration," and of "association." She never practiced the policy of "liberation" and "emancipation," which is the only excuse for colonial intervention. The Léon Blum Cabinet was the only one ever to inaugurate a democratic colonial policy; it was abandoned by succeeding governments. Despite their maturity and culture, the natives of North Africa and Indo-China had less political freedom than the Crown Colonies; that is to say,

less freedom than the least advanced and least favored British possessions or than the Dutch Indies or the Belgian Congo. History teaches that it is never to the interests of a colonial power, whether the Roman Empire, French Monarchy, or the British Empire, to wait until a colony revolts before giving it independence. Had the French Colonial Empire been a federation of free and equal peoples, simply accepting French culture and protection, some of its native peoples would today be fighting for liberty. A clarion call for colonial revolt sounded by French democrats in the name of liberty for all peoples and the equality of all races would be the wisest political move that the free Frenchmen could make. But before sounding such a call we must assure world public opinion that, in the future, French democracy will not allow itself to establish a hierarchy of color and race between its "citizens," its "juridical citizens," and its "subjects." If, under international control, France should administer colonies, it would be agreed that all inhabitants of such colonies would be recognized by her as being free and equal men.

Such are the general observations resulting from meditating on conditions for a future French democracy.

To the question of political conditions must be added the question of social conditions. Just as a democratic France could not adapt herself to a monarchy or presidential government, so she could not accept a return to economic and social conditions which characterized her in 1939.

The extension of democratic principles, under one form or another, to economic and social phenomena will probably be the most important post-war political demand. The contradictions of capitalism have reached a degree which makes them insupportable. One cannot believe that after having fought against Hitler's domination the peoples will tolerate what is called want in the midst of abundance: the misery of unemployment accompanied by abundant production. On the other hand, experience has proved that without "general planning" it is impossible, under the present state of economic, industrial, and financial technique, to increase production of goods; and especially is it impossible to adapt production to the needs of the consumer. Finally, as the author of *Managerial Revolution* has rightly pointed out, economic life is freeing itself more and more from the domination of private capitalism, because, more and more, it is necessary to turn to the state to finance the great enterprises which are the basis of the modern economy. I think that all students of political and economic phenomena must subscribe to Harold Laski's opinion: "I believe that the choice before our generation is, in fact, a choice between a revolution by consent and a revolution by violence." In any case, at the end of that revolution there will be a new social system.

These general views apply particularly in the case of France. It is frequently repeated that France is a country of small proprietors. This is true

about France, for of all countries in the world, or at least all those sufficiently advanced to be able to publish statistics, she is the nation which has the largest proportion of independent workers—proprietors who own their tools of production; in 1939 these independent workers formed 41% of the population gainfully occupied, as against 16% in Germany, 11% in England, 10% in the United States, 20% in Belgium, 22% in Sweden and Czechoslovakia, etc. Yet if the process of capitalist concentration of enterprises was less advanced in France than in other countries, it would be a mistake to conclude that France enjoyed a sound social equilibrium. France was one of the European countries where wealth was the least well distributed. A study published by M. Paul H. Beik in *Political Science Quarterly* showed that in Paris in 1930–1931, 1.18% of the population owned 72.31% of the public wealth, while 94.1% owned only 7.65%; the wealthy man thus had 430 times more riches than the poor one. In the provinces wealth was generally less concentrated, and this explains in part why political opinion was less radical in the provinces than in Paris and the surrounding area. In a highly educated nation such a distribution of wealth is a permanent defiance of justice and reason and a constant provocation to revolution on the part of the “have nots” against those who “have too much.”

If French democracy wishes to avoid “revolution by violence” it must bring about “revolution by consent.” The war created revolutionary conditions which should be utilized, not only to return to political democracy but to organize social democracy; it is to French interests that the “political revolution by violence” should be accompanied by a “social revolution by consent.” To the privileged there will remain but one privilege in the immediate future: they will be able to save their country from a useless resort to a solution by force.

It seems to me that at the stage of social evolution we have reached, practical and theoretic reasons prescribe the extension of democracy to social and political phenomena.

Practical reasons are the most important. One may summarize them by saying that the functioning of political democracy is perverted by concentration of economic power in the hands of a small minority. Whether that minority is composed of owners of the means of production or the directors of great industries and enterprises is of little importance. The power that such a minority can exercise over the entire nation is what is in contradiction to the mechanism of a democratic state. It is inevitable that the minority will exercise its power to influence the course of politics and policy, and in that inevitability is contained the constant risk of corruption. In speaking of corruption I do not mean merely the bribing of a few representatives in a parliament or a few officials; that crass form of corruption is less frequent in the most indifferent democracies than in the best-

organized dictatorships; it was actually of little importance in the Third Republic. I have in mind the far more subtle corruption of the Government, the Administration, and public opinion by means of the venal press and all the forms of pressure at the disposal of the economic forces. It was in this way that a militant labor unionist, no matter how valuable his skill, was placed on the "black list" by French employers' organizations and deprived of his livelihood. In the same way eighty per cent of the French newspapers were controlled by great economic interests.

The French State was not independent. At every moment during my government career I had opportunities to see that the Government often had to bow to superior power: the power of money. This observation remains the most decisive of my political life. The same undeniable fact was noticed by all leaders belonging to the republican parties, men like Clémenceau, Poincaré, Herriot, for example, and M. Pierre-Etienne Flandin himself when, as *Président du Conseil*, he denounced the tyranny of the Bank of France, dominated by the "Two Hundred Families," over French politics. At every moment those democratic governments were subjected to a threat from the banks; a study of the movement of capital and its export whenever a democratic government tried to implement its program proves that the menace was not wielded in vain. In economic and financial matters, and consequently in the social sphere, we had about as much freedom of action as a man who feels the cold steel of his enemy's pistol pressing his temple. Our only choice lay between compromise and revolution; but as conditions requisite for a revolution were not prepared, the choice was merely between compromise and resigning, which would have left our adversaries in control of the field. The Popular Front experiment is often discussed; that experiment proved above all the impossibility of establishing a democratic government simultaneously with a regime founded on capitalistic monopolies: the two cannot coexist. In its present stage of evolution capitalism no longer limits itself to production of goods, even if inadequate, and their distribution, even if unjust; it constantly invades the political field. The question of the incompatibility of a capitalistic economic regime with a democratic political regime is posed by the facts themselves, and is a question that we cannot escape.

These practical arguments, drawn from experience, are supported by theoretical arguments. In order to avoid a too lengthy analysis of democracy and capitalism, and what I consider their divergent evolution, I wish to limit myself to emphasizing two doctrinal arguments. The first argument consists in declaring that there is no reason for not applying to social and economic phenomena the same principles as one applies to political phenomena. If one opines that purely political problems, which are the most important, must be decided on the principle of equality and majority, with greater reason one must reach the decision that eco-

nomic problems must be submitted to the same principle. Either the principle is sound and must be applied to all man's social activities, or it is false, and political democracy must be rejected as has been social and economic democracy. It is paradoxical to declare that war shall be conducted by military men appointed by representatives of the people, but that economic activity shall be conducted by representatives of a small minority whose interests do not coincide with those of the people. The second doctrinal argument consists in emphasizing the contradiction existing, and increasing, between capitalist society, based on the principle of hierarchy and technical competency, and democratic society based on the principle of equality and general competency. Capitalist society trains technicians and subjects them to the hierarchic principle; democratic society in training men must take into consideration, in their widest aspect, general problems and subject those men to the moral law of the substantial equality of man. Every one of us is more or less subject to professional bias; in giving priority to technical knowledge and hierarchy over general culture and equality, capitalism has always tended to undermine democratic ideology.

But these theoretic arguments will be opposed by arguments drawn from notions regarding production. In economic matters, it is said, the law of production must dominate; furthermore, production under a capitalist economy is very evidently superior to that under all other systems. In the first place I shall reply that I am not at all convinced of the *actual* superiority of capitalism, even from the standpoint of production efficiency; during the period of free competition capitalist production was very high; but wastage of manpower, raw materials, and machinery by monopoly capitalism surpasses imagination; Soviet Russia would never have been capable of its prodigious economic development if, instead of being subjected to the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat," it had been subjected to the "dictatorship of the financiers," and the great capitalist democracies, to enable themselves to mobilize their resources against the fascist states, are actually compelled to modify seriously their economic organization. In the second place, I shall reply that in order to judge economic doctrines, it is necessary to adopt a standard of values; a system must be appraised in terms of the public good, social justice, and the development of humanity, much more than in terms of the opportunity it gives to the more astute citizens to exploit their fellow citizens; if the partisans of capitalist production would tour tenements surrounding great industrial towns and see the hovels, if they would watch not alone the stock market but unemployment statistics, they would then understand that a system's human production is more important than its economic production; if there were no police and no law courts, banditry and gangsterism would also be the most efficient means of increasing the welfare and possessions of certain individuals.

My conclusion is that there can be no political democracy without

economic and social democracy. The mistake that we have committed during the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century is to have thought that political democracy could serve to bring social democracy; it was a mistake because the anti-democratic forces of capitalism have revealed themselves as more powerful than the forces of political democracy. In the struggle between political power (that is to say democracy) and economic power (that is to say capitalism), European democracy has succumbed, and democracy all over the world has weakened itself. Future French democracy ought to take to heart these hard lessons. It should build a political regime and an economic regime which are both democratic.

It is not for herself alone that France must build that duo-democratic regime; it is for the whole world. After fascism is destroyed, the mission of a democratic France will be to introduce the spirit and breath of the French Revolution into the new society which will be constructed on the ruins of the fascist world.

The French revolutionary doctrine has lost none of its reality because it was a universal doctrine and not merely a national doctrine, because the thinkers of the Revolution addressed themselves to men of all times and in all places, not only to Frenchmen of one epoch, and because they were humanists and not nationalists. It is due to its general character that the French Revolution, as at an earlier time the Reformation or Christianity, roused so much enthusiasm throughout the world. Doubtless it is necessary to find new formulas for applying that doctrine. But its essential principle, reconciliation of individual liberty with social equality, which was its major contribution, remains more real and timely than ever before.

I often contemplate a fusion of the economic doctrine of Soviet Russia and the political doctrine of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. To reach the necessary degree of heat for such a fusion, I think of the flaming torch set alight for the world by the French Revolution.

THE TRAGEDY OF GERMANY

T

HOMAS MANN

The destiny of the most repulsive monster of our era, National Socialism, has at last been fulfilled—a destiny appropriate to its character, a destiny that from the start was graven on its forehead, visible to every seeing eye, a destiny whose fulfillment was always only a question of time. If its agony were only its own and not at the

same time that of a great and unfortunate nation that is now suffering for its credulity, its seductibility and besottedness, its lack of political judgment, we could view the catastrophe with greater equanimity, with a colder sense of satisfaction for that which is right, just, and necessary.

If we were vindictive, we exiles who were abused as enemies of our people or, at least, as obsolete thinkers, we who were despised as representatives of "retarded humanity"—good lord!—we would be less moved than we are by the agony, the torment, the misery of the community that ejected us. But this agony far exceeds any suffering that we could ever have wished upon it. When I think back, before the beginnings of our exile, to that time of uprootment, of agitation, of anguish, of homelessness—what was our predominant emotion, our ever-recurring thought in all our personal anxiety? It was pity: anticipatory pity that certainly underestimated the time of retribution;—or the full answer to the question, "What is to become of these people?"

I turn the pages of my diary of twelve years ago, to the years 1933 and 1934, that time when the din of narcotizing festivities, of unwarranted jubilation over victories and liberty echoed from Germany to the adjacent countries, with its accompaniment of church bells and peans, flags and endless Roman holidays by decree of the people, the government, the party. It was a time when the sight of the infamous internal war of revenge, of justice gagged to suffocation, of violence and supreme falsehood shook my heart with horror and bitterness.

Here are the words of my diary: "We are profoundly aware that these fools, these unmitigated bunglers, will come to a bad end. And what then? What will become of this unfortunate German people, now intoxicated with pseudo-happiness? What disappointments will it have to swallow, what physical and spiritual catastrophes are reserved for it? The awakening which awaits it will be ten times more horrible than that of 1918." And again: "Pity, from the first moment, for the people that saw the shipwreck of all its great hopes and that is now to experience the frustration of the ultimate pledge of its faith. What is shortly to become of the people who have staked such a measure of faith in falsehood? But I doubt whether pity is appropriate in view of the degree of delusion, the lack of sense for the evil, that this people demonstrates in its faith."

After all that has happened, this doubt of the propriety of pity is more vivid today than ever. The "lack of sense for the evil," for the obviously and unequivocally wicked, that large masses of the German people have shown, was and always will be criminal. The tremendous spree that this ever thrill-greedy nation imbibed from the poisoned gin of nationalism, ladled out by fools and liars, this spree in the course of which it committed unnumbered crimes, this spree must be paid for.

It is impossible to demand of the abused nations of Europe, of the

world, that they shall draw a neat dividing line between "Nazism" and the German people. If there is such a thing as a people, if there is such a thing as a Germany as an historical entity, then there is also such a thing as responsibility,—quite independent of the precarious concept of "guilt." The world has gone through many years of a war full of suffering and sacrifice, a war unleashed by Germany; and from the very first day of this war Germany's opponents were faced by the combined German ingenuity, courage, intelligence, discipline, military efficiency,—in short, by the whole power of the German nation, which stood as such behind the régime and fought its battle. They were not faced by Hitler and Himmler, who would have been nothing at all if the strength and blind loyalty of German manhood had not fought and died with misguided valor for these criminals.

No one can deny that the "national awakening" of 1933, this delirium that carried the seeds of war in it, possessed the uncanny power of a genuine revolution. But hopelessness and damnation were written on its features, "Great revolutions," I wrote in my diary at that time, "usually attract the sympathy and admiration of the world by their bloody and passionate generosity. That was true of the Russian revolution as well as of the French, which deeply moved all thinking and feeling intellects in the world.

"What is there about this 'German' revolution that isolates the country and breeds only uncomprehending loathing round-about? . . . It boasts of its bloodlessness and yet it is the most vindictive and blood-thirsty that ever was. Its basic character, no matter what one may imagine, is *not* exaltation, joy, nobility, love, which might always be connected with great blood sacrifices to faith and to the future of mankind—but hatred, resentment, vengeance, baseness. It could be much bloodier and the world would still admire it, if it were at the same time finer, brighter, nobler. . . . It was left for the Germans to bring about a revolution of a character never seen before: a revolution without ideas, opposed to ideas, to everything higher, better, decent, opposed to liberty, truth, and justice. Nothing like it has ever occurred in human history. And all this is accompanied by tremendous rejoicing of the masses who believe they have accomplished their intent, while, in reality, they have only been deceived by mad cunning, a fact which as yet they do not dare admit to themselves. And behind it all lies the absolute certainty on the part of the better people that everything is headed for a horrible catastrophe."

"A fact which as yet they do not dare admit to themselves." At the risk of appearing to deny German responsibility and to advocate a soft peace, I shall not conceal what I knew at that time, namely the rapidity with which disillusionment, uneasiness, anxious doubts spread through the land; the rapidity with which the "democratic" self-identification of the

rulers with the people became an impudent piece of fiction. For I saw the nation and felt with it that it had walked into a trap from which, partly out of stubbornness and partly out of weakness, it could now no longer escape.

"I have an inner conviction," I wrote for myself alone, "that three-fourths of the people, no, seven-eighths, or, to be more exact, that the people as a whole are filled with a deep-rooted dread of their leaders and of the situation into which they have been led. Indifference, fatalism, hopelessness are the 'bearers' and supporters of the regime, rather than faith and enthusiasm. A cowering watching and waiting prevails, passively ominous, pessimistically curious. These people would sigh with relief, as though freed of a nightmare, if it were all over, and assistance from the outside would scarcely meet with indignation or even with astonishment."

That is what I wrote and I cannot deny it. What I saw at that time was a people lashed and intoxicated again and again into a nationalistic and falsely revolutionary frenzy, but a people nevertheless depressed, fearful of future ills, fatalistically indifferent; a people that seized avidly upon every foreign newspaper and that saw itself delivered up to a questionable adventure without the slightest chance of resistance. The people foresaw every conceivable misfortune: war, economic catastrophe, dissolution of the nation, disquieted as they were by their ignorance, by their impotence in the face of propaganda, by a thousand horrors that took place in their midst, and by their moral isolation.

These are not expressions that I am coining today after a long interval; I used them at that time. Moreover, the condition which I called "an internal war of revenge" had soon developed into a state of war with the outside world, an *ersatz*-war of hopeless isolation, war autarchy, and of the carefully nurtured popular delusion that the German people were the champions of truth against untruth and that all evil and wickedness in the world had maliciously united against the country that could bring salvation. . . . But every state of war, genuine or pretended, brings the people and its government closer together, achieves the emergency identification of nation and regime.

As time passed it seemed that things had always been like this and that they had to be so. The regime was not only recognized abroad but its interests were even promoted,—partly for the sake of peace and partly out of admiration for a country that denied labor the right to strike. The older generation resigned and a young generation grew up that knew nothing but the "heroic life."

Then the war came, the real war, which to an uncritical people like the Germans is simply a challenge to its manhood, its biological soundness, its willingness to sacrifice. The Germans did their best—and their worst. In their name, through their hands, bestial rulers committed atroci-

ties at which the heart of humanity trembles,—unatonable, unforgettable. At the same time the war was lost as soon as the “blitz” had—once more—failed. As long as possible they refused to recognize the fact, and when they finally did recognize it, then ingrained fanaticism and Gothic pathos in the face of destruction were made to replace the lost faith in victory.

It was a terrible sight to see an entire nation gambling desperately and rushing to hell with its eyes wide open. Attempts to break away, to unseat the regime, to save what of substance and of future might still be saved, failed ignominiously. Never had a nation acquired more cruel rulers, masters who more ruthlessly insisted that it should perish with them.

The national catastrophe which the regime carried in its bosom has come. For twelve years we had to wait for it with a mingling of horror and hope. Yes, we wished it—for the sake of the logic of morality, out of genuine hatred, out of desire for the punishment of absurd wickedness in accord with the moral lesson. And now that the debacle is here, ruin of unprecedented extent, an all-embracing, moral, spiritual, military, economic bankruptcy without parallel,—now our pity for so much misguided history, for so much imprudence, for so much loyalty to dead ideals, for so much defiance of the real demands of the present world,—now our pity nevertheless equals our satisfaction: it is a pity that is by no means purely altruistic, for everything German is concerned and is placed in jeopardy, including the German spirit, German thought, the German word; and we are forced to face the question whether in future “Germany” in any of its manifestations can dare to open its lips in human affairs.

Satisfaction? Certainly, we experience it. The disgrace of a disgraceful philosophy that tortured and exiled us; the exposure of the lame-brained, sycophant intellectuals who mistook the vilest travesty of Germanism for the real thing and who saw in a disgusting clown, a hysterical swindler, the “savior,” the “charismatic leader”; who spinelessly took part in every abjectness, prating the while of “change in spiritual structure,” for which “the old standards were no longer valid”—I can still hear them.

The downfall of National Socialism into limbo, into the underworld to which it always belonged—for it was scum of the underworld, the lowest, that had risen with it to the surface—why should it not fill us with satisfaction! And more than satisfaction—it is comfort and bliss to experience the restitution of the honor and liberty of the European peoples, particularly the renascence of France from the deepest humiliation.

But at what cost! What incalculable destruction has been wrought by the folly, the besottedness, the political mysticism of a people,—of our people! How will it be to belong to a nation, to work in the spiritual tradition of a nation that never knew how to become a nation, and under whose desperate, megalomaniac efforts to become a nation the world has had to

suffer so much! To be a German author—what will that be? Back of every sentence that we construct in our language stands a broken, a spiritually burnt-out people, bewildered about itself and its history; a people that, according to reports, despairs of ever governing itself and prefers to become a colony of foreign powers; a people that will have to live in solitary confinement, like the Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto, because the fearful accumulation of hatred round about will not permit it to emerge from its boundaries,—a people that can never show its face again.

One thing is certain: there must be an end of the martial Reich that never understood the meaning of the word "liberty"; that regarded as "liberty" only its own right to enslave others. The mechanized romanticism called Germany was such a curse for the world that no measure whatever that tends to destroy it as a state of mind can be disapproved. The hope remains that, with the cooperation of the German will itself, purified by cruel suffering, a form of government and of life for the German people may be found that will encourage the development of its best powers and educate it to become a sincere co-worker for a brighter future of mankind.

POLAND: BARRIER OR LINK?

T

HADDEUS HOINKO

To those who look at the question of Poland's international relations in its larger historical aspects, it becomes apparent that an independent Poland can never be strong enough to exist in safety entirely alone: it must place a certain reliance on the friendship and support of some larger power.

The hand of destiny placed Poland between Germany and Russia and no one can change this immutable reality, which must be considered as a basic factor in the elaboration of any intelligent, long-range Polish foreign policy.

Indisputable historic facts prove that it is impossible for Poland to expect anything but enmity from Germany as long as that country is obsessed with its *Drang nach Osten* urge. Collaboration with Germany, in the face of German performance through past centuries, and in view of the tortures, starvation, and attempted destruction of all of Poland's cultural and moral values which the Germans have visited on Poland in the present war, is unthinkable.

There remains for Poland the other great neighbor—Russia.

To be sure, history tells of rivalry, hostility, and suspicion between the two countries. The Poles point to the Partitions and to barbarous treatment under the Tsars. Russians remember the Time of the Troubles, when their western Slav neighbor invaded the soil of Holy Russia. This Polish invasion and the occupation of the Kremlin by Polish troops gave rise, in 1612, to the first of the three great national wars in Russian history—against the Poles, against Napoleon, and against the Germans.

The lands between the realms of Warsaw and Moscow have been a bone of contention for centuries, and for centuries these two Slav peoples were rivals for the imperial crown of the East. There was a time when it looked as if Poland would win this crown. Destiny, or the weakness of Polish statesmanship, decided otherwise. The Russia which in 1610 lay helpless at the feet of conquering Poles became an inland empire, stretching through limitless space to the shores of the Pacific, and her erstwhile conqueror was dismembered and ceased to exist as a free nation.

But the Polish gentry, who kept the Polish spirit alive during the Partitions, and who retained political power in restored Poland, clung to the old dream, unaware that the world in a century and a half had moved on.

Pilsudski, the great political romanticist who, with his sixteenth-century mentality, had no appreciation of economic bases of modern statehood, and his Lilliputian colonels, were the epigoni of that old Polish imperial dream which long ago lost its chance of fulfillment. Instead of acquiescing in the realities of the new situation and concentrating all the energies of the reborn nation on the task of building a modern democracy, these leaders, blindly enamored of the past, were dreaming of Poland "sentenced to greatness," as they used to put it—a Poland from sea to sea, which could challenge both Germany and Russia on equal terms. An unrealistic dream thus became the basis of the foreign policy of a modern country. Instead of making Poland an empire, it helped to drive her to the brink of destruction and contributed largely to isolating Poland from her natural allies, the Russians. There was another factor which was impairing Polish-Russian relations. The pre-1939 Poland was the continuation of the pre-Partition Poland in the sense that it was mainly the creation of the Polish gentry, who succeeded in permeating with their mentality even that part of the Polish intelligentsia which derived from the peasantry. Their aristocratic outlook prevented the Polish gentry from finding a common language with their own minority groups and with most of their democratic neighbors. In their eyes such people as the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Czechs were too common to deal with, while the Russians were not only the Muscovites responsible for the Partitions of Poland but also the dreaded Bolsheviks who threatened the established social order of Poland. This aristocratic outlook of the pre-1939 Polish ruling class pushed Poland in the direction of the fascist countries.

Yet fundamentally there is no irreconcilable conflict between Poland and Soviet Russia. This fact was dramatically emphasized when Sikorski, with the vision and daring of a great statesman, stretched out his hand to Stalin in 1941. This act was not a mere gesture. It indicated that it is in the interests of both to start a new page of history in friendship and co-operation.

The Polish and Russian people have experienced the same persecution at the hands of the common enemy. They have seen their peaceful villages burned, their women and children driven out to die of exposure or in slavery, all the senseless brutalities practiced by the German invader. What is probably more important, the Russian people in this terrible ordeal have come to understand what the Poles have known for generations—the terrifying significance of the German *Drang nach Osten*. The understanding of this fact undoubtedly has convinced the Russian people and the Soviet leaders of the practical wisdom of making a common front with their neighbors.

The cession to Soviet Russia of the eastern territories of the Polish state up to the so-called Curzon Line cannot be viewed in the same light as the eighteenth-century Partitions of Poland for the reason that, while during those partitions the inhabitants of these territories were to all intents and purposes human chattels, without any national or social consciousness, the descendants of these people, Ukrainians and Bielo-Russians, who are in a majority in these lands, have matured and developed a natural desire to unite with the rest of their kin, most of whom happen to be in the Soviet Union. The separatist tendency of these people might have been checked by pre-1939 Poland if its leaders had followed a policy of tolerance, democracy, and understanding toward their minority peoples. Unfortunately for the Polish state, such was not the case, and Poland had to pay the price for the mistakes of its leaders. If the Polish people realize that they have an opportunity now to create a strong, racially homogeneous state, and can make up their minds once and for all to give up the territories in dispute, which they have no power to hold against the superior force of their neighbor, they will have removed one of the principal causes of hostility between themselves and Soviet Russia. These regions were the stronghold of those aristocratic families of Poland which exerted on the nation a reactionary influence which was not to the best interests of Poland either socially or politically. A sacrifice which puts an end to centuries of conflict between Poland and her eastern neighbor may not be too great a price to pay for the security it will bring.

In their fierce and almost fanatic concentration on the eastern boundary problem, Polish leaders have paid too little attention to a question which far outweighs this in significance for the future of Poland, namely, the question of the western boundary and Poland's relation to Germany. It may

well be that those interests which plot to save for Germany its potentialities for future aggression are purposely directing Polish attention from the west to the east. Certain it is that some of the very people who most ardently plead Poland's cause regarding the eastern territories are lukewarm as to her rightful claims to westward extension which, in the light of world peace and security, are much more important.

The "substantial accessions of territory in the north and west" which the representatives of the great powers explicitly promised Poland in the Crimea accord find their primary justification as part of the most effective means whereby "German militarism will be destroyed and Germany so controlled as to make impossible future aggression."

An official spokesman of the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw recently stated that the Polish people expect the incorporation into Poland of approximately half of East Prussia (the other half going to the Lithuanian Soviet Republic); the joining of Opole (Oppeln) Silesia (currently referred to as German Silesia) to the rest of Polish Upper Silesia; and the ceding to Poland by Germany of the Pomeranian territory between the 1939 Polish boundary and the Oder River, including the Baltic port of Stettin.

It is in the interests of world peace that these territories should be included in the new Poland for the following primary reasons:

1. The peace of the world and the security of Poland as one of the mainstays of that peace require that Germany be deprived of those eastern territorial bastions which time and again served her as springboards for aggression against Poland, Russia, and the world at large. This cession of territory will eliminate the impossible East Prussian enclave, will strengthen Poland's strategic frontiers, and will shorten them by half. Surely, if Americans have the right to strategic bases for their own protection even on foreign soil, we cannot deny the right of Poland to similar protection.

2. Poland was robbed and devastated to the core and her people subjected by the Germans to scientific mass devitalization and murder. It will take generations to rebuild the physical plant of the nation and to raise to normal levels the biological and health standards so dangerously impaired by the Germans. Some economic recompense, such as mines and good arable lands, will enable Poland partly to achieve this rehabilitation.

3. In the interests of world peace it is indispensable that Poland should become an economically healthy nation. The incorporation of the territories under discussion would contribute to rounding out the Polish national economy.

4. The economic interests of the Polish people, as well as the needs of the people of the large central European interior, including Czechoslovakia, demand that this vast hinterland be given adequate access to the sea—an access independent of Germany. Before the German attack, Poland with its 35,000,000 people had only 50 miles of coastline, as against 940 miles of

German coastline serving 70,000,000 people. Poland and the central European interior need free access to the sea for their normal economic development.

5. Although historical and ethnographic factors in the settlement of boundary questions are not conclusive *per se*, it is important to remember that the Oder was for centuries a dividing line between German tribes and Slav peoples to the east. The Oder lands have been predominantly inhabited, even in quite recent times, by Poles, Kasubians, Lusatians (closely akin to Czechs) and other Slav tribes. In spite of forced Germanization of these people by German conquerors, their basic affinity with Slavdom has been preserved to a surprising extent, as witnessed, for example, by the resurgence of the hitherto suppressed Polish element in Upper Silesia and in the so-called Polish Corridor.

6. The proposed rearrangement of boundaries would, no doubt, weaken Germany, but it would in no way deprive her of basic sources of her livelihood, whereas for Poland the question of proposed accessions of territory is a matter of life or death.

It should be clear that in our present interdependent world, striving for a modicum of peace and civilized existence, the right of any nation to retain and control any territory must be judged not only in the light of legalistic or historic possession but in accordance with the fundamental interests of the world community. Especially is this true of that nation which has been given to repeated aggression against its neighbors and in the case of territories which have served as the sally port for attacks on these neighbors, and as a springboard for repeated campaigns for world domination.

It should by now be obvious that the permanent disarmament of Germany is a *sine qua non* of world peace and of security for America. If this disarmament is to become a reality it must be based not on platitudinous beliefs in a non-existent German democracy, but on effective destruction of the Prussian Junker class; on reducing Prussia to a relatively modest role in the comity of German provinces and on depriving German militarists and militaristic industrialists of their Silesian war potential.

If we are to accomplish this end, we must transfer the territories described from Germany to Poland. This has to be done not as a favor to Poland, not as compensation for any territories which she has lost, not even as a recompense for German damage to Poland, although all these considerations are of importance, but primarily because it is to the vital interest and security of the world at large.

"To condemn such a solution as 'Vansittartism' or as 'appeasement' of Polish or Soviet 'imperialism,'" declares Professor Frederick L. Schuman, "is to ignore the imperative of ethics and politics alike. All Slavic peoples are determined that Prussianism must be excised from the German body politic and that the Teutonic *Drang nach Osten* must be forever ended.

Neither Americans, Britons, nor genuine German liberals can regard such demands as unjustified or unwise. To replace Junker aristocracy by Polish aristocrats, to be sure, would be pointless and dangerous. To end old minority problems by creating new ones would be fatal to future peace. But an orderly transfer of peoples, accompanied by the liquidation of feudalism in eastern Europe and by ample trading opportunities for a new Germany, would offer promise of a new and hopeful life for all concerned."

The serious striving of the Polish people for greater democracy has found voice in the writings of the Underground Press regarding plans for post-war Poland; the Mikolajczyk government in London acted in accord with this purpose when it drew up a new electoral law and provisions for completing agrarian reform immediately after the restoration of Poland; the present Government in Warsaw is, in fact, already carrying out such redistribution of land. In view of this very apparent trend of Polish thought, we can be certain that the new Provisional Government of National Unity, provided for by the Crimea agreement, and its successor, the duly elected government of the Polish people, will not "replace Junker aristocracy by Polish aristocrats," against which course Dr. Schuman warns, but will see to it that social inequality and oppression are destroyed not only in Poland but in the recovered ancient Slavic lands.

It has been the curse of Poland that during the centuries of her existence her boundaries fluctuated to a degree probably never experienced by any other important European nation. It appears that the Crimea decisions will lead to a stabilization of these boundaries in their most logical delineation. This stabilization will have far-reaching effects on the destiny of the Polish people and will without doubt serve as a firm foundation on which the edifice of the new Poland will arise. The strength, the permanence, and the beauty of that edifice will depend on the establishment of a strong and enlightened democratic government that will truly unite the people of Poland and lead them to a better future.

At the Crimea Conference, Poland's right to independence and sovereign self-government was explicitly confirmed, and the statement of this basic principle was properly implemented by concrete proposals setting forth the methods by which this solemn promise of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union should be put into action. The three powers agreed that a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be set up with the advice of their representatives and in consultation with leaders of the Polish people at home and abroad, to operate until such time as a permanent government can be established by free and unfettered elections on the basis of a universal secret ballot. This decision marks a hopeful step forward in the development of a strong national existence for Poland. It was, of course, to be deplored that three foreign powers should have acted as Poland's government makers, with no official participation

of Poland itself. For this the Polish people can blame only those die-hards in London who blocked Mikolajczyk's attempts to bring about a settlement, and the Arciszewski government, which stubbornly refused to yield to realities in the slightest degree. How successful the three powers will be in setting up a provisional government depends on how generally the Polish people agree to accept the opportunity that is offered them by taking part wholeheartedly in the new arrangement.

This will not be easy for Poles because it represents a certain compromise, and compromise is not natural to Poles, who are emotionally color-blind. For them there are only two colors—black and white. If a Pole believes black to be right, then the person who believes in white is a traitor. But to them both, one who sees any of the infinite variety of shades and tones between is not only a traitor but also a fool, for he sees colors that do not exist. For the striking white or black, as the case may be, every Pole will fight, and if necessary die gladly; for the everyday gray of compromise he has only scorn.

This is not to imply that Poles are incapable of reasoning, and Americans who care about Poland can help most by convincing the Poles that an extreme stand means suicide for Poland and the middle course gives promise of real greatness.

Objective analysis of these realities and of the position and tendencies of Soviet Russia suggests several important facts which responsible statesmen of Poland must take into serious consideration. These facts can be summarized as follows:

1. The Soviet system is here to stay. It has just passed with flying colors one of the greatest tests of statesmanship.
2. The Soviet Union has risen to the position of one of the greatest world powers and has ample resources to maintain this position for an indefinite period.
3. The Soviet Union needs and desires peace, because it is intent on developing its resources and its industries in order to raise the standard of living of its people.
4. The Soviet Union, accordingly, would not want to involve itself in foreign escapades.
5. The Soviet Union in its desire to maintain lasting peace will insist on such a government in Poland as will loyally support and develop friendship and collaboration with the Soviet Union as a fundamental tenet of Poland's foreign policy. Of course, such a foreign policy can be possible only if Polish populist and truly democratic elements control the state.
6. Whether such a government becomes a puppet government will depend largely on the attitude of the Polish people themselves. If, following in the footsteps of their great leader Sikorski, they develop with their eastern neighbor relations based on friendship and mutual respect, the government of Poland will be a free government. It will be most unfortunate for the best interests of progressive democracy

the world over, if the Polish government should become only a subservient tool of Russia. Such a forced friendship would not last long and could become a contributing cause of another world conflagration.

The new Poland has a chance to be great and strong and prosperous if the Polish people will cease to listen to pseudo friends, who do not really care for Poland, or to follow leaders who in their fanaticism may have lost their perspective. Rather let them heed the words of their great poet, Adam Mickiewicz, who thus counseled them during the dark days of the nineteenth century: "Verily, I say unto you: Do not inquire as to what shall be the government in Poland; it sufficeth you to know that it shall be better than all that ye know of; neither question about her boundaries, for they shall be greater than they have been at any time. And each of you hath in his soul the seed of the future laws and the measure of the future boundaries. So far as ye enlarge and better your spirit, so far shall ye better your laws and enlarge your boundaries."

It was her spirit that kept Poland alive through more than one hundred years when there was no free Polish land at all. It was that spirit which united the Poles when Germany invaded Poland in 1939, and which has sustained them and inspired their resistance during these past terrible years under German oppression. That spirit can yet help them make, out of what seems at first defeat, a glorious victory.

No people possess in greater measure that heroism which Mickiewicz says is "the only element of value in the human breast, permanent and strong enough to become the foundation of a new life appropriate to a free nation." But they must realize that heroism is shown not only in resistance but in manly acceptance of realities and in intelligent co-operation; that their spirit should not be squandered in negations but devoted to positive good. Poles know how to die for their country. They must recognize that now the country needs not their death but their life, and that to live and work and sacrifice, in unity to build a strong new Poland, may be the greater heroism. They must also remember that the Soviet Union for long has suffered from ostracism by the West. If the Polish people now, following General Sikorski's example, stretch out the hand of comradeship to the Soviet people, this hand will be accepted and a great and firm alliance will arise—an alliance which will contribute immensely toward the peace of the world and the welfare of both Poland and the Soviet Union.

If there is any hope for peace to be built on the ruins left by war, it is based on the determination of all peoples—and this means Americans, as well as Poles—to put aside old hostility and suspicion and bitterness and, in the words of St. Paul, "Forgetting the things that are behind and reaching forth to the things that are before, to press forward." In this spirit, with the help of like-minded America and in sincere friendship with the Soviet

Union, there can arise, on the basis of the Crimea agreement, a Poland which will take her rightful place among the free nations of the world, not as a barrier, but as a link between the East and the West.

BRITAIN EDUCATES ITS PEOPLE

G

ILBERT MURRAY

War intensifies a nation's energies, but concentrates them upon its own purposes. It insists on industry, endurance, public service, technical skill. It is quite indifferent to philosophy, scholarship, poetry, belles-lettres, art, music, and abstract science—except in so far as they may happen to come in useful for amusing the troops or locating unseen airplanes. The intellectual standards are lowered, the social standards vigorously raised. When the outside public suddenly becomes interested in educational affairs, most teachers with much experience behind them will have noticed that it cherishes a quite excessive expectation of what the teacher can do. There are said to be a hundred and fifty separate voluntary societies in England planning the regeneration of the country, or Europe, or humanity, by means of a better education. Some, no doubt, are fantastic or sentimental in their outlook; educationalists are a queer crowd; some confuse education with political or religious propaganda; but the great majority are inspired by a genuine concern for the needs of the world, particularly the need for wiser and better men and ideas to save it from the morass into which the present men and ideas have led it.

There are also the pressing material needs of the moment. The heavy bombing of London and other large towns in 1940 and 1941 led to the evacuation of about a million and a half schoolchildren to safer places in the country, while others, whose parents were unwilling or unable to evacuate them, had no schools to go to, and often no houses to sleep in. They slept in the public underground shelters and their life was disorganized. The educational authorities have dealt effectively with this immense trouble. The children scattered all over the country have been rounded up and provided with schools; more than 99 per cent of them are now having a regular school life.

The evacuation produced curious social lessons and problems. One could, as a rule, rely everywhere on the devotion of the teachers in facing new and difficult conditions, and also on the affectionate welcome which

the children received from the country cottagers. There was not much money in it either way, but it was striking to see what a number of women were delighted to have a child or two in the house. It was also curious to see the effect produced by the country on town children of the poorer classes and often on their parents too. Some were frightened by the loneliness and wanted to get back to crowded streets; some, astonished to see "plums growing on trees!" and not a shop counter; some, not quite pleased at having milk from the inside of a cow instead of a nice clean bottle. In many cases a painful impression was made on the country people by the habits of slum children bred in poverty and the improvidence associated with poverty; sometimes their sharpness of wit proved troublesome. In my own neighborhood a little shop selling ginger-beer and lemonade was in the habit of paying twopence for each bottle returned by the customer and of storing these empty bottles in the back garden. A young financial genius from the East End discovered a simple source of income by collecting the bottles in the back garden and selling them again at the front door.

Such difficulties as did occur were mostly between hostesses and parents. In the main, however, the great migrations of evacuation—experiments, as Mr. Butler justly observes, unprecedented in our social history—have been wisely and successfully handled. England has had, by this extraordinary mixture of classes, a rare opportunity to "Know Herself," and the results will be a strong stimulant to administrators and social reformers. Even educationally the migrations had a certain value. New "short courses for teachers" were organized on the kind of topics for which the evacuation provided a need or opportunity, such as rural subjects of many varieties, as well as physical training, handicrafts, and domestic science, food economy and youth service. Of course there are also a great supply of courses on the United States and on Russia.

One fundamental difficulty was to keep the schools going at all. Those in the large towns were often untenable owing to the *Blitz*. In the country many of the best school buildings were taken over by War Offices; one of the most famous of the girls' schools is proud to have been assigned to the American Army. In general the dispossessed teachers and children were housed in unoccupied buildings or large houses whose owners for one reason or another had to leave them. Several of the great public schools are now in country houses or "noblemen's seats." An interesting side problem was the provision of schools in their own languages for the children of our various allies, Poles, Czechs, Belgians, Norwegians, and others. The adults too, especially those in the air force, had intensive courses in colloquial English provided by the British Council on very novel principles. The teachers were expert phoneticians, and the men were taught to understand technical military orders and warnings, shouted through a telephone. For soldiers in action this is the sort of "English" that is wanted.

And besides, some such step was extremely desirable as a mitigation of the sense of exile and homesickness which is inevitable in people kept so long among strangers while their own people are left exposed to dire suffering.

Meantime, the difficulties of food supply under these conditions made an opportunity for a long desired social reform. Milk was provided for children in all the elementary schools, in some cases free, otherwise at the price of a half-penny—one cent—for a third of a pint. A midday dinner also was supplied in school for about a million children. The elaborate medical and dental care provided for every child in peacetime might well have seemed impossible to continue in war conditions, with the scattered schools and the extensive call-up of doctors and dentists by the army. Yet it was managed. The medical and dental inspection was kept up, and, as a matter of fact, the health of the children positively improved. One ought not to leave this subject without remarking how the schools, to quote the words of R. A. Butler, now President of the Board of Education, "have shown their mettle under fire." From localities which had been raided he had had reports telling how the children had faced bombing with courage overnight and examinations with equal equanimity next morning.

In the secondary schools, and perhaps especially in the great ancient foundations called here "Public Schools," direct war service made a closer appeal. The Officers Training Corps, the special training course for the R.A.F., certain technical courses useful for the destruction of human life or, on occasion, for its preservation, made a great demand on the time and still more probably on the active interest of the boys. Boys and girls took their share in fire-watching and anti-air-raid precautions. In the holidays, and on particular occasions in the summer term, they did land work on farms. Some in this neighborhood did a pretty long day at fruit picking, beginning at 5:00 A.M. In many centers, especially in girls' secondary schools, the young people showed a vivid interest in the study of world citizenship and the part their country can play in the building of a secure and warless world. Special steps were taken by the Board to arrange throughout the whole system courses of instruction in the history and constitution of the United States and to a hardly less extent in those of our second great ally—Soviet Russia.

In the army itself, education has not been neglected. It is worth remembering that in England the first compulsory instruction in the "three R's" was set up in the army of the Duke of Wellington, and that the Red Army has been similarly used as a vast school in present-day Russia. Those enterprises, however, were chiefly conducted in peacetime. The Spanish Republican Army is, as far as I know, the only one which had actual schools of reading, writing, and arithmetic immediately behind the front line in the midst of a campaign. The education of an army during war is bound to be rather scrappy; yet, in a democratic country, the danger of leaving

an army which is half the nation absolutely uneducated and dependent on casual rumor and cheap newspapers for information about war aims and public affairs is obviously a serious consideration.

The War Office itself, commonly reputed in England to be the least intellectual of public departments, set up an Army Bureau of Current Affairs to provide instruction on the outstanding issues and problems of the day. The Bureau issued every week to every regimental officer a bulletin on some current topic written by a competent authority. On the basis of these bulletins platoon commanders gave short talks to their men, followed by questions and informal discussion. Subjects ranged from "The Far East," "Oil," "The Mediterranean," to "America in Total War," and "Re-building Britain." The outsider may wonder whether teaching ability and intelligent views on world policy are a universal quality of platoon commanders, or speculate what happens when a "sea-lawyer" of subversive views begins to cross-question his officer. But the idea is a fine one, suggested by Cromwell's famous requirement that the citizen soldier should be one who "must know what he is fighting for and love what he knows," and in practice it is said to be a success. There is also an optional scheme of army education initiated by the universities rather than the War Office which provides lectures and courses on subjects chosen by the men, some of a vocational sort preparatory to post-war jobs, others on science, literature, history, languages, and the like.

On the universities themselves the war, inevitably, laid a heavy hand. Doctors, surgeons, chemists, engineers have their military value, and students for those professions were in general allowed to finish their degree courses, though the course itself was apt to be somewhat shortened. The subjects that are only useful to culture and civilization, not to war, were treated more roughly. After one year at the university, as a rule students were called up, either to the fighting services or to one of the numerous ancillary organizations. Apart from these improvisations to meet the needs of war, the English educational system has suffered historically from two acknowledged defects. For one thing, it had different schools and standards for rich and poor; for another, the great mass of working classes left school at the age of fourteen and, until comparatively lately, had little provision made for them to continue any intellectual pursuit afterwards. A boy's life was apt to be nothing but lessons up to fourteen, and after that no lessons at all. As to this second defect, the government's intention is to raise the leaving age to fifteen, and to increase still further the facilities for part-time education, technical or cultural, for adolescents. This program, though involving expense and trouble, is fairly straightforward. It implies not merely encouragement of evening schools, technical schools, and of such continuation schools as have been set up by public-spirited employers or authorities in response to the great plan put forward

by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher in the last war; it implies also a great development of adult education through such bodies as the Workers Educational Association, the Adult Schools Association, and the organizations inside the army described above. The present President of the Board, in a remarkable speech, has suggested that the establishment of "an organized system of continuing an adult education" may prove to be the characteristic educational advance of this age. If such hopes are realized, the social results may prove to be of incalculable value. Over a million young people are usually attending some form of voluntary post-school education in England, or were doing so before the war. But I fear it is one of the obvious weaknesses of all existing democracies that the average adult tends to think that learning is the business of children and students; that he himself has learned as much as ever he need learn and may now forget it and turn his attention to real business.

Besides these more definitely educational bodies, there has been during the present century a remarkable revival in English towns and villages of an interest in music and drama. The Drama League has discovered a quite unexpected talent for acting in the average population, and village competitions in play-acting have become a feature of country life. Since the war, the Government has instituted a Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA), which devotes itself chiefly to spreading music and drama all over the country, in villages, factories, and so on, and a Youth Advisory Council for encouragement of young people in their own mental and physical development and in a spirit of active service to the community.

The other defect is less easy to deal with. We have inherited from the eighteenth century a special system of education for the "upper classes," which means not exactly the rich, but includes those who through inherited culture or tradition or sometimes through particular personal ability are regarded as gentlefolk. Their boys are sent to extremely expensive "public schools," Eton, Harrow, Winchester, Rugby, and the like, and proceed normally to Oxford or Cambridge. For the clever boys, there are scholarships, that is, money grants to cover or nearly cover the school expenses, awarded by public examination. At the two ancient universities, indeed, scholarships and other forms of aid are so numerous that any clever and well-prepared boy can be almost sure of paying his way. The real obstacle to a working-class boy lies in the lack of previous preparation at home or at school. Besides these aristocratic schools and universities there is a vast system of state education, embracing elementary, secondary, and technical schools, either free or extremely cheap, and a number of "modern" universities. This system is rapidly improving, but almost inevitably it has a utilitarian bias and is content with a somewhat lower standard than the first named, at any rate in the more literary and cultural subjects.

The existence of these two systems has naturally produced criticism and complaint. The educational ladder by which a clever boy or girl can pass from one system to the other has been broadened and broadened till it is now spoken of as a highway, though not a sufficient highway. About half the scholars at Oxford and Cambridge now come from secondary schools or small grammar schools and not from "public schools" of the Eton and Harrow type. Still the difference that remains has a certain galling quality about it, and the more ardent democratic reformers have been said to hesitate whether they wish "to abolish Eton and Oxford altogether or to insist that every working-class boy shall go to Eton and Oxford." Meantime the wisest line seems to be that advocated by Mr. Butler—to welcome a diversity of system which offers opportunity to the diverse tastes and talents of different boys and girls, but to see that interchange between the different types of school is made far easier and not dependent on what particular parents are able to pay. "There are merits," he says, "in all the different types of education in this country; we must preserve those merits and enlarge the number of those who enjoy them."

War is fertile in illusions. No doubt one of the illusions was that, because we were all making greater efforts toward public service and the attainment of high ideals, therefore the efforts would bear fruit and the ideals be attained. We forgot that the effort itself had been called forth by the presence of extreme danger and unwonted difficulties. It is fine that the evacuation problem was so admirably mastered and, in part, its evils actually turned to good; fine that representatives of all the National Education bodies in the country have joined in a Council for Education in World Citizenship to fit young people for the part the next generation will have to play in the building of a co-operative world; fine that, in the midst of our sharp financial stringency, the Government, instead of economizing on education, should have raised its contribution from £41,000,000 to £57,000,000, and that Mr. Butler should be throwing himself with so much energy and careful thought into plans of educational progress. But war, as the old Greek historian puts it, is "a brutal schoolmaster"; it teaches bad lessons and disappoints high hopes. Our great social schemes may be wrecked by sheer poverty. Our bold plans for a co-operative and enlightened world may be swept away by the storms of bitter hatred nazi atrocities have left behind them. The democratic cry for more widespread education may turn into a cry for lower standards, or more immediately utilitarian training. Mr. Butler speaks of a suggestion made to him "that we should abolish Latin and introduce a compulsory study of the internal combustion engine instead."

War itself is full of pitfalls and unforeseen dangers, and the same applies to all efforts toward the building of a "better world" that are made during war. All may fail, but looking on from outside as an old teacher and

once for some time a member of the Board of Education, I should say that, in the matter of education, the Government, the teachers, the administrators, and a large part of the public itself, have risen to meet the call of the time with an energy and intelligence deserving success.

COLONIES IN A CHANGING WORLD

J

JULIAN HUXLEY The world is changing under our eyes. To the accompaniment of much blood-letting, burning of crops, destruction of buildings, hunger, disease, and torture (but also much bravery, devotion, ingenuity, efficiency, and hard thinking), the institutions and ideas of a historical epoch are on their way into the discard. Unlimited national sovereignty, laissez-faire liberalism, unrestricted capitalist enterprise, neutrality, the police state, free trade are swirling irrevocably down the cosmic drain.

The sharing or leasing of strategic bases, new conceptions of national service, large-scale integrations and regulations of economy, the concept of the state as a positive agent for initiating and planning social welfare—these are throwing up hints of the world that is to come.

In such a confusion of change, the colonies are bound to be involved. The world's conscience is beginning to grow a little uneasy over the fact of one country "possessing" another as a colony, just as it grew uneasy a century or so ago over the fact of one human being possessing another as a slave. The inter-war disputation between the "have" and the "have-not" powers is wearing a bit thin. To discuss colonies in those terms is to regard them exclusively from the point of view of the advanced powers, as so many pieces conferring prestige or wealth or strategic advantage in the game of power politics. It is beginning to dawn on us that the real "have-nots" are the colonial peoples themselves, struggling along in a morass of economic backwardness, a darkness of ignorance, a purgatory of ill-health, from which it has taken the Western World nearly two millennia to emerge, onto its present level of relative civilization.

The mercantilist view of colonies as milch-cows to be exploited for the benefit of the metropolitan power, when looked at firmly in the light of post-depression economics, is seen to be as shortsighted as it was selfish. Not merely to provide a moral basis for their dependent empires but to increase general prosperity, the standard of living of the native colonial peo-

ples (nearly an eighth of the world's population) must imperatively be raised. The principle of trusteeship sounded rather noble when applied to mandates in 1919; but now, even if it were to be adopted for all colonies, it would look inadequate. Positive aid is required, and the only possible substitute for imperialism is seen to be the development—political and social as well as economic—of the areas now classed as colonies. What is more, the development must be undertaken internationally. The separate possession of colonies was an inevitable consequence or extension of the game of power politics as played by independent sovereign states; whatever international framework is superposed upon nationalism, it must concern itself with the colonies as well as with the advanced nations on which the colonies depend.

But first we must know just what we are talking about in discussing the future of colonies. There is still in the United States (perhaps as a historical hangover from the War of Independence) a tendency to call the Dominions colonies. When, some ten years ago, I published a book on problems of Central Africa, one of the reviewers seriously asked why the British Government did not insist on the abolition of the color bar in the Union of South Africa. He apparently was ignorant of the fact that the Union of South Africa is an independent sovereign state, and that Britain has no more say in its internal affairs than does the U. S. A. in the internal affairs of Brazil or China. Even today American newspapers often refer to Dominion troops as "colonials"—a practice which must certainly cause either mirth or resentment in Australian, South African and other Dominion quarters.

Colonies in the proper sense of the word are politically dependent territories, administered from the capital of colonial power. They have their own governors and legislative councils; but there is almost invariably an "official majority" on the council, consisting of local civil servants and administrators. There is little representation of the native population on the council, and that little is in most cases indirect, often through a white missionary (as well as via the Commissioner for Native Affairs), and general policy is imposed from London, Paris, Brussels, and so on. This applies also to the mandated territories, in spite of the slight degree of international supervision exercised over them by the League.

Colonies in their strict sense of the word can be still further subdivided. In the first place, there are the relatively advanced colonies which are clearly destined in the near future to follow countries like Iraq and to emerge from colonial dependence into the condition of partial or complete self-government. Syria, Palestine, and the Philippines are obvious examples, while Ceylon and Burma are clear candidates for a fairly speedy attainment of Dominion status. Ethiopia, after its brief interlude as an Italian colony, has now been restored to independence, but (as with other somewhat backward territories) its independence will be qualified for

some time to come by a certain amount of help and tutelage from the white man.

Northern Africa constitutes a special area. Already before the war, Algeria and northern Libya were for most purposes integral parts of France and Italy respectively: Algeria in fact was virtually a French *département*. In any case the whole of the north African littoral, with its hinterland back to the Sahara, is historically a part of the Mediterranean economy and culture and may be expected to become linked with increasing closeness to the European system.

Among the remainder, a number have been retained as colonies wholly or mainly for strategic reasons. Gibraltar, Malta, and Hawaii are the most obvious cases, while Aden, Guam, Hong Kong, and the formerly fortified Japanese mandates in the Marshall and Caroline Islands are other examples. Cyprus, British Malaya, Dakar, and many other territories are of value as much for strategic as for other reasons: The strategic importance of the West Indies and Newfoundland for the Western Hemisphere has been acknowledged in the arrangements made for leasing bases to the United States, and the Anglo-American occupation of Iceland has *de facto* converted that island into a strategic colony of the United Nations, the Malta of the North Atlantic. The future of strategic colonies will depend primarily upon the arrangements made for guaranteeing international security. The most likely guess seems to be that they will develop, through a stage of pooled strategic strong-points shared by some or all of the United Nations, into truly International bases at the disposal of whatever security league comes into existence. In any event, purely strategic colonies constitute a small fraction of the total, and the strategic aspect of other colonies (for example, Singapore in British Malaya, or Dakar in French West Africa) will clearly be dealt with from the angle of security.

Even when the advanced and the strategic colonies are eliminated, the bulk of colonial territories remain to be considered—the whole of tropical Africa including Madagascar, the West Indies, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, New Guinea, Greenland, and various islands in the Pacific. They all share one characteristic—cultural, social, and economic backwardness.

Britain is the greatest colonial power. In Britain during the war, in spite of all the urgencies of the military situation, there was a great revival of interest in the colonial question. Different groups naturally arrive at different solutions; but it remains true that the general direction of opinion is remarkably uniform. First, it presupposes a necessary minimum of international organization to guarantee security from military aggression and to promote economic stability. It rejects the pooling of colonies under an international body. Instead, it envisages the adherence of all colonial powers to a colonial charter, the raising of administrative and labor standards by a

series of international conventions, and the general supervision of colonial administration by an international Colonial Commission, with advisory, research, and grant-giving powers, but without executive authority. Thirdly, it regards the development of the tropical colonies as one of the major economic priorities before the world, only less urgent than the reconstruction of the devastated areas of Europe and the Far East. Before the world can begin to be prosperous, its backward areas must be provided with the necessary capital equipment, including not only the material basis for prosperity, but the equipment of their inhabitants with health, knowledge, and skill. And the colonies include almost all the most backward areas of the globe. Indeed, we can say that the problem of colonies is primarily the problem of abolishing tropical backwardness. Colonies would not have become colonies if they had not been so backward.

The question is how to raise their mode of existence at optimum speed toward a new level; a level where their standard of living will be as high as that of other countries, where they can govern themselves and stand politically on their own feet, and where they can contribute their full quota to the general prosperity and the cultural life of this planet. I have deliberately used the phrase *optimum* in place of *maximum* speed. In the case of advanced societies, it suffices to prescribe the desirable direction of movement; for tropical areas, it is also necessary to discover the optimum rate of change. When the advance to be made is not merely from one level of civilization to the next, but from a pre-mechanical, analphabetic, primitive tribal society, operating in untamed natural surroundings, to a technological and highly educated civilization which has largely controlled and even created its own physical environment, it is extremely easy to move too fast: change, like food, must be provided in assimilable doses. Equally, it is easy for change in one field to get quite out of step with other sets of changes, so distorting and disturbing the whole process. Thus in some areas, concentration on the economic exploitation of colonial areas has resulted in enormous labor migrations which have not only drained the native reserves of the menfolk needed for subsistence agriculture and a balanced life, but at the other end have brought into being a dingy, discontented, and atomized black proletariat, whch, on any standard of ultimate human values, represents a regression from traditional tribal existence.

The favorite solution of the liberal thinkers and the idealist constitution-mongers has been the immediate pooling of all colonies under the administration of an international authority. This, however, is in reality not only impracticable but undesirable. No international authority which we can contemplate as possible in the near future could be adequate to undertake the full executive responsibility demanded of an administration, and the existing colonial powers would rightly refuse to hand over their responsibilities to such an organization. Furthermore, colonial administration is a

difficult business, demanding a homogeneous staff with its own traditions and accumulated experience. The handing over of administration to a mixed international staff unsupported by strong central machinery would in many cases cause a retrogression in the handling of native problems, and this might well have quite serious effects in some areas. The future of the native peoples, not the satisfaction of the claims of European powers to prestige or to rights of exploitation, should be the primary objective.

The problem is to combine a national machinery of executive colonial government with adequate international regulation; granted that administration remains mainly in the hands of the existing powers, how are we to ensure more uniform and rising standards of administration, how promote an increasing measure of self-government, and how, in the interim before full self-government is reached, strengthen international interest and international supervision?

Another widely mooted suggestion has been the universal adoption of a strengthened Mandate principle. After the last war, the ex-German colonies were transferred to other powers, not as outright possessions, but as Mandates from the League of Nations. The system involved the formal acceptance of the principle of trusteeship. The Mandatory Power was to administer the mandated territory in the interests of the native inhabitants until such time as they were capable of self-government, just as a trustee administers a ward's estate until he comes of age. Largely under the influence of Lord Lugard, this simple idea of trusteeship was gradually replaced by what he called the Dual Mandate. Under this concept the trustee preserves a dual responsibility—toward the native inhabitants, to encourage their progress toward greater prosperity and self-government, and toward the rest of the world, to make the resources of the area generally available. The Mandatory Power had to give an annual account of its stewardship to the Mandates Commission of the League, a body which included representatives of non-colonial as well as of colonial powers.

The mandate system did produce certain valuable results. It has on occasion prevented undesirable action. The French, for instance, made one or two attempts to extend to their Mandates their strongly protectionist imperial system, with the trade of the colonies tied to that of the metropolitan country, but this has always been successfully resisted by the Mandates Commission. The standard of administration demanded in a mandated territory has inevitably had repercussions on the colonies of the same power, notably in spilling over into contiguous colonial areas. It has always aided public opinion, both at Geneva and perhaps even more in the home parliaments, in keeping governments up to the mark.

The suggestion has therefore been made that all colonies should be proclaimed as mandates, held in trust for their inhabitants on behalf of the world at large, and that at the same time the Mandates Commission should

be strengthened both in its research and secretarial staff and in its powers. There are, however, a number of objections to this course. In many quarters, not only in ex-enemy countries, the mandate system as introduced in 1919 was regarded as little more than a pious veneer for annexation. Then the term has become, rightly or wrongly, associated with the idea of transfer of territories from one power to another, which would be bitterly resisted by various colonial powers as well as being undesirable in itself. Again, in certain quarters, including the educated natives of various colonies, it has acquired a connotation of inferior status. And finally, the principle of trusteeship itself is regarded as inadequate to modern conditions. Lord Hailey, the author of the great African Survey, and now intimately associated with the framing of a general line for British colonial policy, has said that the idea of trusteeship is too legalistic and negative, too much a survival from the laissez-faire epoch. Government today must be positive, must take the initiative in an active policy of development and welfare. The trustee, in fact, must be replaced by the educator and the guardian.

For these and other reasons it seems best, while perhaps retaining the mandatory principle for the existing mandated areas, to include it within a wholly new system. This system must be as comprehensively international as possible. It is not enough for one or two colonial powers to adopt the guardianship principle of development and welfare. For one thing, it is no good blinking the fact that some colonial areas are by no means well administered, either in the sense of efficiency or in that of promoting the welfare of their inhabitants. The world's conscience will not long continue to tolerate any such gross inequality of standards. What is more, inequality of standards is economically unsound and politically dangerous. Inefficient administration and insufficient development interferes with world prosperity. And inequality of treatment will, sooner rather than later, create a sense of political grievance. Malays, Negroes, Melanesians—all the colonial peoples are rapidly and inevitably reaching a level at which they are capable of a simple but heady brand of political thinking. In the so-called Dark Continent, for instance, fifty years ago the Negro millions still lived their tribal lives as ignorant of the word *Africa* and its implications as were the vast majority of Indians a century ago of the implications of the word *India*. Today, however, there is a rapidly growing minority who think of themselves first and foremost as Africans; and the Italian annexation of Abyssinia, together with the fact that the white men have fought two wars among themselves in the last twenty-five years, is now in the background of the native mind from the Sudan to the Cape, from Tanganyika to French West Africa. Africans can see just as far beyond their noses as other people: and inequality of treatment in neighboring areas, perhaps more than any other type of injustice, is likely to produce a resentful and dangerous type of Africanism, in place of the healthy African patriotism and ambition.

which it should be the business of the colonial powers to encourage and to guide.

What system then should we aim at setting up? In general, it should subserve the dual aim of development and of internationalism. Coming down to detail, in the first place it is desirable that the new conception of positive guardianship should be internationally expressed and publicly proclaimed. This would probably be best accomplished by the promulgation of a Colonial Charter, which would be for the colonial peoples what Magna Carta was to medieval England or the Declaration of Independence to the infant United States. Such a charter should be jointly proclaimed by as many as possible of the United Nations; it would be difficult for any of the colonial powers to stand outside for long.

The charter should be neither detailed nor lengthy, but need affirm only such general principles as the following: First, colonial dependencies are not possessions but are held in trust or guardianship. Second, the primary aim of the guardianship is to help the colonial peoples as rapidly as possible toward self-government. Thirdly, its other major aim is the development of the colonial territories, first and foremost for the benefit of their own inhabitants, but also for that of the rest of the world. Fourthly, the guardianship is to be exercised jointly by all the advanced nations adhering to the charter, but its administrative responsibilities are to be delegated to powers with colonial experience. Fifthly, colonial status implies no inherent or permanent inequality: No such inequality exists, and equal status and equal opportunity for all peoples and races is the goal to be realized as quickly as possible. Sixthly, all posts in the colonial services, up to the highest, shall be open to the local inhabitants, subject only to selection for efficiency; and the educational system of the colonies shall have as one of its prime functions the training of men of local race for such posts. Seventhly and finally, all nations adhering to the charter shall have equality of economic opportunity in the colonies, and also equality of all other types of opportunity, subject only to the need for maintaining efficiency of administration.

The best method of implementing the charter and of ensuring a steady raising of standards will probably be by a series of international conventions. The organization for handling such conventions lies ready to hand, in the shape of the International Labor Office (though in some cases other types of international instrument, such as the Congo Basin Treaty, may be preferable). The I.L.O. already has a colonial section, which would merely require strengthening. If it be asked what the conventions would cover, we can answer forced labor, labor conditions and welfare in general, and opportunities for employment and education. The great advantage of the method is that it is a progressive one, which can contribute to a steady raising of standards in relation to changing world conditions. Its effectiveness

would be increased if means were found to associate local organizations, such as agricultural co-operatives, say, or bodies concerned with social welfare, with the detailed application of the conventions to particular areas.

Secondly, even if executive responsibility is left in the hands of powers with colonial experience, their administration can be to some extent internationalized, and it can be subjected to international supervision. A small proportion of technical posts should immediately be thrown open to qualified men of any nationality, and the proportion should be gradually but steadily increased. The actual selection should be left in the hands of the power concerned, for otherwise it could not well continue to assume executive responsibility. As time went on and the system proved workable, it could be extended to administrative posts as well. Meanwhile, a growing number of increasingly important posts would become filled by inhabitants of the colonies themselves. Thus there would be parallel progress toward international government and toward self-government; and even if in some cases international government takes the lead, its share in actual administration will all the time be growing quantitatively less and that of self-government quantitatively more.

International supervision and regulation, however, will be needed at the outset, both to ensure proper standards and also to give some degree of responsibility to the other powers and some outlet for their natural desire to participate in colonial affairs. This could be provided in the form of a colonial section of whatever international political organization comes into being: let us call it the Colonial Commission. Some people are still obsessed with the idea that we should attempt to lay down now, in as much detail as possible, the formal constitution and organizational machinery of any such body. This I am sure is wrong, and a wasteful diversion of will and energy. Whatever organization does spring up will grow bit by bit if it is to endure and is in any case quite certain to be different from any present theoretical imaginings. What we ought to define is the broad functions of such a body: once we are clear about these the machinery for their realization can be brought into being. One major function should be planning. A second is advice. And the third is financial help. The experience of large-scale development organizations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority in this country, shows that a set-up of this kind, although without executive authority (the T.V.A. has executive authority only in connection with its dams and power plants, not in matters of health, agricultural improvement, education, recreation, and so forth), can be extremely efficient in supervising and guiding development along right lines.

There are various prerequisites. The whole program depends on securing the co-operation of the executive organizations concerned. For this, the central authority must be prepared to act as a general catalyst and as an organizer of joint action whenever several separate organizations are con-

cerned in a project. In the long run, it depends also on popular understanding and backing: for this, co-operation with the agencies of education and of public opinion is needed, and local bodies and communities should be encouraged to contribute to the plan and to feel a sense of participation in the forward swing of development. Then the planning must be based on ample research and survey; the advice must be based on detailed field knowledge; and the financial help must be based on an ample supply of men of first-class caliber, to go where the problems are and to persuade the executive authorities to use the money to best advantage. Thus all we need say at the moment about the Colonial Commission is that it should have attached to it a strong international staff of research workers and advisers, and should have allocated to it a considerable share of the central fund which must be at the disposal of any international organization that is destined to endure.

The separate colonial powers will no doubt have their own funds for colonial development and their own staff of experts and traveling advisers, such as Britain, for instance, already possesses. There should be no more difficulty in combining these with the resources of the Colonial Commission in a common program than there has been difficulty in pooling the resources of, say, the Land-Grant Colleges, the State Universities, the forestry and agricultural services of the Department of Agriculture, and the 4H Clubs with those of the T.V.A. in securing a sane agricultural development in the Tennessee Valley area.

There remains the function of reviewing progress and of detecting any failure of the colonial powers to live up to their executive responsibilities. Something of the sort is performed for mandated territories by the Mandate Commission; but its function is confined to discussing the reports which it is the duty of the Mandatory Powers to make. It would seem best that detailed review, including any inspection which might prove necessary, should be kept in the hands of the International Labor Office. This in its turn could report to the Colonial Commission on any matters concerning general principles or demanding political action.

Some such general set-up would seem best adapted to reconcile the divergent claims of the colonial peoples, the colonial powers, and the other advanced nations, with the obvious need for international responsibility and guidance, in a practical scheme of step-by-step advance.

I have left to the last the most urgent problem—the raising of standards of life in the backward tropical colonies. Though this is primarily an economic and social problem, it has its political aspects. It concerns the political future of the colonies themselves, since political aspirations toward self-government must be built on the foundations of prosperity and education. And it concerns the political future of the advanced nations, since in the joint development by them of backward areas is to be found the only

possible substitute for imperialism in the tightly-knit unit world of after the war.

Let us first try to picture more in detail some of the hard facts which are included in the phrase "tropical backwardness." It is not easy, for the life of most colonial peoples is lived on a different level of history from ours and is measurable by quite other standards. The tropics are in large part just emerging from primitive tribal existence; at best, they are still mainly in the barbaric phase of culture—pre-scientific, pre-technological. They are almost entirely lacking in the apparatus of modern civilization. The task of development is immense—nothing less than the capital equipment of the tropics for civilized living. But if we can carry it through, we shall have benefited ourselves as well as the native peoples of the colonies. While they are in their present backward state, they cannot provide good markets for the manufactures of advanced countries; they cannot make any adequate contribution to the industrial and cultural life of the world; and even as a source of cheap labor they will be inefficient and unreliable so long as they remain unhealthy and uneducated. In the last few decades, economists have realized that mercantilism is a short-sighted policy which in the long run cannot pay; today they wish to substitute constructive development for mercantilism, the building up of new resources and new potentialities for the immediate exploitation of what is now there.

Let us take a look at the extent of the job which this new policy implies. In the first place, the idea of the tropics as a luxuriant region, effortlessly producing abundance and riches, is a fable. Almost the only tropical regions which are prosperous are some of those endowed with mineral wealth. Soil erosion, absence of necessary mineral salts, pests, and parasites are common. In any case, the tropics are to a large extent still physically untamed and unequipped. Railways, motor roads, ports, bridges, warehouse and storage facilities, processing plants, marketing services, dams and reservoirs, power plants, forestry, agricultural and veterinary services—these are in their infancy in most areas and must be provided on a generous scale before the colonies can take their proper place in world economy, where they can act as a stimulus rather than a drag. In addition, encouragement must be given to light and secondary industries, for only so can a reasonably balanced economy grow up in colonial areas.

But human resources are just as important as material resources. By and large, the inhabitants of tropical colonies are miserably equipped with health, energy, education, and technical skill. The noble savage, the magnificent human animal endowed with the health of which civilization has robbed us degenerate whites—that is another myth. The tropical peoples as a whole are unhealthy peoples. In the tropics, vital statistics are very dubious, but we know enough to say that death and disease rates are of a different order of magnitude from those which applied science has made

possible in the Western World. To take but a few examples, African infant mortality ranges from 1 in 4 to 1 in 2; probably every adult Negro is infested with one or more kinds of worms, usually including hookworm, and often with malaria as well; in some areas up to 90 per cent of the population suffers from venereal disease; gross malnutrition as well as vitamin deficiency is frequent. The white man in the tropics curses the native for his laziness. But if the native were once rid of parasitic and infectious disease and given an adequate diet, he would not merely be more energetic: his entire personality would be transformed.

Improved health would provide the physiological basis for a new advance: education is needed to provide the mental basis. The tropics are as backward in education as in health. Over most of Africa, not 10 per cent of the children ever go to any school; and not 10 per cent of the schools are anything but the most primitive sub-elementary bush-school (hymn-singing, the catechism, and the rudiments of the three R's). When the so-called primitive is given his chance, he can learn as well as anyone else. He can acquire mechanical skill, as exemplified in the workshops of the Belgian Congo; intellectual skill, as is to be seen in the Gold Coast; military proficiency, as was demonstrated in Ethiopia during the war by the black troops from Nigeria and East Africa. For the realization of the people's latent abilities, home background and some general culture are needed as well as schools. But, given two or three generations of good education and of outlets for those who have been educated, the people would be as radically transformed in mind and capabilities as they would be in body and energies by proper health and diet. Tropical backwardness, economic, political, physical, and mental, is not an inescapable and permanent fact of nature; it is a temporary phenomenon which can be remedied if we are willing to make the necessary effort.

What measures should be taken to lift the tropical countries and their inhabitants out of this slough of backwardness? It is clear that the task is too large, too complex, and too long-term to be left wholly or even mainly to the free play of private initiative. Aid in colonial development must be in large measure international. The first prerequisite is an exhaustive survey of resources and needs, backed by adequate pure research. Anthropology, water-power, mineral and forest resources, soils, erosion, agricultural products, transport and marketing needs, home economics, health, population trends, the prospects of export and home industries—all need to be surveyed in a much more comprehensive way than has yet been done.

Next comes the financing of development. This can be done in various ways. Colonial profits and revenues will only go a short distance. Loans and grants-in-aid, both from the separate colonial powers and from the international Colonial Commission, will be of importance. And private finance, largely guided into desirable channels through some international

investment board, can still play a major role. The British and American authorities are considering ways and means for setting up international finance agencies, among whose functions would be the promotion of development in backward areas. For the actual job of carrying out development, special agencies and methods will be needed. Existing colonial governments can continue doing much valuable work. Then we may envisage the setting up of more organizations of the type of the Empire Cotton-Growing Corporation in the Sudan, where co-operatives of native producers are organized with the help both of private finance and of government aid. We shall require a careful organization of marketing agencies for all products which are regulated by international schemes of commodity control. And we shall certainly need special long-term planning and development agencies of rather new type.

One valuable suggestion, which will apply to those numerous tropical regions where all-around development is needed for a longish period before commercial profit can be expected, is to set up agencies rather of the type of the T.V.A., but adapted to regions of greater backwardness, and under some international control. Their function would be social as much as economic and would involve the transformation of every aspect of life —a task which obviously requires long-term planning as well as large-scale capital investment. We may call such bodies Regional Development Agencies.

For other regions where a profitable external market is already, or will shortly be, available, a different type of body is needed, which we may christen the International Public Concern. Their shareholders should be given a minimum rate of return on their investment by international guarantee. In return for this, a maximum rate should also be laid down; all profits in excess of this must be returned to the area, and a certain proportion must be set aside for social, educational, and health improvement (somewhat as with the Miners' Welfare Fund in Britain). This compulsory ploughing-back of any excess profits is essential if the development of the area is to proceed at a reasonable rate. Finally, as such concerns are bound to exert a dominant influence on all aspects of native life, it is essential that they should operate under welfare and conservation regulations approved by the Colonial Commission.

There are many other aspects of colonial development which it would be interesting to discuss, but space permits me to mention only two. First, it is very important that there should be a well-thought-out population policy for backward areas. As health measures bear fruit, we may expect a formidable spurt of population growth in areas such as tropical Africa; and population pressure is one of the main causes of economic backwardness in countries like India. Thus the provision of birth-control facilities should be a recognized part of the colonial health program. Finally, we must do our

utmost to secure a continuity of cultural growth, even for the most backward peoples of the world. At present, in most areas the old tribal society and its values and ideals are being rapidly destroyed, and nothing solid is being put in its place. The detribalized native too often gets the worst of both worlds, acquiring a rather unpleasant growth of imitation white civilization grafted on to roots of tribal ignorance and superstition.

World War II was a symptom of a major historical transformation which will pursue its inexorable course whether we like it or not—a transformation toward a world that will be more socialized, more planned, more internationally organized than the nineteenth-century world that is fading out. But if we cannot prevent that transformation taking place, we can help to guide it. We can see that it is achieved either in a totalitarian, Hitlerian way, or in a democratic, co-operative way. In the former case, the new world order will be based on inequality and on domination by force; in the latter, on equality and on mutual help. In regard to colonies, nationalist imperialism could not help being tainted with inequality, exploitation, and forcible domination. The alternative is to treat the colonial peoples as human beings like ourselves, to be guided, helped, and developed toward future political and cultural equality. The responsibility for this rests not on the few colonial powers, but jointly on all the advanced nations. Once this alternative is chosen, all else is a mere matter of machinery and will follow in due course.

RUSSIA

Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks; methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full mid-day beam.

—Milton

RUSSIA AND AMERICA: A CRITICAL PARTNERSHIP



MAX LERNER Nothing is clearer than that Russia and America stand now, in mid-twentieth century, as the two towering world powers, and that the world's destiny is summed up in the anodes and cathodes of their relations.

History is often complex and indecisive. Yet it has managed in the past quarter-century, with an almost terrifying simplification, to strip away everything that might have obscured the new polarity of these two great peoples and of these two alone.

By manpower and resources and their skilled use, by geographical position in relation to land-mass in one case and sea lanes in the other and airways in both, by armed might and economic power and war potential, by ideology and prestige, by the gusto and assurance of their people, these two promise to be the colossi in whose bestriding shadow the world's future will be enacted for better or worse. They form the first principles and the end terms in the calculations of diplomats. When they agree, an international conference moves; when they do not, it comes to a standstill. All other nations, even the other powers called "great," take up their world position in relation to these two: to lean on one or the other as ally, to deploy or manipulate its strength, to mediate between both.

These two powers have the choice of working together or of struggling over the spoils of world imperium. If they choose the latter, while it is not necessarily true that a new world war would be imminent, the world would become a more delicate balance-of-power equilibrium than ever before, with almost any shift or quarrel capable of upsetting the balance. If they form a working partnership to underwrite the world's peace, there is no power in the world that would dare break it. Even in such a working partnership there would, of course, be an element of balance-of-power and an element of empire. When two states overshadow the world in their strength, each is likely to exert a polar attraction on other states, and each cluster is likely to assess the other to determine whether its strength is so great as to be intolerable, or its weakness so evident as to invite aggression.

But these elements of empire can be held in check, and the elements of balance-of-power can become harmless, within the framework of a larger world-security structure which both powers underwrite.

Will they, however, underwrite it?

The greatest danger lies in the chance that once more, as after World War I, the statesmen and thinkers of our time will allow themselves to be split into two worlds instead of becoming one. Any student who reads the history of the past quarter-century with insight will know that the great reason for the failure of the last peace was not only the lack of power in the League and not only the failure of America to adhere to it, but something far more decisive. Crucially it was the fact that revolutionary Russia was excluded from the peace settlement. The shadow that hung over Versailles was the shadow of the Soviets and of Lenin as their creator. The western world was swept by a *grande peur*, unexampled since the French Revolution, and the function of the peace settlement was less to break the German enemy's power forever than to build a sea-wall against the Bolshevik waves. A new social system and a new world outlook were in the forming, but both were excluded from partnership with those of the Western Powers. The great fact about Versailles was that Lenin was not there except as a spectre that was haunting not only Europe but America as well. And what was true of the Versailles settlement was true also of the birth of the League of Nations and the first decade of its history, as is made amply apparent by the documentation of K. Zilliacus' history of that tragic period, *The Mirror of the Past* (London, Gollancz, 1944).

What happened was that the world was split into two—a capitalist world holding on to its power with a fierceness embittered by its fear, and a socialist world obsessed with its capitalist encirclement and seeking to break it first by world-revolutionary adventurism and then by a socialist isolationism. This cleavage, more than any other factor including the world depression of the 1920's, was what gave fascism its chance to make a thrust at world power. More than any other factor, it was what made the western democracies pursue their appeasement course for so long in the hope of raising a fascist world that would redress the balance of the capitalist-socialist world. And, more than any other factor, it was what induced Russia—after desperate efforts to forge a structure of collective security—to recoil into its isolationism and make a security pact with the Germans. The new fascist power groups in Europe and the Far East drove their wedge right down the center of the world's collective will, but the cleavage was already in existence to give the wedge its golden chance of success.

There are those who, whether out of their fears or their lust for power,

would have liked to see the same process repeated after World War II. And for a short period following the German collapse and also President Roosevelt's death in 1945, it seemed as if their expectations might be fulfilled. From the balance-of-power standpoint, the big facts were the unexpected completeness of the crushing of German power and the unexpected strength of Russia. The whole power framework within which statesmen and military leaders had carried on their calculations for decades was gone, and in its place was a new one whose measure men had not yet learned to take. The months that followed were one of the great crisis periods of world history.

But those who thought that history was swinging back into the same trajectory as in 1919 were not thinking in terms of development. History has moved on, for both Russia and America, and for the world. Russia is no longer rejected and despised, as she was when the Western statesmen thought that a few half-hearted efforts to help the White generals would overthrow the new government, or as she was when she was cast out of the League of Nations. The Revolution, whatever else may be said of its other phases, has come to fulfillment in terms of national power in a world framework. The nation has been tested as an economic and military going concern, and it has displayed more cohesive force than any other. It has come through the most fiery tempering that any nation has experienced in modern times, and both its power and prestige are greater than ever in Russia's history. Economically Russia has borrowed the industrial techniques of the West and developed them, if not within a classless and stateless society, then within a new set of class forms and power relations. The old revolutionary zeal and the old revolutionary threat have been replaced by the tenacious realism of men who know what they want, and who want something that is neither world revolution nor the *status quo* but a consolidation of new forces in a new world.

Nor is the America of 1945 the America of a quarter-century ago. It is an America in which isolationism as a way of thought has been so completely blasted by events that the remaining force of it must masquerade under new guises and garbs; an America whose army is the most powerful in its history, whose navy covers the seven seas, whose air force darkens the skies, whose national economic product challenges comparison with the entire rest of the world put together, and whose economic potential is limited only by the arts of planning and the daring of the collective will; an America which has learned that the world is a closed circle, that world products as well as world markets are crucial for its own economic survival, and that if nations do not become economic partners, the world is turned into an arena for fratricide. It is finally an America which has been under progressive administrations for almost a generation, which has learned new strategies of economic control within the framework of capitalism, and

whose labor groups have shown signs of rising to a consciousness of their political function.

I do not say that this Russia and this America will inevitably use their massive strength for the world's good, or that they will infallibly have the wit and the survival instinct to form a partnership. I do say there is a good chance, if we know how to take it. Both Russian and American foreign policy have shown a dualism which reveals within each nation both a nationalist and an internationalist potential. Each nation still contains within itself both the seeds of isolationism and the seeds of collective world action. Outside a world security structure, a set of false moves by one could easily precipitate similar moves by the other, with the accelerated pace of a vicious circle. Within such a structure, however, there is every reason why the affirmative, rather than the negative, impulses should find fulfillment.

Let us set out these reasons concretely. Both these powers have been part of the greatest military coalition in history, and were able through it to achieve what neither could have accomplished singly. Both are still held by the memory of this war collaboration, and impressed by its possibilities for peacetime collaboration. Both have immense stakes in keeping the phoenix of fascist power from rising once more out of its ashes. Both have an interest in helping to revive the economic energies of a shattered Europe. Both need a period of enduring peace in order to wrestle with their internal economic problems—Russia in order to lift the living standards of its people, America in order to find a method for economic stability and full employment even in peacetime.

The big question is whether these things that tie them together will prove stronger than the things that tear them apart—their divergent systems of thought and the natural jealousy of two huge powers in a power world. Many read the recent tensions at peace conferences and over European governmental settlements as a portent of ultimate failure. Yet there is a strong chance that this is to misread them. Perhaps, paradoxically, something has already been gained when there is a framework within which the tensions do get felt and within which the quarrels do take place. The tragic fact about Versailles and the early history of the League was that Russia was not there. The tensions were subterranean, the quarrels did not have a chance to get aired, and the cleavages by which the world became two worlds took place with democratic world opinion helpless to prevent it. Russia has re-entered not only the concert of powers but the circle of discussion. That re-entry along with America's re-entry is in itself a fact of major weight.

There are of course immense dangers that remain. I have said above that even the best sort of partnership will involve residual elements of world empire and of world balance-of-power. That partnership has not yet

been achieved, and both imperialist and balance-of-power politics are still in the ascendant. We have the beginnings of international action, but thus far much of it has been in the realm of rhetoric, and it is the folklore rather than its reality which has held sway. Only a world security structure can possibly become powerful enough to contain within itself the tensions of these two polar powers, or to channel their divergences harmlessly. But we have made a start, if only an imperfect and fractional one, on building such a structure.

To many, the crucial question will be whether a huge capitalist power and a huge socialist power can coexist within the same world framework. There is no inherent reason why they should not, provided each of them is stable within. And their instability, if it emerges, will proceed not from the fact that they are capitalist or socialist, but from the possibility that each social form will be bungled. Fascism necessarily and inherently was a system of world imperialism and of racist hatred and clash. That is not true of either socialism or capitalism. Russia has shown that a socialist state can solve its problems of production and employment. What remains to be shown is whether it can also solve its problems of political power and freedom. There are signs of a dissolvent force within the totalitarianism of Russian politics which will make the government more sensitive to world opinion and give it an impulse toward realizing some of the democratic implications of the 1936 Constitution.

But what is true of Russia is equally true of America. If our internal instability leads to imperialist adventures, it will be because we do not have the will to bring our property institutions under popular control. An American capitalist economy, which uses planning and fiscal controls for full employment and which has enough rationality to see the need for economic partnership with the rest of the world, will not be one that leads to world imperialism. But an anarchic and planless capitalist economy will generate forces, both within itself and in the rest of the world, that will break the bounds of a peace structure.

Neither of the two great powers needs to accept the social and economic forms of the other. Each of them can continue a critical attitude toward those forms. But while the partnership need not exclude criticism, it must be a partnership and not a tug of war, a framework of order and not a jungle of anarchy.

By the nature of its economic system and its social cohesiveness Russia exercises an enormous attraction on the new governments which are being rebuilt all over the world. By its political freedom and its high living standards, America exercises a similar attraction on them. One holds out to them the hope of economic order and full employment. The other holds out the hope of political scope and the amenities of life. If the two forces clash

with each other on a world scale, that clash will be reflected internally within each of the new nations, and the resolution of it may take generations and even centuries. If, however, the two powers can develop a functioning critical partnership, it will be a symbol to the peoples of the world that they can effect within their own societies a fusion of the two principles for which America and Russia stand.

If that can be accomplished, it would not lead to a golden age, but it would spell the end of the pathos and the poverty, the bloodshed and the tyranny of the modern world.

ASIA

And the epitaph drear: 'A Fool lies here who tried
to hustle the East.'

—Kipling

INDIA LOOMS UP

B

ERTRAND AND PATRICIA RUSSELL If an alliance is to work without friction, it must have a common purpose. What obviously unites us is the wish to create a world where those who are not aggressive can live in peace. But success in this aim demands some sacrifice of separate national desires. The British must be prepared to sacrifice their rule over countries that wish to be independent of them. The Russians realized years ago that they must abandon the attempt to spread communism to other regions. The Axis propaganda pretended that the United States has economically imperialistic designs in Latin America and elsewhere; if Americans felt any temptation in this direction, they would have to resist it.

In these respects, the United Nations must restrain their own nationalistic impulses for the sake of the future. But it may easily happen that, for the same reason, they have to restrain nationalistic impulses in other countries.

There exists, as to this, a certain confusion of thought; many people are not clear as to the limits that can rightly be placed on national independence. In the case of India, this problem is acute.

Let us begin with a simpler case, that of Egypt. If Egypt had had unrestricted independence, it would have refused to allow the troops of either side on its territory; if we had acquiesced, this would have led, as early as 1940, to the occupation of the Suez Canal by the Axis. No one has suggested that the British ought to have allowed this to happen, out of a pedantic regard for the principle of self-determination. But those who dislike imperialism are not clear as to *why* they think the United Nations justified in occupying Egypt while the war lasts. The same situation exists in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and now in North Africa. Norway, Holland, Belgium, and the Balkan countries, whose independence we respected, were conquered by the Nazis.

To arrive at any principle in this matter, it is necessary to distinguish between war and peace. We all recognize that, in peacetime, the relations of nations ought to be regulated by law; we hope that now such regulation may become possible. War is a negation of law. It is foolish to enter upon a

war if there is no chance of winning it, and there would have been no chance of winning the present war if we had left each nation completely free to determine its own policy. The only result would have been that there would be no independent nations in the world except Germany and Japan. The question: "How far, during war, should we respect the rights of nominally independent nations?" is one to be decided, not by legalistic arguments, but by its bearing on victory or defeat. This, however, may sound too harsh; it is subject to many considerations which will soften its working in practice.

In the first place, respect for the rights of neutrals, whenever possible, increases sympathy for our side; Latin America might have been completely alienated by a high-handed policy. In the second place, we have fought to preserve the possibility of national self-government, and we must make it clear that we do not, even temporarily, interfere with any country except for grave reason. In the third place, when we think interference unavoidable, it must be strictly limited to what is necessary for the conduct of the war. In the fourth place, to prevent the suspicion of private imperialism, any interference should be sanctioned by all Allies. In the fifth place, there should be a solemn undertaking by all the United Nations that any nation, not an enemy, shall after the war enjoy as much independence as the United Nations will claim for themselves.

Let us now apply these considerations to India. The failure of Sir Stafford Cripps, the subsequent movement of civil disobedience, and the repressive measures taken by the Government of India, have caused a certain perplexity in the minds of those who dislike imperialism and feel that every nation has a right to freedom. It seems to us that what the Congress Party claims is more than any group of human beings has a right to claim, and that nations which are at war are obliged to repress interference with their war effort, such as that with which the Congress Party attempted to enforce its demands, whether such action takes place within their own boundaries or not.

It is worth while to set out clearly the demands and policies both of the Congress and other leading Indian parties, as Americans, misled by propaganda, are too apt to assume that the Congress demands are the only ones which need to be considered seriously, and are also deceived as to the nature of these demands. Congress party representatives in this country present to American audiences only those aspects of Congress policy which they know will meet with sympathy. They profess that internal discord between different religious and political groups in India is a British invention which can safely be ignored, though all the Indian leaders, when they write for home consumption and not for foreign propaganda, tell a very different story. They claim that the Congress party represents India, and are then obliged to deny the obvious fact that Gandhi dominates the

Congress party, since to admit this would be to disprove their claim that India, if granted unconditional freedom now, would immediately organize vigorous armed resistance to Japan.

Gandhi is not pro-Japanese; but he is wholeheartedly and unalterably convinced of the rightness and efficacy of non-violence in all circumstances. It is not generally realized that Gandhi has stated that the Indian Army should be disbanded with the withdrawal of British power, and that India should give no aid beyond tolerating the presence of Allied troops on Indian soil. It is obvious that no adequate substitute could be found for the disbanded Indian Army, since the United Nations could not spare 1,500,000 trained troops to take its place, and a hastily armed and untrained Indian populace could at best only practice guerrilla warfare, for which the plains of Northern India are far from suitable.

The independence that Gandhi wants is in fact freedom not to fight, and he has declared: "I believe that there can be no settlement with the Congress, short of complete independence during the pendency of the war, for the simple reason that the Congress cannot commit itself to active help in the war with men and money. That would mean a reversal of the policy of non-violence which the Congress has pursued for the last twenty years." Other Congress leaders, of whom the most vigorous is Nehru, are in favor of armed resistance to Japan, but they could not hope to carry out such resistance if Gandhi opposed it. Nehru's political life has been, by his own account, a long process of giving in to "Gandhiji" against his better judgment.

Apart from the faith in non-violence in which the party is steeped, there were overwhelming objections to the Congress demand on which the Cripps negotiations broke down—the demand, namely, that the British should at once hand over the Government of India to a body of Indians chosen, as far as possible, to represent proportionately the various sections of Indian opinion. Even at best, there would have been, during the transition, administrative chaos, with the Japanese already on the frontier. Moreover, the majority in such a Government would, presumably, have belonged to the Congress party, which is vehemently disliked by large parties in India.

There is no reality in the Congress declaration that they would have been willing to allow Mr. Jinnah to form a Government, since Congress would still have had a majority in the legislatures, which would have made such a Government unworkable.

The great recent increase in the power and energy of the Moslem League is a direct result of the increased power of the Congress party, which abandoned its policy of non-co-operation to take office in the Provincial Governments in seven out of eleven provinces in 1937. Moslems claimed, with what justification it is impossible to determine, that the

Congress Governments pursued a deliberately anti-Moslem policy, and Mr. Jinnah has declared that the day of their resignation shall be celebrated by his followers forever as "Deliverance Day." Since the Cripps mission, Mr. Jinnah has redoubled his efforts and his following has grown rapidly. "The whole policy of the Congress party," he says, "was to create a National Government in which Hindus would have an overwhelming majority. Such a Government would be set up with British and now with American bayonets. Moslems would be placed at the mercy of Hindu rule. This is a position which Indian Moslems would never accept." He has stated that "Mohammedans might stand in need of the sword to prevent any aggression against their rights." And their rights, they consider, are nothing less than Pakhistan, a separate Moslem State.

Then there is the Hindu Mahasabha, a militant organization of orthodox Hindus, opposed both to Congress and to the Moslem League. Its membership has been growing rapidly, while that of the Congress party has been decreasing, and its President, Mr. Savarkar, has announced that it will meet with force any revolt of the Moslems against incorporation in a predominantly Hindu India.

The Sikhs number only six million, but as they pointed out in their rejection of the Cripps proposals, their importance is out of all proportion to their numbers, because of their military prowess. Unfortunately, they are largely concentrated in the area which the Moslems claim as Pakhistan. They will never submit to being incorporated in it.

Finally, the depressed classes, including the "untouchables," have declared through their leader, Dr. Ambedkar, that they will never submit to Hindu rule. In their opinion the Cripps proposals would have placed them in this position, and they would be a good deal worse off if, as Congress demands, the British were to hand over the Government immediately.

A Provisional Government created by Indian party leaders would have no popular mandate. It would not be directly responsible to an electorate and could not be made to resign except through armed rebellion. It might choose to perpetuate itself, or, at least, to decide a number of major questions before resigning office. For example: Should the future Constitution be determined by a single Constituent Assembly elected from all India? Or should there be two bodies, one representing Hindus and one Moslems; or one representing Provinces with a majority of Hindus, the other Provinces with a Moslem majority? A single Constituent Assembly would have a Hindu majority and would be unacceptable to most Moslems. The Congress proposal leaves all such questions to a body appointed in a hurry to meet a crisis, and almost inevitably such as either Hindus or Moslems would repudiate.

We know that the propaganda of the Congress party presents a very different picture. It is suggested that Congress really represents all India.

The danger of civil war is represented as a British invention. No one who has read the documents in the case, or the voluminous writings of Gandhi on Hindu-Moslem hostility, can regard this propaganda as valid. There is no evidence that external danger is diminishing the bitterness of these ancient quarrels; rather the opposite. If the English were to withdraw, the war effort of Hindus and Moslems might well be directed against each other, not against the Japanese.

The question whether, in time of peace, India should be left at liberty to fight a civil war is one to which we shall return shortly. But when chaos in India would mean almost certain Japanese conquest, it is obvious that order must be preserved in India. Mr. Rajagopalachari, ex-Premier of Madras, who was until lately a member of the Congress party, realizes this and vigorously dissents from the demand that the British should leave India at this critical time. He says: "There is no reality in the fond expectation that should Britain leave this country in simple response to a Congress slogan, a vacuum would be created, in which we could begin with a fundamental national organization. Every inch vacated by Britain would be occupied by Japan. The enemy will deliberately foster and exploit existing chaos in order to make his own work easy and reduce the country to hopeless subjection."

On the other hand, a widespread campaign of civil disobedience might hamper the conduct of the war. Some leaders, notably Nehru, are moved toward moderation by this argument, but most of the Congress party seems to agree with Gandhi when he says, "I see no difference between the Fascist or Nazi Powers and the Allies." And not a few sympathize with Japan as an Asiatic Power.

What then should be done?

The following suggestions are based on two premises, both of which have been part of our political beliefs for a very long time. They are: (1) That Great Britain should grant Indian demands for *Swaraj*, not through the concession of Dominion status as an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations (the Indians are not British), but admitting that India has the same right to independence as any other country in the modern world. (2) That this right to independence on the part of nations is strictly limited. No nation should be subject to another nation, but each nation should be subject in some respects to all the others. This is simply an extension of the principle of democratic government to international affairs.

There are two classes of decisions to be taken: first, as to the war period; second, as to the status of India after the war. Both must be taken while the war is in progress, since they affect the attitude of Indians to the war.

For the war period, the problem should be treated solely in relation to

success in the war. It is important that the civil-disobedience campaign should cease and that Indian leaders (not only of the Congress party) should have indubitable proof of the British intention to do everything toward meeting their wishes that is compatible with the efficient prosecution of the war. Negotiations should be revived, on the understanding that, so long as they continue, there will be no civil-disobedience movement and the present political prisoners will be set at liberty. The negotiators should not be all British, but should represent the United Nations. For this there are two reasons: first, that the Indian question is to be considered from the standpoint of victory in the war, which is a matter that concerns all the United Nations equally; second, that the deep suspicion of the British which unfortunately exists in India makes purely British promises unacceptable. We should suggest, therefore, that the negotiators should consist of four commissioners, representing respectively the British, American, Soviet, and Chinese Governments. The initiative for the appointment of these negotiators should come from the British Government.

It must be admitted that even international arbitrators would be unlikely to find the problem a simple one. Gandhi has expressed his fear of having American rule added to British. There has been indignation among Moslems over an alleged pro-Congress bias both in China and America. And Dr. Ambedkar recently repudiated the suggestion of United Nations intervention in the following terms:

Nothing is more shameful for Indians than frantic appeals to the President of the United States, General Chiang Kai-shek, and other leaders of the United Nations to come to India's rescue by forcing the British people to give India liberty. These appeals are bound to be fruitless. China is too dependent upon British help to do what some Indians want them to do. Americans are living in glass houses, as all who know the Negro problem will admit. . . .

To me it seems as impolitic as it is unbecoming for Indians to get other nations to find a solution for their problems. It is impolitic because the Allied Nations urging settlement of the Indian problem are looking at it from their own point of view and not from the viewpoint of Indians. They want a settlement, not because they are interested in doing justice to the various elements in its national life. They want a settlement because they want to use India as a base for operations, and they want the base to be peaceful. Their primary interest is to win the war in which they are engaged. The settlement of India's question is only incidental. Under such circumstances they might suggest a settlement in haste which the Indians may have to regret at leisure.

Dr. Ambedkar's fears are most natural. But the danger of a hastily devised solution can be avoided. The United Nations Commission should go to India, ascertain the main facts, and converse with the leaders of the various parties, with a view to discovering and recommending (a) interim

measures, for the war period, (b) a long-run solution of the Indian problem, to be put into effect when the war is over. The Commission should, in fact, resume the task in which Sir Stafford Cripps failed, with more hope of success, since they would not represent only the British Raj or only the white man.

With regard to the war period, their purpose should be to discover what is the utmost that can be done immediately in the way of handing over administrative power to Indians without risk of administrative chaos. They will have to remember that it is not enough to please only one party, since the resentment of the others might produce a situation even worse than that which now exists. We do not know what recommendations they will find possible, but in any case, Indians and Americans will know that their findings will be dictated solely by military needs, not by any wish to preserve British imperialism. We think, therefore, that at least one good result may be expected, namely that there will be a great diminution of the widespread suspicion of Great Britain which at present exists in the United States.

With regard to the long-run solution of the Indian problem, the Commission might also be able to give useful advice. But as to this, they would need the guidance of certain general principles, which would have to be set forth in the terms of their appointment.

What should these general principles be?

The simplest solution, which would no doubt be advocated by most Indian political leaders, would be that the British should undertake to evacuate India unconditionally at a given moment, say six months or a year after the cessation of hostilities. It may be said that, when the war is over, what happens to India is India's business, not that of the British or the United Nations. What if there is civil war? an Indian might say; the Americans, the British, the Chinese, and the Russians have all had civil wars, and have not welcomed foreign intervention. It is sheer imperialism, he may continue, for outsiders to decide what is for India's good, and if Indians want internal conflict they have a right to it.

These considerations would be valid if conflicts could be localized. We do not see how to answer them if international affairs are to remain anarchic, and on this hypothesis there is no alternative to unconditional British withdrawal after the war. But if any international authority is created, other considerations become relevant, and suggest a different answer.

Such an authority, when faced with the risk of civil war, must ask certain questions. Would there be any assurance that a civil war in India between Hindus and Moslems could be localized? Is it not highly probable that Mohammedans to the West and non-Mohammedans to the East would be drawn in? Can we be sure that no nation would seize the opportunity

for imperialistic intervention? The history of the Spanish Civil War does not encourage optimistic answers to these questions.

If there is to be a peace which is not merely an armistice, there will have to be certain international controls over the action of single powers. There will have to be an Alliance pledged to resist armed aggression anywhere. But the Alliance must not only veto *foreign* aggression; it must also protect lawful governments against internal revolutions such as those by which Fascists established their military dictatorships. If, for example, such an international organization had been in existence when General Franco rebelled with arms against a newly elected legitimate government, its duty would have been to send sufficient forces to hold the rebel army at bay while a plebiscite was taken to determine beyond doubt the wishes of the nation.

Any constitutional change in any country therefore should in future be sanctioned by a plebiscite, not imposed by an armed minority; and any regional minority should have the power of presenting its grievances to an international authority, which should be empowered to conduct a plebiscite in the region concerned to determine whether or not it should be granted local autonomy.

If this principle is accepted, the task of finding a long-run solution of the Indian problem cannot be settled by *merely* saying that the British must go. It will be necessary to discover some political organization of India which the various parties will accept, and which they will undertake not to resist by civil war. As things stand, it is not easy to imagine such an organization. Mere majority rule will not do, because the Moslems will not consent to be ruled by the Hindu majority any more than the Irish formerly submitted to the rule of the British majority. The Moslems must be granted independence of the Hindus, and the Sikhs must be granted independence of the Moslems. We are not arguing as to whether these claims are reasonable; we are saying that they must be conceded if civil war is to be prevented. Nehru has remarked that Indians are suffering from the disease of nationalism, which prevents their having a clear view either of Indian or of international affairs. He should have said "nationalisms," since the Moslems are now claiming to be a separate nation. Before any permanent solution of the Indian problem can be found, Indian factions must learn to see themselves not only in relation to each other, but as interlocking pieces of the global jig-saw puzzle.

The commission, accordingly, will have to state bluntly that, until Indians can agree to obey peaceably some system of self-government to which the leading groups have assented, the United Nations (not merely the British) will remain to preserve order. If this were known to be the fixed policy of the United Nations, it is possible that the Indian parties would reach an agreement. If not, it would have to be reluctantly decided

that India, for some time, must submit to external control, not by Great Britain, but by an international authority.

This principle should, of course, not only apply to India. Domestic chaos giving rise to fascist tyrannies cannot be tolerated. The obvious course would be to decree that an existing constitution can be changed only by plebiscite, but that plebiscites are held whenever any large group demands them. This must apply, not only to the whole population of a state, but to any minority which, in some region, is in the majority. If changes are not to be violent, there must be provision for constitutional methods by which they can be made.

The imperialism of single nations, such as the British, the French, and the Dutch, has become an anachronism, and an invitation to war, because it is no longer backed by irresistible military force. But in certain parts of the world, if there is not to be dangerous chaos, national imperialism will have to be succeeded by an international control. The principle of national independence, if treated as absolute, is anarchic, and makes the prevention of war impossible. The independence of every country should be limited by the duty of obeying the law: externally, by abstaining from aggression; internally, by abstaining from civil war. The international authority should have the right and the duty of enforcing this obedience to law upon any state that endangers it. Subject to these conditions, nations should be free to manage their own affairs.

The late Wendell Willkie set forth with admirable force the reasons for coming *now* to decisions as to the principles on which peace is to be based. "The people must define their purposes during the war," he said, "for I live in constant dread that this war may end before the people of the world have come to a common understanding of what they fight for and what they hope for after the war is over." India, to which these wise words are emphatically applicable, is a difficult problem, both practically and theoretically. In the above discussion, we have assumed that the United Nations have fought, first, to obtain a peace which shall be more than a breathing space between great wars, and, within that paramount object, to secure the greatest degree of justice and freedom compatible with peace, both within each nation and in the mutual relations between different states.

FOR A JUST PEACE IN THE PACIFIC

HU SHIH I once wrote that a just and durable peace in the Pacific area must fulfill these basic conditions:

It must not result in vindicating any territorial gain or economic advantage acquired by the use of brutal force in open violation of international law and solemnly pledged treaty obligations.

It must satisfy the legitimate demands of the Chinese people for an independent, unified, and strong national state.

It must restore and greatly strengthen the international order for the Pacific area and in the world at large so that orderly international relationships may always prevail and aggressive wars may not recur.

Since that was written the world has radically changed. But I still think that these three fundamental principles sum up the factors necessary for a durable peace in the Pacific Area.

The first point is merely a reaffirmation of the "Stimson doctrine of non-recognition" which was stated in the U. S. Government's note to China and Japan on January 7, 1932, as follows:

The American Government . . . does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

This principle of non-recognition was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 11, 1932, when it unanimously passed the following resolution proposed by the British Government:

The Assembly . . . declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

This principle was reaffirmed by the League of Nations on February 24, 1933, when in adopting the Lytton Report it declared that its members "will continue not to recognize this régime [the puppet régime in Manchuria] either *de jure* or *de facto*."

Since 1933, the same doctrine has been applied to similar situations created by aggressor states in other parts of the world.

In its specific application to the original dispute in the Far East, this principle means the non-recognition of the puppet régime in Manchuria. Clearly the same principle should now apply to any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by means contrary to international law and solemnly pledged treaty obligations. This should include not only the puppet régimes in Manchuria, Peiping, Nanking and other occupied areas of China, but also any situation, or treaty, or agreement that may be brought about by the aggressors in any other parts of the Pacific Area, or in any other parts of the world.

It is to be noted, however, that the principle of non-recognition was proclaimed by the American Government and by the League of Nations at a time when the war-weary world was not prepared to take positive action to curb armed aggression and help its victims to redress the injuries already done to them. Non-recognition is a negative doctrine with a positive purpose. As Mr. Henry L. Stimson himself said in his famous letter to the late Senator Borah of February 23, 1932:

If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such [aggressive and law-breaking] action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

Many years have passed and the civilized world is now better prepared to take more positive stand on this issue of armed aggression and international brigandage. Thus the "Atlantic Charter" in its second and third articles goes much farther than the doctrine of non-recognition:

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

I willingly and gladly accept these two articles as positive amplifications of my first principle.

In specific application, this first condition therefore means the complete restoration to Chinese sovereignty and government of all the territories of Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar, and Suiyuan, as well as the occupied parts of North, Central, and South China.

And this also means that the wishes of the 22 million people in Korea should be given a fair hearing and just consideration and steps should be taken to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to these people.

The second principle I have proposed—namely, that a durable peace

must satisfy the legitimate demands of the Chinese people for an independent, unified and strong national state—needs no detailed explanation.

“An independent, unified and strong state of China” means a sovereign China free from all forms of so-called political and economic “cooperation and collaboration” which her aggressive neighbor has been forcing upon her; free from the remaining legal or extra-territorial restrictions that have survived from the early relations between China and the foreign countries seeking to trade with her; free from domination and control by any foreign power; free, in the words of the Nine-Power Treaty, “to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government”; free, in the words of the “Atlantic Charter,” to choose the form of government under which the people will live.

It is unnecessary to defend this thesis except by pointing out that the central idea in the traditional Far Eastern policy of the Anglo-Saxon powers throughout the last forty-odd years has always been a desire to see China develop into an independent, unified, modernized and strong state as the stabilizing force for the peace and prosperity of the entire Pacific area.

The American and British statesmen who formulated the “Open Door” policy in China at the turn of the century apparently had a clear conception of the dangers of an international war which was certain to come on the Asiatic continent and in the Pacific area if and when the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China could not be preserved. They saw clearly that the principle of equality of economic opportunity was dependent upon the political independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. They saw clearly that the door of China could be kept open only by an independent, sovereign state of China with a modern government sufficiently stable and effective to protect the rights and interests, not only of China herself, but also of all nations having friendly relations with her.

This fundamental concept seems to have consciously motivated and inspired all successive stages in the development of the “Open Door” policy in China, from the John Hay notes of 1899–1900 down to the Nine-Power Treaties and the other Treaties of the Washington Conference of 1921–22. Because a weak, disorganized and backward China would always be a temptation to the territorial designs of aggressive powers and therefore constitute a constant source of danger to the peace of the Far East, the China policy of the Anglo-Saxon powers has consistently and consciously aimed at the setting up of an international arrangement which should provide to China “the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.”

Viewed in the light of history, however, this policy has suffered from one fundamental and inherent weakness—that it is essentially, in the words of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, “a covenant of self-denial among the signatory

powers in the deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression" in China. As there is no provision for effective sanctions against possible violations, the whole structure of Far Eastern peace breaks down whenever a strong and selfish power refuses to be bound by this "covenant of self-denial." The history of the last fifteen years clearly demonstrates that determined and premeditated aggression cannot be checked by voluntary pledges of self-denial and may at any moment break out, wreck entirely the peace structure of the Pacific area and endanger the peace and order of the whole world.

An independent, unified, modernized and strong China is therefore an indispensable condition for an enduring peace in the Pacific area. A China strong enough to resist unprovoked aggression and defend her own territory and political independence,—such a China can and will serve as the most reliable and effective guarantee of the peace and prosperity of the Far East.

Such a China will be able to keep her doors open to all nations seeking to trade with her on terms of equality and justice. Such a China will be able to participate fully in carrying out the greater "Open Door" policy proclaimed in the fourth and fifth article of the "Atlantic Charter," namely:

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect to their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.

The third condition necessary for a durable peace in the Pacific area, I believe, is the restoration, strengthening and reinforcing of the international order for the Pacific area and for the world in general so that orderly international relationships may always prevail and recurrence of aggressive wars may no longer be possible. This newly restored international order must have overwhelming power for the enforcement of peace.

During the years between the First and Second World Wars there actually existed an international order both for the Far East and for the larger world—a real world order founded on a series of highly idealistic international covenants, treaties and agreements, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Treaties of the Washington Conference and the Pact of Paris. The peace structure in the Pacific area which dates back to the earlier pronouncements on the "Open Door" Policy and which primarily centers around the Nine-Power Treaty and the other treaties of the Washington Conference—this international order of the Pacific area has been linked with the larger world order by the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris.

The events of the last fifteen years have proved beyond any doubt that there was fundamental weakness common to the general international order and the Far Eastern peace structure: neither had the power or force to enforce its own peace and order. That international order was a reality as long as it was not subjected to any severe test by determined and forcible violation. It became "sham and pretense" when it was challenged and was found powerless to enforce its own law and order.

The moral of the tragic events of these past years should be plain to all. The moral is that peace must presuppose an effectively maintained order or rule of law; and that law and order do not mean the absence of force but, on the contrary, are always dependent upon some effective form of organized power for their maintenance and enforcement. The moral, in short, is that peace must have power to enforce itself. Without this essential element of enforcement, all law and order are empty words.

Therefore, the new world order which we want to see set up as the necessary condition for a durable peace in the Pacific area or in any other part of the earth must be a "League to Enforce Peace"—it must be, in the words of President A. Lawrence Lowell, "some kind of international organization based upon the principle of a threat of overwhelming power to prevent aggressive war." This new world order must command a sufficient amount of organized force to support its law and judgment, and thereby effectively enforce peace. Its provisions for economic and military sanctions against all possible violations of peace and order must be so clear and so unmistakable that no evasion of responsibility will be possible and that both aid to outraged victims and penalty to the aggressors will not be unduly delayed.

In the above discussion I have purposely stressed the idea of "overwhelming power or force" for the enforcement of peace and order. The old idea of "balance of power" seems now untenable, because a balance of power can be easily upset by a slight preponderance of force or a new combination of forces on any one side. The peace of the community, both nationally and internationally, can be maintained only when the organized force of the whole community is placed overwhelmingly on the side of the law and the public safety.

I want, therefore, a new world order which will devote its first efforts to the organization of the post-war world for the effective enforcement of international peace and order. All other ornamental things such as intellectual co-operation or technical co-operation can wait. First things must come first.


What has been outlined above seems to conform in general to the plan of peace contained in the 6th, 7th, and 8th articles of the "Atlantic Charter" which hopes "to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries." I am partic-

ularly interested in the 8th article which proposes that it is essential to disarm those "nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers." I am sure that my government and people will heartily support the disarming of Japan as one of the necessary factors in the maintenance and enforcement of peace in the Pacific area.

And I am also in hearty support of the idea expressed in the 8th article of the "Atlantic Charter"—that "they will aid and encourage all other practical measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

But I venture to suggest that the most practical measure to lighten the burden of armaments and to establish lasting peace in the world is not through "the abandonment of the use of force," but through pooling and organizing the overwhelming forces of the peace-loving peoples for the sole purpose of enforcing the peace and collective security of the world.

CHINESE VIEW OF A WORLD ORDER



OU SAOFONG

Much as a genuine New Order is needed by the entire human race, its achievement is a far more urgent problem for Europe than for the rest of the world. This has become increasingly the case even since the outbreak of the First World War. Even though World War II was in effect launched by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, we must recognize that this attack was encouraged by the sympathetic passivity of the conservative governments of Britain and France, which controlled the League of Nations. Since Europe is not only the center of world disturbance but also the center of modern civilization, nothing could be more important than an examination of the ills that so obviously afflict that continent. Historically the West as a whole, and France in particular, have never been able to break the vicious cycle of economic and political war. Consequently it is by no means far-fetched to assume that there is something inherently wrong in its economic structure at least, and probably in its civilization as a whole. In any case it is obvious that the present economic structure and civilization of the West is no longer adaptable to the new conditions of a changing world. Taking the League of Nations as a concrete example of a Western attempt to organize a world order based on peace, we are confronted by a glaring failure. It becomes the task of men of good will everywhere to attempt to diagnose that failure and to seek remedies.

The World War was supposed to be a war to end war. It was with this noble ideal that Woodrow Wilson came to the Paris Peace Conference. Unhappily the British and French representatives at that historic occasion, archetypes of the ruling classes of their countries, were men imbued with the capitalistic and imperialistic spirit of the nineteenth century. Since the Treaty was dictated by these men it was necessarily inspired by the desire for national aggrandizement, which in this case involved the seizure of Germany's colonial empire, although it might be said that Versailles was relatively more progressive than previous postwar pacts. That part of the Treaty which gave birth to the League of Nations and provided self-determination for the peoples of Central Europe was the work of Wilson. The machinations of the leaders of the Big Powers gave the American people the impression that the Old World was incorrigible and did much to undermine American sentiment in favor of entering the League. This was the first failure for the League, and it proved prophetic.

Twelve years later came the Sino-Japanese conflict. It is impossible here to examine the diplomatic negotiations that took place in Geneva, London, and Paris concerning that episode, but it is worth while noting the general reaction in Europe which tended to paralyze the League in this first great test.

It is a matter of record that following the "Manchurian incident" of September 18, 1931, the rightist press of the world was sympathetic to Japan, while the leftist press favored China. The London *Times* of November 2, 1931, asserted that the British people admired the success of Japan's exploitation of Manchuria and agreed that Manchuria was the "lifeline of Japan." The Socialist London *Daily Herald* of December 2, by way of contrast, attacked the Japanese policy of conquest in Manchuria and compared it with the earlier annexation of Korea. Obviously Japan was violating the Covenant of the League, the *Herald* declared, and in such a situation, however embarrassing, the League was duty-bound to take action.

Similarly in France, *Le Journal*, a rightist daily, stated emotionally that the world was mistaken in considering China a civilized country and urged the League to declare China unfit to enjoy the rights of an independent nation. On the other hand, the Socialist paper, *Le Populaire*, accused the League of surrendering to Japan and pointed out that this attitude would only encourage the Japanese militarists to further aggression.

Why did the conservative ruling classes of Britain and France sympathize with Japanese aggression? First, because they hated revolutionary, socialistically inclined China, whose goal was to reconquer its freedom from foreign political and economic oppression as exemplified by the foreign concessions that had established themselves on its territory. Second, because they always entertained the hope of having Japanese assistance in a possible war against Soviet Russia. Third, because there was a natural

and traditional solidarity among British, French, and Japanese capitalists, despite their respective imperialist interests. Fourth, because the ruling classes of Europe with the exception of some few enlightened spirits never sincerely thought of the League as anything but an instrument for maintaining their hegemony. The sole aim of their participation in the League was to make use of that body as an instrument of national policy. Therefore it was only natural that when obligations were to be fulfilled they were perfectly ready to discard it like an old shoe.

This same story was repeated in the case of the Italian assault on Ethiopia. The same conservative classes ranged themselves in opposition to the use of sanctions against Mussolini. They feared that the downfall of the Fascist dictator would provoke a socialist revolution in Europe. When sanctions nevertheless were invoked, the most essential of all war materials namely, oil, was strangely enough not included among the products to be denied to the aggressor. When Mussolini told Neville Chamberlain: "Negotiate now or it will be too late"—some people interpreted "or too late" to mean "or I fall"—the British government promptly concluded the so-called Mediterranean Pact with the Fascist dictator and recognized the conquest of Ethiopia. In this particular case, however, France, under the guidance of Pierre Laval, was more responsible for the failure of the League of Nations than Britain.

The memory of what happened in Spain is still too fresh to leave any doubt that the same kind of reasoning prevailed: encourage fascism to fight socialism. It was for that reason that the British and French governments prevented munitions from going to the Spanish republicans. The League of Nations, to which the Spanish government appealed either to stop the German-Italian invasion or to grant it the legitimate right to purchase arms abroad, was once more rendered impotent by the British and French ruling classes.

The Munich Conference was the deathblow to the League and the direct cause of World War II. The most loyal European member of the League, namely, Czechoslovakia, was dismembered by the British and French governments in collaboration with Hitler and Mussolini, naturally outside the framework of the League. The motive of this treason on the part of the Western Powers was not essentially different from that of previous instances: solidarity with the German fascist regime, which they regarded as the last stronghold of capitalism. Having betrayed Czechoslovakia, they gave Hitler a free hand to attack the Soviet. This was certainly the principal reason for Russia's conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany. It is an open secret that foreign capitalist groups, as well as Italian and German, financed Mussolini and Hitler in their struggle for power. At the end of 1939 a German princess named Hohenlohe charged in a London court that Lord Rothermere, one of the reactionary British

leaders, had not given her sufficient compensation for her work in connection with paving the way for the Munich Conference.

This record of misbegotten diplomacy over a period of two decades is sufficient to prove that the ruling classes of Britain and France carry a heavy measure of responsibility not only for the failure of the League of Nations but for the outbreak of the Second World War.

From the moral point of view the leaders of the conservative classes of the world are perhaps not to be blamed so much as the economic structure which produces them. Their hatred of socialism and their sympathy with aggressors are often enough the instinctive reaction produced by their conditioning. Psychologically their attitude derives from the instinct of self-preservation. It is an entire structure that is in fact responsible for the agony in which the world now finds itself. Is it not a shameful thing that during the recent worldwide economic crisis the United States spent \$766,000,000 to plough up cotton, corn, wheat and tobacco, and that pigs were systematically slaughtered to reduce a surplus, while at the same time more than ten million Americans were unemployed and thousands suffered from hunger? And this under the New Deal, which is admirable and universally esteemed. The destruction of crops and livestock is an indictment not of the New Deal but of the capitalist system, under which the American government could not have acted otherwise in the crisis that faced it. The weakness of the capitalistic economic structure is obvious: production is designed not primarily for use, as it should be, but for profit. Territorial expansion never serves the interests of the masses but springs from the desire of the rich for conquering new markets and obtaining access to raw materials. Under this system social unrest at home and war between nations are inevitable. It is a mistake to believe that the inhabitants of this planet are necessarily faced with a struggle for existence.

In 1918 Lord Leverhulme said: "With the means that science has already placed at our disposal, we might provide for all the wants of each of us in food, shelter, and clothing by one hour's work per week for each of us from school age to dotage." And in 1932 J. L. Hodgson reported to the Royal Society of Arts in London: "Since that date [of Lord Leverhulme's statement] our average potential productivity has nearly doubled." Thus the poverty of today is a poverty in the midst of plenty. If the wealth of the world were more rationally distributed among individuals and among nations through the devices of a more reasonable economic system, the struggle for wealth could easily be brought to an end. Along such lines lies the fundamental solution of present world problems from the materialistic point of view.

If we examine from a philosophical point of view the state of affairs in which the world finds itself, we find war has its roots deep in the defects of Western civilization. Almost every page of European history is written in

blood. This tragedy seem to me to stem from the Westerners erroneous view of life. The tendency of Western civilization is always in the direction of dominating both mankind and nature. The religious wars, the Inquisition of the Roman Catholic Church, the struggle for predominance among the great states, the policies of colonization, the spirit of nationalism, the capitalistic system, and modern dictatorship are all phenomena produced by the passion to dominate.

Intending to praise the civilization of the white race and to deride that of the Chinese, the French writer, A. F. Legendre, wrote in 1926: "The Chinese is encouraged to be a pusillanimous being from childhood on. I have never seen a Chinese child who climbed trees to destroy birds' nests. The children of the West, on the other hand, like movement and are cruel. They like conquest and domination, characteristics which are practically unknown to the children of China. Consequently when Western children grow up they tend to be adventurous and to consider conquest of the world and the universe as their duty."

To be sure, Western civilization has its own kind of greatness. The knowledge acquired by Western scientists is deep and accurate enough to enable them to pierce the mystery of stars so distant that their light takes millions of years to reach our planet. It enables them to disintegrate atoms and to subdue electricity, to give humanity comforts that our ancestors never dared to imagine.

Unhappily, this tremendous material progress has not been accompanied by a parallel advance of the spirit. The Westerners today are not the masters of their machinery but its slaves. The story of the Frankenstein monster best exemplifies the present state of Western civilization. It is this will to dominate that has produced such megalomaniacs as Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler, to name only the most obvious. All of them were pathological to some degree, with no understanding of the real meaning of life.

Aside from this fundamental misconception, much of the explanation of the present moral crisis of the Occident may be sought in the decline of religion. All too rarely is it remembered that Christ stood for the equality of men and was in a real sense a socialist of the ancient world. Was it not he who said, "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of Heaven"? I believe that when Christ said that "The kingdom of God is in man himself" he really meant that the only paradise for man lay in his own knowledge and conscience. It took the priests to create Heaven and Hell and the moral code which is imposed and sanctioned by the Church as the will of God. This moral code can no longer serve to maintain social and international order now that science and experience have demonstrated its fallacies and shortcomings. The threat of hell-fire is obviously not enough to sway men from killing

their neighbors and taking their property so long as it is not accompanied by the sanctions of the law, which the clever and the powerful are frequently able to evade. The West today has a religion, deformed by the clergy and the bourgeoisie, that satisfies the heart but not the head; it has on the other hand a science that satisfies the head but not the heart. Spiritual disorder and cynicism are so prevalent that tyrants and aggressors are able to make war in the name of God. Religion, however noble its inspiration, is reduced to the role of consoling the poorer spirits for their sufferings and pardoning criminals for their sins. Inspired by the same instinct of self-preservation, the clergy, confronted with the decline of organized religion as a vital force, has become the natural ally of capitalists struggling to maintain their privileges in a changing world. This explains why the Vatican gave aid and comfort to the Fascists in their uprising against the Spanish government.

In the fascist countries the State replaced the Church and nationalism took on a neo-religious quality. This neo-religious nationalism, requiring from the individual citizen absolute obedience and sacrifice, is the greatest scourge that humanity has even known. It transforms such acts as murder, arson, and betrayal, commonly recognized as crimes when committed by individuals, into moral acts when committed in the name of the State.

What is even worse than this nationalism, which in some cases does represent after all a certain primitive kind of idealism, is the Western elevation of wealth to the status of a great social objective. In spite of the apparently prevalent worship of God or State, the real divinity for innumerable Westerners is money. This is so true that when that typical bourgeois gentleman, Neville Chamberlain, was asked in the House of Commons what measures the British government had taken to protect the country's interests in the Far East following the Japanese assault, he said that Britain had no occasion to hurry since with the end of the war in China, Japan would be economically exhausted and would be forced to borrow money from Britain for the rebuilding of China. Japan would always need British collaboration, he added, to such a degree that British interests in China were bound to be restored. How can a civilization avoid decay when the central government of the greatest empire of the world so crassly bases its policy upon material profit and without the faintest degree of idealism? By the same token is it not appalling that it was next to impossible to find a newspaper in wealthy France that was not open to bribery? Or that despite the sympathy of the immense majority of Americans for China, huge quantities of American oil and iron were shipped to Japan to help in the slaughter of Chinese innocents?

By way of contrast Chinese civilization has taken a road of evolution which stresses above all the cultivation of the individual. Central to the teachings of Confucius is the following doctrine:

The ancients who wished to govern the world believed that they had first to govern well their respective states. Wishing to govern their own states well, they had first to regulate their own families. Wishing to regulate their families, they had first to cultivate themselves. Wishing to cultivate themselves, they had first to purify their hearts. Wishing to purify their hearts, they had first to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they had first to extend to the utmost their knowledge. This extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of the nature of things. Thus, from the leaders of the world down to the people, all must consider the cultivation of the individual the root of everything.

This philosophy has had a profound influence on Chinese life, both social and individual. Since the time of Confucius every child in China has been taught to live in conformity with it. Government officials of the imperial regime were chosen from among those with the greatest knowledge of the Confucian classics. The man who attains a high degree of culture in this kind of civilization is one who, according to Mencius, "when rich and in high position never abuses his privileges; when poor and lowly never changes his mind; force can never move his will." The Chinese believe that morality is absolutely necessary for the preservation of the human race and that to be moral is the highest dignity of man. They accept their moral code freely without obligations or sanctions imposed either by a divinity or any other superior authority. Thus there can be no conflict between the head and the heart.

This conception of life and the world appears to them far more rational than the ways of the West. From it come the self-respect, pacifism, moderation, and the calm character of the Chinese people. It is not an accident that the Chinese Empire extended its territory almost without military conquest. Chinese historians have never worshiped military heroes; on the contrary they have heaped their honors only on sages. Even emperors commonly descended from their horses when they passed by the temple of a sage. Neither is it an accident that in spite of many deceptions China remained, to the very last, faithful to the principles of the League of Nations. It is the only country that did not recognize the conquest of Ethiopia by Fascist Italy. If China's behavior in the society of nations, throughout its long history, is above criticism, that is because China knows how to face the ever changing world with immutable moral precepts. According to the first of Sun Yat-sen's "Principles of the People" a world order must be based on the cooperation of free peoples, that is, an international democracy. Obviously a people that is under a foreign yoke must reconquer its freedom before it can participate in such a world union. Sun Yat-sen's principle would forbid Chinese imperialism in any form, however powerful China may become. But national independence is only a


step toward the final goal of universal union wherein boundaries and racial discrimination will ultimately disappear.

The Second Principle of Sun Yat-sen is political democracy, which is as vitally necessary within each country as it is on an international plane. Only in a democracy can people choose between war and peace. No real political democracy can exist, however, without economic democracy, for without economic equality political equality is only an illusion.

In his Third Principle, Sun Yat-sen declared that the future struggles of the world would no longer be between states, races, or continents. They would be between oppressors, namely, the capitalists, who are very few but very powerful, and the mass of people, who are innumerable but powerless. The mass of people cease to be powerless, however, when they unite in a struggle for freedom; thus economic democracy only can save the world from being plunged into a formidable class war. These three principles of Sun Yat-sen are overwhelmingly accepted by the Chinese people. Sun Yat-sen's conception of a world order is therefore the ultimate goal of China today.

In order to build a rational and lasting world order it is obvious that we must fuse the materials of Western civilization with those of Chinese civilization, eliminating in so far as possible the weaknesses we have already discussed. Since only by some such fusion of the two greatest civilizations can a more suitable world order be built, it is obvious that no such goal can be achieved so long as the spirit of dissension prevails in the West, even though the most perfect plans may be evolved on paper.

This is of course a long-range view and cannot be expected to satisfy the need of the hour, which is the organization of world peace and the creation of an instrument to guarantee it after the victory of the democracies. China is ready to cooperate with any nation to assist in organizing a new League of Nations based upon the following fundamental principles: (1) collective security, guaranteed by an international organization resting upon a temporary alliance between Britain, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union; (2) establishment of a world authority with police powers to check aggression; (3) disarmament by international agreement; (4) an international court to settle disputes between nations; (5) recognition of the sanctity of treaties; (6) provision of means to remove the causes of international conflict; (7) international cultural and economic cooperation.

**OSHI KATAYAMA**

Everybody seems anxious to know whether there exists any possibility for a democratic revolution in Japan. To this question some influential writers and commentators have already given a negative reply. It is quite understandable that a democratic revolution cannot easily be brought about in a country like Japan, where the military fascist rule has prevailed for so many years.

However, in view of the long history of the democratic struggle of the Japanese people, it is wrong to think that such a possibility is entirely excluded. Some people might be surprised to learn that modern Japanese history is the history of the people's struggle for liberty and democracy. The democratic movement in Japan dates back to the time of the feudal Tokugawa dynasty. Some critics maintain that there exists no democratic tradition in Japan's history and give as a reason that there was no Japanese equivalent of the middle-class revolution in Europe. It is true that the Meiji restoration, from which Japanese capitalism starts, was not a revolution of the middle classes, backed by a democratic mass movement. It emerged from the struggle between the Tokugawa feudal dynasty and the coalition of some rebelling feudal clans.

But we should not forget the fact that the insurgent clans won the victory because they utilized the peasant revolts which were undermining the Tokugawa dynasty. The peasant revolts were the democratic people's movement of that time. The peasants were betrayed by the new regime. The feudal oppression was intensified. In order to suppress the people's dissatisfaction, the new regime established a highly centralized feudalistic police state and reinstated the Emperor, who until then had actually been nothing more than a minor feudal lord with comparatively little power, as the absolute monarch.

In the first ten years of the Meiji restoration there took place numerous peasant revolts. The "freedom and people's rights" movement evolved from these revolts. Besides the peasants, those samurai of minor ranks who were excluded from the political machinery of the new regime, and small traders and artisans, joined this movement. It was nothing primitive as in feudal times, but a political mass-movement with the aim of introducing the parliamentary system, which was expected to replace the absolutism of the new regime. Ideologically the movement was influenced by Anglo-American utilitarianism and also by the ideas of the French Revolution.

The leaders were assassinated, imprisoned, and banned from having residence in Tokyo or vicinity. The people's movement ultimately forced the Government to promise the promulgation of a constitution in 1889. This concession by the absolute ruler was partially nullified by him when he introduced a reactionary constitution on the Prussian model.

During the period covering the Russo-Japanese War, with the development of capitalism the workers acquired a more important position in the people's movement. Those who came back from America led the movement. The first trade unions were organized. The Social Democratic party was also brought into existence. One of the aims of this party was to carry out total disarmament and to work toward world peace. When the Russo-Japanese war broke out, these people fought courageously against the imperialistic aims of the Japanese militarists, disregarding the severe suppressions by the Japanese Government. Their newspapers were banned and their leaders were sent to prison. It is a well-known fact that a Japanese delegate was sent to Amsterdam to meet a Russian delegate to express the solidarity of both peoples in the fight against militarism.

The victory of Japanese imperialism over czarism was followed by a dark age in the democratic movement of Japan. The reaction started with the execution of twenty-four fighters. It was the time in which everybody carefully avoided using, even in daily conversation, any word connected with social policy or socialism. The reaction, however, ceased at the end of World War I. The changed current of thought outside Japan encouraged the Japanese people. Militarist and reactionary policies were condemned everywhere. Democracy, freedom, and socialism stood as the order of the day.

The start was made with the rice riots of August 3, 1918. The rise in prices during the war made the average man's life intolerable and was directly responsible for the revolt. About three hundred housewives in a small fishing village went into the streets accusing the Government of keeping up the high prices and demanding a stop to the increase. The action was instantly copied all over the country, involving several million people. The police as well as military forces were employed to suppress them. It took one and a half months. The resignation of the reactionary Terauchi Cabinet was the result of the rice riots.

These riots exercised a tremendous influence on the people's movement. Through them the masses became conscious of their strength. The growth of labor and tenant-farmer unions, the formation of independent "proletarian" parties, in fact, the very backbone of the democratic movement stemmed from these riots. Small traders, manufacturers, men of liberal professions, salaried men, and intellectuals were mobilized for the twofold fight for democracy and against the military rule. In some cases even the old political parties of the vested interests participated in this struggle.

It represented the awakening of the masses. Thus universal suffrage, even if only for men, was introduced. A new constitutional usage, namely, the rule of the majority party in the Cabinet was established. The military cliques were attacked more energetically. The withdrawal of the Japanese Army from Siberia in 1922 was greatly due to the opposition of the democratic forces at home. The Government was formed to reduce the standing army three times between 1922 and 1926. Some politicians, even though they were unsuccessful, suggested that civilians instead of military men be appointed to the posts of war and navy ministers. The students carried on fierce struggles against military education in the schools. The change of notion went to such an extent that young officers were almost ashamed to appear in military uniform before the public. Many Europeans who were in Japan at this time thought that Japan was nearing a social revolution. The conflict between capital and labor was also intensified. The number of labor disputes rose from 933 in 1924 to 2,456 in 1931, and that of tenant farmer disputes from 1,260 to 2,689 in the same period. The Government was shocked at this development and took steps to suppress the Left Wing of the democratic forces. This reaction came in about 1928 and doubtless encouraged the rise of military fascism. The Manchurian incident of 1931 was the first crisis of this new trend.

The period from 1931 up to the present day represents the most difficult time for the democratic forces, which were and are being subjected to terrorism. But the democratic movement never disappeared. Legal organizations have been destroyed. Their leaders and active members have been removed. Still the strong anti-fascist currents flow underground, appearing sporadically and in various forms.

In 1936, we saw an immense rise of the "people's anti-fascist movement" which was indirectly aimed at the military rule in the political life of Japan. Not only the proletarian parties, which were backed by labor and peasant unions, but also bourgeois parties were supporting it. Some of the chief leaders of the proletarian parties were trying to curry favor with military Fascists. But they could not ignore the strong anti-fascist demand of the rank-and-file members.

From November 1936 to January 1937, more than three thousand anti-Fascists were arrested. The arrests took place all over the country, but most of them were in Osaka, one of the greatest industrial and commercial centers in Japan. A great percentage of those arrested were workers, trade unionists. They were simply accused of having undertaken to form an anti-military, anti-fascist organization. An interesting change can be noticed in comparison with the arrests in the late twenties and early thirties, in which most of those arrested were intellectuals and were accused of communistic activities. This did not frighten the democratic forces, which gave a clear answer in the general election of early 1937. In the election the candidates

of military fascism suffered a crushing defeat. The Social Mass party, despite the strong sympathy of some of its leaders with the military, entered the election with clear-cut anti-fascist slogans and received about nine hundred thousand votes. The candidates returned were increased from nineteen in the preceding election to thirty-six. It was an epoch-making event in the history of the proletarian movement. The corrupt political parties of the Right remained in power, however, because the people thought that they could not be worse than the militarists.

Another answer given to the militarists was in the economic field. From 1931 to 1936 labor disputes were slowly decreasing owing to military pressure. But the speed-up of rearmament, which was begun in the second half of 1936, led to a rise in prices. According to the official statistics the cost of living rose more than 20 per cent by July, 1937. Strikes increased from 2,689 in 1936 to 6,170 in 1937, most of which occurred in the first half of the year. The strikes took place in large armament factories like Mitsubishi's heavy industry factory in Nagoya. This situation was intensified by tenant-farmer disputes, which increased from 2,689 in 1931 to 6,170 in 1937. Public opinion sided with the strikers. It was felt that this was an attack undertaken by the democratic forces against military fascism. And it brought forth immediate action by the Fascists in the form of the Chinese-Japanese War in the summer of 1937. Under cover of the war, persecution of democratic elements began in earnest. Not the leftists, but liberals and even conservatives, who had fought the leftists before, were this time the main prey of the military Fascists.

Did this reaction succeed in wiping out the democratic movement? It did not. In the Parliament of 1940 the Minister of Home Affairs warned the Members of Parliament that anti-militarist leaflets were being distributed among peasants. He added further that the "dangerous elements" were approaching the innocent people under the mask of patriotism and spreading anti-militarist slogans, and that these patriots had to be watched carefully. It is an open secret in Japan that rice riots occurred in various parts of Japan at the end of 1940. The Government was especially worried about the unrest prevailing near Tokyo, because it was near the Emperor's Palace. To avoid trouble of a serious nature, stored rice was distributed there. The Japanese rulers were facing the most severe crisis in their history. The acuteness of the crisis can be measured by the rapid changes of the Japanese Cabinets in 1940 and 1941. In order to surmount this difficulty, the military Fascists once again resorted to a new war, as was the case in 1931 as well as in 1937. But it is impossible to think that this democratic tradition has disappeared overnight.

It is not our intention to overestimate the strength of the democratic forces in Japan. In view of the feudalistic traditions in which the majority of the people are still steeped, the democratic forces have enormous diffi-


culties to overcome. We also know the source of their weakness in the past.

The weakness consisted in the absence of any actual union of all democratic forces. On the one hand, there were conflicts between workers and peasants; on the other, between liberals and conservatives. The disciplined Fascists, utilizing their strength to the best advantage, overcame these conflicting groups. One of their most effective methods has been the propaganda against the domination of the white race.

It is well to keep in mind that the Japanese Fascists have desperately represented their predatory war as a war between "white imperialism" and the Asiatic nations which are striving for emancipation. One of their aims was to rouse the reluctant Japanese people, whom they failed to win during the Chinese-Japanese War, to active co-operation. By a democratic postwar occupation and the presentation of the real issue before the Japanese people, a long step can be taken toward a democratic revolution in Japan.

We by no means underestimate the strength of the Japanese militarists. They once succeeded in destroying all legal anti-fascist organizations. They once succeeded in bringing up elite groups of young fanatics. But they have never succeeded in having mass organizations, such as the Nazis of Germany. This weakness will show itself in the long run. If some fatal blows are given to the Japanese militarists by the United Nations, there is no doubt that the democratic forces inside Japan will be able to rally the people for another revolt against the military despots and, taking the fate of their country into their own hands, will finally succeed in founding a democratic Japan.

WHAT JAPANESE CHILDREN THINK



TTO ZOFF In 1938, the Japanese press reported a sensational incident. A certain young man had been rejected for military service on account of the poor state of his health. During the sea journey back home he had leaped overboard and drowned. He had left behind a note in which he requested that his life insurance be turned over to the Government. The military operations in China, he said, could use even the smallest sum of money. This was the only way in which he could sacrifice himself for his country. The papers printed the picture of the young hero. He was a boy, at most seventeen years old. His conduct was fervently lauded as a shining example.

September 18, 1931, is an important date in the history of Japan and of the world. On that day a track section of the South Manchuria Railway, controlled by Japan, was blown up. The Japanese Army used this "Mukden Incident" as an excuse for occupying the whole of Manchuria.

But the year of 1931 is memorable in other respects, and the "Mukden Incident" may be considered the climax and perhaps the result of some of these events. That year, silk exports to the United States, Japan's chief customer, had fallen by one half as a result of the depression. At the same time, the Chinese boycott had cut exports to that country first 33, then 65, finally 80 per cent. Finally, the 1931 rice crop was the lowest in many years. In some districts, the authorities had to organize medical aid centers to treat people suffering from starvation.

Here one of the small but significant incidents that affect the destiny of nations enters into history. The Tokyo correspondent of the *North China Daily News*, a paper not unfriendly to Japan, undertook an automobile tour through certain parts of the country. He described conditions and set down the results of many interviews. Among them was the opinion of a community nurse who stated: "The people are starving, have been starving for quite a long time, and they have now grown so apathetic that they do not care what happens. All their ambition is gone, and worst of all, there is no money with which they can be assisted to regain at least their self-respect. You must know there are 200,000 schoolchildren in Japan who get no food in their homes and about 3,000 public schools owe their teachers more than five million yen in back pay."

This statement was seized upon by General Sadao Araki, War Minister at that time, to serve his own purposes. At that time, General Araki was considered to be the most powerful man in the country. As a simple, unostentatious, and unselfish soldier who had risen from the lowest ranks of the people, he was the idol of the army. According to the most authentic reports, General Araki appeared at the Ministry of Finance accompanied by his closest friend, General Mazaki, the outstanding authority on questions of military education. He demanded the appropriation of a sum of money sufficient to feed these 200,000 children in school. The Minister of Finance is said to have countered with the statement that everybody was starving and that, while there was sufficient money to provide for the children in question, there was no reason to make an exception in their case. He showed General Araki some of the official reports made by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. One of these read as follows:

Many villages are in a state of destitution below what we have always considered to be extreme poverty. Conditions are such that thefts of rice, sugar, salt, soybean sauce, and all kinds of food are no longer the exception but the rule. . . . Between 80 and 90 per cent of the revenue in the Prefecture of Niigata comes from rice-growing.

Now, however, nobody has any rice except a few big farmers. The peasants, having nothing left to sell, are selling their daughters. . . . Hundreds and hundreds of families have sold their daughters, ten and twelve years old, to proprietors of public houses.

The generals glanced through these reports and departed. A few days later they delivered a kind of ultimatum to the Ministers of Finance and Education demanding that reforms be introduced as quickly as possible and indicating that, if this was not done, the army would assume supervision of the educational system. This ultimatum was followed within a few weeks by an order in which all the physical education instructors were replaced by army officers. This was the first step in gaining control of Japanese education by the military clique.

This order was recognized as a *coup d'état*, and the liberal opposition raged against it in vain. There were protest strikes on the part of the teachers, widely supported by students. In the Christian schools, Catholic and Protestant missionaries preached against the approaching menace of fascism. Both pupils and teachers were arrested.

The generals disregarded all opposition. Mazaki was appointed Inspector General of Education and he in turn appointed the new physical education officers as guardians of school morale. They really became censors of the teachers and pupils. One of their first acts was to do away with the school readers published during the Taishō administration (1912-1925), which laid special emphasis on the ideals of peace, and to replace them by the so-called Shōwa textbooks, which were rampantly chauvinistic and militaristic.

A crude appeal to militant patriotism characterizes both the texts and illustrations of these volumes. The frontispiece, of course, has the national flag, while page one is a picture of marching soldiers. The next page again shows the banner of war streaming from a high flagpole, and opposite is an illustration of children saluting the rising sun. The following pages are filled with pictures of bombs and warships.

It is impossible to communicate to those who are unfamiliar with the old school texts how complete is the change in what Japanese schoolchildren learn since the Ministry of War took control of education. In the readers of the Taishō epoch there was an almost naïve attempt to inculcate the sentiments of peace and virtue in the minds of the children. The pages of these readers abound in verses to the flowering cherry trees, apostrophes to mother love, and explanations of the blessings of peace. In the new books, all but a few lines of filial sentiment are expunged. Instead, there are biographies of ancient Japanese war heroes; a dialogue between the father and son in which the latter is informed that the possession of Manchuria is not an international issue, but a question of life and death for the people of Japan, an alternative between starvation and a full dinner pail; a soldier's

description of the beauties of Siberia and his explanation of why that vast country belongs to the Island Empire rather than to the mainland.

In the morality readers (*shushinshō*), which constitute the collateral reading in the intermediate schools, the tone of friendly and conciliatory international relationships is maintained. The text there teaches the ancient virtues of patriotism, filial piety, and courtesy. But there is a constant insistence on the duty of the Japanese subjects to the emperor. Always, the moral of the essay or story is that one must die for the emperor. The emperor is not only the chief of Japan, he is the head of the world. The emperor is ruler by virtue of his divine descent in unbroken succession from the grandson of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu O Mikami. No other national chief is equal to the emperor. All others are mortal; he alone is immortal. Is there any greater happiness or pleasure given to a soldier than to die for his god?

Such, then, was the result of the War Ministry's control over education which went into effect in 1932. The changes in the curriculum became more and more extreme and more oriented to the military program. By 1937, the entire Japanese school system was subordinated to a course called "War Instruction." This began in the first year of the intermediate schools where the students are about ten years old. Whether mathematics, history, or geography, the textbooks and the curricula were changed to give the maximum amount of emphasis to war-mindedness and military training.

Here is a mathematics problem given to thirteen-year-olds in the intermediate school of Nagoya: An airplane has a speed of 260 miles per hour and can carry a load of 1,550 pounds in addition to the crew. An incendiary bomb weighs 3 pounds. It takes 15 incendiary bombs to cause a fire. Question 1: Calculate the distance between Formosa and Hawaii on the map. Question 2: In what time can that distance be covered by the plane? Question 3: How many fires can be started in Hawaii by 25 planes?

Such simple arithmetical problems led in the last two years of the intermediate school to the elements of ballistics. The pupils learn to chart the flight-path of a released bomb, given the wind velocity of the speed of the plane. They receive instruction in other phases of military tactics.

In 1937, a student in the most important intermediate school of Kobe made a stenographic transcript of the final oral examination in history that was given to his class. This report is not only significant for what it shows of the educational system, but it affords a revealing insight into the confusion which the doctrines of fascism created in the Far East.

Question:—After what example are the United States of Asia conceived?

Answer:—After the ideas of the late Aristide Briand for a United States of Europe.

Q.—What people has the United States of Asia taken for its political model?

A.—The Japanese people.

Q.—Why do the Japanese people aspire to a United States of Asia?

A.—Because every country wishes to have more than it has, which leads to ever new wars.

Q.—Is it true that the nations declare that they only desire equality, but actually each nation wishes to get the better of the others?

A.—Quite true. You see this by the example of Italy.

Q.—Italy declares that its appetite is now satisfied with the annexation of Ethiopia. But will it really be satisfied?

A.—It will not. It is already putting forward claims to our ocean.

Q.—Italy! What has Italy to do with our ocean?

A. (Several voices):—Nothing! Nothing!

Q.—The question arises as to the nature of the United States of Asia, a vast continent with so many different peoples! Who of you can tell me something about this?

A.—There must be a common religion to achieve unity. That religion must be Japan.

Q.—Why Japan, of all nations?

A.—No people have ever breathed on earth who are intrinsically more religious-minded.

Here, similarly, is the composition-subject given to the students in a Tokyo commercial school the day after a morale teacher had delivered a lecture. This was the outline given to the students on the subject of the United States: "America is the richest country in the world. There are plenty of gold mines in America. Americans are the most wonderful dancers in the world. It is a country where there are lots of gangs and it is dangerous to live there."

So much for the theoretical aspect of instruction. But there is a practical aspect too. The civilian teachers have nothing to do with that. It is the exclusive province of the officers, the moral teachers. They take up two school hours each week and sometimes, on holidays, leisure time as well. The subject is called "Military Exercises." These courses are compulsory for children from the age of twelve upward. In the lower grades, they consist of simple drills, turns, salutes, marching, and singing. In the higher grades, these exercises are repeated—but with arms. There is also small-arms practice, marksmanship and gunloading, guard duty, practice with small-scale machine guns, field exercises with map reading, use of terrain, estimation of distances, crossing of trenches, hoisting of flags. The marches are fatiguing—ten miles on the average. Careful study has developed a method by which children learn at an early age how to overcome pain and fatigue. In certain schools, there are elementary courses in bridge-building.

A new factor affected the educational situation in the years that followed. To the Western mind, there would seem to be no connection be-

tween patriotism and the morbidity rate resulting from malnutrition. But in Japan, the first was a means of meeting the emergency created by the second. In 1933, 82,000 persons had died of tuberculosis in Japan; in 1937, that figure had risen to 120,000. A similar condition existed in all the endemic and epidemic diseases. The situation forced the Government to take action and it established a Ministry of Welfare which held a number of academic conferences and arrived at the conclusion that the life span in Japan is some ten years shorter than in other countries because of the fact that children of school age are underfed. Since the Ministry of Welfare could do nothing about increasing the rations distributed among these schoolchildren, it had recourse to the ancient means of meeting Japanese problems. It exploited the patriotism of the people to distract them from their troubles.

One of the most common forms of patriotic expression in Japan is the pilgrimage to the national shrines and temples. There are 50,000 principal and an additional 60,000 minor shrines, each of which is dedicated to the memory of a national hero. In the past, the pilgrimages to these temples were a custom, an occasion of self-expression on the part of the pilgrim—never a compulsion. Two pilgrimages a year constituted a record! Today, every school child is required to undertake at least six such pilgrimages, now known as cultural trips. Often, these are merely excursions on foot to the nearest temple, but sometimes they involve day or night trips by railway to distant shrines. Led by their teachers, boys and girls often walk many miles from the railway station to stand a few moments before one of these shrines or little temples, dedicated to some Japanese deity. Some of the students are still quite small, others already grown-up, but all march behind their teachers with the same sullen earnestness. Sometimes these youngsters are dressed in festive garments of ancient style with quaint head-dresses, their faces painted white in accordance with ancient custom.

The most frequented of these shrines is the Yasakuni Shrine near Tokyo. It is a fine large gabled structure in the shadow of age-old trees. Many steps lead up to the entrance. The names of dead heroes are inscribed in this shrine—more and more of them, 130,767 at the last count. Slowly the children wander up the steps to stand in prayer for a few minutes. Then they clap their hands, first three times loudly, then three times softly. Finally they fall to their knees.

When the devotions are over, the teacher leads them down the great cherry-tree mall to the Military Museum on Kudan Hill. This museum is unmatched anywhere else in the world—a museum of bruised and battered uniforms of the sons of Japan who have fallen in recent wars—a coat with a great jagged hole in it, through which a shell fragment once found a gallant young heart, the actual blood congealed in a dark-brown stain all round; another coat with the sleeve torn off, hanging limp and ragged, also

blood-stained; handkerchiefs, shirts, and vests drenched in blood. Over each souvenir is a photograph of the man, often a mere boy.

A large crowd of visitors passes through these four long halls every day. They look at these things without flinching. They are proud. Hither come young mothers of two- or three-year-old sons dressed in generals' uniforms with many medals and ribbons and long sabers.

The mothers stand in devotion. Each holds her child's hand firmly. And ever again they pronounce this stereotyped phrase to the little one: "Ah, if my greatest desire could be fulfilled. Then you too will die for the Emperor! It would be so beautiful. . . . Then, every day, my son, I will come here, to see your uniform and to be proud."

THAT ALL MAY KNOW

He said that there was one only good, namely, knowledge; and one only evil, namely, ignorance.

—Laertius (on Socrates)

progress would become hazardous and dangerous. The very essence of any system of collective defense is that the weak shall be defended by the combined power of the international society. Otherwise a criminal or violent minority (a Germany of seventy millions confronting a Europe of four hundred millions for instance) could, by the one-by-one device, render the majority incapable of defending itself. It was precisely that which happened to the nations of Continental Europe at the hands of Hitler.

Britain and the United States having refused to give an undertaking to defend France against Germany, being moreover much divided as to how Germany should be treated, it was hardly surprising that when Japan committed her aggression against Manchuria in 1931 the Western nations declined to see in that aggression any very direct interest of their own. To very many in the United States and Britain it seemed sheer absurdity to risk war with Japan as the method of preserving the peace of the world. Similarly, when it became a question of imposing sanctions against Italy to prevent the conquest of Ethiopia. The rest is an old story.

Part—a large part—of the confusions which prevented common action against aggression here arose from the belief that we had to determine the merits of a particular dispute before taking action to prevent its settlement by violence. Thus, there was much discussion during the years 1931–36 as to whether there was not a good deal to be said for Japan in her complaints about banditry in China; whether, after all, the world ought to intervene to save a state like Ethiopia, where slavery still existed. All this missed the point. If there had been anything like a Grand Alliance for peace at the time of the Japanese and Italian aggressions, it should in effect have said to Japan: "You may be entirely right and China entirely wrong in the merits of the dispute itself. In that case we will give every opportunity for the airing of the truth and will use our influence to secure justice. But you, one of the parties to the dispute, shall not be also judge and executioner merely because you believe yourself to be the stronger. If you persist in that line we shall defend China."

The case for such a stand would have been even stronger in respect to Italy and Ethiopia. It is conceivable that Britain by her own power could have prevented the conquest of Ethiopia merely by notifying Mussolini that Britain would defend Ethiopia as though it were British territory.

Such defense of the *status quo* might have involved injustices, but the way to correct those injustices was not to allow Japan to conquer China, Italy, Ethiopia, and Germany, Czechoslovakia. A very large part of the confusions which destroyed the Alliance which fought the first world war and might have prevented the second arose from the strange notion that before law can have the combined power of organized society behind it, it must be absolutely perfect. The remedy, of course, for imperfect law is not to withdraw the policeman, which would merely mean that the law would

become the law of the gangster, the remedy for its imperfections is to make possible peaceful change while using the policeman to keep the gangster in order.

It is extremely doubtful whether these simple lessons have been learned with any vividness, and it is the failure to have learned them which constitutes the great danger to the San Francisco Charter. A good many have protested violently against the proposition that the purpose of this war is "mere national survival." They insist that its purpose is a world-wide revolution for a new social and economic order. Others, a little less sweeping, insist that it is a war for democracy and that no non-democratic government should be tolerated anywhere.

Now it is quite obvious that if the fifty nations who subscribe to the San Francisco Charter, including twenty Latin American states, the states of the Arab Confederation, to say nothing of Russia, have to agree even approximately on the meaning of "real democracy" and on the true form of the new social and economic order, there can never be peace. The Russian Soviet Republic or Republics may represent in their highly centralized power, single-party government, denial of political opposition or of press freedom, a form of democracy superior to the bourgeois forms of the West. A great many ardent evangelists in this as in other countries say so with great vehemence. But it is quite plain that, however passionate the convictions of Communists on these points, those who differ from them—and many Socialists even differ—are often just as passionately sincere. That is to say there is no agreement as to the true form of the new social order. Britain has a form of highly socialized society which embodies many of the principles of socialism, but which differs fundamentally from the socialism of Russia. The socialism of New Zealand differs from both. The economic and industrial organization of the United States differs from all three. The democracy which has prevailed in, shall we say, Brazil, differs from the democracy which has prevailed in the United States. If the law which is to have the backing of the combined power of the United Nations is to embody agreement on all these points we know that that law can never be enforced.

But we know also from the events of the war itself that all the United Nations have an over-riding common interest, on behalf of the defense of which they can all co-operate. We know this because they have been so co-operating, co-operating in defense of the common interest of national survival. Here, therefore, on the basis of experience, we have a law, the law that each nation shall have the right to live under the particular system, political, social, economic, which it prefers. Experience has corrected a good deal of the theorizing of the past. A great many sincere protagonists of the social revolution have been in the habit of declaring that it is utterly impossible for capitalist and socialist states to have a fundamental common interest for which both could fight as allies. Yet we have discovered

that this is not true. The differences between capitalism and socialism do not prevent co-operation for defense of the right to national existence. Russia has been able to maintain her right to live as a Communist state by virtue of the help accorded by the most capitalist state in the world, the United States. The right of the United States to remain capitalist has been sustained in part by virtue of the help accorded by the first Communist state of the world.

Here, surely, are valuable hints for laying and maintaining the foundations of unity. An alliance for the purpose of upholding the right of each nation to live under the system it prefers can be maintained; an alliance to compel others to adopt our system cannot.

For some time now debate as to future security has tended to create the impression that we can be sure of peace if only we treat Germany with sufficient severity. Which is one proof the more of how easily we forget experience. Immediately after our previous victory we had no soft mood. For a time we were just as anti-German as at present. We maintained the blockade despite starvation in cities like Vienna. The cause of our failure in dealing with Germany was not that we were insufficiently angry with Germany but that the Allies were too angry with each other. No policy that we might have devised, however "hard," could have been carried out, because the British began to quarrel with the French, the Americans with the British, and all with the Russians.

Today many seem to believe that if only we hate fascism enough and insist on lynching all collaborators, we shall give the world peace. In 1919 fascism had not yet been invented and there were no collaborators; but neither was there peace. The failure to get peace could hardly have resulted from our tenderness toward those non-existent creeds. The enemies that destroyed us were not fascism or collaborationism, but nationalism and isolationism; our refusal to accept the obligations and duties of international organization.

That danger today takes only a slightly new form, as in the difficulty of continued effective co-operation (particularly in the future government of Germany) between the western democracies and the Russian autocracy. The avoidance of World War III will depend, mainly, upon the ability of democracy and autocracy to work together for the common ends of security and peace. The condition of effective co-operation will be the frank recognition of these two facts: first that, as between the Russian power on the one side and the democracies on the other, there are deep differences of values and outlook; second, that on no account must those differences be allowed to lead to conflict. Future peace demands that we shall recognize the differences and manage to live and work together despite them. Co-operation will be dammed at the beginning if we proceed on the assumption that the Russians must forthwith adopt our views or we theirs; that we

must surrender our political freedoms and adopt a dictatorship because under dictatorship like the Russian true democracy is achieved—as so many Soviet advocates so frequently insist.

At present, discussion of the problem presented by these differences seems to be between two main groups, one of which apparently assumes that Russia can do nothing right and the other that Russia can do nothing wrong. From such a discussion nothing but heat and mischief can emerge.

It is strange how little we draw the most needed lesson from the dreadful revelations of what the Germans have done. Here were a people not in any way biologically different from ourselves, closely allied indeed to the British and American peoples in race (if there be such a thing as race) and in much of their cultural background; the heirs to a great civilization, having made enormous contributions to science, philosophy, religion, art, music; highly educated, orderly, disciplined, efficient—and the outcome of it all was the acceptance of political philosophies which every sane man outside Germany knew to be arrant nonsense, the acceptance of the autocratic rule of an ignoramus, a guttersnipe who could only be regarded as a psychopathic, sadistic, criminal. If this episode proves, as it does, that a whole people can go utterly wrong, it must prove also that the voice of the people is not always the voice of God; that we too may become subject to dreadful error unless we keep alive our awareness of liability to error, our need to know, and to judge with responsibility and discipline what we know. It illustrates the futility of the perfect constitution as the instrument of human welfare if those who are to work the constitution have not the necessary human quality. The Weimar Constitution was one of the best ever devised by men. Its outcome, again, was Hitler. It was a constitution for the government of that highly "educated," "civilized" people whose governance and reform has now become one of the prime problems of the Allies.

Why did a people, heirs to a great western civilization, learned, bookish, encyclopedic, thorough, efficient, and all the rest of it, living under the best constitution that the professors of political science knew how to devise, nevertheless go so disastrously wrong? We don't know. But there are some things related to that problem we do know.

A democratic constitution implies as its fundamental assumption that final decision in political, social and economic problems shall be by the people. But if political, economic and social decisions by the people are to be on the basis of the facts, the people must have access to the facts, be free to discuss them. If the people do not know the facts, obviously they cannot decide what to do about them. In the absence of such knowledge all talk about "the will of the people," "government by the people," is a perilous and evil sham. Obviously, therefore, this "access to the facts" is in the category of first things, for all democracy rests on it.

Yet access to the facts is of little avail unless men acquire the moral and intellectual disciplines by which alone the facts can be rightly judged, the right conclusions drawn. When, after the first victory over Germany, the public of the United States decided, contrary to the counsel of Wilson, that the road to peace was isolationism, that public had free access to the facts if they had been concerned to get them. But the mood and temper of the time obscured judgment.

Perhaps our first task in establishing really dependable relations with Russia will be to persuade her to remove her present blackout of knowledge. An additional reason for putting this first is that it runs counter to no real Russian interest. Russia's real interest indeed is all the other way. The restrictions she has imposed in the past have not prevented adverse criticism, deep differences of opinion about things Russian. It is quite unlikely that the criticisms or the differences would be any greater under free reporting; the probability is that they would become much less.

We must somehow manage to make it clear to her that this secrecy and prohibition of free reporting stands as an insuperable obstacle to understanding and confidence. For us in the west to pretend that this is not so is to do no service to Russia, to the Russian people, to future peace, to the success of the efforts of San Francisco, to the purposes for which we fought this war. Until we know day by day fully what the facts are, and have been permitted to judge those facts for ourselves, we simply don't know what we are talking about.

Without full access to the facts, it is tragically certain that we shall fail all along the line—fail to maintain unity, fail to control Germany, fail to make peace.

OPEN CHANNELS FOR NEWS

H

UGH BAILLIE One of the most important problems of the peace looms large today and cannot be side-stepped—the problem of unrestricted flow of news throughout the world.

The problem does not involve the establishment in all countries of what we in the U. S. A. term a free press. That is desirable, but not feasible, unless we wish to try to dictate our way of life to all the other countries in the world. But it does involve equal access to news at its source in all countries, equal transmission rates, no peacetime censorship. This could be arranged on a basis of reciprocity.

Unrestricted dissemination of news throughout the world by an American agency—the United Press—made great headway between the end of the last war and the rise of the totalitarian states which preceded World War II. There was, of course, a constant battle for access to government news sources. Some countries desired to have all their news go out via their government-dominated agencies. But progress was being made in the long fight which started in 1907 when the United Press decided to go out and hustle for its own news rather than accept the “handouts” of the government-owned or government-dominated agencies. United Press put its own correspondents in foreign capitals. It fought for the right to tell what was going on, by going directly to the sources of news everywhere. It entered into competition with the world-wide system of interlocking news monopolies. Several invitations to the United Press to join the cartel were declined. This organization always preferred to “roll its own.”

In the realm of news distribution the United Press built up a tremendous export business in Europe, South America and the Far East. When World War II began it was supplying independent, impartial news to 194 clients in what became enemy or enemy-occupied territory, including a few in France where Havas made it extremely difficult for any French newspaper to buy news from outside sources. In total, in September 1939 the United Press served 486 foreign newspapers, including the most important newspapers of South America, and it had fought off repeated efforts on the part of the “combine” to freeze it out of government news sources abroad. Even today, under complicated conditions, the United Press distributes fair and impartial news to 543 newspapers and 117 radio stations abroad, and is by far the biggest worldwide distributor of news.

In the future, if we succeed in securing the right to free interchange of news among nations, there will be more uncolored information than ever available to the press of the world, since the Associated Press is now entering fields abroad from which it has heretofore been barred by the terms of its membership in the Allied agencies combine, which terms have now been altered so that the A. P. can now seek business everywhere, just as the U. P. does. Reuters, Ltd., of Great Britain has also a freer hand than before and, with a young and aggressive management, it will be found active in fields where in the past it was unknown. This new competition abroad among Reuters, the Associated Press and the United Press bids fair to be very lively, and beneficial to readers everywhere. Always conceding, of course, that we are allowed equal access to operate in all countries, and that a new crop of government news monopolies does not arise.

Under the old monopoly arrangements the news-territories of the world were divided up by the so-called Allied News Agencies and each agreed not to sell its news in the territory of the others. The French agency, Havas, for example, was allotted South America and had an exclusive right among

the Allied Agencies to sell news of all the world to the newspapers of that Continent. Reuters, the British Agency, took the Far East, and in Japan and China had the exclusive right to sell its news of the rest of the world.

In addition, these Allied Agencies, which included all the important European press associations and Rengo of Japan, exchanged news among themselves and covered their respective countries for each other. The news of France, Germany, or Italy, for example, originated with a French, German or Italian news agency, a circumstance which did not always encourage dispassionate, impartial news-reporting.

The United Press never joined this alliance. The U. P. was founded to oppose news monopoly and immediately set out to demonstrate the worth of the contrary theory of operation, that is, that a news organization wholly independent of any other could cover the news of all the world with its own correspondents and profitably sell that news to all who wanted it, in every part of the world.

The United Press proceeded to invade the precincts of the Allied Agencies and their associates, selling a news-product which was entirely its own and which frankly boasted of its freedom from any taint or bias which government influence or subsidy might impose on others.

From the beginning the United Press was welcomed by the newspapers of other countries, both for its excellence and because it could guarantee freedom from any official viewpoint. In South America the United Press became and still is the principal source of foreign news; in the Orient until the outbreak of war United Press clientele was growing along with rapidly improving transmission facilities; on the continent of Europe the United Press was serving a total of 151 newspapers when the war began in 1939 and continues to serve 85 direct, located in Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain and Finland. United Press news is now printed or broadcast in every one of the United Nations and the neutral nations of the world.

The fact that a news agency of the United States has been able to win acceptance in every one of the free countries of the Old and New Worlds is a tribute to a principle—demonstrating that a world news agency can operate most successfully when it is absolutely free from restraint, bias or influence, official or unofficial, or even any possibility of such influence.

This concept of news is well established and familiar in our own country. However, in many foreign countries it has had to fight its way. Not every country wants freedom of the press as we practice it here and it is not my belief that we will get very far trying to impose it on those countries that don't want it.

But I do think we can ask persuasively that governments do nothing to hinder the news agencies of other countries from operating as freely within their borders as the news agencies of their own countries wish to operate in other parts of the world.

In the United States this equal treatment of foreign news agencies has been accorded, even in time of war. They enjoy equal access, with domestic agencies, to official sources of news and to transmission facilities, and they are free to sell their news to anyone who wants to buy it. All that is needed to take the first, basic step toward greater news freedom in the post-war world is for other nations to adopt the same simple policy. They would thus establish an atmosphere in which news agencies would live and flourish in accordance with the excellence of their product, rather than a hot-house climate in which they drew their sustenance from a government's purse or its favors.

We must have more than equal access to news and transmission facilities, important as these essentials are. Above them must be the challenge that exists when news competitors are vying with each other to create a superior product in order to sell more of it. It is this competition that keeps every agency on its toes every day and is the news-consumer's best guarantee of the dependability of his news.

As I see it, this freedom to compete in gathering news everywhere and freedom to compete in distributing that news to all who want it necessitates four basic conditions:

1. News sources, particularly official sources, competitively open to all.
2. Transmission facilities competitively available to all.
3. A minimum of official regulation of the flow of news itself.
4. All newspapers throughout the world to have access to all possible sources of news.

A world free press is highly desirable, but whether it can be achieved by inserting a clause in the peace treaty is something that remains to be seen. What we should reach for, in my opinion, is competitive equality in access to the news and transmission facilities—a fair and equal status for all news agencies in all countries.

It is my feeling that no better weapon exists with which to combat news restriction and suppression than the mere existence of a free source of news. I doubt that freedom of the press can be successfully imposed where it is not wanted. I do believe that the fewer the restrictions placed on the flow of news among nations, the greater are the chances that freedom of the press will win its way within those nations themselves.

We expect to continue to sell our news to papers in foreign countries as we did before the war. If those countries refrain from setting up official or government news agencies of their own, so much the better.

Certainly we don't want any American official agency, or any combine of U. S. agencies operating as a unit overseas. That would too closely resemble the operation of the old official news agencies, especially in the eyes of the foreign press.

In all of this I have not spoken of the value of a free flow of news throughout the world as a buttress to world peace. I have not felt it necessary because I believe there is no disagreement among freedom-loving peoples on the desirability of unhindered exchange of news among all who wish to be informed. Certainly every measure taken to open up news sources and to speed that news on its way to the four corners of the world is a step in the direction of creating the better understanding among nations upon which any enduring peace must be based.

FREE NEWS: FIRST STEP IN PEACE

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ENT COOPER Never before has there been such fervid determination in the world that nations must find a better way to live together. This generation must find a way to durable peace, or take responsibility for one of the most ghastly failures in human history.

Yet in all the zealous planning of this eleventh hour to avoid the tragic mistakes and failures of the past, only recently has any considerable attention been given to one of the basic essentials of a stable world order. Indeed, it is so basic that most planning has begun several steps beyond it, without thought as to whether this first and utterly necessary step had been taken.

It is elemental that there can be no amity and cooperation between nations and peoples unless they can know each other, yet it is a shocking revelation to most people when they are informed that the great masses of intelligent, thinking people throughout the world have had no adequate and effective means of knowing the truth about each other. Nor will they have such means now, unless determined, thoughtful and strenuous effort is immediately applied to this long-overlooked problem.

Let me not seem to oversimplify when I say it is fundamental that man is a gregarious being, and that he is not at heart a killer. Normal men become killers only in self-defense, or under the influence of mass emotion. Wars are started by leaders who are able to instill into their peoples, first prejudices, then mass hatreds.

The outstanding and most infamous example of this technique is what Hitler did in Nazi Germany. This is generally known, but it must never be forgotten. Freedom of press and speech died in Germany on the night of January 30, 1933, when Hitler took the government into authoritarian hands and completely regimented every form of public expression into his propaganda machine.

It was not long before persons entering Germany from the outside found in that unhappy land a world depicted in press and radio so astonishingly fictional as to seem like another planet. So completely and skillfully was this diabolical program organized that it seemed as if no lie the Nazis could conjure up to justify their outrages was too monstrous to be accepted by at least a very large proportion of the German people.

This, I repeat, is fairly well known, at least in the United States, thanks in large measure to the brilliant and courageous work of American and other foreign correspondents who were able to get this black story out to the world. What is not generally known and what must be fully understood, if there is to be any success in purifying the flow and counterflow of international news and information, is that what the Nazis did is only an extreme form of what has gone on steadily throughout most of the world, under our very noses.

It is easy to believe that pollution of the news in Germany antedates the Nazis, and so it does. Before 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm, through his personal banker, controlled the only extensive national and international news channel in and out of the Reich, the German news agency then known as the Wolff Bureau, now the Deutsches Nachrichtenburo, or DNB. Through this agency German minds were prepared for the first World War, and in addition, through its dominance of news agencies in Austria-Hungary and in Balkan countries, it generated awe and fear in Germany.

Had the practice of systematic and purposeful distortion, perversion and choking of the news channels been common only to the nations who are now our enemies, the history of this little-known subject would be far less shocking, and the problem which now confronts us far less difficult than it is.

Thoughtful Americans visiting Europe even as recently as the years immediately preceding the war were often perplexed by the low esteem in which we seemed to be held. It became common to attribute it to the war-debt controversy, or perhaps the unrestrained conduct of some of our vacationing countrymen. But one needed only to read the newspapers. In many countries rarely would news from the United States be found unless it were an item dealing with a Chicago gangster killing, or a Hollywood divorce case.

For years, our own State Department was perplexed by the stubborn apathy in South America toward happenings in the United States. It found its efforts to cultivate a closer understanding with the lands to the South persistently frustrated.

These are just two examples of effects upon this country of news channels controlled and influenced for nationalistic and other ulterior purposes. It is little wonder that much of the world had come to regard the United States as a soft and pleasure-loving country, to believe that Americans would never sacrifice their luxuries for moral principles.

The foreign news agency arrangements, with roots going well back into the 19th century and broken down only very recently, cartelized the world among British, French and German agencies under strong governmental influence.

I have disclosed this in considerable detail elsewhere (*Barriers Down*, by Kent Cooper, 1942).

It is sufficient to relate here that the British agency, Reuters, founded in 1858 by Julius Reuter, Anglicized German, soon became the dominant agency in Europe, aided by the close relations of Reuter with the Rothschild banking family. A helpful circumstance was that British capital controlled most of the cables linking the continents of the world.

Reuters controlled or made secret deals with agencies in other countries, many of which were only government mouthpieces. The French agency, Havas, developed similarly, working closely with Reuters. Havas not only handled news, but was an advertising agency in addition, so that newspapers in France, Italy and other countries where it once was dominant paid for its service in advertising space and became its servants. Both were private corporations, operated for profit, skilled at intrigue, exclusive contracts and monopolistic arrangements, and both worked closely with the foreign offices of their respective governments.

The perplexing apathy to United States news in South America to which I have referred stemmed directly from the European news cartel. Until the first World War, Havas had the exclusive right to send news to South America. For this purpose it used the British cable. So Havas was careful not to offend the British, and South America saw the world only through French and British eyes.

It is perhaps not surprising that we in the United States, engrossed in our own affairs and in the development of a virgin continent, should have been blind to these dangerous news-agency machinations, and that we were victimized by them. But I have previously written that true and unbiased news was "the highest moral concept ever developed in America." Historians and philosophers may say I exaggerate the importance of this, but I do not think so.

I insist that when a group of American newspaper publishers in 1893 formed a news non-profit cooperative, to be wholly owned by the newspapers it serves, and thus to have no function but to supply accurate and unbiased news, necessarily accurate and unbiased because it must be satisfactory to newspapers of all shades of editorial opinion, something new and vitally important occurred in the world.

The purpose of this organization, The Associated Press, was to break a private news monopoly which had then developed in this country. The American newspapers at that time lacked the means to collect the news systematically from far lands, and essential strategy in the infant AP's suc-

cess against the American monopoly of that day was obtaining a news-exchange contract with Reuters.

Thus The Associated Press was compelled to take the best terms it could get from the European cartel. These terms were that it could not dispatch its own news outside of North America. It could and did, as rapidly as its organization developed, send its own staff correspondents into foreign countries to send to North America the news of happenings abroad, reported according to its principles of unbiased reporting. I worked for twenty years to break down these barriers to the sending of Associated Press news throughout the world. The first break came in 1919, when AP began service to South America, but not until 1934 was the break complete.

Meanwhile the other two American news agencies, the United Press and the International News Service, developing at a later time, made some progress after the first World War in sending their news to the world, although in my opinion such progress as had been made up to the outbreak of World War II little more than broke the ice.

A new era in international news arrangements dawns. Whether it will be one of free and untainted news channels, essential to maintenance of peace and international cooperation, will depend upon our determination and zeal to make it so. Previously, I have written in detail of my unsuccessful efforts at Versailles in 1919 to bring the principles of freedom of information into the peace settlements after the first World War. I was finally informed by Colonel House that "the matter had been taken care of privately." I learned later that this meant it had been left to the mercy of the European news cartel.

Today, the entire background has changed. On October 28, 1941, the British newspapers took control of Reuters, and through a trusteeship arrangement it is now operated mutually for the newspapers of Great Britain. Thus, England has adopted the American formula of the cooperative Associated Press. The Havas agency of France is no more. Surely there will be a new order in Germany.

In 1942, two far-sighted and high-principled executives of the new Reuters, William J. Haley and Christopher J. Chancellor, came to New York to negotiate a new contract with The Associated Press. The preamble to that contract, which I wrote, begins: "Associated and Reuters, recognizing the desirability of world-wide acceptance of the principle of a free press and international exchange of truthful, unbiased news between the press and the instrumentalities of the press of all nations . . ." Since then, Haley has become Director General of The British Broadcasting Corporation, and Chancellor General Manager of Reuters.

Carrying the program further, Reuters made a contract with the Swedish News Agency this year which begins: "Both parties to the present agreement declare that they are news agencies serving no other purpose than the

dissemination of truthful, unbiased news; that they are free from any government or tendentious control, and that the news which they supply to each other shall be compiled and selected purely on its merits as news, and that any editorial discretion on each side shall be free from outside dictation or prejudice."

In publishing the text of this preamble the British newspaper trade magazine, *World's Press News*, added:

"The necessity for making news in the international field independent of governmental or financial influences—for the sake of world peace—has found expression in the principles established some two and a half years ago, when Reuters was converted into a cooperative undertaking. . . .

"After the war, all European countries whose newspapers have been destroyed by the Nazis or made into Quisling organs will have to rebuild their newspapers and news agencies, and it is hoped they will, in their task of reconstruction, build on the same principles."

A gratifying awareness of this problem in its international implications is finally developing in the United States. Concluding an address to the annual luncheon of the members of The Associated Press on April 19, 1943, I said:

"This, then, is an expression of hope that whenever the day of peace shall come, the press of all countries will seek the right to give the people the truth. As surely as it has, through lack of interest, contributed to a cause of war, it should avail itself of this opportunity.

"And as for the press of this country, the strongest newspaper force ever developed in any nation ought to crusade to prove to all the world that a free press is a heritage of the people and that with it, the people can maintain their freedom."

The idea of cleansing the channels of world news obtained striking recognition in summer of 1944 in the political platforms of both great American political parties. Some day, the names of those responsible for this splendid accomplishment will be emblazoned.

The paragraph in the Democratic party platform said:

We believe in the world right of all men to write, send and publish the news at uniform communication rates and without interference by governmental or private monopoly, and that right should be protected by treaty.

The longer Republican platform said:

In times like these when peoples have found themselves shackled by governments which denied truth, or worse, dealt in half-truths or withheld the facts from the public, it is imperative to the maintenance of a free America that the press and radio be free and that full and complete information be available to Americans. There must

be no censorship except to the extent required by war necessity. . . . All channels of news must be kept open with equality of access to information at the source. If agreement can be achieved with foreign nations to establish the same principles, it will be a valuable contribution to future peace.

Of course, these vital objectives will not be won with fine phrases. Many will give lip-service only to them. Vast areas of the world have never known a free press. There will be dangerous periods of transition when war-racked countries are reconstructed.

Radio presents a new and special problem. While it obtains its news chiefly from the news agencies, nowhere has it obtained the freedom that the press has. Naturally, the very nature of the medium presents special problems. In the United States, radio is licensed by the government. In Europe it has from the beginning been considered a government function. No medium of communication thus far developed has been so effective a tool of warmongers. What Hitler did with it, we know too well. He was able to whip his people into a war frenzy much more rapidly than was Wilhelm II in his day.

It must be remembered that government control of the channels of information has been so long established over much of the world that it may be a long time before officials in power will freely accept a policy of non-interference. The temptation will always be present, especially whenever a government finds its popular hold slipping. At Versailles, scarcely anyone dreamed that all means of communication in the new Germany would one day fall into the hands of a war-mad dictator. It did happen, as I feared it would, and it can happen again, if the rights to news and information are not set forth in treaties, and vigilantly protected.

Indeed, it will be strange if some new governments which arise do not proclaim that the guarding of the channels of information is a proper public function of government, and for that reason the new government should take control. We know only too well to what that can lead. If the power is not abused today, at some tomorrow the temptation to restore wavering popularity by trumping up inflammatory grievances against another country, seemingly confirmed by false or distorted news reports, will prove too strong.

Furthermore, whenever a news agency accepts special favors from a government, whether it be outright subsidy, or favored treatment in availability of communications facilities and rates, or even exclusive or prior access to the news of the government, it has taken a fatal step toward becoming the servant of the government, both in what it reports and in what it fails to report.

All the zeal and idealism that we can muster will not readily bring freedom of information throughout the world. In many areas, a long process in

education and development is necessary. But it would be disastrous to delay the process of education.

While government control of the flow of news and information must be prevented, major governments of the United Nations should lend their benediction to the development of independent news agencies, responsible only to the publications, radio stations and other outlets they serve, which in turn are responsible to their public.

They can well advance the principle now that the peace settlements will include guarantees of the right of men to get, send, and publish the news. This should include specific rights of correspondents of both native and foreign news agencies and publications to have equal access to news at the source and to transmission facilities. In other words, no agency should be granted prior or exclusive access to the news. By their competitive efforts some will report important happenings ahead of others. But if all have the right to report the news, truthful reporters will ever be present. Truth will ultimately prevail, if it is not systematically choked off, or distorted.

Let us not lose sight of this basic first step—overlooked at Versailles twenty-five years ago—in building lasting peace. Disarmament is, of course, important. But indeed if all disarmed, a powerful leader who could control the media of news and information might drive his people to attack a weaker neighboring people with such meager peace-time weapons as were available.

Alleviation of depressed living standards, the provision of economic opportunity, is also important, but wars have frequently been started by comparatively prosperous peoples. Living standards are relative. When the people of one country can be led through propaganda to believe their living standards are being held down by the malign plotting of a neighbor country, or combination of countries, they can be driven to war.

The elemental, essential step to any lasting comity of nations is the assurance of the free and untrammeled flow of news and information between nations.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: PILLAR OF HUMAN RIGHTS

SUMNER WELLES One of the most encouraging developments in popular thinking in all the United Nations during recent months has been the increasing evidence that people are giving thought to the

need for insuring the security of individual rights as well as of national rights as a necessary requisite to a peaceful and stable world when they formulate their ideal of what a future international organization should be.

The concept of the necessity for an international bill of rights is rapidly gaining more and more support. There is an increasing realization that chief among the contributing causes for war has been the deprivation by governments of the individual rights of their nationals. Men and women see more clearly today than ever before that no world order can exist when human beings are prevented from enjoying freedom of worship, freedom of expression, and freedom of information. They have learned that where the masses of the people have no true knowledge of what their government is doing, and no accurate information of what other governments and peoples are undertaking or thinking, the great majority of them will always be tempted blindly to follow the dictates of their governments.

Free men and women such as those in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, where these basic individual rights have long been established as the very foundation of their national life, are conscious that the enjoyment of these rights of all peoples is as much a prerequisite to the peaceful and prosperous world of the future which they seek, as is the construction of a practical form of international organization which can maintain peace among nations by force when necessary and which, through cooperative measures, can undertake to remedy past economic and social errors.

The objection has often been raised by some of the more timorous or reactionary of the skeptics that the establishment by common agreement among the nations of an international bill of rights will necessarily involve continued interference by foreign nations in the purely internal affairs of independent peoples. They maintain that it would be intolerable for any sovereign country to be obliged to subject itself to an investigation by any international organization of the measure of freedom enjoyed by its nationals. They insist that the United States, for example, could never permit any international organization to determine whether the people of this country are enjoying the essential liberties to which they are entitled.

Specious and insincere objections of this character have, of course, retarded throughout history the achievement of all forms of social progress. It was only 150 years ago that moral opinion in many different parts of the civilized world reached the conclusion that human slavery was an intolerable institution and that it must be destroyed. At first the efforts to eliminate slavery resulted solely in international agreements for the abolition of the international slave trade. As nations themselves progressively eliminated slavery within their respective jurisdictions, concerted international moral opinion brought about a general agreement upon a still more far-reaching objective. All civilized peoples determined that slavery,

wherever it existed, must be stamped out. They decided that the end must be achieved, whether or not the means infringed upon a purely legalistic conception of sovereignty.

In much the same manner, the elimination of such evils as the trade in narcotics and the white slave traffic has during the past decades come to be regarded as the accomplishment of a great benefit for all mankind. International moral opinion has at length come to the conviction that all nations must share in taking the steps necessary to its realization.

The rapid rise of the conviction that the general international maintenance of standards which call for freedom of religion, of expression, and of information for all peoples is essential to the maintenance of world peace, represents a similar phenomenon. It implies that those free men and women who are determined that a better world shall exist in the future regard this issue as one which transcends the previously accepted doctrines of unlimited sovereignty.

There is, however, no reason to anticipate that the acceptance by the nations of the world of this new standard of international conduct necessarily implies that peoples will generally be forced to acquiesce in constant interference in their domestic affairs by foreign powers. The practical solution of the problem would eliminate the danger of any continuous meddling by foreign powers, great or small, in the domestic affairs of other peoples.

It is difficult—notwithstanding the contentions of certain writers to the contrary—to envisage any future international organization which is not premised upon the prior acceptance by the nations composing it of certain definite obligations and of certain fundamental rules of international conduct. These principles and rules must be embodied in some international agreement similar in character, if not in content, to the Covenant of the League of Nations. There is every reason why such a charter should contain the specific stipulation that no nation may become a member of the new international organization unless it is able to demonstrate that by its constitution, or by its basic legislation, the citizens of such nation are granted as inalienable rights freedom of worship, of expression, and of information. In such manner the great principles embodied in the international bill of rights would be for all time established as obligations which each country must assume before it is able to secure from the freedom-loving nations of the world its acceptance as a member of the new international organization.

Should the complaint subsequently be raised that a government was depriving its nationals of these freedoms, the matter should be brought to the cognizance of the competent agency of the international organization, which presumably would be the international court, for determination. In the event that any government were shown to be guilty of violat-

ing the pledges which it made when it became a member of the international organization, it would obviously be no longer entitled to be regarded as a member in good standing of international society, and should be subjected to such sanctions or penalties as might be provided in the charter of the international organization.

The need for freedom of information as a means of preventing peoples in the future from being deluded by their leaders into the belief that a war of aggression will redound to their benefit, or can ever prove to be a remedy for any legitimate grievances, has never been better demonstrated than in the case of the German people during the past eleven years. To the reader of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, any elaboration of this statement will be unnecessary. Hitlerism could never have dominated Germany had it not been for the receptivity of the German mentality to the grossest forms of propaganda. The rest of the world should for many years remember the truth of the words which a former Foreign Minister of Germany, Kiderlen Waechter, once so cynically set down:

"A press campaign of four months will convince the German people of the rightness of any idiocy you like to suggest."

Hitler's propaganda commenced its deadly work, it is true, at a time when relative freedom of information still existed in Germany. Its results swept Hitler into power, with the only half-concealed support of the guiding forces within the German Army and the great German industrial cartels. The ruthless use of terrorism during the first years of the Nazi regime, however, soon brought with it the repression of all of those elements within Germany which had been at the onset opposed to the Nazi system. These could only have made their opposition effective through the use of the press and of the radio in order to counteract the hold which Hitlerism had riveted upon the German mind.

Once Hitler had eliminated every means of information other than those controlled by the Nazis, the German people became wholly responsive to the blatant forms of official propaganda which they were fed. Within only a brief period from the time when Hitler first seized power in February 1933 no German newspaper and no German broadcasting station could function unless it not only refrained from publishing the news, domestic or foreign, which the Nazi leaders did not wish the German public to learn, but also unless it published the kind of doctored news which Hitler wished the German people to assimilate.

There can be no question of the effectiveness of the Nazi system in this regard. Inclined as they instinctively were to believe in the militaristic theory of the master race, and to suspect that all other peoples of the world were bent upon depriving them of their legitimate rights and upon "encircling" their native land, the German people, now deprived of all opportunity of knowing what other peoples were actually doing or thinking, became

wholly confident that the course pursued by their Government was justified. They became convinced, in their overwhelming majority, that the hideous official persecution of the minorities within their borders was righteous; that the Western democracies were determined upon their destruction; that the obliteration of all their own individual freedom was a glorious form of patriotism, and that the domination by Germany of the rest of the world was equivalent to the triumph of good over evil.

The more fantastic the lies which the Goebbels propaganda machine poured out to the German people, the more avidly were they swallowed. Only one thing could have prevented the supine obedience given by the German people to Nazism in the years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, and, even more, during the years since 1939. That would have been knowledge on their part of what the peoples of the Western democracies, and particularly of the United States, were really thinking, and the opportunity to receive accurate news of what was happening in the rest of the world. Had they been possessed of this information, they could not have failed to know that the Second World War was deliberately brought about by the Nazi Government, and that not only would the free peoples fight to the last man to prevent the successful domination of the world by the Axis powers, but also that the greater resources of the United Nations must inevitably, in the long run, result in a new and, this time, total defeat of Germany. Only such knowledge could have given them pause.

In Japan, of course, freedom of information in any real sense has never existed. In the years prior to the First World War and in the early 1920's, the Japanese people had available to them a far greater measure of the truth as to what was going on in other parts of the earth than in more recent years, but the official influence exercised over all means of information in Japan, even during the most liberal period in Japanese history, has been extreme.

It is interesting to take, as an example of what lack of freedom of information can bring about in the political development of a traditionally and inherently democratic people, the history of the Argentine Republic during the past few years.

Constitutional government has existed in Argentina, with only brief lapses, for more than eighty years. The Argentine people are a highly individualistic nation. Individual liberty has long been a fact and not merely an aspiration. Liberty of the press, in particular, has been a matter of national pride. The complete independence of such great world newspapers as *La Prensa* and *La Nacion* has been proverbial for many generations. Any form of governmental interference with the press, or in more recent years with the radio, could not even have been imagined.

Nevertheless in 1941 when President Ortiz resigned, and the Vice

President, Dr. Castillo, succeeded to the Chief Magistracy, martial law was soon thereafter proclaimed under the pretext that the security of the nation demanded such precautionary measures as a result of the spread of the World War. Little by little censorship became more stringent. People gradually became accustomed to it. Little by little encroachments upon the freedom of the press became more far-reaching. At first limited to restrictions upon criticism of the foreign policy of the Government, they later embraced any form of criticism of the regime. Soon the constitutional rights of the Legislative Branch of the Government were invaded. With the revolt in June 1943, which resulted in the establishment of the military junta of General Ramirez, the form of dictatorship to which Europe grew accustomed during the period between the wars immediately became evident. The Argentine Congress was abolished and the rights of public assembly and of speech were obliterated. But a measure of liberty was still preserved by the great Argentine newspaper.

When the Ramirez regime was replaced, as the result of a new military coup d'état, by the Farrell dictatorship, even this nominal measure of independence disappeared, and for the first time in the history of the Argentine Republic the two great newspapers which have for so long been a glory not only of Argentina but of the entire Western Hemisphere as well have been forced to bow to the dictates of the military regime.

Today the Argentine people, unless they are able to listen in to the radio broadcasts from neighboring countries, or to obtain surreptitiously newspapers from Chile or from Uruguay, have not the slightest conception of what is going on in the rest of the world, or of the opinion held by the public in all the other Americas concerning the dictatorship which has imposed itself upon them.

Had the Argentine people been able to avail themselves during the past few years of full freedom of information, the political history of Argentina during that period would inevitably have been far different.

The hope which so many of us have today that an international organization can be created, and that through it war may be prevented and orderly human progress become a reality, is based in large part upon our conviction that the masses of the people everywhere, if they always secure accurate information, can and will ultimately attain these objectives. We are also entitled to hope that over a period of years, with the victory won, the people of the Axis themselves may undergo a transformation and a regeneration. But we know also that this cannot come to pass unless they are enabled to know the truth.

What this means is that a great majority of the people of the United Nations have come to the conclusion that the maintenance of peace among nations in the future will be contingent upon the growth of real democracy in every region of the earth. Democracy cannot, however, develop, nor

even exist, unless men and women everywhere are in practice enabled to enjoy those freedoms which are set forth in the international bill of rights. Among these freedoms none is more immediate in its effect, as a guarantee for the maintenance of peace, than the ability of all peoples freely to learn the truth, and freely to govern themselves accordingly.

FREE SPEECH IN THE FILMS

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DARRYL F. ZANUCK A unique problem faces the American motion picture industry today—a problem which has a direct bearing on the kind of world we are to have in the future.

Simply put, it is this: The movies, under the compulsion of war, have grown astoundingly in scope and stature. Almost over night, as it were they have become of major, if not paramount, importance in shaping men's thought and action. Yet only relatively few outside the industry recognize this. In that sense, the movies have outrun their public and left behind too many of those entrusted with the task of charting our postwar destinies.

Lest this be misunderstood, let me say that I am not trying to pick a quarrel or even to be critical. I am simply calling attention to a development which must be taken fully into account in order to help insure mankind against future chaos. The failure to give proper evaluation to the screen as a constructive force is easily understandable. Its development has been so rapid that there has hardly been enough time to gauge all the implications.

In all the current public discussions about the dictator nations and their control and reeducation at this time little or nothing has been said about motion pictures. The complete dismantlement of their industrial facilities has been suggested. The abolition of their arms and munitions plants is taken for granted. The elimination of their air fleets, including commercial planes, has been urged. The rigid control of their press, their radio and their other means of communication is demanded. But almost nothing has been mentioned concerning the fate of their film industries.

This is a grave and dangerous oversight, both by the public, which has entered into these discussions, and by the planners of a better postwar world. This neglect obviously points to a lack of understanding of the immense and still unplumbed possibilities of the screen in molding and guiding public opinion. It may leave to the vagaries of chance a weapon which can be used for incalculable good or harm in shaping the future.

It has been used for evil in the dictator countries and used with great cunning and efficiency. The record is there, plain for all to read. It is a record of the debauchery of a great art and educational medium for sinister purposes—a black record that should be highly instructive to the planners of the future.

The dictators were quick to seize control of the motion picture facilities in the countries under their sway. They reached out for them almost as soon as they came into power. The motion picture industries of Germany and Italy felt the dictator's heavy hand even before the press did. The screen was used to pave the way for aggression by conditioning the mind of the masses to a belief in the absurd theories of the master race, the glory of war and its moral and material benefits.

Later the screen became an outright propaganda medium and, finally, part and parcel of the war machine, doing the master's bidding without thought or question. It descended to depths of falsification and distortion almost beyond belief. Terror films, exulting in the barbarous cruelties inflicted on helpless peoples and cities, made their appearance—for example, *The Destruction of Warsaw* and *The Conquest of Crete*. Propaganda films were exported under pressure to the rest of the world still at peace.

Week after week, more than 100 million people in conquered lands were served a steady diet of poison on celluloid. Let me cite one example of the falsifications to which the nazi film propaganda descended: A nazi officer in occupied Paris was shown on the screen addressing a group of rebellious Frenchmen. He asked those in the group desiring additional food coupons to raise their right hands. Naturally, the response is automatic. But when this newsreel was distributed by the Nazis it was titled "French citizens welcome us to Paris with upraised hands in the Nazi salute."

American films quickly came under the ban because they showed a more decent way of life. The dictators were properly fearful of the effect of such films on the populations which they had conquered. Arbitrary restrictions and flagrant censorship became the order of the day in nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Again the ambitious conquerors of the world took action against foreign films first, before they invoked similar measures against newspapers and periodicals coming from the outside world. By so doing, they once more gave thunderous recognition to the role of the film in influencing thought.

That is one reason why motion pictures must receive serious consideration in the councils of the United Nations. It is also a very good reason for dealing realistically with the nazi film industry. On the basis of their record you can no more trust the nazi film makers to stick to entertainment than you can trust the nazi munitions makers to manufacture plowshares. Unless the nazi film industry is absorbed or extirpated, we may look forward to a postwar series of apparently innocuous little comedies

dedicated to the theory that while Hitler may have lost the war, Germany and the German people were never actually defeated and that *Der Tag* is yet to come.

It is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between the nazi munitions industry, which manufactured weapons of war, and the nazi film industry, which manufactured weapons of war propaganda. They must be treated in exactly the same manner.

To pursue any other course, in the light of the vast progress made by the film medium, would be rank folly. Given half an opportunity, nazi film capital might seek sanctuary in some friendly land, such as Spain or Argentina, and there set up shop again. Or it might infiltrate into neighboring countries, such as Sweden, and there gradually take over film control by dint of superior skill, knowledge or financial pressure.

Only by assuming absolute control can the United Nations hope to avoid such disturbing contingencies. Some sort of international control board, representing all the United Nations, must be set up. Under its authority, the various film companies of England, Russia, France and the United States could readily establish branch studios in Germany or the satellite nations. They could use production facilities of their own importation in addition to the studios, distribution branches and theaters at hand. They would make the pictures for the European countries which had come to depend on the Nazis for their film fare. These films naturally would be supplemented by imported productions at the discretion of the international control board. The companies operating in Germany would be subjected automatically to the restrictions of their own government and the limitations set up by the international group.

Such a plan meets most of the foreseeable contingencies. Further, it would tend to eliminate the possibility of a film Underground since the best of the German film artists and technicians, once they proved they could be trusted, would be absorbed by the outside companies and their activities would thus come under constant and proper supervision.

The rightful owners of the plants and physical properties would receive adequate compensation. Later their plants and facilities might be returned to them if the United Nations decided that such a course was safe.

To contribute their full share in reeducating a turbulent world to enduring peace, motion pictures must have a relatively free hand. First, they must be free from unnecessary government interference. Much has been said about freedom of the press, freedom of the air and freedom of science but very little about freedom of the screen. A free screen is today demonstrably as important to the world as a free press.

The visual image remains longer in the mind than the printed word. Motion pictures combine, on their simplest level, the spoken word and the visual image. They now have enormous world audiences and these

probably will be far greater with the war over. The war made millions of new movie fans among the fighting men scattered over the world who have come to regard movies as almost their sole form of diversion. It has also created new audiences for films in the remote, far-off places on the globe, among the isolated and allegedly backward peoples. They have seen many of the pictures sent to the fighting men stationed temporarily among them and they are now avid for more. By means of the new, revolutionary educational techniques, these people can now be brought to take their proper place in the world.

The possibilities are almost limitless. It is vital that this great medium of enlightenment, education and entertainment be kept free. It should receive the same privileges and protection accorded the press and be permitted to function with the same freedom here and abroad. The necessary limitations should be held to the absolute minimum. Unless the screen is free, within the limits of decency and good taste, it may easily become an object of partisan strife and political reprisal. Then it would be robbed of its chance and real value in the job of reconstructing a chaotic world.

Let me be blunt. The fear of political reprisal and persecution has been a millstone about the neck of the industry for many years. It has prevented free expression on the screen and retarded its development. The loss has not been merely our own. It has been the nation's and the world's. Few of us insiders can forget that shortly before Pearl Harbor the entire motion picture industry was called on the carpet in Washington by a Senate committee dominated by isolationists and asked to render an account of its activities. We were pilloried with the accusation that we were allegedly making anti-nazi films which might be offensive to Germany.

The press of the nation, the publishers of our books and magazines, fortunately were not compelled to undergo this same inquisition. They have been writing about the nazi peril to civilization for many years. It was a service for which the nation can be forever grateful but it never could have been rendered so effectively if the press had been exposed to the same fears of retaliation as the films were.

Very few outside our industry are fully aware of the new vistas that have opened for motion pictures. Too many are still prone to regard the movies as escapist froth, without much importance. They do not realize how profoundly American movies have already influenced their own lives and the lives of other peoples of the world. The movies have played an important role in raising the standards of American life. They have also raised the standards, by much or little, in other parts of the globe. They have sold bathtubs, telephones, automobiles and sewing machines. They have sold styles and skyscrapers. They have also sold the American way of life: its tolerance, understanding and good-will. It does not seem to me that even a fanatical Nazi could view our films for any length of time with-

out being seriously shaken in his beliefs and, if not wholly converted, at least badly "contaminated."

How many of you know about the startling progress made in the use of film for educational purposes? In the armed services visual education through training films has not only cut classroom time enormously but the trainees have learned their subjects much better. Such films have also entered academic fields previously considered beyond the province of the screen. They have been used to teach new and difficult surgeries, to explain difficult problems of science and to make plain complex mathematical equations. They have also been very effective instruments of instruction in the fields of camouflage and sanitation.

All this points to what can be done in the reeducation of Germany and Japan for peace. It is the solid foundation on which we can build. The actual task will have to be approached from two directions. The people of Germany and Japan have undoubtedly assimilated enough propaganda to make them believe that what they fought for was right. They will have to be shown otherwise. They should be compelled to view the incredible brutalities, the slaughter, the burnings and tortures which their armies and leaders indulged in to punish their hapless victims in the countries they overran. Film material of this kind is readily available, and should prove a salutary means of bringing many in Germany and Japan to their senses.

But this counter-propaganda alone would not be sufficient. By this time certainly the average German and Japanese must surely have had his fill of propaganda. For years he has been on a diet of falsehood and half truth. But unconditional surrender has exploded the myths in his face.

The process of reeducation here will have to take more subtle form. It will have to take the shape of entertainment. The defeated, exhausted people will undoubtedly be yearning for escape and entertainment. American films, once immensely popular in those countries, can supply that want. These films will have the kind they understand and like. But in them we can make our point and make it so often that its truth is finally grasped. We can do it until these people, all unwittingly, come to have an appreciation of freedom and an understanding of democracy and its workings.

Primarily it is a job of teaming entertainment and enlightenment. The techniques are at hand. We know how to use them. The industry can be relied on to use them properly and well.

THAT THE MANY MAY BE ONE

Mankind as a whole has always striven to organize a universal state. There have been many great nations with great histories, but the more highly they were developed the more unhappy they were, for they felt more acutely than other people the craving for world-wide union.

—Dostoyevsky

THAT THE MANY MAY BE ONE

THE MOTION PICTURE IN THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

W

ALTER F. WANGER

One burning word, "freedom," is today inspiring peoples everywhere. It has been a battle cry of the fighting armies of the United Nations, it has been written on the walls of the prison-fortress that was Europe by the heroic men and women of underground movements, it has drawn to our cause more than 1,600,000,000 human beings, 80 per cent of the inhabitants of the earth. People everywhere are fighting and working for freedom with such abnegation and self-sacrifice that one thinks of the present as a revolution. When I say "revolution" I do not imply the guillotine in France or the Russian upheaval. I mean our own Revolution, launched in 1776 with a high purpose and pure ideals which many of us have betrayed. We have forgotten the fortitude and self-sacrifice which made this nation of nations a living thing. We have forgotten the courage and unbelievable foresight of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Benjamin Franklin and a host of others who gave the world extraordinary hope and a charter for freedom. We have forgotten Tom Paine, who said:

Tyranny, like Hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have the consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap we esteem too lightly. It is dearness only that gives everything its value. Heaven knows to put a proper price on its goods. It would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as Freedom should not be highly rated.

It was Paine also who said:

I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress and grow brave by reflection. 'Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.

We have forgotten Patrick Henry's words:

People, Sir, form the strength and constitute the wealth of a nation.

We have forgotten John Adams' declaration:

You will think me transported with enthusiasm. I am not. I am well aware of the toil and blood and treasure that it will cost us to maintain this Declaration, and support and defend these States. Yet, through all the gloom, I can see the rays of ravishing light and glory. I can see that the end is more than worth all the means.

Never in our history have these men and their words been more alive than today. Never in history were any people blessed with so many capable and heroic minds, able to withstand the combined power of the rest of the world and clearly to indicate a better civilization.

Revolution in the sense of freedom, of happiness and of battle for a better humanity is an American ideal. It has helped us win many friends everywhere and it might, in the future even more than at present, be the decisive element in cementing great international friendships. When you hear slipshod thinkers demanding a new America think of the men I have quoted. We *are* a new America. All we have to do is to preserve our glorious Bill of Rights and the heritage our fathers gave us. That heritage still lights the world. Our task is to use our great modern inventions to conserve their dream and the reality they made of it.

I am certain what Thomas Jefferson would do—he who so firmly advised, "Direct your crusade against ignorance, educate the people. If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, it expects what never was and never will be." With his interest in all that might help enlighten his fellow citizens, and with his belief that freedom is impossible without enlightenment, Jefferson, if he were alive today, would add to his many activities that of being a motion picture producer. I say this not only because Mr. Jefferson was a statesman and a man of the world but because he loved his fellow men and their activities. All his life he sought contact with the people. He would have seen many things about the motion picture that his descendants have overlooked.

Of all the great mediums of communication so highly developed by the people of the United States—the press, the radio and the motion picture—the motion picture is the most democratic and far-reaching. It is the most democratic because it definitely belongs to the people. It has no other subsidy than the nickels and dimes of the people. We of the cinema derive no revenue from advertising; we derive our entire support from the box office. We are the only American medium of communication with a great audience outside the United States. The circulation of the press of the United States among the people of the rest of the world is limited. The American radio's listening audience is limited to those who own short-wave sets. Therefore the American motion picture, with its support from a worldwide public, becomes a great force of which Hollywood can be proud.

We can be proud of it because it proves to cynics that international organization is possible, for here is a vast industry constructed not by theor-

ists but by extraordinary American citizens. They realized their responsibility and built this important medium of enlightenment and entertainment on a foundation that was commercially profitable and yet respectful of the international interests of other free peoples.

The motion picture industry has never been nationalistic. We have never rejected talent because he or she was not born in the United States. We have realized that talent transcends national boundaries and in consequence the greatest artists of the world have come to Hollywood and have been accepted, with no discussion of quotas or discrimination. Origin and color have been forgotten in the interest of talent and the people of the world we wish to serve. Jefferson would perhaps have pointed this out to his colleagues in Washington as an example of successful international organization used on behalf of the freedom of mankind.

Hollywood's subject matter has also been sought on a highly competitive basis, regardless of source, and nothing has diminished the desire to give the great audience of the world the best in entertainment and enlightenment. Hollywood has therefore become a Mecca for the world's talent in writing, acting, producing, photography, stage-setting, technical progress and even music. Such a community is not merely a unique artistic force; it is a community with psychological power.

In the course of only a few years Hollywood has become one of the most important sources of "datelines" in the world. Hundreds of foreign correspondents devote themselves exclusively to the motion picture industry because the whole world wants to know what is happening to it. Out of its experiences those who are concerned with people throughout the world could learn much about dealing with them. The same spirit of cooperation that we have applied might prove practical in political and economic fields.

I should not be giving a fair picture if I gave the impression that Hollywood is the motion picture industry. Hollywood is the production center. only. There are three equally important and complicated divisions of this structure—distribution, exhibition and production—and they are completely interdependent. The distributors' division in the United States has 352 film exchanges in 31 important cities. These are the geographical and shipping centers for as many territories. They are needed to distribute the product effectively and quickly, so that the entire country can be serviced speedily (in contrast to the years it took a spoken drama to cover the country). For the exhibition of films there are 16,000 theaters in the country serving the public with the kind of motion pictures they want under the most favorable auspices at the lowest possible prices.

The majority of films shown throughout the rest of the free world are American (acceptable only because they have not been nationalistic in content). American firms maintain their own distribution centers throughout Latin America, the British Commonwealth, China and the entire free world

(except Russia), in order that films may be distributed as quickly and effectively in these territories as at home.

Because the nature of this business demands that we deal with that great, important mass throughout the world known as the people, I believe that in many instances our understanding of their wishes is more realistic than that of certain statesmen and politicians who do not approach us in contact or familiarity with Everyman.

Let me now turn to the industry's special war services. They have been too vast to describe here; certainly no industry has a better record for giving its product, artists and time without remuneration. The slogan has always been "We serve." The distribution branch has handled both its own war films and (without charge) all those the government itself has made, getting them quickly and efficiently to its 16,000 theaters.

We have made more than 300 special films for the government, for civilian information and for charity. These include war-training films, bond-selling films and instructional "shorts." In each case directors, writers and actors have donated their services and the studios have given the use of their space and facilities. No charge is made except for part of the physical cost of the film.

Every American should go through Walt Disney's studio. He would come out of it with a new admiration for his country. There is nothing comparable to it in all the world. More experts, scientists and technicians operate under Disney's roofs than in any other one organization in the world. Out of that amazing place have come films on meteorology, on countless types of technical subjects for the army, on the prevention and cure of malaria, on every subject that might be useful in time of war.

I want to dwell on the contribution of time, energy and courage made by the artists of the industry, apart from the great number of them, men and women, who joined the armed services. The records of the Hollywood Victory Committee list 1,985 actors and actresses who have made 12,760 camp appearances. That 12,760 figure is a great understatement. Mickey Rooney, for example, gave eight 50-minute shows in a single day, and this was recorded as one appearance. Red Skelton, who worked on his own, gave 400 shows in the first six months after Pearl Harbor. One weekend, leaving home Friday night and returning to the studio at nine Monday morning, Skelton drove 1,500 miles and gave nine shows, none less than an hour long. Bob Hope, Bing Crosby and Kay Kyser have also toured on their own. They staged their radio shows in camps and, in each locality, they telephoned to all the Special Service officers in the vicinity and said, "I'm here. Do you want me for any shows?" There have been many journeys by ship and plane to the far corners of our fighting fronts. All camp-show appearances, and of course all appearances for bond-selling, Red Cross and USO, have been without pay. The Hollywood Victory Committee has records of

more than 8,000 bond-selling appearances. That figure, too, is way under the actual number. More important than figures is the thrilling fact that Hollywood has met America and America has met Hollywood—not the Hollywood of the gossip columnists, but the movie stars as they really are, people who work hard and serve gladly.

And the job gets done. Motion picture stars are TNT as salesmen. Greer Garson, touring West Virginia for the Treasury Department, went to one town whose population is normally 2,000. Fourteen thousand were there to meet her. The town's bankers told her, "You just can't sell any bonds here. We've corralled every dollar in this area. Our town is sold out." Miss Garson drove through crowded streets, got into lively arguments about hogs and cows—she was born on a farm—and made speeches every fifteen minutes. The bankers didn't know about the dollars hidden in socks and old coffee cans out in the hills, but the farmers brought them in to buy bonds from Miss Garson. She sold \$2,000,000 worth in one day in that "sold out" town.

In the field of bond-selling the exhibitor also deserves high praise. Every motion picture theater has been a sub-office of the United States Treasury. In September, 1944 16,000 motion picture theaters gave a series of "free" shows. All one had to do to get in was to buy a bond—\$25 and up. That one concerted effort sold \$94,000,000 worth.

The importance of informational and instructional pictures will increase as time goes on. There are many hundreds of new fields which will open up to the motion picture industry. But Hollywood is not neglecting entertainment and never will give it second place. Musical comedies, gag comedies, detective films, light romance, westerns—these are better for tired minds than anything in the medicine chest.

And now what of the present and future? By chance some time ago I saw a film being prepared for army audiences by the men of our industry serving in the Signal Corps. Those who had a part in producing it were Lieutenant David Miller, a fine director from Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer; Colonel Anatole Litvak, one of Warner Brothers' best directors; and Colonel Frank Capra, the world-famous producer-director of such hits as *It Happened One Night* and *You Can't Take It With You*. I believe this picture, called *Conversion and Substitution*, is the finest and most significant film yet produced. It expressed the real spirit of the United States more effectively than anything I have seen. This great film showed how we lost the strategic materials of war by our failure to hold the Philippines. (We lost 25 per cent of our supply of chromite—and without chromite you cannot make one pound of armor plate. We lost 97 per cent of the world's rubber supply and half our supply of tin. We lost tungsten, iron, manganese, all used for the essential materials of war.) It revealed how enormous our needs were—and reminded us that we did not say, "These problems are insoluble; let's give up and go the same

old way, alibiing and compromising," when confronted with grievous losses. It pointed out that, instead, expert scientists, research specialists, engineers, businessmen, professionals, designers, workmen, got together in the interest of the nation to solve the new problems. It underscored the miraculous growth of our Army, Navy and Air Force; it gave us confidence that nothing could stop us.

I have been speaking of our material transformation. But this is all futile if our conversion and substitution are confined to material things. Our concern is for the peace and the future of the world. Only unconditional social and spiritual reconstruction can bring lasting peace.

We in Hollywood try fervently to keep in touch with the trends of taste. I sincerely think we must have done a pretty good job to date because in every way our industry has been growing constantly. But we are far from satisfied. I personally have been horrified to discover how ignorant I am after trying for twenty years to keep abreast of events. The war revealed my scandalous ignorance of geography. I find I am not alone. On all sides people pore over maps. Never have I seen so many excellent and informative books published and eagerly absorbed. Never have people so eagerly sought information from the radio. Never have the better motion pictures received heartier support. The great improvements in taste and the eagerness for knowledge should give us all hope and confidence; but we cannot be complacent if we are to win the peace—within ourselves and for our children.

Our spiritual and social conversion is under way but far from complete. An American saint, Abraham Lincoln, said, "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise to the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think and act anew."

We who try to survey the trend are convinced that there is a rebirth of the spirit abroad in the land, that the American Renaissance is here. The people know that we must not return to the *status quo*. They are preparing themselves to reject propaganda and politics and to respect truth and knowledge. I have seen enough letters from men and women who have been at the front to know they want an enlightened world. I know the youth who are in the schools and colleges. I have recently talked to a group from the University Religious Conference. They are alert and uncompromising in their revolt against stupidity.

This transformation of the national atmosphere will increase the importance of the vote because the individual citizen is beginning to realize that government begins with him. It begins in the home, in the local community. After that it moves out to the state and federal government. The citizen of this country, and I am sure of all other countries, is beginning to realize also that there is the rest of the world and that we must understand

not only our own society but the rules of international society—the art of preserving peace, the art of increasing our own prosperity and that of all humanity. Our eyes have been opened by tragic events; we now know that when a tyrannical government deprives a people of its rights and threatens our neighbors' peace it threatens every one of us.

I want to state, and I do so with humility, that the motion picture industry is conscious of the temper of the American mind and of our world. In our films we shall try to interpret the American spirit to the rest of the world, so that a coordinated and enlightened civilization can transform itself and thus ensure universal freedom and security from spiritual or material attack.

The motion picture industry cannot work without freedom. And as the very expression of freedom it never will give up the fight for liberty—for all men.

ART: GOODWILL AMBASSADOR

J

JOHN G. PAYNE These are days when minds of men everywhere turn to thoughts of lasting peace. The world is growing weary of hate. The sacrifices that have been made by almost every country of the world both in youthful lives and in wealth, the economic dislocations that have been greater than people ever believed they could bear, the disruption of normal daily life, quicken in the minds and hearts of men and women everywhere the determination that peace shall be real, shall be lasting and shall be uninterrupted.

How to attain that kind of peace for which the human race so ardently longs is engaging the minds of thinking people everywhere. There is no simple panacea for its attainment. The edifice of peace must be built on the bedrock of universal desire for it, and each block that is used in its construction must be carefully selected and properly molded to the building's great design.

It has become evident that no one people can live apart from all other peoples, that we must recognize the full interdependence of all nations. Whether we like it or not, we must live with our fellowmen—people with different-colored skins, with different languages, with different religious beliefs, with different background and traditions, affected by differing environments.

The interdependence is largely economic and, because this is so, has a tendency to beget selfishness and distrust and conflicting aims and aspirations. It seems therefore that it should be the job of each nation to see to it that its people are known intimately by all other people. One rarely quarrels with one's friends and intimates, and it would seem to follow therefore that if we know the other folks in the world very well and if they know us equally well, one substantial block at least in the edifice of peace will have been created.

At least one of the means, and it would seem an important means, by which this needed international acquaintanceship can be accomplished is the exchange of cultures.

Here in the United States we have paid all too little attention to this important force. Fortunately we have not neglected it entirely, and more fortunately our leaders today are giving it more and more attention. We here have been too prone to think of culture as a luxury, to think of it as an antithesis of the commonplace, but this is not so. A culture is the sum total of all the forces that are currently at play within a nation and which mold the personality of its people and shape their destiny.

In our citizenship here there are people who are more sensitive to these forces than others, who feel them to the point of being conscious of them, who are stirred to their very depths by their contact with them and who capture these forces and express them in various art forms—in the drama, in painting, in sculpture, in the literature of the nation, and very particularly in its music and its songs.

In these art forms, the culture is passed on to future generations, and the emotional response that we get from contact with these art forms gives us an understanding of the times and of the conditions under which the people lived. We know something of the political, the economic and the intellectual development of the early Greeks through the learned researches that are made, but we understand the Greeks because of the poems and the drama and the sculpture and the architecture that they have passed on to us.

Few nations have been really aware of the power of a national culture. Of the modern nations, France was probably the most aware. In 1937 Dr. Jean Zay, then the National Minister of Education in France, said to the writer that "a national culture was a national asset." He enlarged on this greatly and believed, as all France believed, that the national culture of France was one of its best ambassadors to the rest of the world.

In the United States we have not treated our national culture as a national asset largely, doubtless, through a feeling that we had no culture to offer, through a belief that the great classical painters were better than any painters that we had, that the great dramatists of France, Germany, England were greater than the men and women writing for our stage, that

the music of Brahms, Bach, Beethoven, Verdi, Wagner, Massenet exceeded in value the works of any of our composers, that the art works which were the interpretation of our culture were so inadequate and so immature that they could not possibly constitute an asset.

True, our art forms, measured by the classical standards of these older cultures, are perhaps immature and inadequate but our error was in measuring them thus. We should and must measure them by their own standards. Our country is still immature. The spirit of exploration and adventure is still alive here. Life still offers fascinating vistas. We have developed beyond the dreams of any other people. The ideas of mass production have cultivated a consciousness of the value of time and efficiency that no nation heretofore has ever even nearly approached. These are among the vital forces that are America, and these are the forces that are reflected in our art.

We as a nation are still very close to the soil. We as a nation find life reasonably simple and unsophisticated. We as a nation strive for robust health, are interested in personal well-being, cleanliness, sanitation. One cannot see the paintings of Grant Wood or of Rockwell Kent without knowing these things to be the fact and without understanding America a little better. One cannot hear the rhythms of George Gershwin or of Raymond Scott without understanding something of the forces that make up America. One cannot sing the great songs of *Oklahoma!* without a conscious feeling that these spring from the soil of U.S.A. and only U.S.A. One cannot hear the *Skyscrapers* suite of John Alden Carpenter or the Third Symphony of Roy Harris or any of the works of Morton Gould, or see the ballets of Aaron Copland or Leonard Bernstein without catching something of the spirit that motivates the men and women of this country.

The time has come when we must begin as a nation that definite program of sending these our art forms throughout the world so that peoples everywhere can be exposed and brought in contact with these art forms, for in doing so they will know us better and knowing us better they will like us more. At the same time that we are sending our art forms to the far corners of the world, we should be equally interested in having other nations send to us their art forms that we may be exposed to that culture which is theirs and that we may thereby grow to know them better and like them better.

At a luncheon with Dr. Serge Koussevitzky, the conductor of the great Boston Symphony Orchestra, and an important music critic, the question of an exchange of cultures between Russia and the United States after the war was the subject of discussion.

The music critic said to Dr. Koussevitzky, "Well, in the field of music Russia has much to offer to America, but what has America to offer to Russia?" Without giving it a moment's consideration Dr. Koussevitzky

answered emphatically, "You have *Oklahoma!*" Then he said that nothing in all of his American experiences had given him such an understanding of America or such an insight into the soul and spirit of the American people as that beautiful and exquisite play, so gay, so colorful, at times perhaps bawdy. The Russians, he said, would not only love it but they would understand it and respond to it as he did. Perhaps Dr. Koussevitzky's wish may become a reality. Let us hope so.

Let the leaders in each nation give thought to this idea of a deliberate and active interchange of culture of peoples everywhere as a peace measure.

It seems certain that if other peoples become conscious that we have here in the United States a culture that is vital and that we have pride in it and that we as a nation enjoy it and love it, they will think of us less as mere money-changers and merchants, shrewd businessmen, and they will like us better because of that.

It is quite possible that people of other lands would prefer our culture to our gold and would find the diplomacy of art forms more acceptable than the diplomacy of dollars. Certainly the former could never beget the jealousy or hate the latter might.

A FEDERAL LANGUAGE FOR A WORLD COMMONWEALTH

A

LBERT GUERARD

A language for international relations is not a utopian dream; it is an immediate and constant problem. Whenever the representatives of several countries assemble, the question cannot be shirked. It is met in various ways. The commonest is the use of three or four major languages, into which all speeches and documents have to be translated. This method was cumbrous even when English, French, and German alone were in the field. It has broken down beyond repair. For the privilege of the "Big Three" is no longer recognized. Spanish, the most genuinely international of all, since it is official in a score of countries, had already claimed the same rights. Russian cannot be ignored. Italian, Portuguese, Polish will not be satisfied with a back seat. And one of the inevitable results of this war will be to secure full equality of status for Asiatic nations and cultures. As every group and every province seeks to evolve a speech of its own; as Ukrainian insists on being different from Great Rus-

sian, and Slovak from Czech; as even in Norway the *Landsmaal* strove to assert itself against the *Rigsmaal*; as in South Africa the Boers are promoting Dutch—and Cape Dutch at that—at the expense of English; as Eire breathes new life into its half-forgotten idioms and the Zionists into Hebrew, the curse of Babel grows heavier upon us.

Language differences, language conflicts are not merely material obstacles to friendly intercourse. Worse even than blood or economic interests, they seem to concentrate and embitter the pride and jealousy of men. What Hitler sought in Czechoslovakia and in Poland was to create a sharp hierarchy of languages: the tongue of the *Herrenvolk*, with a monopoly of administration and culture, and the despised patois of the lesser breeds. The sentimental, the passionate, aspect of language is a fact which should never be overlooked.

Of this fact the English-speaking world is serenely oblivious. We do not ignore the international language problem, but it does not worry us in the least, for the inescapable solution is perfectly clear in our minds. Of course there must be a language for international intercourse, and that language is already English. Any attempt to evade that ineluctable development is merely the pathetic struggle of petty provincialism. Those men of English speech who believe themselves to be world-citizens, like H. G. Wells, or refined philosophers like I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden, are on this question in full accord with the average politician or businessman.

This is not obtuseness, but the result of experience. We know how eager immigrants are to adopt our language (all too often, their children are ashamed of their parents' tongues). If before the war we traveled over the world, everywhere the inscription *English spoken* met our eyes—provided we kept to the beaten Anglo-Saxon track. Nor was this limited to hotel, curio shop, or tourist agency. If we wanted to meet the "natives," naturally those who could speak English came to the fore. Their knowledge of the language was an achievement they were only too anxious to display. Thus English spread a tenuous but undeniable net from pole to pole.

The war emphasized this predominance. Until 1939, the Western Democracies stood as the hope of mankind against brutal tyranny; and France, even more than England, was the haven of all free minds. With the collapse of France, the English-speaking nations remained alone as the refuge and the hope of liberty. But for Britain's magnificent resistance, but for America's formidable resources, three continents would be subjected to irremediable serfdom.

Certainly this is not the moment for refugees to begrudge our leadership. On this point, many exiles vigorously endorse Anglo-Saxon claims. Good Europeans, like Thomas Mann or Coudenhove-Kalergi, accept English as the federal language of a free world. Washington is paying the

pipers and calling the tune. We have no information about the enormous mass of international activities which now have their center in the United States, but it is a safe surmise that in overwhelming proportion they are conducted in English. The same conditions are bound to prevail at the Peace Conferences. China and Russia have borne the brunt of the fighting; but their forces were gradually depleted while ours were growing. Neither Chinese nor Russian is widely known outside of its own country. French, Italian, and German will have no standing; they represent defeat. The Spanish world is divided, and will remain a minor partner. With victory ours, there is nothing that can prevent English from being the sole official language of the peace conferences and, by an almost inevitable extension, the federal language of the World Commonwealth.

Nothing—except our own moderation and sense of fairness. To these I would appeal, for the adoption of English as the federal language would be a severe handicap for the new Commonwealth of Nations.

For one thing, it would accompany victory, and to the defeated it would remain the hated badge of defeat. Yes, millions will bless us, in France, in Italy, even in Germany, for having finally exorcised the incubus. But millions also will mourn their vanished dream, and rebel at the thought that world supremacy should pass into other hands. We do not mean to give offense, but nationalistic pride is desperately sensitive and gratitude often is an unbearable burden. When normal life is restored, the feeling will be: "So that crusade for liberty was a tussle for the mastery of the world? It did not abolish, as it promised, the noxious conception of a *Herrenvolk* and a *Herrensprache*; it merely decided that English, not German, would prevail." In such a state of mind, the World Commonwealth, with its Anglo-Saxon stamp, will be not welcome but resented. Every group that feels itself dispossessed and humbled will try to limit, not to extend, the scope of international activities. It will be "patriotic" to unlearn English. English could grow before the war, on a free and unofficial basis, just as German and French, in other spheres, were growing also. But official predominance is a challenge.

A second moral danger is that the triumph of English would almost inevitably be ascribed—by us and by the rest of the world—to the wrong reason. Even today, we meet cultured and gentle men who unconsciously advance the most vulgar arguments. "Our speech is prevailing, and must prevail, because we are bigger and richer than anyone else on earth. We have more automobiles, more telephones, more bathtubs than the rest of the world combined. We make more gorgeous and more fabulously expensive movies." Brutal as this is, this claim is perhaps less objectionable than self-righteousness: "We are the natural overlords, because of our moral rectitude. We have saved the world, and deserve to rule it." No one dares, and no one cares, to challenge our pretensions now. But before long,

these pretensions will be examined, and not in a submissive spirit. It will then be remembered that as world leaders we had shown ourselves singularly remiss between 1919 and 1939. It was our sacred egoism that caused world organization to fail. If we are right today, then we were wrong during those two decades; and our utmost efforts are only a belated atonement.

The sin of the best intentioned among us has been to be so unquestioningly right in their own eyes. We refused to think in any terms except those of Anglo-Saxon experience—and Anglo-Saxon interests. We never understood that the Washington Conference, inspired by the purest motives, was an offense and a challenge to the non-Anglo-Saxons. Our representatives could never see the merits of Europe's stand on the debt question. Even today, we are apt to identify the Anglo-Saxon constitutional pattern with the very concept of liberty. Even today, we find it hard to look at India's problems except through British spectacles. The official adoption of English would make our spiritual insularity impregnable. What we need, on the contrary, is to meet the rest of the world without fear or favor, on a common level.

These things are not popular. Most of us, pardonably, never think about them at all: Anglo-Saxon supremacy is the very air we breathe. Our foreign friends cannot tell us. I am free to speak: I am an American citizen and a veteran of the other war. But I was brought up in Europe, and have been a determined internationalist ever since I was conscious of thought. This is not antagonistic to American loyalty; I prefer the tradition of George Washington, who called himself "a citizen of the great Republic of Humanity at large," to that of Stephen Decatur. William Lloyd Garrison said: "My country is the world." To this ideal we must remain true, if we are to liberate mankind. And this means the renunciation of every privilege of race, class, caste, nation, or language.

(A minor argument seriously adduced is that "Anglo-Saxons" would never learn any language but their own, because they could not. I know that American journalists can spend a decade or so in the Latin Quarter without learning French: still I believe that our congenital dumbness in this respect has been greatly exaggerated. It might well be a convenient alibi for laziness and pride.)

The language we need, therefore, must be one which does not stand for victory, power, wealth, pride, but for brotherhood; one that can be used by the World Police, the World Court, the World Airways, without any fear that the strong and the rich will be made stronger and richer thereby; one that will respect the essential equality of all cultures, and give the least of the tribes a fair chance to co-operate in the world's welfare; *a language, in short, that will be the symbol as well as the instrument of the international spirit.* Because of the very might and wealth of the

Anglo-Saxon world, English is barred out. What other solution could be adopted?

Here we must distinguish between a provisional solution, valid only for the peace conferences, and a permanent solution for the World Commonwealth of the future. A provisional solution must be immediately available, rather than perfect in theory, but its provisional character must be made manifest. To meet these conditions, we suggest a return to the bilingualism of the League of Nations, English and French. There are innumerable diplomats and technicians throughout the world who know both these languages; there are few who do not know at least one of them. The use of French in diplomacy for two centuries has imparted to the language a precision which even English cannot match. In the very effort of preparing a text in two different languages, all ambiguities would be exposed to the sharpest scrutiny. But the great advantage of this historical solution, in our eyes, is that it would be unquestionably a makeshift. There is not the slightest possibility that German, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, or Hindustani would permanently accept an Anglo-French condominium. The adjunction of French would simply be an indication that English had no thought of entrenching itself in power.

As a long-range solution, a major national language other than English—say French, Spanish, or Italian—would also rouse the legitimate jealousy of the others. A minor language, like Malay or Swahili, would not be open to this objection. But it would have to be fitted to the complexities of modern civilization; it would lack the tradition which, in many fields, is a condition of definiteness; it could not rely upon a large international body of men already familiar with its elements. These objections apply with even greater force to a language which, for the sake of perfect neutrality, should be absolutely artificial.

A language that is neutral, non-national, yet with a tradition; a language that is known to some extent by a large number of men in all countries—these requirements seem exacting, yet Latin fulfills them all. Only a few years ago, no man was deemed a gentleman and a scholar unless he had at least a nodding acquaintance with Latin. In my youth, all candidates for the French Doctorate of Letters had to write one of their theses in Latin. There is hardly any high school in our land that does not offer Latin; and the Catholic Church places a Latinist in the remotest village, and bids the humblest believer repeat magnificent Latin hymns and prayers. Even in the early nineteenth century Latin was still the official language of polyglot Hungary, and the trouble began when the Magyars attempted to force their tongue upon the minor nationalities.

I freely admit that classical Latin is too difficult, not only for the common man, but for engineers, diplomats—and professors. The Latin of the medieval hymns, however, is a different proposition. And we might very well go

much farther: this is the age of conscious planning and "synthetic" products. Here Messrs. I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden would be excellent guides. Their work in Basic is essentially logical or semantic. They apply their method to the English vocabulary; but there is nothing to preclude the possibility of a Basic Latin. All that is needed is to divorce, in Basic, the philosophical aspect from the chauvinistic.

As a matter of fact, this solution was adumbrated three centuries ago by Descartes and Leibniz. Men like Rudolf Carnap admit the possibility of a logical regularized language. The combination of thought-analysis with the most international vocabulary was carried out by the Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano. His *Latino sine Flexione*, or *Interlingua*, based on those Latin roots which exist in English, is intelligible at first sight by anyone who knows Latin, or English, or any one of the Romance languages. Without declension or elaborate conjugation, it can be made even simpler than Esperanto. As it uses the Latin words in their etymological form, without arbitrary distortion, it provides a valuable introduction to classical Latin in its majestic fullness.

Patre nostro, qui es in celos, que tuo nomine fi sanctificato. Que tuo regno adveni; que tua voluntate es facta sicut in celo et in terra. . . .

THE EDUCATORS' WAR ABOUT THE PEACE

LIN YUTANG The United States is now standing at the crossroads: one road leading to a higher and better world order based on equality and co-operation of all nations, and the other leading to world mastery or world domination through sheer military force by America in the exclusive company of Britain and excluding Russia and China and all other countries. These two tendencies of thought are basic; this is the war about the peace. Their conflict is necessary and inescapable, and between world mastery and world co-operation there is no other choice. Both schools of thought have sensibly ruled out isolationism after the war as both foolish and impossible.

In World War II our political leaders made a better showing than our academic writers. Thus the men who have headed up the making of American foreign policy have consistently stood on the side of world co-operation and equality of all nations, so far as their public record goes. On this same side, I must also mention all New York taxi-drivers and our soldiers at the

front, and Samuel Crafton, the only columnist who seems to speak about a better world with anything like passion and deep sincerity.

The showing on the part of publicists and college professors is disgraceful, and this is the whole point of my writing this article. The deep-seated cynicism, the stupid belief in domination by force, the total absence of appreciation of a moral point of view, and above all, the haughty threat of force, in the form of an overwhelming air and sea power with which they are going to police the world for the world's own good, are the general characteristics of such reasoning. On the whole, it is the American college professor or research advisor of some learned institution, rather than the statesman, who can view comfortably the replacing of a nineteenth-century imperialism by a greater and more powerful, more overwhelming rule of force. This is the result of his peculiar academic training, which teaches him to be objective and amoral and to rule out all "silly," inexact, immeasurable human sentiments.

In spite of this objectivity and cynicism, which seem to imply wisdom of age, to an Oriental the net conclusions of such writers seem jejune and naïve in the extreme. The basic ideas are: (1) war for power; (2) balance of power, and (3) racial discrimination—incidentally, all the ideas that motivated Adolf Hitler. Some of these persons are even professed believers in Haushofer's geopolitics, except that, unlike Haushofer and Mackinder, their geopolitics is bad. As Dorothy Thompson pointed out, Dr. George T. Renner, professor of geography at Columbia University, indicated in his article in *Collier's* that he does not even know geography. It seems that we are all inheritors of a sick and dying tradition in modern thought, from which these professors are not able to lift themselves. If the voice of professors prevails over the voice of the politicians, the blood of millions of American boys will have to be shed in a future war, for even they themselves do not tell you that, following the pattern of world domination, there will be world peace, but only that the Anglo-American sword shall be ground so sharp and suspended so ominously low over the rest of the world that no revolt will be possible. In other words, what did succeed in Hitler's hands will succeed in Anglo-American hands. If this is the sum of wisdom of Anglo-American scholarship, then God help Anglo-American scholarship.

I must elaborate, going in succession from the better to the worse exponents of the theory of Anglo-American domination. It is necessary to write about them because this theory of world domination represents a powerful trend of thought against the other trend of world co-operation, and because the cost in money to American taxpayers and the cost in blood to American families in the next war will depend on the result of this fight between these two schools of thought—and, let us not forget, the issue of peace or war in the future will also depend upon it.

The best book on the domination side of the argument, on the whole temperate and highly intelligent, is John MacCormac's *America and World Mastery*. It is a reasonably argued and clearly written book. Also, the author is aware of moral values. "Democracy, therefore, demands not only victory but a rebirth.... To free it from the taint of the status quo they should proclaim it as the New Democracy—the democracy that believes man has both a soul and a body and that both are more precious than dogmas or vested interest." Its point of view is historical and matter-of-fact in regard to the theory of balance of power. Tracing the development of the balance of power in Europe, Mr. MacCormac comes to the conclusion that an Anglo-American alliance is the only alternative to an Anglo-German alliance against Russia after the war. "It would be the instinct of the English people to maintain a Germany strong enough to act as a counter-weight to Russia. That is what they tried to do after the first World War, but their efforts were rendered futile by France's fear for her security.... *It is highly likely that in post-war Europe Russia may succeed Germany as the fire-breathing dragon against which England must play St. George.*"* Pan-Slavism, reinforced by a communist ideology, may appear as great a threat as Pan-Germanism wearing the cloak of a new world order." Nothing is more correct than his analysis of both fact and trend, except that Baldwin, Chamberlain & Co.'s efforts to allow the restoration of "a strong Germany" against Russia were not so "futile"—as we have sadly learned now. Yet there is never a suggestion of sincere co-operation with Russia in the new world order (without which world peace will be impossible), or a plea for a sincere attempt to do so; on the contrary, it is assumed throughout that this Anglo-American combination is against Russia. Moreover, the author advocates that in the world federation, "the one-member one-vote principle should be succeeded by a more realistic representation of world forces."

Next in order comes Stephen King-Hall's *Total Victory*. As editor of the famous King-Hall News Letters, he has all the facts, quotations and dates correct, and the book is informative. Like the other titles, this one is frightening. Total victory means the maintenance of an Anglo-American "peace force," the organization for which is outlined in "The Anglo-American Proclamation to Mankind," to be issued by the President of the United States and the English King. Article 3 reads: "Therefore the President and the King have undertaken to establish a joint British-American Fleet and Air Force. The strength of the Fleet will be in all respects three times that of the next largest fleet afloat at any given moment and not less than twice as strong as any combination of any other three forces." Article 4 reads: "The strength of the Air Force will be not less than four times as great in all respects as the next largest air force and twice as strong as any possible

* All italics in this and the following quotations are Lin Yutang's.

combination of two other air forces." Article 7: "Eighty per cent of the personnel of the British-American Fleet and Air Force will be British and American citizens. Foreign subjects shall be eligible to enlist . . . up to a total of 20 per cent of the whole establishment of each force. Foreign subjects desirous of serving in the Peace Force will be required to take an oath of loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief of the branch of the Peace Force in which they enlist."

Mr. King-Hall's comments on this scheme are both ingenuous and really amusing; they disarm all criticism and make everything clear and pretty.

By reserving 20 per cent of the personnel of our Peace Force for non-American and non-British subjects, we hope that we should *make a contribution toward international understanding and do a little* to meet the criticism that the establishment of this force was an attempt to establish Anglo-American world domination. On the other hand we feel that no attempt should be made to gloss over the fact that *the British-American peoples are determined to use overwhelming force to prevent aggression.*

The British and American Governments would not wish to deny to any power of good will the privilege of partaking in the chastisement of the aggressor. *All they intend to do is to make themselves responsible* for the maintenance of a force large enough and efficient enough in all circumstances to do the job, with or without assistance.

One can hardly expect other nations such as the Russians, for example, to accept what seems *a platitude* to most British and Americans, i.e., the fact that in neither of the great democracies would an aggressive imperial policy receive support. It will therefore be best to *explain the existence* of the Peace Force to other Powers by stating that since the Governments of the British Empire and the U.S.A. between them are *responsible for the welfare of some 30 per cent of the human race* and since experience has shown that owing to the economic integration of civilization it is impossible to limit the effects of war, *the two Governments feel they have a duty and a right to make special efforts to safeguard world peace.*

It is our belief that if millions of common men and women of every race and creed in every part of the world were convinced that a powerful Anglo-American force existed in order to strike ruthlessly at any aggressor they would cry out: "Thank God!"

All in all, that is naïveté from the respectable editor of the King-Hall News Letters. The scheme looks as easy and as simple as did Hitler's scheme to conquer the world.

We are descending rapidly in our parade of fascist thinking. Lionel Gelber's small book, *Peace by Power*, deserves little comment, not because it is small but because it is very badly written from the point of view of style, and this seems natural, because we are now turning to the academic group, the present author being "a teacher of modern history

and international affairs at Canadian universities." Had this fact not been clearly indicated on the jacket, I should have thought from the author's cynicism toward higher ideals that he was a college sophomore or at best a fresh graduate in any decade of intellectual and moral anarchy. It is sufficient to quote his standpoint regarding the nature of the war. *"Let us be perfectly frank with ourselves. There is nothing cynical in a plain recognition that this also is a war for power.* All power corrupts, said Lord Acton, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. And because of that conviction, it bears a sinister name. Yet power, *as Machiavelli perceived*, is the very stuff of politics, the deciding factor in public and international affairs. . . . What must settle the future of humanity is to whom it belongs and how it is used. In the hands of the West, even though they falter, power will be employed in one fashion; in German hands, it will be employed in another. And such being the stark contrast *none but the frivolous still can wonder what the war is all about.*" I wonder where the author received his college training, but I am informed he "lived in Oxford and London for eight years," and not in fascist Germany.

Before we come to Professor Spykman of Yale, we will take a short glimpse at Kurt Bloch's mimeographed memorandum on Far Eastern Post-War Problems, published in May, 1942, by the Institute of Pacific Relations, to show that when Professor Spykman speaks, he does not speak alone. Since this comes from a research institute, it is classified here in the academic group, which is idiotic in this case. Throughout this group, I have never seen one trace of moral sentiment, moral sentiment being out of bounds for research scholars who are interested only in facts such as geography and products. The academic dilemma in modern scholarship, that in order to be "scientific" we cannot properly handle human sentiments—in other words, the enforced amorality of the academic point of view—had better be solved quickly by Western thinkers, or we must have as a natural result international amorality in human relations. The elimination of conscience has come from the top, not from below, from the educated, not from the uneducated. Consequently, if we are to continue to live safely together in peace, as surely we must, we must rely on the judgments of the New York taxi-drivers, and not of a Yale professor of international relations.

One quotation should be enough. Mr. Bloch's idea with regard to China is international control of Formosa and Burma and Indo-China, not so much as a check against Japan, but as substitutes for the checks against China in the outdated railway and port zones. He writes: *"Given the broader range of modern implements of war, the establishment of narrow port and railway zones—as established in China by various 19th century arrangements (South Manchuria Railway Zone, Boxer Indemnity Protocols concerning the Tientsin-Peking Railway, etc.)—is no longer satisfactory.* The strategic interests (*sic!*) of China would seem, *therefore, to require*

some kind of international control over both Indo-China and Burma with strong, though not decisive, Chinese participation." Mr. Bloch continues: "If American-British interests were assumed to be in opposition to Far Eastern powers other than Japan, i.e., if they were predicated upon some 'inevitable' future conflict with China or the Soviet Union, *doubts might be raised as to the advisability of strengthening the Sino-Soviet position in the Far East*, as outlined under A. and B. To forestall the growth of such conflicts, however, *the international condominium of the Trans-Pacific strategic area constituted by the Mandated Islands* (and possibly Liu Chiu and Bonin Islands), *Philippine bases and Formosa, combined with international control over Burma and Indo-China would seem to constitute a safeguard.*" Note that the phrase "international control" is not conceived as control by the United Nations, but as an apparently benevolent but actually hostile control by America and Britain against China.

Finally we come to Dr. Nicholas John Spykman, professor of International Relations at Yale from 1928 and, until his death in 1943, Director of the Yale Institute of International Studies. His book is *America's Strategy in World Politics*. With all his learning, Professor Spykman could not escape the verdict of being totally lacking in the moral sense, when he said, "*Unless the United States [after the war] continues to struggle until she has defeated not only her enemies, but also her former allies, the post-war period will begin with an international society composed of numerous independent states,*" which is a contingency the professor dared not contemplate. The context on the previous page makes it clear that by "enemies" the author meant Germany and Japan, and by "former allies" he meant Russia and China. How many millions of American boys must shed their blood in order to crush both China and Russia never concerned the learned man. If it had, he would have ceased to be objective and made a disgraceful display of such human emotions as justice and the revulsion against killing fellow men. Professor Spykman forgot about God. His reply was that his subject is geopolitics, and that God and geopolitics are separate. My reply to that is that they should not be separate, or we should be debasing the human intellect in the name of science. This dilemma exists everywhere and must be faced quickly.

The matter is more serious than it looks. It is of this book that Dr. Isaiah Bowman, President of Johns Hopkins University, said: "On grounds of merit and public value it should be read in not less than a million American homes. *Every Government official responsible for policy should read it once a year for the next twenty years.*" "Lest we forget—lest we forget," I might add.

Now why did President Bowman recommend this book so highly? The reason is easy to understand. It is a serious, informative, and very well-written work. Its main thesis is the United States and the balance of power,

and since the theory of balance of power has dominated European politics for the past three centuries, one should be informed of such facts. I do not regret purchasing this volume for my library. How then could Professor Spykman champion such terrible conclusions? It is because in his final chapter, he still maintains that academic, impartial standpoint of a historian, or a Martian. He does not say his conclusions are moral or immoral; he merely outlines what he believes to be future developments on the basis of past facts of history. He says more often "This will be the development," than "This should be the development," although occasionally he lapses into the latter form. On the whole, the tenor of his conclusions tends to recommend that realistic, amoral, and immoral approach. It never occurred to him that, since the theory of balance of power has embroiled Europe for the last three hundred years, a change might be made in another direction, so that post-war collaboration with Russia and China might be based on sincere good will and co-operation; on the other hand, he intends to apply this balance of power to Asia now, and to see that Russia, China, and Japan are kept so evenly balanced that they can continue to slaughter one another for at least another three hundred years, following the noble example of Europe. This being the essence of his conclusion, he is able to look upon future human history from the height of a geopolitician's or a Martian's point of view. As a geographer, he made no distinction between England and Japan, because of their geographical similarities with regard to their respective continents. But we had better read a bit of American geopolitics.

On the hegemony of England and America, the professor said objectively: "The Anglo-American federalists present their program as a first stage in the creation of a world federation and they concede that other states, upon certificate of good behavior, will eventually be permitted to join. The fact remains, however, that in the meantime the union is expected to function as a hegemony. . . . The response to any plan for a permanent Japanese-American-British hegemony based on sea power would inevitably be the creation of a counter-alliance by the great land powers. The integration of the Eurasian land mass by force . . . would then take place through voluntary co-operation because Germany, Russia, and China would find themselves encircled and in need of combining their strength. An alliance of the insular continent of North America with the two off-shore islands [Japan and England] facing the Eurasian land mass would have great merits from the point of view of the territorial defense of the Western Hemisphere, but it *would not be strong enough to rule the world and it would leave England and Japan in extremely exposed positions.*"

This conclusion seems to be not entirely satisfactory in the professor's mind.

We can now understand his recommendations with regard to creating a balance of power in Asia. The "Asiatic Mediterranean" (Philippines,

Dutch East Indies, etc.) must be under this Anglo-American hegemony because of rubber and tin. But "the preservation of a balance of power will then be necessary not only because of our interest in strategic raw materials but also because of what unbalanced power in the region could do to the rest of the world." The professor goes on to explain why. "*The main difficulty of the post-war period will be not Japan, but China.* . . . A modern, vitalized, and militarized China of 450 million people is going to be a threat not only to Japan, but also to the position of the Western Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean. . . . Her geographic position will be similar to that of the United States in regard to the American Mediterranean."

To the author's profound regret, he found that "It will be difficult to find public support in the United States for a Far Eastern policy based on the realities of power politics. . . . This tradition is tied up with a pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese orientation. . . . Public opinion will probably continue to see Japan as the great danger. . . . If the balance of power in the Far East is to be preserved in the future as well as in the present, *the United States will have to adopt a similar protective policy toward Japan* [similar to what she has adopted toward England in the two World Wars]. *The present inconsistency in American policy will have to be removed.*" There the author has reached a height of understanding far above that of the New York taxi-driver, and the perception of such rare truth gives the author a justifiable pride in his scholarship.

But the whole point of this article is that I accuse modern Western scholarship of being amoral, which is a splendid attitude in regard to the natural sciences, but downright decadent in the sphere of human studies. I maintain that the academic attitude, deprived of warm emotions for our fellow men, is a dangerous attitude to teach in our college classrooms. I maintain that this trend of thought has produced a Hitler, and might produce more Hitlers in the future, wherever this type of mental attitude prevails. I maintain, further, that this method of strict objectivity, useful in natural sciences, is unreliable and dangerous in the human sciences. I maintain that objective thinking in human relations is an impossibility, and never exists.

I maintain this, because first of all, in the final weighing of conclusions, after the assemblage of facts, the decision is always a subjective process, involving evaluation of imponderable factors, never reducible to facts and figures.

An example of the failure of the objective method is the isolationist position of Charles A. Beard. In the final weighing of divergent facts, to arrive at an isolationist or anti-Axis stand, the emotions not only do but also *should* enter into our consideration, or we are debasing the intellect and the conscience that God has given us.

Secondly, in the realm of human affairs, psychological facts and factors could never be assessed with anything like the accuracy of the scientific

measurement of electric volts or radio waves. Outstanding cases are Russian and Chinese morale. If anybody ever took painstaking trouble to assemble facts, the Germans certainly did. The odds looked all in their favor. If the Germans could be wrong, so could we.

Thirdly, we all place different values upon such human factors, making objectivity impossible. The fact that the Japanese are a warlike nation, and the English a peace-loving nation, has a certain significance for me, but not for Professor Spykman. The fact that the Japanese are warlike and aggressive and the Chinese are peace-loving and essentially democratic in spirit should be a deciding factor in choosing our partners for the post-war world; but it does not seem so to Professor Spykman, who only looks upon the map spread out before him and is intellectually intrigued by the similarities in geographical positions between England and Japan. Who is really objective, and who can say that he alone is correct?

Fourthly, our emotional bias inevitably steps in. Professor Spykman notes that China's position in the Far East is similar to that of the United States in North America. Nevertheless, through personal bias, he thinks of the necessity of creating a strong Japan to check China, while he would never for a moment think of creating a strong Mexico to check the United States. That final decision is emotional and not objective.

Fifthly, back of all such fascist thought is the fashionable determinism of modern scholarship. Determinism always spells irresponsibility, as if we were by necessity helpless to create a better world to live in. The taxi-driver has the courage to say, "This world of eternally recurring wars is bad; let's change it." The determinist, objective professor has not the heart to say it, but must say, "It is bad, and will continue to be bad." There is a curious intellectual pleasure in such Satanic predictions, but it is not going to help build a better world. The elimination of conscience from Western scholarship has gone far enough.

Sixthly, the world is not so simple as these pseudo-scientists like to imagine. What the unpredictable effects of Anglo-American domination by an overwhelming force will be, the best geopoliticians cannot tell us. The normal human reaction against all threats of force, the corruption that will set in with power, and the guilty conscience that follows corruption, the necessity of sending American boys to help England fight a native insurrection in New Delhi or Calcutta, the absolute certainty of the willingness of Russians, Chinese, and Hindus to be bombed to pieces and sullenly continue to resist, the meeting of violence with non-violence by the Hindus which should burn Christian cheeks, the groaning and public dissatisfaction with the crushing burdens of taxation for armaments—all such things are bound to follow in its wake, resulting in a violent reaction such as followed the Versailles Treaty.

The advocates of such sheer domination by force have not even the wit

to see that such things are bound to happen. In any case, the guilt of arming against Russia and China will lie heavily on the American conscience, and moral defeatism will set in long before an actual war between the races sets the final and greatest conflagration of the world.

EDUCATION AS A FACTOR IN POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION

A

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN In the making of plans for international peace and justice, three sets of factors must be dealt with. I list them in order of increasing importance, which is also the order of increasing difficulty. They are first, economic; second, political; and third, educational. As to the first of these, all men now know that the time has come when we must create and administer a unified economic world order. Economic chaos is no longer tolerable. It is no longer necessary. But second, this ordering and controlling of our business activities implies and requires that we create and administer a unified political world order which shall be equal in scope, but superior in power, to the forces of economic procedure. The production and distribution of wealth must be under public control. A world economy without a world government spells strife and disaster. But third, political institutions in turn must be sustained and controlled by adequate education. The nature and quality of a government depends upon the nature and quality of the intelligence of its citizens. Our tragic experience with Adolf Hitler has shown us that no dictatorship can endure unless it can teach its people to be slaves. But it is equally certain that no democracy can endure unless it can teach its citizens to be free. A unified world economy, authorized and controlled by a unified world government, implies, as a basic postulate, a united system of world education.

When I speak of world unity in economics and politics and education, I am not thinking of a unity which ignores or denies the facts of multiplicity. I am thinking, rather, of unity in multiplicity—a unifying activity which, as it faces the varieties and complexities of human experience, endeavors to save them from sinking down into chaos and meaningless and brutish strife. What we must have in economics, in politics, in education, is an ordered multiplicity—an economic order, a political order, an educational order. These are three interdependent phases of a single human enterprise. They are three sides of that endeavor by which—if I may borrow

a phrase from Rousseau—the human being “ceases from being a stupid and unimaginative animal and becomes an intelligent being, and a man.”

Now, if what I have said is true, then two serious dangers beset the planning of the United Nations for postwar reconstruction. First, our economic experts working in isolation may be tempted by “the bias of happy exercise” to devise an economic world order without placing it under the control of an adequate political world order. Second, our political experts, influenced by the same bias, may attempt to create and maintain political institutions without giving them a solid foundation in an adequate system of popular education.. If those dangers are not avoided, then the outcome of our struggle for the Four Freedoms will be the establishment of more than four slaveries. Our economic arrangements will fail because they are not supported and controlled by adequate political institutions. Our political institutions will fail, because they are not rooted in the understanding and good will of their citizens. If those evils are allowed to come upon us, catastrophe is inevitable. The greatness of our opportunity will be the measure of the greatness of our failure to meet it.

The economic danger of which I have spoken can be very simply though very abstractly indicated. It has to do with the choice between public and private control of business. If we say that an economic world order is created, what we are really saying is that some human mind, or some group of human minds, has taken control of the economic forces of our civilization. Order, as here used, means control. To say that the play of economic forces has become orderly is to say that someone has taken charge of them. Someone has so studied them, so measured and charted them that they can be directed to work together for the realization of assigned ends. Forces in themselves have no order. Order is a human contrivance. It is a human achievement. If, then, the world of business becomes a world of order, the first question to ask is: “Whose order is it? By what methods and toward what ends is it directed?”

And to that question two sharply different answers are possible. The control of the world’s business may be in public hands or in private hands. It may be exercised with common consent or without common consent. It may belong to the common people or to the masters of the common people. If the first of these alternatives is adopted, if the production and distribution of the world’s wealth is made subject to the common judgment, the common will of the citizens of the world, then world government, in some form or other, is established. But the danger which now threatens us is that our economic experts will lead us in the other direction. Men who through special knowledge have the inside track, and especially the shrewd and aggressive minds of our Anglo-American business world, will be sorely tempted, without the consent of their fellows, to take into their own hands the domination of the economic process. Such men do not always realize

what they are doing. They commonly regard themselves not as our masters, but as the servants of natural forces which work through them. It is not by accident that the men who dominate our Anglo-American economic life have so generally believed in Natural Laws as governing human society. But that belief is, more or less unconsciously, simply a cover for the brutal fact of their own domination over the lives and fortunes of their fellows. These men, if they are not subjected to the authority of political institutions, will lead us into disaster. I do not on the whole challenge their good intentions. But I do challenge their understanding of what they are doing. I do not deny the need of economic leadership. But I do protest the futility of self-appointed, dictatorial leadership. Government, whether economic or political, must be by consent of the governed. If control is not public, then it is private. And a world economy in private hands means war—and war again. Only under a free world government is a free world economy possible. There is only one device by which human beings can escape the evils of dictatorship. That is by governing themselves.

But secondly, the enterprise of government has its own perplexities and dangers. If it be decided that an international economy is to be politically controlled, if its problems are to be dealt with by common consent, then all the difficulties of human education come rushing upon us. How shall the citizens of the world give consent, or refuse to give consent, to measures which they do not understand? Two thousand years ago, Epictetus stated the principle underlying this dilemma when he said: "The rulers of the state have said that only free men shall be educated; but God has said that only educated men shall be free."

Here, then, is the second, the greater danger which threatens the plans which our experts are making for the organization of the world. To arrange that a world government shall be conducted by the consent of the governed implies and requires a system of world education. If we are to have a free world community, the citizens of the world must learn what free institutions are and how under actual conditions they can be achieved. To say this is not to deny that in the first instance the problems of an international society must be dealt with by "experts." These problems must be studied with all the finesse of scholarly investigation and with the wisdom which comes from wide political and economic experience. But for the purposes of free self government such study is not enough. The same problems must be studied on the popular level. "Experts" may recommend. But "citizens" must decide. And that means that the citizens of a world order have much learning to do. They must become able to comprehend and to pass judgment upon what their leaders say. Even more important than that, they must learn to know each other, to think together, to understand the common enterprise. In the last resort, political institutions can succeed only as they grow out of and give expression to fundamental agree-

ments of idea and purpose. But that implies mutual acquaintance, mutual understanding—in short, a common education. A free world government is possible only if from one end of the world to the other, free men and women are engaged in widespread, well organized, and persistent study both of the *end* to be realized and of the *conditions* which are favorable and unfavorable to its realization. Just as a government must rule its business, so must a people rule its government. On any other basis than that we shall have dictatorship and with it the wars, the injustice, the slavery which dictatorship, whether open or concealed, inevitably brings.

If now we turn from the negative side of our problem to its positive side, from the dangers which threaten postwar reconstruction to ways of overcoming those dangers, I venture to suggest how a beginning might be made in the establishment of a system of world education adequate for our economic and political needs. I have in mind the creating of an International Institute of Education, somewhat analogous in kind to, though differing in function from, the International Labor Office in the planning of the League of Nations.

The positive considerations from which that suggestion springs are somewhat as follows:

1. It is, I think, essential that from the start international planning shall include as an organic element in its procedure provision for general popular education. And, especially, teaching must be devised for those mature persons who are to have the rights and responsibilities of world citizenship. As men plan for a world order, economic, political, and educational institutions must grow together. We cannot practice justice and freedom unless we can teach them. To impose economic and political arrangements upon citizens who do not understand them is to plan for the renewal of world conflict.

2. The international education which we need cannot be limited to provision for intellectual co-operation among scholars. Nor can the need be met by the establishment of one or more universities. Scholarship is essential. But it is not sufficient. The task which lies before us is that of cultivating among all the common people of the world such knowledge and good will as will weld them together into an international community.

3. It follows from what has just been said that, in its initial stages at least, international teaching must be done chiefly in the field of adult education. The citizens of the world must learn what it means to be a citizen of the world. They must learn to use their minds, to enjoy using their minds, for the making of a free human society.

4. The education of which we are speaking must be, in the democratic sense, free. It must present to its pupils not the solution of a problem but the problem itself with all its perplexities. Such teaching

forbids the use of propaganda. The common people of all countries must be led into a common study of a common enterprise in which they are together engaged.

5. It is equally certain—though the statement of the fact seems paradoxical—that in all countries the same basic education must be given. Amid all the varieties of circumstance, the same lessons are to be learned. Chinese, Englishmen, Indians, Russians, Peruvians, Javanese—for all these the same fundamental problems must be presented, the same teaching methods applied, the same intellectual materials used. The first essential is that learners shall recognize that from one end of the world to the other the same human struggle to devise and maintain law and order is going on. To be educated is to be fitted to participate in that struggle.

On the basis of these considerations it is, I think, possible to draw in outline the form which an Institute of International Education might take. One can see also certain forms which it must not take.

1. The teaching we need cannot be given by the separate nations, acting separately. It must be given by the international organization itself as a fundamental part of its own procedure. All genuine education is initiation. It is the attempt of some social group to fit its members, old and young, for participation in the activities which the group is carrying on. The world government itself must study and teach what it is doing. No other group, no separate groups, can meet that responsibility.

2. It follows from what has just been said that the financial support of world teaching must come from the world government. That teaching must be free from all the restrictions and conditions which direct financial support from local or national sources might lay upon it. And in the same way the international organization must take direct and unqualified responsibility for the intellectual and administrative control of the teaching process. The world government must do its own studying, its own teaching.

3. The staff of an Institute of Education would be drawn in part from the administrative staff of the international organization. It would include also other scholars and teachers who are trained for the critical examination and interpretation of the principles of world order. If these two groups could be fused together into a uniform faculty clearly aware of its responsibilities, we might achieve that integration of intellectual and practical activities which is so sadly lacking in much of the scholarly work, much of the teaching which is now going on.

4. The pupils of the Institute would be drawn from universities throughout the world. They would be young scholars who have completed in some special field of study the intellectual training ordinarily required for admission to teaching on the university level.

5. These young scholars would have at least a year of training at

the Institute. They would study there the work of the international organization, its aims and methods, its general principles and its specific problems, its successes and its failures, its hopes and its fears. They would be fitted to become, in the forms of adult education, interpreters of what the international organization is trying to do.

6. On the completion of their training, the Institute would send these young scholars throughout the world as teachers of its citizens. Acting in collaboration with local authorities, they would go from community to community, staying two or three or even four months in each place. But the Institute would keep them in close touch with each other and with itself. It would endeavor to make of them a well-integrated teaching body, clearly aware of its own purposes, ready to promote the realization of those purposes in the midst of all the differences of circumstance into which they might come. These international interpreters would learn as well as teach. In them and in their work, the motives, the ideas of world peace and world justice would find an approach at least to adequate expression.

Anyone who has engaged in actual teaching knows how fragmentary are the suggestions which I have made. The path of education is not an easy one. The task of devising and administering a scheme of education for the citizens of the world will be a long and perplexing one. And yet, fifty years of the achievements of adult education in many countries indicate the lines which we may at the beginning fruitfully follow. I mention here three of these:

1. As our teachers enter local communities, public meetings would be held at which various phases of the international enterprise would be presented, together with the intellectual materials bearing upon them. Such presentations would be supplemented by discussion at the meeting and on other occasions.

2. More important, however, than listening and discussing are the activities of careful and sustained study. To this end, small study groups would be formed in which leaders and pupils together would read and reflect upon the great books and the decisive documents in which international issues find their most enlightening formulations. The far-off goal of this method would be that every adult citizen of an international society should be an active member of such a group. That goal will not soon be reached. But only as we approach it are we making headway toward an international society.

3. In the new forms of communication and travel, the radio, the film, et cetera, there are opening up vast new possibilities of teaching achievement. These must be tested and developed. They are for the first time in history making possible the creation in intellectual terms of a single, unified human society. In fact, so great are their promises and so great their dangers that they must not be allowed to develop without public criticism and control. They can be made to serve as instruments either for the

elevation or for the degradation of the intelligence and generosity upon which in the last resort all human attempts at co-operation must rest. It would be a primary task of the Institute to explore and to develop the teaching possibilities of these agencies.

As I close this plea for an Institute of Education in the field of world government, two final words must be spoken. The need which I have presented is immediate and urgent. If adult education is to be ready to play its part in postwar reconstruction, decisive action must be taken at once. It will not do to wait until the experts in economics and politics have finished their work. The plans for teaching must modify and be modified by all other types of planning. The Institute of Education must take form and assume responsibilities step by step with all the other agencies which will appear as the general project moves forward. To that end, official and unofficial conferences should be now under way. Too much time has already been lost.

As we plan for the education or re-education of the nations of the earth, let us not think it is only our enemies who will have new lessons to learn. That theme has been much played in these days of bitter strife. But in sober fact it must be said that if, as we hope, we are to be the victors in the world conflict, it will be we, rather than our foes, who stand in greater need of teaching. Defeat brings its own lessons. But victory in battle has never been a good teacher. And we Anglo-Americans have been terrifyingly successful in the struggles of the modern world. Seventy-five years ago, Matthew Arnold told in bitter, hopeless words the impenetrability of the successful British mind to the forces of education. "One has often wondered," he says, "whether upon the whole earth there is anything so unintelligent, so unapt to perceive how the world is really going, as an ordinary young Englishman of our upper class."

I quote these words not because of their peculiar reference to the ruling class of England. They apply to all individuals and to all nations who have won predominance over their fellows. The greatest danger to the United States is that as its power and success grow greater, there will come upon it the same blindness to its own need of education. The lessons of freedom and equality are not easy for nations accustomed to superiority and domination. It is the victors who must be educated. It is upon them that an International Institute of Education must lavish its efforts. It is idle to plan for a free world and, at the same time, to plan that we shall be masters of it. A free world is a world of equals. All men, all nations must be educated.

SCIENCE

He who would do good to another must do it in
Minute Particulars.
General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite, and flatterer;
For Art and Science cannot exist but in minutely
organized Particulars.

—Blake

ON THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION OF THE SCIENTIST

A

LBERT EINSTEIN

Question: The advance of science has made impossible a return to the old world of isolationism, to a compartment world. What is, therefore, the best way, the chief way, in which scientists can make their influence felt toward the aim of world cooperation?

Einstein: In my opinion scientists can collaborate in achieving the goal of international security if they take a stand in the face of public opinion for the establishment of an international body with both a permanent personnel and a permanent military force. Such a collective step undertaken by the greatest possible number of prominent intellectuals is all the more necessary as none of the governments of the great powers appear willing to relinquish any portion of their sovereignty in international affairs without strong pressure of public opinion.

Question: In certain quarters the view seems to be held that a genuine scientist, a "pure" scientist, should not concern himself with political issues. Would you care to comment on this view?

Einstein: I think that it is the duty of every citizen according to his best capacities to give validity to his convictions in political affairs. If this duty is neglected by intelligent citizens capable of judgment, there can be no sound democracy.

Question: What relationship, if any, do you see between the progress of physics and mathematics and the progress of society?

Einstein: Physics and mathematics are important for the community, firstly, because they fecundate technical development and, secondly, because like all finer cultural endeavors, they are efficient counterweights against the dangers of sinking into an odious materialistic attitude toward life which inevitably leads to the predominance of unrestrained selfishness.

Question: What educational measures should be taken to undo the effects of Nazi training, and redirect the German people in the paths of democracy?

Einstein: The Germans can be killed or constrained, but they cannot be re-educated to a democratic way of thinking and acting within a foreseeable period of time.

SCIENCE AND STATESMANSHIP

J

JUAN NEGRIN

Recovery, reconstruction, and the laying of foundations for a lasting and, if possible, a permanent peace, will depend fundamentally on a successful union between statesmanship and science. I do not intend here to discuss this statement systematically. It is solely my intention to offer, in a succinct and perhaps almost aphoristic form, a few reflections resulting from personal experience—from the somewhat rare experience of a professional scientist who, disliking and shunning political activities, found himself involved in them through the obligations of citizenship, and who in 1936, on the outbreak in his country of war, was committed by destiny to tasks of government which in one way or another he has continued to perform during the whole of this critical, turbulent period.

I should like to say, first of all, that the spirit informing these considerations does not support either openly or disguisedly a regime of "technocracy," less still of "sophocracy." Technology and science must provide the essentials for rational government, but they can in no way replace it. Science and government have distinct methods and aims. It is clear that the man of science may possess or acquire the gifts of a leader, but there is no similarity between the formation, discipline, or "style" of the two. The role of the technician and the scientist, as such, is that of a chief collaborator, not a substitute.

Between the statesman and science a dual relation is possible—firstly a passive one, wherein the statesman incorporates learning, assimilates the scientific method, and becomes imbued with a scientific spirit; and secondly an active one, more directly utilitarian, wherein he makes use of the teachings and progress of science for his achievements.

What can the statesman find in science?

Science can serve him by its capacity for forming a criterion. Scientific criticism and method make it easier to remove the antagonisms of social life and the contradictions in individual conduct and collective behavior, antagonisms and contradictions produced by that paradoxical human

nature which is so full of coexistent antinomies. Science can also serve to correct the professional deformation of the statesman. I do not here refer to those perversions frequently found in the politician, although not specifically or exclusively pertaining to him, such as superficiality and lack of objectivity; indifference to truth and a taste for fallacious argument; the ignoring of principles; an inclination for local or personal favoritism; a sectarian exploitation of party politics; and finally a tendency to vanity and a striving after effect which not infrequently finds its deadliest punishment in adulation, that sweet poison by which so many early hopes of public life have perished. All this is represented by corruption born either of private interest or of the desire to ensure, without caring for the means, public favor and the conquest of a power which, when achieved thus, is usually short-lived. Against this science can do little. It is a problem of civic morals and sanity.

I am referring rather to those genuine qualities which are the mark of the statesman and which can easily cause a professional deformation of his personality. Leadership, one of the first conditions of a statesman, implies an instinct for premonition combined with a capacity for cold calculation; a creative imagination held back by a sane realism; an enterprising and combative spirit counteracted by a realization of possibilities; energy counterbalanced by moderation; boldness combined with prudence; ability to form decisions rapidly, but calmly and without undue haste; firmness and persistence free from obstinacy. A scientific foundation is no bad method of maintaining the delicate balance required by such opposite qualities and of removing any confusion which might be caused by an incongruous predominance of any one of them.

On the other hand, the great motive power of a statesman is faith in his work. This is needed by the ruler just as much as by the artist and the scholar, for without it no creative work is possible. But pure faith and deep-rooted conviction must not lead the statesman into any dogmatic doctrinaireism. Scientific education counteracts agnostic incredulity, but at the same time it is the source of that doubt which inspires action, and it creates that healthy spirit of skepticism which proves the paradox that faith is more intense in those who best know how to doubt.

Science, perhaps more than any other human activity, can instil in the statesman that prevalent subconsciousness which gives his work an experimental character, his convictions the form of postulates, his ideological doctrine the scope of provisional theory, and his program the significance of a working hypothesis. In short, if the statesman can become infused and impregnated with the scientific spirit, his mission will be ennobled and he can consider himself as an active research worker. In government, as in science, one of the chief incentives must be an ardent desire to discover truth, and even to inquire whether truth exists—that is to say, whether the

essence of things and events can be attained by the methods at the disposal of the human intellect.

The vast problems of peacetime reorganization with an economic, social and political structure undermined, and in parts razed to the ground, cannot be successfully approached without the help of science. One may be optimistic concerning the possibilities of reconstruction, if routine is placed in chains, and if the leaders of the future do not persist in applying out-of-date solutions to fresh problems. Certain it is that the efforts and wealth of generations have been destroyed, but the countries which have preserved their vitality have always shown unforeseen and amazing powers of speedy recovery after the cruelest of wars. Apart from what is irreplaceable on account of its historic or artistic value, there is nothing that cannot be remade and excelled in a short time, always provided that the help of science is not scorned, and its guidance accepted. In this way it will be possible to avoid a repetition of what for future generations will be the astounding and incomprehensible fact that, for many years after the last war, human labor—the greatest wealth which exists on earth—was recklessly squandered, and millions of men were kept idle. The totalitarian countries gave proof of wisdom, and gained an advantage, in utilizing—although only in a partial and inhuman form—scientific principles for the creation, provision, and distribution of work. If with a more rigorously scientific judgment and progressive spirit, in accordance with the respect which we take pride in conceding to the human personality, the countries affected by the war make an estimate and rational planning of all possible effort, the wounds will soon heal and leave no trace of any scar.

Technology and science have placed at the service of the human intellect tremendous stores of energy which allow it to multiply its efforts infinitely, and to achieve in decades what before the last century would have necessitated a whole historical period. While we are approaching the time when energy will be fabulously abundant and cheap, we may be certain that, even today, a rational co-ordination of its production and utilization throughout the whole world will make it far more easily available and will considerably reduce its cost. In this way a rapid restoration is now feasible. Effective effort in the years to come, which will be vitally necessary if our civilization is not to be destroyed, cannot be made without a planning and rationalization which must ignore the present state frontiers.

For this planning and rationalization the essential instrument is science. Besides the recovery, reconstruction, and material reorganization of a world laid waste, the statesman will be confronted with other problems for whose solutions he must look to science: problems of culture, education, and general instruction, aids to knowledge, development of research, encouragement of the arts; problems connected with the physical improvement of the race, with the raising of the standard of living, and the bestow-

ing of a progressive content on collective life, creating new values and morals.

In stormy periods of history, everyday problems are sometimes battered into a different shape, and so made easier of solution. It would seem probable that such widely debated subjects as the scope of state tutelage in science and art, or state control of education and instruction, and of the development of physical culture, lose a large part of their polemical attraction in the light of the situation created by the war. In the first place, collective interest and the instinct for defense demanded that every country exploit to the full the potential faculties of its citizens, and that in consequence education and learning shall be placed unrestrictedly within the reach of all. Secondly, if we are to survive as an independent collectivity, contacts with other countries in order to obtain the highest possible physical, intellectual, and professional standard in the citizen are a basic necessity.

It is the task of science to draw up this program, and of the statesman to carry it out, and to grant that natural desire of the needy to raise and dignify their standard of living, which has been the basis of profound political agitation as far back as historic memory can go.

In this conflict, it is true, we have fought for a liberal concept of democracy, for the independence of the peoples, for the rights of the individual, for a progressive conception of the world. But that alone does not represent the essence of the struggle. Beneath all this there has been something biological, primitive, and animal, with which we can find an analogy only by going back in imagination to prehistoric times, when races and species perhaps disappeared altogether in conflicts of extermination.

A people who—sad truth though it is—knew better than any other how to take advantage of science in their endeavor to achieve hegemony were seized with the delirium of Lucifer, and as a god-like nation tried to subjugate the rest of the world. Their resources were terrifyingly great, their preparation solid, their foresight meticulous, and the risk which they represent to all of us was greater than has ever been known in history. In the tremendous, life-and-death struggle which has been waged, science has had to assist not only by improving the methods for destroying the enemy and for protecting us against his attacks, but also, in the spiritual sphere, by serving as a lantern to show us our path and as a leaven to lighten the task of the statesman.

The historical cycle begun in the second half of the eighteenth century and characterized by the clarification of democratic principles and the struggle for their application is showing, in my opinion, symptoms of decay and is about to give place to a new epoch. There have been abundant conflagrations during this period, and we have perhaps witnessed its crisis. From an historico-scientific examination, the statesman may gain

concentrated experience which will allow him to sketch in outline the generic features of the present age. This retrospective analysis will not only make it possible for him to distinguish by contrast obscure contemporary phenomena, but will also give him a historical perspective which will show what is homogeneous in our epoch and will reveal the *leitmotif* at present hidden by a blur of confused happenings. From this standpoint it can be seen that we are witnessing the gestation of a new world, and if the countries try to prevent its advent by supporting the old and outworn, they will jeopardize their very existence. This was only too well understood by those countries which have represented retrogression and barbarism and have nailed to their mast of hysterical deception the colors of revolution.

The advance of humanity is a discontinuous process, and even its evolution is achieved in sudden leaps. Restriction in its development, if it could be brought about, produces stagnation, involution, and death. Just as in living nature, human society accumulates impulses for renewal, and suddenly a revolutionary phenomenon appears as though by an abrupt mutation. In my opinion there is no doubt that we are living in a period of tremendous mutations. And here is a new field in which science can serve as mentor to the statesman and can help him to remove the obstacles in the way of rejuvenation and progress, such as a decrepit archaism, and false traditions which kill spontaneity and lead inevitably to a regime of snobocracy. There would be no culture or civilization without traditions. These prevent us from breaking away from the past and losing the idea of continuity. Indeed, the symbol of human progress is a quintessential system of traditions. In war, the ideals which inspire us are a stylized synthesis of our European, Christian, and human traditions, the finest creation of the spirit and substance of our civilization.

But how many examples are there in the past of peoples who have fallen beneath the load of their own obsolete traditions! Every tradition which is not historically dynamic contains the germ of death, but traditions generally necessitate a periodic revitalization in accordance with the spirit of the time. Science provides the touchstone to reveal the senescence of traditions and to point out those which need renewal and those which should be removed. Science can give new life to inanimate traditions. As also occurs in questions of belief, everyone in matters of science proclaims the incontrovertibility of his doctrines. And although we all maintain our convictions, I do not wish to fall into the error of proselytizing my audience. But the politician will find in science a sieve by which he can distinguish, classify and purify the aspirations of the masses, and an apparatus for elaborating and formulating feasible solutions.

Jurists, sociologists, economists, and historians, principally, with the help of the other sciences, will have to prepare the varied formulas, formulas which will not force a hasty improvisation of the solution of the funda-

mental problem of establishing a supernational and super-state organism, in sympathy with our democratic designs, but with sufficient authority and strength to enchain that part of national sovereignty which it will be necessary to sacrifice on the altars of a durable peace.

In the hearts of our fighters there lives a faith in democratic principles, which are the kernel of our civilization, and which are manifested by a complete individual liberty as far as thought is concerned, and only restricted in action as the legitimate interests of others are affected; by tolerance—a corollary of liberty; by the idea that the people are the source of public power, and that their will, expressed directly or through delegates, is the decisive arbiter of their own administration and government.

Science can render a valuable service to statesmanship by paying attention to the following points:

Selection of leaders in every field of national activity.

Regard for the education of the masses.

Active participation in public life.

It is the patriotic and human duty of the scientist to bend himself to these tasks, tasks to which the statesman should summon him. His special conditions are of exceptional value in the present circumstances, particularly the wide feeling of tolerance which is perhaps more common among scholars than in any other class of society; the zeal for truth, which should be the common denominator of the scientist; and that wide international and universalist comprehension which—as far as it is possible in human beings—is free from exclusivist prejudices of race and creed.

In order to create a new and better world it is not enough for the statesman to rationalize government and to plan on a world scale. It will be necessary to promote and instil new moral values, to which the scientist will give form and content, in a supernational and humanist sense.

In the final analysis the goal of science and the goal of statesmanship are similar: they both in their proper spheres pursue truth, a quality which in the realm of human relations finds its highest expression in fairness, liberty and justice. Twenty-four centuries ago Aristotle said in his *Ethics* that the supreme end of politics was human good. In the same sense as that of the Stagirite philosopher we may say that the highest aim of man is goodness.



ALDEMAR KAEMPFERT

We have been told much about the fight for freedom and democracy. Much more is at stake. It has not been sufficiently dinned into us that we have been fighting for a culture—a culture which was made possible by democracy, a culture which is essentially scientific and technologic. That culture is a product of the Renaissance and of eighteenth-century liberalism. It is a culture fashioned by steam engines, electrical machinery, aviation, four-day transatlantic liners, coal-tar chemistry, automobiles, motion pictures, printed books and periodicals, rayon, and plastics—a culture which is the common possession of all industrial nations. Backward peoples try to acquire it, for they know that the whole idea of progress is now expressed in terms of science and technology. Wars have been fought for religious reasons, but never for the sake of science. Human morality varies with latitude and longitude and with the social environment. But science is everywhere the same in its convictions and in its procedures. Alfred North Whitehead has said that the acquisition of the scientific attitude brought about the most intimate change in outlook that the human species experienced. Yet statesmen have not yet made the most of science in bringing about world unity.

Peace maintained by an international army is peace maintained by force. Better than force is a unifying ideal. The only ideal on which nations as culturally far apart as China and the United States, Ethiopia and Great Britain, Egypt and Sweden, Greece and Canada can agree is that cherished by every scientist. Religion preaches the brotherhood of man, but only science practices it. In normal times some 250,000 first-class research scientists meet in international conventions, asking no questions about race, religious creed, nationality, or political belief. These highly trained men and women are fashioning the material world of tomorrow. They receive less for their work, on the average, than an American bricklayer. They give freely of their knowledge to all mankind. They have shown that it is possible to sink prejudices and passions in a common cause and to think in terms of mankind and the planet. And so it is here proposed that, while we experiment with an international army which is to deal with aggressors, we organize research on a world scale, cultivate science and technology with the conscious social intention of raising all countries to a single high eco-

nomic and intellectual level and of giving all men the common objective outlook of the scientist. Before we can have the World State, for which H. G. Wells and others have argued so convincingly, we must acquire experience in international co-operation. It is easier to acquire that experience in science than in politics.

The compelling reason for this approach lies in the social influence of science and technology. Why is the world already so unified economically that a crisis in one country has its effects in others that may be thousands of miles away? Solely because of scientific and technologic advance—the type of advance that has made petroleum, aluminum, tungsten, rubber, tin and ten thousand other materials indispensable in war and peace. The very fundamentals of economics have been undermined because of the achievements of the scientist and the engineer. Where once we had an economy of scarcity we now have an economy of abundance. We talk of planning to make the most of the world's enormous productive capacity. But the Western Democracies have not yet incorporated research in any economic or political world plan.

Economists as a class no longer hold to the laissez-faire theory of Adam Smith—a theory based on a belief in the sanctity of free enterprise and free competition and on a fictitious “natural order.” Science has developed in accordance with this laissez-faire principle. Just as the automatic operation of the “laws” of supply and demand were once supposed to regulate prices and consequently the production and consumption of goods, so it was supposed that the spontaneous evolution of science and technology is inevitable. Discoveries and inventions undoubtedly do come forth at some indefinite time and in some indefinite way. In the West only the industrial laboratories have departed from the laissez-faire principle. They have shown that despite the unpredictability of what may emerge from research, science can achieve its goals more surely if it is properly organized and directed.

Only recently have scientists begun to realize that the old formula “science for science's sake” has lost much of its old validity. For centuries they had no clearly defined goal, no sense of social purpose. An interesting problem was presented by a star, an atom, a gas under pressure, a micro-organism, and somewhere a specialist was impelled to study it and lucky enough to find a philanthropist to pay his costs. For this reason the physical sciences have far outstripped the biological sciences, with the doubtful exception of agriculture and medicine. Profits and military advantage lie in physics and chemistry but not in biology. Only the Marxists have boldly formulated a state plan for the social utilization of science and technology and the wholesale organization of research, but with the reservation that scientists must accept the social philosophy of dialectical materialism.

Suppose we organize science internationally, lay down a long-time

flexible plan of research, finance experimentation and investigation in all fields by contributions from participating nations, bolster the sciences that lag, see to it that there is intelligent supervision without dictation. The chances are that we would accelerate the tempo of discovery and make rapid progress in unifying mankind.

The conditions that must be accepted in carrying out any such proposal are those under which science has flourished best, which means the fullest freedom in research, in international movement and communication, and in the application of discoveries for the benefit of society as a whole. First of all, we must create a World Scientific Commission which will be composed of the foremost natural and social scientists. These acknowledged leaders will not be older than fifty. They will be paid as liberally as are judges of the highest courts in the United States and Great Britain. They will serve no longer than ten years, so that room will be made for men who still retain much of the initiative and imagination of youth. They will have at their disposal funds subscribed by all nations proportionately to their pre-war national budget. One-half of one per cent should be enough.

The Commission will be fully aware of its social function, meaning that the unknown is to be penetrated and explored with no thought of profit, yet with the conviction that direct material and immaterial benefit will accrue. So far from dominating science, the Commission will be fed not only by the laboratories that it supports but by those of universities, industrial organizations and governments. There will be no vast palace of research where hundreds of chemists, physicists, and biologists will work under the direction of some general of science or of some committee of master minds, but a directing body which will frame a program large enough to include all the natural and social sciences. Committees will assign projects to qualified men in any part of the world on a non-profit contract basis—a method which our Office of Scientific Research and Development has followed with brilliant success in improving searchlights, signals, and metals for the use of the army and navy in World War II.

The cost of research conducted on this far-flung scale will be large, yet trifling when compared with the financial waste incurred in maintaining a standing army or a powerful navy. Not millions but scores of millions must be spent annually by an intelligently managed organization if we are to tighten our grip on matter, on energy, on the living cell, on medicine. Even nations that may reject proposals for world federation have everything to gain by supporting a plan that promises to conduct research on all fronts. We want new, workable theories and discoveries that theoretical scientists as well as manufacturers, engineers, inventors, physicians, and farmers can apply.

Consider these examples of what should be done by internationally organized research. It is a disgrace to medicine that virtually nothing is

known about arthritis. The approach has been purely empirical. So with cancer. How is a piece of beefsteak converted into the tissue of arms, legs, and organs? Our knowledge is only rudimentary. Why do we inherit blue eyes and snub noses from similarly endowed parents? The geneticists can give a partial answer, but they cannot pick out of the American population the 18,000,000 who are carriers of epilepsy and who are likely to have socially unfit children if they marry the wrong mates. Why can serums and vaccines cope with some infections? The actions are clearly chemical. But what is the chemical that is so effective? We simply do not know.

These questions will not always cry out for answers. But internationally organized research could provide the answers far more rapidly than we have a right to expect under the old system, given a sound program and money enough. Arthritis would cease to groan if the answers were forthcoming. A diagnosis of cancer would not usually mean death. The marked epileptics would be detected by some simple test. Serums and vaccines would give way to chemicals in the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases.

Scores of other problems could be similarly attacked. We are still without a means of predicting the weather a fortnight in advance. We know very little about the process of plant growth, and we have no certain way of changing starch and sugar content of vegetables and fruits chemically. In the paraffin series of compounds there are three billion possibilities of which hundreds must be of enormous importance. The relation of sunspots to auroras and terrestrial magnetism has been only partially revealed. Wherever we turn we find these problems. Yet without a World Scientific Commission there is no way of attacking them systematically. The cost should not stagger countries that were accustomed to spend \$80,000,000 for a single battleship.

If scientific research were organized and conducted internationally, the immediate result must be intellectual federation and in the long run political federation. For as science and technology advance, nations tend to resemble one another more and more. Industrially the countries of the West hardly differ. Russia, once technologically backward, is rapidly assuming the industrial aspect of the United States. Since the dissemination of scientific techniques has brought about this uniformity, what may not be expected of a wider, deliberate, and systematic procedure?

The prospects of a World Scientific Commission are brighter than may appear. The League of Nations scored its most signal failures in politics and its most signal successes in what use it made of the natural and social sciences. The work of the League's scientific commissions is enduring. It has influenced medical thinking. It has caused nations like Great Britain to consider the matter of feeding the undernourished. Even without the League's scientific success as a precedent we have the example of the Inter-

national Institute of Agriculture and of the work done by co-operating governments in hydrography and meteorology. Moreover, some of the sciences have long been loosely organized internationally—astronomy in particular.

We need a practical demonstration of cooperation on a world-wide scale before we are ready for political federation—a demonstration that social unity is not a utopian dream. The ultimate purpose of federation is to treat the biological, social, and economic environment of man as a whole. Since it is the function of science and technology to understand and control the environment, no better beginning in federation could be made than by organizing and conducting research internationally and thus accustoming the world to collaboration. If this argument is correct the world-wide cultivation of the natural and social sciences must ultimately break down the barriers raised by nationalism, and this for the reason that social changes inevitably brought about by changes within science and technology will in themselves demand international consideration.

WORK FOR A FREE WORLD

If civilization is to survive—we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples of all kinds, to live together and work together, in the same world, at peace.

—Franklin Delano Roosevelt

WORK FOR A FREE WORLD

A PHYSICAL PLAN FOR A WORLD OF PLENTY



ORDECAI EZEKIEL Let us consider the physical steps needed to move toward freedom from want.

The economic expansion and prosperity actually achieved in the post-war world depend in large measure upon the success of three international undertakings: (1) the international security organization; (2) the international stabilization fund and investment bank, proposed at the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference, and the world-wide progress in industrialization which they will make possible; and (3) the program for agricultural expansion, proposed at the Hot Springs Food and Agricultural Conference.

Restoration of prewar productive capacity in most of the devastated areas will probably be accomplished in a surprisingly brief period, excluding possibly the heavy German or Japanese industries which are purposely left unrestored. All the major belligerents have greatly expanded their metal-working and chemical industries for munitions purposes. In some cases, as in Soviet Asia, they have developed great new industrial areas.

These war industries can be used with only minor reconversion to turn out the machine tools, processing equipment, rails and rolling stock, building materials and other physical goods for the restoration of damaged productive equipment. Even if only a fraction of the facilities, manpower, and expenditures that have gone into munitions production were applied to reconstruction, the job could be carried through within the first few years of peace. Rebuilding of devastated housing will be much slower, however. Temporary housing may be the rule for a considerable segment of the populations for many years ahead.

In many areas of Europe the new factories will replace old buildings and old equipment which had long been obsolete. In addition, war has forced many countries to learn and apply the methods of pre-planning and mass production which have made American industry both so productive and so given to continued improvement. This new modern equipment combined with modern methods should greatly increase the productive capacity of these countries above their traditional levels.

In addition to the munitions industries of the invaded countries, a con-

siderable part of the enormous metal-working facilities of England and the U. S. A. will be available to speed the reconstruction of other countries, while loans for reconstruction projects from the International Bank and other agencies can provide the necessary funds.

Far more exciting than the restoration of prewar output are the possibilities of output and standards of living improved far above prewar levels. The wartime expansion in the United States, with industrial production doubled and food production increased one-third, has shown how enormous are the productive capacities of modern industry and agriculture when assured of a market.

Industry and agriculture in Canada and in the uninvaded portions of the U.S.S.R. made comparable gains. For the advanced industrial nations, such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, the postwar economic problem is largely one of maintaining buying power for their products. If markets for the goods can be maintained, farm and factory products can be produced at levels substantially above prewar norms.

For most remaining countries the problem is greatly different. These other countries have been far less industrialized. The great increase in industrial production which characterized the rapid rise of world prosperity in the hundred years prior to World War I occurred mostly in a limited area bounded roughly by St. Louis and Chicago on the west, and Danzig and Prague on the east.

Concurrently, there was a great increase in raw-material and handicraft production in the remaining areas of the world. The colonial exporting areas gained in the industrial products they got back for their exports. Even so, the largest part of the increased production was retained by the industrial areas for themselves. Malayan copra producers, Bolivian tin miners, Argentinian beef gauchos, South African gold and diamond miners, and Alabama cotton sharecroppers, had only a meager share in the rising living standards of Liverpool, Providence, or Hamburg.

The further rise in industrial and agricultural productivity in the interwar period precipitated a situation where the raw-material exporters expanded their production beyond the quantities that could be used effectively in all the raw-material-consuming countries. Steps toward industrialization were taken in many scattered areas in the predominantly colonial regions. Birmingham, Alabama; Japan; Bombay; Buenos Aires; Moscow, Leningrad, and other Russian centers—all saw notable industrial developments.

On the whole, improving agricultural machinery and techniques made previous workers unnecessary in agriculture at a more rapid rate than industrial expansion provided alternative work for them. Agricultural nations continued to develop capacity to turn out raw materials faster than the material-consuming industries of the world developed uses for the

materials. Both farm products and farm workers tended to pile up in "unsalable surpluses."

These mounting raw-material supplies and declining raw-material prices accentuated the tendencies toward economic autarchy which were already present in Mussolini's "Battle for Wheat" and other pre-Nazi nationalistic pressures. The cessation of American foreign lending in 1928 and 1929, and the subsequent Great Depression with its sharp declines in prices and employment, sharply intensified the "live-at-home" policies and the raw-material surpluses.

The fundamental task for the period ahead is to maintain balanced expansion in industrial and agricultural output. This will help expand markets and uses for foodstuffs and other raw materials as rapidly as the output of raw materials is increased, while protecting and conserving the basic resources of soil, water, and forests.

The tractor, the auto and truck, electric power, and other power-operated machinery have enormously increased agricultural output per man in North America, Australia, the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. Hybrid corn and other crop developments, better care of soil and water, and improved feeding, breeding, and disease control of livestock are increasing the potential agricultural output per *acre* almost as rapidly as per *manhour*.

Chemistry and technology are supplementing natural products with new materials—rayon, nylon, synthetic rubber, plastics. Unless special efforts are made to develop industrial outlets for these expanded raw materials at corresponding rates, flooded raw material markets may again deadlock the upsurge of prosperity, and lead once more to unemployment and starvation in the midst of plenty.

It is imperative that industrial development be encouraged on a far more massive and widespread scale. This would be in the interest of general world prosperity, and would directly provide the means to raise standards of living in the less developed nations.

It is easy to see why this is so. Labor plus tools and training can achieve infinitely more than labor alone. The gardener with a wheel-hoe can care for triple the crops of a man with a hand-hoe—yet a wheel-hoe costs only about \$5, and lasts for a decade of use. The rise in labor efficiency in wheat production from the sickle to the cradle, the cradle to the binder, and the binder to the combine-harvester, is classic. The typical European peasant, harvesting with a cradle, can produce 100 bushels of bread-grain from a year's work. One man can produce 2,000 bushels for a year's work on an average family-sized wheat farm in the Great Plains of North America, harvesting with a combine.

Throughout Europe, even in London, many goods are delivered by hand-operated carts and pedal-driven trucks. Automotive equipment could increase the efficiency many fold. The shift from the hand-operated forge

or the one-or-two-man tinsmith's shop of the medieval bazaars to the conveyor belts, pre-planned operations, and assembly lines of modern mass-production factories has enormously increased the return from a day's work. And this made it possible to sell complex modern miracles like electric light bulbs, radio tubes, flashlight batteries, and standard pharmaceuticals, for a few cents a unit or a bottle.

When a country has large numbers of workers and little capital, it must concentrate that capital on the most crucial spots—such as railroads and ports—and use hand labor elsewhere in place of the simplest machines.

Statistical investigations have shown how intimately connected are industrial development and national prosperity. The studies related the proportion of each country's working population engaged in agriculture and forestry and fisheries to the average per capita income produced by the people of that country. The following data are from analyses by Louis H. Bean:

PER CAPITA INCOME AND PROPORTION IN AGRICULTURE, SELECTED COUNTRIES 1925-34

Country	Proportion engaged in agriculture* Per cent	Income per capita Dollars
<i>Industrialized countries</i>		
United States	19	525
Canada	35	521
United Kingdom	6	425
Argentina	23	430
Netherlands	21	358
France	25	287
Germany	24	290
<i>Non-industrialized countries</i>		
Hungary	54	165
Japan	50	159
Poland	62	165
Italy	43	154
U.S.S.R.	74	152
Bulgaria	67	119
India	62	90
China	75	49

* Includes also fishing and forestry.

The data for a larger number of individual countries illustrate how striking is the general relation between the extent of industrialization and the average income per capita. When the comparisons are made between countries in the same economic region, such as between the several Scandinavian countries, the relation is still more striking.

Data for the individual States of the United States show much the same picture. Chronically poverty-stricken areas of the U.S.A., such as parts of

the Cotton Belt and parts of the Southern Appalachian States, are areas of very low industrial development, while the highly industrialized States, such as Connecticut, New York, and more recently California, are regions of far higher average income.

The correspondence between industrialization and income is far from perfect, of course, either between countries or between American States. Agricultural countries using advanced methods and with abundant resources per worker, such as Canada or New Zealand, have incomes relatively high for their proportions in industry. Some countries moderately industrialized, such as Italy, but with limited resources and relatively primitive agriculture, have incomes low in proportion to their industrialization.

Similarly, American States with rich agricultural resources like Iowa or Minnesota have much higher incomes than do equally industrialized States with poorer agriculture, such as Tennessee or Kentucky. The degree of development or tertiary industries—trade, transportation, service, and professions—also affects income, since these industries provide higher incomes on the average, than do manufacturing and mining. Many of the figures, too, are inexact, and incomes can be compared between unlike countries only with a considerable margin of uncertainty. Yet general correlation between industrialization and income is striking.

Both as between rural America and industrial America, and rural countries and industrial countries, the basic facts are the same. The hewers of wood and the drawers of water—and the producers of food and fish—are as a rule poorly paid throughout the world. The high-level prosperity of American farmers in 1918–20 and 1941–44 seems to happen only at the peak of great wars. The wielders of implements of modern civilization—spindle and loom, I-beam and welder's torch, bricklayer's trowel, locomotive throttle, engineer's T-square and transit, surgeon's scalpel, movie camera—earn more and live far better, as a rule, than do farmers. This overlooks, of course, the industrial unemployed in periods of business depression. Farmers too can multiply their power by machinery, setting their hands to tractor plows, hay loaders, and milking machines—but as we have seen, that can work out well only if still more of their brothers and sons turn to industry.

The great task of the postwar generation is to complete the industrial revolution—complete it by spreading industrial opportunity throughout the world, putting the means and mechanisms of large-volume modern production in the hands of peoples in all countries and aiding them to learn to control and use them wisely and effectively.

Three-quarters of the people of the world still live on the bare edges of subsistence, malnourished, poorly clothed, miserably housed. Their restricted and narrow lives show in their short span of life, in their limited

education or knowledge of the world, in their abject poverty. The normal peacetime expectation of life is now over 60 years in the industrialized countries of western Europe and America. In Egypt and India and many Central and South American countries it is 35 years or less.

Out of 1,000 children born, about 170 die before one year of age in British India, only about 55 in the United Kingdom and the United States, and only 32 in New Zealand. Of each 100 male babies, only 54 reach 15 years of age in India, 70 in Bulgaria, while 94 do in New Zealand. The average income before the war was around \$25 to \$50 per person per year in most South American countries and China, and \$90 in India, as compared with over \$400 a year in the U.S.A., Canada and the United Kingdom, and around \$300 a year in most of the highly industrialized regions of north-western Europe. These bare dollar figures provide merely a rough measure of the average distance that still exists between the standards of living in different countries, without considering the even larger extremes behind these averages within each country.

Completing the industrial revolution means developing the industry of all countries to the extent suitable to their resources and culture, and modernizing and intensifying their agriculture, mining, and other exploitative industries. The erection and operation of the factories themselves constitutes only one sector of the necessary transformation. Transportation, by road, rail, sea, and air, must be provided. So must electricity, water, sewage, streets, roads, schools, hospitals, communications, and all the other paraphernalia which make high-level modern industry possible. Methods of agricultural production and marketing must be improved. Finally, creation of housing itself is one of the great users of human energy, as well as one of the great goals and symbols of human well-being.

The possible magnitude of this task that lies ahead—the industrialization of all underdeveloped regions of the world—may be estimated in various ways.

The world is fortunate in having had one great demonstration of what industrialization can do for an underdeveloped country. The Soviet Union has demonstrated the possibilities of rapid industrialization. This has shown the rate of growth at which a country can both build the implements of modern civilization and learn to use them.

During its two decades of peace, the Soviet Union carried through the greatest national program of deliberate and planned industrialization the world has ever seen. During most of the last decade of this program, the threat of the fascist menace caused more and more of the growing industrial strength of the U.S.S.R. to be diverted into military preparations. We know now how fortunate the rest of the United Nations are that the U.S.S.R. began to prepare so soon and so well. Despite this diversion from peace to defense, the actual rate and magnitude of growth of Soviet in-

dustry is a measuring rod against which other nations can compare their plans and their achievements.

In 1929, as before World War I, Russia was a country of peasants. Over 80 per cent of the population was engaged in farming, and less than 20 per cent lived in cities. Despite its great per capita wealth of fertile soil the Russian income was only about 100 American dollars per capita. In 1926, only 51 per cent of the population was literate.

By 1939, the Soviet Union had increased its industrial employees to 42 per cent, or twice the proportion in 1928. The proportion of workers in agriculture had fallen from 80 per cent to 58 per cent, and the proportion of literacy in the population had been increased from 51 to 81 per cent. The reported State investment in new productive capital over this period was 135 billion roubles, equivalent to possibly 35 billion American dollars, about \$220 per capita for the entire population. The national per capita income of the country had almost quadrupled in approximate dollar terms.

These bare accounting summaries give little idea of the human suffering and deprivation, or struggle and achievement, that went into this great period of growth. The creation of new industrial communities like Stalingrad and Magnitogorsk, the carrying through of vast construction and developmental projects like the Dnieprostroi dam and hydroelectric works, now destroyed, the reorganization and mechanization of Soviet agriculture and countless other realistic activities were involved in remaking the whole life of the country. The struggles, aspirations, and careers of tens of millions of people went into the great development.

For many years the Russian people had almost no new textiles, shoes, or other deferrable consumer goods and only the most Spartan of food and clothing, in order to squeeze out the capital for basic industrial development. They were just beginning to relax a little, and to enjoy rising, though still low, standards of consumption, when the growing fascist threat plunged them into another era of privation, which actual war greatly intensified.

The industrialized might of the modern Soviet Union, the technical perfection of its tanks and planes and guns, the inventiveness and skill of its military leaders, and the stubbornness and devotion of its fighters, both in the ranks and on their own as guerrillas, astounded Hitler and all the world. Few had believed the Soviet's own reports of its internal progress. The reported fact of an increase in Russian industrial production of 437 per cent from 1928 to 1939 no longer looks fantastic, in retrospective view of the way that industrial might, aided by supplies from her allies, halted and smashed the greatest fighting machine the world had ever seen up to that time.

Few other countries may wish to regiment their people for peacetime development so rigorously as the U.S.S.R. has regimented hers. Few may

attempt to go so far and so fast in all lines of the nation's life at the same time. Given help from the more advanced nations, other undeveloped nations can gain many of the advantages of industrialization without calling on their people for the extreme initial sacrifices which the present generation of Russians have made. But no matter how the Soviet achievement may be qualified, it still remains one of the outstanding facts of the present world. A nation can, if it will, lift itself by its own bootstraps. It can "starve itself rich." Given the will to industrialize, it can make itself over from a backward nation to a modern industrial power within a single generation.

Other nations or areas have made similar transformations, though at somewhat slower rates. Turkey is one example. The Jewish settlements in Palestine are another, greatly aided, of course, by the inflow of loans and contributions and skilled persons from other countries. The growth and development of the Tennessee Valley area of the U. S. A. is a third. But none of them—except possibly Palestine—has achieved the tempo and intensity of progress of the Soviet experience.

Peacetime industrial development may follow greatly different forms in different countries.

The upheavals of wartime, and the stimulus to national effort which invasion, struggle for freedom, and eventual liberation have given many countries, may produce national efforts in many other countries comparable with the Russian in intensity. Free China is one case. The greatly stimulated energies of modern China and the vision of a more prosperous country may push forward to bold programs involving transportation and modernization of agriculture and industry.

Poland is another. Experts of the Government in Exile have developed far-reaching plans for railways, roads, bridges, waterways and flood control, communications, air and sea transport, and mining, manufacture and agriculture. Other governments have parallel ideas for the development of their countries. If and when Spain is finally free from dictatorial rule, the restored democratic government will undoubtedly tackle the development of Spain with as much vigor as it displayed against the overwhelming odds of the fascist attack.

Many South American countries have ideas and plans for development, though generally on a somewhat less ambitious scale. Even in India, long the most somnolent of all nations in conscious social action, the "Bombay Group" of young enthusiasts are pushing an ambitious program for the industrialization of their country. Once India is given control of its own destiny, as England has promised, the ideas of this progressive group may become part of the basis for action. The Soviet Union itself, beyond plans for reconstruction of war damage, is projecting plans for still further increase in output and further advance in the physical and cultural standards of living of its people.

What would it take to industrialize all these backward countries? How much progress might be made within the first postwar decade? How much investment would be required? Could the world produce and erect the capital goods required? How much difference might it make to the peoples of the countries concerned? Let us now turn to these quantitative aspects of the problem.

We can approach the questions in several different ways. On a rough over-all estimate, we may say that the undeveloped areas in greatest need of industrialization embrace eastern Europe, the Near and Middle East, China, India, Central and South America, and Mexico. Roughly 1.1 billion people, over half of the population of the world, live in these areas. Probably less than 40 per cent of them are now employed in non-agricultural pursuits. Judging from the Russian experience, if these countries were to increase their non-agricultural workers up to 55 per cent within a ten year period, that would be a creditable achievement (though only about one-half as fast as the Soviet Union went after it really got started, from 1928 to 1938). We may assume there is a working population of roughly 400,000,000 people out of the total population. Making new places in non-farm employment for 15 per cent of these workers would mean creating new work places for 60,000,000 people. That means adding to their industrial labor force a number of workers equivalent to the total present labor force of the U. S. A.

American experience can throw a little light on how much capital would be required. American manufacturing and transportation concerns have invested in their facilities about \$5,000 capital per employee. Governmental units and public utilities have correspondingly high investments in roads, schools, ports, streets, water systems and other capital facilities. In peacetime only about one-third of American non-farm employment is in factories and public utilities, however. The capital investment in financial, commercial, and construction concerns is far lower than in factories—under \$1,000 per worker. Service, professional, governmental, and domestic employees use still less capital per worker.

In any case, the initial stages of industrialization in underdeveloped countries would not attempt to bring them fully up to the highest levels at the first stage. The capital available would be spread out more thinly in those industries where it was most productive, while production on a primitive or handicraft basis would continue in many others. The relatively primitive methods of the small Chinese production cooperatives still yield a great gain in output per worker above that of a typical Chinese peasant or coolie.

In the Soviet Union, the average investment in capital facilities during the prewar decade was about 13,500 roubles for each worker added to non-farm employment. This includes the investment to improve facilities used

by the workers already employed, as well as to provide facilities for new employees. This is roughly equivalent to about 3,500 American dollars.

Let us take a conservative figure of \$1,000 per head as the average investment needed for workers shifted from agriculture to other employment in the undeveloped countries. For the 60 million workers to be shifted in the postwar decade, that would give a rough estimate of 60 billion dollars' worth of capital required. Not all of this would need to be in dollars, of course, for much of the construction labor and purchase of crude materials such as lumber, stone, and sand, could be provided domestically and paid for out of internal funds.

This crude over-all estimate may be checked against rough estimates which national authorities of the countries concerned have made of their postwar investment requirements. During my attendance at the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference, I inquired among the experts present for their views on this problem, and succeeded in bringing together quite a number of such figures. In some cases, as of those for Poland, they are based upon reasonably careful plans. In other cases, as for China and India, they are very rough calculations of projects that seem feasible and desirable. For South and Central America, they represent preliminary calculations from the Inter-American Development Commission. In other cases they are very crude rule-of-thumb guesses. With all these qualifications, here are the estimates:

ESTIMATED INVESTMENT NEED, FIRST POSTWAR DECADE—BILLIONS OF
U. S. DOLLARS

Regions	Total investment	From domestic sources	Foreign investment required
Eastern Europe	18	6	12
China	10	4½	5½
South and Central America	12	6	6
India	10	5½	4½
Total	50	22	28

In addition, large investment funds would be needed for reconstruction and further industrial development in countries already well advanced industrially, such as the Soviet Union, England, France, the smaller western European countries, and Germany itself.

Estimates are not available for the Iberian Peninsula and Italy. No doubt substantial investments would be needed there. Nor is the Near East estimate known, but it is comparatively small.

Despite the crudity of these figures, it is apparent that these nation-by-nation estimates—or guesses rather—are of the same magnitude as the earlier \$1,000 per person estimate. In fact, the agreement is almost suspiciously close. How does this figure seem, of 50 or 60 billion dollars' in-

vestment in the undeveloped nations, as a ten-year goal to start toward world-wide industrialization? How reasonable is it? Can the materials be produced? Can that much of the world's goods be set aside from current production, without intolerable burdens upon consumers?

As indicated by the detailed estimates, somewhat over half of the goods would have to come from the industrialized nations—possibly 30 to 35 billions' worth over the ten years, or an average of 3 to 3½ billion dollars' worth a year. Of this, possibly half might come from the United States and the remainder be supplied by English, French, and perhaps eventually German industry.

Compared to their war effort, this much export of capital goods would constitute little or no burden on the industrial nations. Even though industrial and transportation equipment exports to the Soviet Union, France, and other advanced countries doubled the total, the amount would still be relatively small, compared to war-time production. In fact, the rate of our own shipments of fighting stuff could provide the materials to industrialize all the backward nations of all the world in a single year—if its composition could be magically changed from materials of war to the goods of peace, and if nations were prepared to receive and assimilate such a deluge of productive equipment.

Over the decade, on the contrary, these average rates would have to be built up by a growth process—training engineers, managers, construction and maintenance crews, and operatives in each country—in step with the creation and development of the new facilities. Transportation and marketing facilities would have to be created and expanded, and workers on them trained, in balance with the increasing output of goods to be used.

The level of industrial equipment exports estimated would, however, be much higher than that sustained in prewar periods. In the United States these never exceeded one billion dollars' worth a year, and averaged much below that even in the 1920's. If our exports, to advanced and undeveloped nations alike, averaged 3 billion dollars a year during the first postwar decade, that would constitute a significant though by no means decisive contribution toward maintaining full employment in the United States. It would, however, make a relatively much larger contribution toward providing useful outlets for the products of our metal-working and other capital goods industries, greatly overexpanded to meet war demands.

The domestic share of the needed investment, correspondingly, might total 25 to 30 billions, or 2½ to 3 billion dollars a year, for all the undeveloped areas combined. This would not seem to be an undue burden to be saved for industrialization. It would probably be a less crushing burden than the large proportion of its national income which the Soviet Union spent for capital investment during the prewar decade.

The burden would be a declining one, for the process of industrializa-

tion would itself raise the income of the countries concerned. The construction programs themselves and the large new demands for construction labor and other high-order skills in construction would provide employment for many workers not effectively occupied on farms. As the new enterprises were completed and put into production, further new employment opportunities would be opened up. Judging both from the Russian experience, and from the differences in incomes in countries having various levels of industrialization, the increase in the workers in non-farm occupations from 40 to 55 per cent might be expected to raise the present real national income per capita in these countries by at least 50 per cent over the decade. While this would be far from establishing a millennium, it would involve more improvement in average standards of living in many of these countries than they have enjoyed in several generations.

Industrialization of the undeveloped nations will create new problems of its own. For one thing, by making nations progressively more able to meet their own industrial needs, it will in the long run reduce the proportion of foreign trade as compared to domestic trade. Both should continue to increase, but domestic trade should expand at a more rapid rate than international trade expands. For another thing, it will involve long-term readjustments in the industries of previously exporting countries, causing them to concentrate more on production for domestic consumption and on exports of products in which the country enjoys some unique advantage, geographic or otherwise. These readjustments would take place at the expense of previous exports of staple industrial products which could as readily be produced elsewhere, once the factories were built and the new skills were learned. Adolph Lowe gives a brilliant yet simple exposition of this in an article in the *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (Vol. 3, No. 3): "The Trend in World Economics."

On the agricultural side, industrialization will create outlets for over-crowded farms and increased markets for more and better food.

Stimulating and working out these long-range readjustments, and keeping all the many varied phases of agriculture and industry in proper dynamic balance through the successive steps in the process of expansion, will be a long task. It will require all the energy and foresight that citizens and organized groups of all sorts—including governments—can bring to bear upon it in the years ahead. But it will be a richly rewarding task. It will mean carrying to their logical conclusion, in use for higher levels of human activity and happiness, all the great productive powers which scientific research has unearthed to date and can unleash for the use of mankind.

THE GLOBAL FARM PROBLEM

T

. SWANN HARDING

Until World War II took over the headlines, one of the most discussed and least understood problems of our nation was that of agricultural parity. Almost everywhere it was regarded as a local issue when, as a matter of fact, it is global in its implications.

Farm parity is a changing concept. Parity price is determined as follows: Data are first collected on the prices of 174 items farmers buy for household or productive use. These data are averaged; farm taxes, interest, and freight charges are next reflected, and thus a theoretical national average is attained. This is compared with the similarly determined average for the period 1909-1914, in the case of most crops affected. The percentage increase found is now applied to the base average farm price of the particular product for which parity is being calculated. The result is the current parity price.

Net farm income attained about 136 per cent of parity in 1942 and parity had, of course, been the major objective of the farm program since its inception. Parity income is the net farm income needed to maintain the 1909-14 ratio of per capita farm income to per capita non-farm income. For the first ten months of 1942, cash income from farm marketings totaled \$12,117,000, as compared with \$8,906,000 in the corresponding period of 1941. The total for 1942 was about 15 billion dollars, an increase of one-third over 1941, and nearly double the 1935-39 average. This sum also topped the former wartime peak of \$14,600,000,000 for 1919. The increase in the income of 1942 over that of 1941 resulted from a rise in prices of around 25 per cent and a 12 per cent increase in sales. Government payments increased the total cash farm income in 1942 to 15.6 billion dollars as compared with 11.8 billion in 1941.

In 1943 income from farm marketings rose to 19.25 billion dollars and, in 1944, to the astounding sum of 20 billions. In January 1944, farmers also had in savings accounts and in war bonds the sum of 12 billion dollars, far more of a nest egg than they had ever had before. It certainly looked as if they were doing very well.

But it should be remembered that farmers and their families now constitute only one-fifth of our entire population, for the farm population steadily dropped during the war. Yet, in 1944, the total national income

was 160 billion dollars. Hence farmers should have had an annual income of 32 billion dollars instead of the mere 20 billions they received. Now, when they are at their highest peak of prosperity, their share (now one-eighth, formerly one-seventh) of the national income is still disproportionately small. Furthermore they are on the verge of an inflationary land boom which can become disastrous unless it is somehow avoided.

Moreover their buildings, facilities, and equipment are still run down. The farm plant originally ran down in the great farm depression, which began early in the 20's and had not ended when we entered World War II. Scarcities of labor and supplies prevented farmers from renewing their plant and replenishing their facilities under wartime conditions. On January 17, 1945, Secretary Wickard told a Senate Committee that two-thirds of the nation's farm families were ill-housed. He went on:

Slums usually are associated with cities, yet the average level of farm housing is far below that of the city dwellings. This is true of what might be termed the settled farm families. Housing conditions for most migrant farm workers are on an even lower level.

The Secretary of Agriculture wisely went on to say that a mere housing program would be insufficient to remedy this condition. For the farm families with the lowest incomes lived in the worst houses.

The only broad and permanent solution can come through a combination of stable and adequate farm income and full and continuing industrial employment. Better housing for farm people depends largely on better opportunities in agriculture or outside of it. We must have no more industrial depressions that drive people back to the land in tarpaper shacks.

During the First World War, net farm income rose from 97 per cent of parity in 1916 to 147 per cent in 1917, then to the record level of 165 per cent in 1918. In the period 1935-39, farm prices averaged just about parity, but 112 per cent of parity was attained in 1941. The so-called farm bloc for a long time battled to have the parity index revised upward. This could have been accomplished, the bloc felt, by giving full weighting to farm labor costs, an item omitted in 1937-38, because its inclusion then would have lowered parity.

The Department of Agriculture has consistently held out for maintenance of the parity index unimpaired. However, under the Emergency Price Control Act, ceilings could not be imposed upon farm prices until they reached 110 per cent of parity. To this provision the Secretary of Agriculture agreed because, at that time, farm prices averaged only 99 per cent of parity and they had continuously been under parity for many years. He felt that if an average of parity was to be attained, some farm prices must be permitted to exceed 100 per cent, for others would not attain that. On

September 15, 1942, however, the Secretary told the Senate Banking and Currency Committee that conditions were such that the restriction was no longer needed. Thereafter, the Administration fought for an unimpaired parity index. The index remained unimpaired in the Price Stabilization Act which became law on October 2, 1942. Under Section 3 of this act, no maximum price shall be established or maintained for any agricultural commodity, or for any commodity processed in whole or in substantial part from any agricultural commodity below a price that reflects the higher of the following: 1. parity price; 2. the highest price received by producers between January 1 and September 15, 1942. The President may modify the price when necessary to secure increased production for war purposes, to "Correct gross inequities," or whenever costs incurred by farmers since January 1, 1941, "adequate weight" being given to farm labor, are not duly reflected.

Thus the battle for parity was won. Did farmers then attain millennium? Unfortunately, as we saw above, they did not. It is, in fact, ironical that just when the parity battle raged most furiously farmers were more interested in declining manpower than in price, and in producing to meet the wartime needs of the nation than in maintenance of parity indices. Farmers had just topped all previous production records. Instead of turning out only 6 per cent more than in 1941, they turned out better than 13 per cent more. They doubled their production of oil crops—soybeans, peanuts, flaxseed for linseed oil, and cottonseed—more than wiping out the deficit caused by our lost trans-Pacific oil imports.

But much of this task was accomplished by the planning and labor of more than 1,600,000 individuals who later entered the armed forces or went to work in industry. The surprising thing is that, in 1942, 1943, and 1944, our farmers, in spite of wartime scarcities of fertilizers, insecticides, machinery, and other supplies, and a greatly reduced labor supply, maintained all-time record production. Of course, there were then many underemployed farmers on small holdings where they would produce neither economically nor efficiently. With Government loans, particularly of the kind the Farm Security Administration had specialized in providing, they could, however, considerably increase their production of food and fiber, and they did. But the Government aided only about a quarter of the two million such operatives.

Unfortunately the FSA was long under constant fire and adverse criticism based usually on misunderstanding or deliberate ignorance. Its activities were curtailed. Yet it was at all times a thoroughly up-to-date instrumentality of Government, urgently required by our modern technological society. It was and is traditional—perhaps too traditional—in its ideology, because it has sought merely to equalize opportunity for those rendered underprivileged by modern industrial society through no fault

of their own. It has always recognized that farm production matters more than price. It has also sought to preserve and protect the family-sized farm.

In wartime there is no longer the question of doing this or that and of trying to make it pay. It is in part a problem in human engineering, and in part one of utilizing machines, manpower, materials, and processes, functionally to create all those things needed to win the war. Agriculture has a basically important place in this picture. This industry was recognized as fundamental even by the most rapacious dictatorships. If our farmers have at last achieved the highest income in history, this has done no more than make them a relatively privileged class in our society, which is precisely what they tended to become all over the world.

Has that solved the farm problem? It has not. For farmers have for so long operated in deficit, producing our food, fiber, and timber needs at a discount, that a slight improvement just now does not even equalize their status, much less place them in a preferred position. But as the war continued, we, like the British and the Germans, increasingly recognized the fundamental importance of the tillers of the soil. With the war won, we must settle the farm problem on a global, not a national, basis.

“Solving the farm problem” became quite a joke in the United States in recent years. The proposed solutions were the butt of endless witticisms and cartoons. About as far as many of us went in our thinking was to say that farmers got paid for not producing. As a people, we failed signally to realize that our own farm problem was part of a world problem and that other nations, both democratic and totalitarian, also sought solutions in splendid isolation. Unless such problems are considered on the premise that the world is an organic unit, they simply cannot be understood, much less solved. For science and technology have inexorably integrated and unified the globe. Thus, as war has been made global, all national problems have been made world problems. At the same time, technical and scientific progress has rendered obsolete our traditional ideas about national self-sufficiency and sovereign independence. For no nation can now act without regard to the interests of other nations. We acknowledge this in trying to solve such problems as epidemics by setting up international control in peacetime. We must also acknowledge it in agriculture, industry, economics, and politics.

Though we usually speak of our six or seven million farmers, there are in the nation only four million tracts that could be properly classified as farms, for two million of the tracts described as farms by the Census Bureau have annual cash incomes averaging only \$215, which is patently insufficient to support a family. Over a million tracts reported ownership of no agricultural implements and a million and three-quarters reported ownership of not a single horse or mule. Even then, on two of the four million

tracts classified above as farms, annual cash income averaged \$647 a year, and the lowest amount of cash necessary to provide a farm family with a minimum adequate living is \$700.

There was indeed an American farm problem. Many measures were adopted in the effort to solve it, among them direct and disguised subsidies, payments for soil conservation and the reduced production of soil-destroying crops, efforts to raise prices of farm commodities, and other measures adopted by industry in a depression. For American agriculture worked within the frame of reference of American industry and some conformity to industrial procedure in depression was inevitable. In taking such measures, however, industry tends to disregard the social consequences of its acts. Agriculture did not do this. Emphasis was placed upon the conservation of our natural resources—soil, water, and forests. Rational means of surplus disposal were introduced which not only acted as price-control mechanisms, but also made food available under the Food Stamp and other plans, to the underprivileged. Crop insurance, elaborate financing devices, and commodity-market controls were all established.

In the earlier stages of its enhanced mechanization American agriculture provided the nation with food and fiber at a sharp discount. During a depression it was expensive to maintain this highly mechanized industry in something like running order. Compensation for past favors had to be given to farmers by means of what were essentially government grants. As a result the agricultural industry, even in the United States, has tended more and more to become a government-planned and government-regulated enterprise. Here, as elsewhere, war brought agricultural prosperity. This was not an evenly distributed prosperity and there is still much rural distress. But farm income as a whole is higher than ever before and the average farmer willingly states today that he is far better off than he was a year ago, and expects to become still better off. Moreover, he has done a big job.

But the means taken to solve the pre-war farm problem stuck pretty closely to the price end of the situation. The proper procedure would have been to begin with a scientific survey to ascertain the food, fiber, and timber needs of our population, to be followed by a scientific plan for satisfying those needs functionally. That would have been a rational solution though still within a nationalistic frame of reference. Instead, efforts were made to raise prices, regardless of the fact that they would only render still more consumers unable to buy what they needed. Nevertheless, accompanying relief measures were soon instituted, but they were designed originally to help the underprivileged to pay the usual prices charged to others. Yet when the oversupply of hogs forced farm prices down to \$3.98 a hundredweight in July, 1933, and the much maligned "little pig" slaughter took place, this yielded 97,531,000 pounds of dry salt pork which was

distributed through relief channels. The measure also saved sixty million bushels of corn that were necessary in the drought year of 1934 to maintain hog numbers and the pork supply when the national corn crop was halved by the weather. We were not alone in our farm troubles, though we acted as if we were. Every other country, democratic or totalitarian, was then trying to lick the farm problem. Unfortunately they were all trying separately, whereas the problem could be really licked only on a world basis.

It was fortunate that our Government had proceeded with a much derided farm-aid program since 1933. While the United States and Great Britain were not consciously preparing for war, much less aggression, their Governments did take some measures to help ailing agricultural industries. But under peacetime conditions the production, processing, and distribution of foods is handled in both countries by an elaborately inefficient and overlapping instrumentality, a complicated conglomeration of trades and businesses mismanaged for profit by private enterprise.

The necessary basic foods were manipulated and elaborated into all kinds of special and trick foods in order to coax money out of consumer pockets. The simple means of sustaining life had thus become a large collection of interrelated industries, some still concerned with satisfying our primary wants at a good profit, but others producing and selling frauds and luxuries palmed off upon consumers as necessities. The functional problem of properly feeding the population on scientific principles had been neglected. Instead, the system, if we may call it that, was based upon the idea of producing food at a price level which at least one-third of the population could not afford to meet. Even under wartime conditions the tendency for a long period both in Britain and in the United States was to operate food control with a minimum of interference with existing trade practices however wasteful and bungling they were. Needs, not permitted expenditures; the nutritive requirements of the population, not price control, should have been the first objective.

Certainly in wartime, consumers should not be fair game to be bullied and defrauded as they are in what is quaintly called "normal" times—the legitimate prey of manufacturer, merchant, and advertiser. Yet even in normal times our only method of effectively aiding the underprivileged was through the established agencies of the grocer and the banker. The Food Stamp Plan was ingenious and commendable in the extreme, but it certainly was not strictly functional in operation. To solve the problem functionally, properly qualified experts should be called upon to estimate the food (by which I mean the nutrient elements required to keep every citizen in a state of maximum fitness), fiber, and timber requirements of the nation. Other experts should then take these estimates and devise a

program along the lines of our Food Fights for Freedom farm-production goals for the production, marketing, processing, and distribution of this food. This would constitute a scientific approach to the problem.

Sooner or later such an approach must be adopted even during peace. However abhorrent many devices of totalitarians are to us, we must adopt the useful parts of their program if we are to stand up against them effectively. They are profoundly right in their assumption that agricultural production and the food industry must be under a single highly-centralized governmental control. Great Britain has gone rather far along this line under pressure of acute food shortages, but not far enough.

We have long assumed that we need bother comparatively little about food. We felt that our potential productive capacity was all but unlimited in this field. We underestimated the calls upon us of other members of the United Nations. We neglected to provide facilities for food storage and stock piling. We rationed sugar and faced shortages of certain meats and canned goods. More and longer shortages and much more rationing were bound to come. Had we quickly reorganized our entire agricultural and food industries as an organic whole and without regard to profit we should have been far better off.

In the first place, though our farmers performed miracles during the war, our food-producing potentialities have by no means been fully realized.

In 1944 our production of food and fiber was one-third greater than during the 1917-18 period, and three-fifths greater than during the 1910-14 period. This was a remarkable increase, and it enabled civilians at home to have considerably more food per capita in 1944 than they had had in the 1935-39 period.

This remarkable increase occurred when an unusually large part of the farm-labor force consisted of the very old, the very young, women, children, and inexperienced town and city volunteers. Actual trained farm labor was scarcer than it had been for years. But production per farm worker was twice as great in 1944 as in 1910. Making due allowances for weather, farm technology has advanced so rapidly that we can regularly expect average yields 20 per cent higher per acre than in the 1923-32 decade.

This improved technology covers not only increased use of better machinery, but also more efficient food production from both animals and plants, better strains and varieties springing from genetic research, better protection from plant and animal diseases and from insects, and improved methods of fertilization, cultivation, and harvesting. Above all increased use of soil-conservation methods has enabled the land to produce better because its humus and mineral riches have been better conserved.

Within a decade we could, if we wished, produce food for double the number of people we supplied in 1943. This would require the diversion

of more manpower, materials, and resources, to agriculture, and some drastic changes in our food production and consumption habits, but it could readily be accomplished. Indeed we could do this even under wartime conditions if necessary, while its accomplishment in peacetime would be easy, if we set it as our objective. Certainly some such scheme could be used to enable us to give food to many starving people outside the United States without sacrificing the essentials of an adequately nutritive diet here.

The real question is whether we intend to do this. We have shown that we could produce more farm commodities under wartime conditions, using less labor than the "effective" market could absorb in this country before the war. The postwar export market is an unknown quantity. People already on farms could effect the increases in production mentioned above, without any additions to their number from the myriad veterans who think they want to farm with the war over.

Unless we elect to give all our people adequate diets all the time, and unless we avoid industrial depression and urban unemployment, we shall continue to have a sick agricultural industry to help render world agriculture sick. In addition we must have smoothly functioning, reciprocal, international trade relations. We must have sound working agreements with other nations as to the production and distribution of agricultural commodities.

The Draft Convention on Wheat announced by the State Department July 2, 1942, points the way. This is an agreement arrived at after a year's deliberation by representatives of Argentina, Canada, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. It marks a break with the old method of individual competition in food production among the nations. Under this method each country produced whatever wheat it desired, even if at high cost, and all countries then fought for the available outlets. Overproduction, confusion, and monetary loss resulted; meanwhile huge groups of human beings had too little wheat in their diets. As a result of this agreement, world-needs for wheat will be the first consideration, due attention being given to providing an adequate diet for all.

Hereafter, a pool of not less than one hundred million bushels of wheat will be maintained at all times as an international ever-normal granary. Wheat will be produced in regions where it can be grown economically. There will be continuous free trade in wheat and the pool will be used for intergovernmental relief of war-stricken countries and in such food-deficient areas as require it. The basic aim is fuller and more efficient use of human and natural resources. Prices will be maintained which are fair both to consumers and producers. Ruinous surpluses will be avoided. A Wheat Council of experts is to administer the agreement.

Such agreements should be made regarding other commodities just as quickly as they can be formulated. Only by such voluntary international

regulation of the production and distribution of agricultural and industrial commodities can we avoid chaos in the hoped-for free world of tomorrow.

Finally there should be mentioned here some steps that have been taken to improve the nutritional status of the entire world. This has nothing to do with giving milk to Hottentots; it is the sort of thing Henry Wallace had in mind when he made that wholly misinterpreted remark which was used to belabor him. The first step in this procedure was the National Nutrition Conference for Defense in Washington, May 26-28, 1941. Here we rediscovered what we had known: that the newer knowledge of nutrition was not being fully put to work because about one-third of our people were habitually undernourished. The customary pious resolutions were made to do something about this matter.

It is a striking fact that more persons are engaged in the agricultural industry than in any other. In many countries the services of from seven to nine persons out of every ten capable of work are required merely to produce farm products which maintain the population at a bare subsistence level. In the United States we have managed to feed civilians and the armed forces better than ever in history—civilians got 9 per cent more food per capita in 1944 than in the 1935-39 period—while using only one worker, out of five, in the farm industry. But whereas two-thirds of the world's population have in the past been engaged in farming, two-thirds of the people of the world have never had enough of the right kinds of food. So, in May 1943, there was held, in Hot Springs, Va., a United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture. It explored what could be done by united action in the fields of food and agriculture to lay the foundations for world economic improvement and stability, without which no peace can remain secure.

The Conference recognized that it was now scientifically and technically possible for the world to produce adequate diets for all of its people, and that cooperative effort should be made to secure increased efficiency in world production and distribution of agricultural products. Immediately after this conference the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture was set up in Washington to formulate a specific plan for a permanent organization in the field of food and agriculture. This it did by August 1944. It had by then prepared a constitution for the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations—FAO. With the acceptance of the constitution by twenty of the United Nations, FAO comes into existence and the Interim Commission automatically dissolves. FAO is a purely advisory body, staffed with technical experts, whose over-all budget will not exceed 5 million dollars annually.

But it can and will make statistical global surveys, which we have never had, of agricultural production and distribution possibilities, to form a basis for extending sound nutrition and good marketing practices to the entire

world. FAO can make special surveys at the request of any member-nation and ask for reports on these and on the results of following FAO's advice in specific instances. In the long run it can aid greatly in raising the levels of nutrition and the living standards of all peoples; in effecting improvements in agricultural and food production and distribution; in bettering the condition of rural populations everywhere; and in contributing to an expanding and smoothly functioning world economy.

Since its activities are advisory, not mandatory, FAO can succeed only if its staff is competent and its operation efficient. Backed by the authority of scientifically verifiable knowledge, FAO should point the way to unyielding progress toward freedom from want. Only by the extension of such activities as these, and peaceful international cooperation, can the global farm problem be solved.

CTIMS OF E DEAD NEW ORDER

It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion . . .

—Lincoln

VICTIMS OF THE DEAD NEW ORDER

CARL VON OSSIEZKY

H

ILDA WALTER

The citizens of the small town of Sonnenburg—two hours by car from Berlin—in April of the year 1933 addressed a complaint to their municipal authorities. For more than a month their peaceful nights had been disturbed by the screaming of the tortured that issued for hours on end from the ancient penitentiary near the city limits, denying them their good night's rest. Six weeks later, on a radiant noonday of May, 1933, when I was escorted by S.A. men through the barriers and controls into an office building of the Sonnenburg penitentiary, not a sound came from the main building with its seven hundred inmates. An emaciated man, deathly pale in his old field-gray uniform, crossed the graveyard stillness of the court alone. His stride seemed uncertain though he tried desperately to walk straight. He held his arms pressed tight to his body but his hands trembled. A gray military neckerchief encased his throat as tightly as though it were a surgical dressing. He could not move his head.

Carl von Ossietzky—for he was the man in the veteran's uniform—was permitted to speak to me for ten minutes, standing and under guard, in order to consult about what could be done for his ailing wife and his twelve-year-old daughter. No word was exchanged about his arrest on the night of February 28, when the Reichstag burned; no word about his first days and nights in the Berlin prison; no word about the time that followed and about the future. He raised his voice at the conclusion of each sentence, saying in a stereotyped tone: "Please don't worry about me; I'm all right." When we took leave, he repeated the words with special emphasis and insistence, adding very softly and cautiously, "For the moment."

Carl von Ossietzky had fought against Hitler, the Nazis, and all who helped them, when the war against Hitler was still being waged inside Germany. That was why he was among the first to be put out of the way after Hitler's victory over Germany. It is possible that the Nazis had not yet passed sentence of death on him when they tortured him in Sonnenburg. They did not torment him as diabolically as they did the Anarchist writer, Erich Mühsam. They did not maim him as they did the Protestant attorney, Hans Litten, who had appeared in court to oppose Hitler. When Ossietzky

bled under their blows or collapsed of heart attacks under hard labor, they granted him a few days' rest on his cot. But then a high-ranking Nazi would appear at his sick-bed. "A message from the Commandant"—that was the official formula. Actually the message would come from the talented writer and journalist, Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Minister for Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment in the Third Reich, addressed to the equally talented Carl von Ossietzky, until then editor of the independent radical-pacifist weekly, *Die Weltbühne*, and now in "protective custody" charged with "treason." Joseph Goebbels proposed to his colleague Ossietzky that he sign and make public a declaration composed by Goebbels. The text ran as follows:

I have convinced myself that the National Socialist regime has introduced several remarkable achievements in Germany, particularly favoring the working people. I admit that my former views concerning the purposes of the National Socialist Party must be revised in many respects. I have therefore resolved to cease engaging actively in politics and to confine my literary activities to non-political topics.

Ossietzky would say, No—and was then instantly ordered on fatigue drill in the prison courtyard. His fellow inmates would stand lined up and watch Ossietzky shunted twenty times around the courtyard on the double-quick. All the while the guard would roar, "The swine must learn at last that he must wash his mess kit clean."

This indomitable man was forty-five years old when he rejected the first peace offer of the Nazis. He knew that he was signing his own death warrant—irrevocably—unless he were to renege on himself, his past, his ideals. Ossietzky's ideals had been shaped by neither party nor doctrine nor class interest—nor by so-called racial allegiance, for he was an "Aryan." They had been shaped by his own life, and his "yearning for the dreamland of justice." When young Ossietzky, an impoverished son of the middle class despite his aristocratic name, wrote his first political article in Hamburg, he was still fired by the ambition to become a poet. That was in 1912, and poets in Germany liked to place themselves in opposition to the Prussian militarist class. After four years of service in the World War he—like Corporal Adolf Hitler—"decided to go into politics." Embittered and shaken by the tremendous experience of the war, he sought to establish peace forever, a goal most Germans sought at the time. He wrote articles against war, founded associations against war, rallied the urban masses to protest against war.

The German Republic, rising from the ruins of the Empire and seeking to remain alive by compromising with its many enemies, soon deflected Ossietzky from his original course. Several years of routine experience in Berlin as secretary of pacifist organizations and editor in the great liberal publishing house of Mosse failed to satisfy Ossietzky, whose impulses were those of an intellectual guerrilla fighter and who lacked the elbows of a

political careerist. In 1927 he became editor, publisher, and chief editorial writer of a small weekly, much read by intellectuals. Before the World War the *Weltbühne* had reviewed the drama and literature. Later, it turned to the critique of politics and economics. And to the degree that German politics degenerated into latent civil war among three groups—the left radicals, the right radicals, and those loyal to the Government—Ossietzky himself began to wield his eloquent pen against the danger from the right.

His style was brilliant, witty, cosmopolitan. So excellent and impressive was his political journalism that a whole stratum of Germans described its political convictions as those of *Weltbühne* readers. The editorial policy of the *Weltbühne* devoted as much interest to the problems of the workers and the liberals as it did to the Reichswehr, out for rearmament; it harbored inexorable enmity against the pro-Hitler rightist party.

Revelations concerning clandestine rearmament activities engaged in by certain Reichswehr authorities who were secretly but vigorously preparing for German rearmament in the air on Soviet territory and in co-operation with the Soviet Government brought Ossietzky in 1931 before the bar of the highest German court, the Reichsgericht in Leipzig, under indictment for treason. He was sentenced to eighteen months in prison—even in peace time the publication of military secrets was punished as treason! It would have been quite easy for Ossietzky at the time to evade this penalty by escaping abroad. But he stayed to face it because he was unwilling to relinquish the face-to-face struggle with his opponents. He was a militant martyr. "I am willing to accept the consequences of my policies not only with my pen but also with my person," he wrote before entering prison. When he was freed under a general amnesty at Christmas 1932 there were just seven weeks left—seven lead editorials, seven reckonings with the Nazis struggling for power—before those same Nazis, now in the Government, again arrested him. This time there was no indictment and no trial.

Foreigners unfamiliar with German conditions may find it difficult to understand that it took more than a gift for journalism, that it took human courage, to agitate as bitterly and uncompromisingly as Ossietzky did against the powerful military leaders and the dangerous Nazis. Nor can they well imagine the effect that so valiant a stand exerted upon public opinion in Germany—which accounted for the Nazis' hatred of Ossietzky. All through his political struggles, Ossietzky had put his trust in the German people who, like any other people, would have liked to live in peace had leaders and circumstances permitted them. In the struggle against these fateful circumstances and dangerous leaders Ossietzky failed. But even when he was completely at the mercy of his enemies, who transferred him to a new concentration camp in January, 1934, he did not give up hope. The new camp represented the ultimate in horror, even after the torture

dungeons through which Ossietzky had been dragged during the preceding year. Reports from those who shared his fate in the peatbog camp of Papenburg described how the familiar terror engulfed him too.

More than three years he remained in this hell until, one morning, the name of Carl von Ossietzky was world-famous. For two years the propaganda agencies of the Third Reich had fought against this eventuality, had slandered and depreciated him abroad, had launched impressive rival candidates against him; but now it had really happened—on November 23, 1936, the Nobel Prize for Peace was voted to Carl von Ossietzky. Twenty-one nations throughout the world had filed nominating petitions in his favor. The award significantly recognized Ossietzky's passive suffering on behalf of his ideals as much as it did his active achievements in peace propaganda in Germany. The decision had barely been made in Oslo, when official Germany began to rage with indignation. Hermann Goering summoned the tortured convict of his regime for an audience. For three hours he talked, threatened, flattered, and promised. He roared: "You will wire Oslo that you will not accept the Prize." Ossietzky's only answer was a resolute no.

He was sent back to his prison; but the German telegraph carried his message of gratitude and acceptance to Oslo.

The Nazi press fulminated furiously against Norway which had dared honor a prisoner of the German State. The foreign press in Berlin, at that time still feared and courted by the Nazis, was eager to exploit the news value of the story of the concentration camp inmate who had been honored by a Nobel Prize. But the stage managers of the Third Reich had moved Ossietzky in time from the notorious camp into a thoroughly respectable Berlin hospital, robbing the story of its bitter point.

It is customary for winners of the Nobel Prize for Peace to receive the prize solemnly and in person in the Norwegian capital. The trip to the Nobel festivities would have meant freedom for Ossietzky. Naturally the Nazi Government would not let him go. But almost to the last moment—in keeping with familiar Nazi tactics—spokesmen declared that there was nothing in the way of Ossietzky's trip and that he could appear in person to receive the prize. Actually the iron grip of his jailers never loosened for an instant and the prize scroll could not be given to anyone. The German Envoy in Norway, who usually assumed the duty of representing absent Nobel Prize winners of his country, was hardly the proper man in this case. But the Nazis had no intention of surrendering by default the large sum of money connected with the prize. The one hundred thousand Swedish kroner granted to the tortured fighter for his efforts in behalf of peace were needed by the Third Reich for its armament program. The final ironic touch was furnished on January 30, 1937, three days after the Reichsbank had collected this foreign exchange, when Goering proclaimed to the Nazi

Reichstag that henceforth no German would be permitted to accept a Nobel Prize. In its place Hitler endowed a German National Prize.

As for Ossietzky, immediately after he had been exhibited to the foreign correspondents, he was transferred to another hospital where he again became an isolated prisoner. But the sufferings and tortures of the concentration camps were not cured in that hospital. They had left horrible scars. During the years in camp, he had contracted a grave case of pulmonary tuberculosis as well as acute heart disease, and medical skill was almost powerless against these disorders. By keeping him locked up in his hospital cell, the Nazis were really contriving swift execution of death sentence—without a hangman and seemingly without guilt on their part. And thus Ossietzky's death sentence was executed.

One final moment of tension, for the flame was not to sputter in silence! In the spring of 1938, the Nazis haled into court the crooked Gestapo agent who had arranged to have Ossietzky's prize money transferred from Oslo to Berlin and pocketed most of the funds after they had been exchanged for German currency. Ossietzky was summoned as a witness in the trial. It was hoped to put on a big show for the foreign press—Ossietzky thanking the valiant swastika police for running down the swindle. But once again the Nazis had reckoned without their protagonist. The transcript of this trial, which has never been published in its entirety, shows that on this occasion Ossietzky was far more interested in trying to show why he had received and accepted the Peace Prize than in proving the guilt of the accused. But the judges would not let him talk.

He died two months later, on May 4, 1938. His legacy consists of some four hundred articles from the magazine *Weltbühne*, today scattered in the libraries. In their entirety these articles that grew in vigor and vehemence week by week and revealed all the faults and all the hopes of the Republic constitute a critical and aggressive history of that Germany which sought its place not in the sun but in freedom. But—and this is even more valuable because it is rare and more vital—he also left us the legend of his life. In the struggle against overwhelming odds he remained true to himself and to the ideal that Germany was to become a land of progress and peace. He held out in the face of the onslaught. Carl von Ossietzky, victim of National Socialism, is one of the great heroic figures of the free Germany to come.

J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO The bullet from the firing squad that stopped his heart struck at the same time the heart of Madrid. The town he had glorified in his sensitive and personal prose was now suffering the full blast of the new Gestapo drive. Heinrich Himmler had just been there for a brief visit and when informed of the high spirit that prevailed in the Spanish prisons had reacted as might have been expected: "Shoot them all!" All were not shot but Julian Zugazagoitia fell, as was his due if the best were going to die.

He was not from Madrid. He came from the north and his silhouette, his way of walking, and his beret at once revealed his origin. His name above all, that long name, Zugazagoitia, from which American readers need not shrink. Everybody called him Zuga and we shall stick to it here. He was from head to foot a Basque, but Madrid had won him forever on that morning of July in 1936 when the masses poured into the streets with every kind of weapon they could procure and in a few hours accomplished the fall of the Cuartel de la Montaña, the main stronghold of Franco's rebel army.

From the office of *El Socialista*, of which he is editor, Zuga follows the drama of Madrid from that day until the moment when the rebel troops, on the point of entering, are thrown back, beginning the most impressive epic in the annals of a besieged city. A man of his extraction cannot, of course, limit himself to the role of reporter, however acute and honest, of what happens around him. A fighter since the years when he joined the Socialist Youth of Bilbao, with a long record of persecution and imprisonment behind him, he is not merely the commentator of the resistance, but a part of the resistance itself. And yet the integrity of the writer transcends the passion of the partisan. Being in the middle of the battle does not prevent him from registering his impressions with a serenity and a soft humor that make the two books he has left us among the most valuable and human documents of the Spanish War. The volume covering the period from the outbreak of the rebellion until the consolidation of the resistance carries the simple title *Madrid*, subtitle, "Carranza 20," the street and number of the offices of *El Socialista*.

It is the heroism of those first days that inevitably stirs Zuga most deeply and awakens his old faith in the virtues of the common people. The *mili-*

cianos of the period before the creation of a regular army—it is they who appeal to the sensibility of a man grown up in close contact with the life of the worker: the baker, the carpenter, the barber and above all the printer who comes from his forms to tell him: "Well, Zuga, with the two or three old comrades and youngsters downstairs you have enough to get out the paper; I had the luck to get a rifle and this afternoon I leave for the Sierra." And leaving along with the workers are the reporter and the engineer and the doctor and the musician, and even the typist girl, everyone who has the good fortune to get hold of a rifle. Since the assault on the Cuartel de la Montaña there are rifles and even machine guns, the latter in very small numbers to be distributed among the unions. Until then everybody had to satisfy himself with a pistol to meet the rebel army.

He loves those *milicianos* who go singing to death without even registering their names in the union office in order to secure pensions for their wives or their children. He hates those who remain half dressed in uniform in the cafés of Madrid emulating the fervor of the Club of the Jacobins. "All the rifles to the front," he writes morning after morning. He hates still more the display of arbitrary violence on the part of certain people who have no sense of the responsibility that the possession of a gun places in their hands. He foresees already how the isolated acts of extremists, often maneuvered by *agents provocateurs*, will be exploited by fascist propaganda abroad, attaching to the Republic the infamous label of "red atrocities." He wants a people hard in the fight, courageous to temerity, a people such as he sees before his eyes, but in its dealings with the enemy capable also of the greatness that the character of so noble a cause imposes.

Every time the feeling of the common people is the deciding factor he is sure of not being disappointed. I remember how he enjoyed the description of a scene that I witnessed in my capacity as acting chairman of the Socialist organization in Madrid a few weeks after the outbreak of the war. The Government had given orders that wherever the rebels might enter an effort should be made to save everything possible: documents, civil and penal files, works of art, the money in the banks. One morning very early three men came to the Socialist headquarters, unshaved, without sleep, with the fatigue of a hazardous trip visible in their faces. They were carrying a very heavy sack. They came from Talavera, which on the previous day had fallen into the hands of the rebels, and with them they brought about five million *pesetas* in bills and silver from the local branch of the Bank of Spain. The secretary of the organization, an excellent Social Democrat, with that severe sense of responsibility that made the Socialist Party of Spain an example of honesty and probity in the politics of the country, wanted to call in the other members of the Committee and to surround with all kinds of formalities the delivery of the receipt for this huge sum of money. The other members were in adjoining rooms extraordinarily busy with the dis-

tribution of arms and munitions to comrades from Estremadura and Andalucía who had come to Madrid to get the necessary material to organize several battalions of *milicianos*. As they delayed in answering the call, the men who held the sack became impatient and, using an expression which only Hemingway would dare put into English, one of them said: "Damn the receipt and the accounting. Let those other fellows go on with their job. I don't need any paper. When I entered the bank yesterday I had with me four pesetas and seventy-five centimos. The seventy-five centimos went last night for an omelette and a glass of wine. This morning there wasn't time to take coffee. So the four pesetas are intact. Here they are. Keep them, too. For the Cause." And without waiting for our thanks he walked out.

Zuga's appreciation of the qualities of the simple people of Madrid helps him to await with confidence the hour of the supreme test. It is on November 6, 1936 when he finds his hopes entirely fulfilled. Madrid becomes tense and acquires that consistency of tempered steel which it was to maintain during two and a half years as a symbol of Spanish resistance. Emotions multiply each day: the arrival of a lorry with shells when all ammunition is exhausted; the testing of a new machine-gun like a wonderful, unexpected toy, a machine-gun that has been converted by the ingenuity of some mechanics into an antiaircraft piece—a weapon which Madrid at that time entirely lacked; the quickness with which even the youngsters master the technique of defense, discovering ways of zigzagging along the street to keep on the side less exposed to the explosions from the big enemy batteries; the inspiring appearance of the first volunteers of the International Brigades, looking at the same time strange and familiar, men of every race, singing in unintelligible tongues a single, world-famous song: "Spain Against the Fascists"; the death of Martínez de Aragón, one of the first popular heroes, a noble, high-ranking officer who has rushed to the firing-line to fall on the side of the workers in the defense of his country. All these things are reflected in the pages that Zuga writes in his diminutive and beautiful handwriting—the epic of Madrid; and above all the dignity of the city. Heroism, yes; courage, yes; grace and a sense of humor, yes; but above all a tremendous dignity which never degenerates into vulgar pride. That was the gesture of Madrid. The foreign delegations, British, French, Scandinavian, American, were all touched by the dignity with which Madrid was able to endure everything, even the lack of understanding and the stupid egotism which characterized the capitals of the other democracies.

His year in the Ministry of the Interior, to which Dr. Negrín appoints him in 1937, does not compensate Zuga for the satisfaction he found in sharing the fight as one of the people. When the crisis of 1938 produces the re-organization of the Cabinet it is only out of a sense of discipline that he accepts the new post of General Secretary of the unified Department of Defense which he holds until the end of the war.

The other war, second act of the Spanish drama, finds Zuga in France as a refugee. He suffers to see his comrades of the fight thrown like pigs into the concentration camps, their offers of service as aviators, artillerymen, *dinamiteros* having been ignored. And yet, like Dr. Negrin, like all of us, Zuga places the victory of France and England above everything. He becomes furious when somebody says: "They are paying for what they did." "For their terrible blunder in Spain they are already paying in blood; let us not talk about it. It is not the moment to blame but to help." Zuga helps in his way by writing against Hitler in *La Vanguardia* of Buenos Aires.

Suddenly the memory of Madrid comes to him as a fire to inflame him and to betray him. Paris has remained alone, alone with its people. The government has left, and with the government, the traitors and the appeasers of the Quai d'Orsay. The air is clear of the imbecility and the shame of those who, with the name of France always on their lips, sold her to the enemy, those who look upon the anti-fascist fighters who had taken refuge in the capital of the Rights of Man as enemies instead of as allies. It is now the people of Paris, the people of the Bastille and of the Commune, free from the demoralization that has paralyzed their action, it is they who are going to throw back the Nazis at the doors of the city, repeating Madrid. His last article, published in Buenos Aires on June 9, three days before the entrance of the Nazis into Paris, still reveals a passionate confidence. "The German radio is mistaken. Its reports are not only wrong but mendacious. Paris is not Berlin. Now, when I have put my signature under this article, I shall walk through the town. I shall go along the river to look at the old book-shops on those wonderful streets, the rue Bonaparte, the rue de la Seine, those book-shops which still conceal exciting discoveries. Paris has not the offensive joy of Berlin but it has something that Berlin doesn't know —the security of victory." A prediction at which the professional reporter may smile but which reveals the fibre of our friend.

For his enthusiasm he was going to pay with death. He refuses to follow the other refugees who go to Toulouse and Marseille. He tells them in a brotherly way: You will come back soon. He is arrested by the Gestapo and delivered to Franco.

His trial in Madrid impressed even the smug officers who formed the Court. A South American diplomat who witnessed the trial told us that Zuga was simply marvelous. The whole heroism of Madrid, the whole dignity of Madrid, was embodied in this Basque of few words, but capable of moving a hostile audience.

We are proud to have fought at the side of Julian Zugazagoitia, one of the great spirits killed in the war against fascism.

K

LAUS MANN

In the death of Stefan Zweig, not only one of the representatives figures of modern letters has passed away, but also an eminent connoisseur and patron, indeed a great lover, of literature.

This fine word, lover, seems particularly apt to describe his attitude towards life and letters. He was infinitely curious, always eager and prepared for new intellectual adventures. With fervor and diligence he kept exploring and extolling ever new aspects and domains of the literary cosmos. He rediscovered the classics and discovered the young. He translated foreign poetry into German and transmitted German values to five continents. He wrote prefaces, book reviews, numerous essays, and innumerable letters. His literary contacts reached from Paris to Rio de Janeiro, from San Francisco to Helsingfors. He traveled, lectured, adapted old comedies for the modern stage. His collection of manuscripts was unique, including original works of Goethe, Balzac, Stendhal, Holderlin, Johann Sebastian Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart. His own autograph went, by request, to his admirers in Leningrad and Leipzig, Milwaukee and Madrid. It also appeared on the checks which he presented to many a striving colleague. Whoever was in hard straits, and happened to be a writer, could depend on his help. His beautiful home in Salzburg, indeed every hotel room he occupied, whether for a few days or weeks, became a center of literary activities.

While Zweig possessed Flaubert's ardent preoccupation with the written word, he was completely without the ascetic pathos and monkish gravity of the French master. Flaubert despised and virtually renounced life for the sake of a vampirish abstraction, art. As for Stefan Zweig, he was by no means inclined to sacrifice life at the altar of absolute art; on the contrary, he considered literature as the comprehensive expression of man's experiences and endeavors. There was nothing rigid and exclusive in his nature and attitude. In fact, he was as remote from the "Ivory Tower" as he was from the didactic brutality of Emile Zola. The classic type upon which he formed his character was neither the ill-tempered high-priest of beauty, nor the boisterous herald of progress. It was the scholarly humanist of the Renaissance epoch—aloof but sympathetic, tolerant but incorruptible.

In his treatise on *Erasmus of Rotterdam*, Zweig attempted to explain

and defend certain features inherent in his own character. This solemn masquerade was evidently supposed to increase his authority and elucidate his objectives. Zweig asked his readers, almost openly: "You blame me on account of my elusiveness? Maybe you think me unduly soft or craven because I choose not to side with either party in the struggle of our time? But that is the way we are—we intellectuals, we humanists, we unselfish servants of the spirit. Hesitant, out of conscientiousness; seemingly aloof, but actually partaking in every human effort; profoundly versed in all abysmal secrets of the human soul and, therefore, *au dessus de la mêlée*. Thus we have always been, since the days of yore. Look at Erasmus, my illustrious brother!" But the hazardous parallel is only partly correct. There is something missing in this indirect self-portrait. It stresses and reveals but one aspect of a more complex and colorful reality. Zweig at once simplified and exaggerated his stature when he identified himself with the sixteenth-century scholar. The hesitation and indecision, in Erasmus's case, sprang from meticulous probity. Zweig, too, was loyal and high-minded. But, at the same time, there were other ingredients fused in the compound of his character: something bland and iridescent, seducible and seductive, a Casanova-like charm. Stefan Zweig came from Vienna—not from Rotterdam.

How typically Austrian he was! All his penchants and animosities, his smiles and motions, the cadence of his voice were unmistakably Viennese. Only Vienna produced that peculiar style of behavior—French suavity with a touch of German pensiveness and a faint tinge of Oriental eccentricity. A mood of *laissez faire* and serene scepticism prevails in the baroque palaces and patrician mansions, the literary cafés and cheap tenements of Vienna. Racial or national intolerance seems utterly out of keeping with the general spirit of civilized nonchalance. Barbaric aberrations like anti-Semitism appear incompatible with the innermost being of Vienna. They exist; but one would like to believe that they have been imported from provincial or foreign places. Not that Vienna was the ideal of a democratic community. The prejudices and limitations of the *ancien régime* had never been completely overcome. However, the various sectors of society were interrelated in a much more cordial and organic way than was the case in any part of the Reich. The Baron and the *fikir* driver understood each other; they had the same vocabulary and mostly the same ideas. The idiom of the great Viennese writers has a strong popular savor, for all its sophistication. From the entralling verse of Hugo von Hofmannsthal emanate the sweetness and simplicity of folk-songs. And as for Arthur Schnitzler, he is not only one of the outstanding psychologists of modern literature, but also the authentic voice of his city, communicating its sadness and merriment, its desires, problems and joys.

It is in this context and against this particular background that we should try to conceive the character and work of Stefan Zweig. The Aus-

trian element was, of course, much more essential in the texture of his personality than was the Jewish component. That is to say not only that the cultured Jewry of Vienna had completely assimilated their way of life to the Austrian pattern, but also that the Austrian style itself, or rather the style of Vienna, had become integrated with certain Jewish traditions. No German-Jewish writer could ever have attained so representative a position as Arthur Schnitzler, the Jew, occupied in Austrian literature.

One may be allowed to say that the Jews of Vienna were more Viennese than their non-Jewish compatriots; for they possessed, in a still higher degree, those qualities we consider specifically Austrian: the keen wit, the civilized courtesy, and the love of music.

The greatest explorer of the human psyche in this century, Sigmund Freud, was a Viennese Jew. Stefan Zweig, who analyzed and praised the inventor of psychoanalysis in an acute treatise, was in many respects his pupil. It is to *him*, the bold discoverer of the unconscious, that Zweig owes most of his insights and intuitions. It was Freud's authoritative example which taught and encouraged him to untangle the confusions of the heart, to scrutinize the inspiration of masterbuilders and *dæmons*, to delve into the subterranean sphere of repressed desires and forgotten fears.

Indeed, Zweig's approach to the human drama is akin to the attitude and tactics of the "mental healer." It may be that this comparison will prove more helpful than any other to elucidate a character whose potentialities range from Erasmus to Fouché, from Don Juan to Isaiah. What his methods and aspirations have in common with those of the psychiatrist is the odd blend of detachment and sympathy. Zweig does not hope nor pretend to change the world by his writing; his sole ambition is to mitigate the bitterness of human suffering by amplifying our awareness of its roots and causes. The angle from which he tackles reality is neither idealistic nor materialistic, in the Marxian sense. In fact, there is no "angle" at all—no principle according to which human beings could be labeled and evaluated. The only principle Zweig accepts is that of civilization, which exists for the sake of man. But if man, in devastating frenzy, turns against the very civilization which was conceived and built to protect and improve his life, what will be the reaction of the lover and analyst, in such sinister case? Will he continue to "understand"? Will he abide by his detachment and sympathy? Does he not realize that sympathy has long become dangerous, indeed *suicidal*, considering the murderous impetus of the assault? How can he fail to see that those ferocious hordes threaten our civilization? Civilization implies and guarantees liberty which—as Zweig has put it in his last, tragic letter—remains "the greatest wealth in the world." Why, then, does he not lift his hand to defend what is so dear, indeed indispensable, to *him*? Why does he not protest? Why does he not resist? He used to be so glib and agile, jaunty and alert. What is it that paralyzes him now?

Beware of Pity! The title of the only novel he wrote indicates that he knew his danger. *Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner.* . . . But how could you understand and how forgive the crime and *not* feel sorry for the criminal? He is your enemy, he will kill you—and yet you understand, forgive, and pity him.

How can you fight, paralyzed by knowledge and sympathy?

“I don’t want to fight,” says the humanist. “All I want is to understand.”

“But how can you strive for truth when the glaring lie triumphs? How can you maintain your detachment and dignity under the heel of the tyrant?”

Says the humanist: “No tyrant will ever touch me. I am free.”

He is free to die. Nothing else remains to be done when the last courteous letter is couched and everything put in order. The hour has arrived: the philosophical lover of life, letters, and liberty invites his wife to join him in the last macabre escapade.

Those who stay are saddened and bewildered. Some of them discreetly scold the late Master because of his lack of courage. Some others think, on the contrary, that he acted courageously: this is what they admire him for.

How trite and arrogant are our judgments, considering the overpowering reality which is death—the unspeakable drama which is suicide. Was he “right” to throw away his life? Was he a defeatist? Does his voluntary death affect the validity of his works? And if so, how? The last one of these questions is the only one that makes sense. To Stefan Zweig as a person our measures and evaluations are not applicable any more. Our moral concepts necessarily proceed from the presupposition that life as such is valuable and worth while. He who renounces life automatically overcomes a morality that loses its relevance in the vacuum of eternity.

But the work remains here; it is ours. No doubt the tragic end of the author is likely to influence our views on these brilliant biographies, masterly essays, skillful novelettes. Zweig’s desperate action in Petropolis, Brazil, seems to have added a new note of gravity to the fluent elegance of his prose. The lights as well as the shadows become more distinct in the rich and colorful texture. With wistful admiration we watch the display of his craftsmanship. We relish his daintiness, but not without apprehension. His own death reminds us of the enemy, who wants to destroy all this. What can we do in order to protect such vulnerable splendor?

Only this: to accept and cherish those elements of his message that *could* have resisted: if only the other element, the fragile and weary one, had followed his own admonition: *Beware of Pity!*

GROUP PREJUDICE BLOCKS DEMOCRACY

No man has the right in America to treat any other man “tolerantly” for tolerance is the assumption of superiority. Our liberties are equal rights of every citizen.

—Wendell Willkie

GROUP PREJUDICE BLOCKS DEMOCRACY

ANTI-SEMITISM: FACE FACTS OR FACE FASCISM

H

HARRY W. FLANNERY

"Why, that dirty little beggar! He's always bustin' in where he ain't got no place to be, loud and acting like I wasn't there at all."

He was one of a group of men around a table in the club car of a Pullman. One of the others nodded assent.

"Just like a Jew," he said.

You've heard variations of such remarks. You hear them in the conversation after dinner in rich homes; as two women chat when meeting in the corner grocery; when businessmen meet at luncheon; as servicemen gather in bases or on shipboard all over the world. You travel through resort sections and read signs outside hotels: "No Jews Allowed." Advertisements by girls seeking jobs say, "Gentiles Preferred."

One of the most extensive anti-Semitic campaigns this country has ever experienced has developed in the United States since the beginning of the war. It does no good to go whistling along our way, pretending it does not exist. Rather let us face the fact—let us see the viper and beat it down before its poisonous fangs sink into the veins of more unwary passersby. Jews, too, may well open their eyes upon a sight that is not pretty, but nonetheless real. They must not be like the Jews in Berlin who heard of outrages against their brethren in Poland, Austria and elsewhere, and said, "That is the *Ost Juden*, the eastern Jews, not we." They must not be like Hans Priwin of the executive committee of German Jews who, when told by Max Jordan of NBC not to pull any punches in his broadcast to the United States, nevertheless went on the air in the first days of Adolf Hitler to plead with his American listeners not to give credit to reports which made the outlook appear desperate.

I plead now with Jews and with all other Americans, not only for the sake of the Jews, but for all of us. I ask that we rally against this and all other tendencies toward fascism that are arising in our country. We all need more calm reasoning and less emotional fanaticism, for our own good. Those who kicked, spat upon and shot at Mussolini after he was no

more than a dead, broken body did no harm to a man whose soul had flown, but they cruelly twisted their own souls.

Any man who halts his intemperate outbursts of vituperation long enough to think would know that the Jews cannot at the same time be the international bankers who control the finance of the world and the Communists who would divide it; that they cannot be both inferior people and too damn clever for any good; those who work too hard and those who make a living off the work of others; those who try to shoulder their way into Gentile circles, and who keep too much to themselves. Each of these charges is declared characteristic of a Jew by those who are the loudest in calling themselves Americans while doing most to destroy this country. They talk of Jews controlling the money of the country without pausing to note that the seven largest banking houses in the United States are all Gentile and the eighth, Kuhn, Loeb and Company (partially Jewish), has but 2.88 per cent of the international banking business; without learning that of 93,000 bankers and banking officials in the United States, only 600 are Jews, and of 40 members of the governing committees of the New York Stock Exchange, only three are Jews. These figures could be carried into greater detail, but in each case the conclusion is the same.

"But what," cries the gentleman who has wrapped the Stars and Stripes about him while he stamps upon the Constitution, "what about the Jews as communists? They're commies, all right. You can't answer me that one."

Well, the communist leaders are William Foster, James Ford, Robert Minor, William Patterson, Ella Reeve Bloor, and they are not Jewish.

"So what? The Jews don't come out in the open, but they vote red—I know."

Well—authoritative, non-Jewish surveys, such as *Fortune*, have shown that even in cities with populations of several millions, only a tiny proportion are communists, and of these an insignificant number are Jewish. Altogether, the communist membership is measured in tens of thousands, Jews and non-Jews, while there are about five million Jews in this country.

"All right, all right. But that's because the Jews do not expect to make the United States communist yet. But Stalin, Lenin, Molotov, all those guys are Jews. You can't tell me."

It's hard to tell you anything, I might reply, but let me say that every such statement can be challenged and refuted. If reference is made to available authoritative records. There you will find that Lenin was not a Jew, nor Stalin, nor Kalinin, nor Voroshilov, nor Molotov, nor almost any other Russian communist leader. Litvinov is. That's one. Of the 19 commissars of the people in Russia, four are Jews. In 1924, Stalin said the Communist Party had 900,000 members, of whom only five per cent were Jews. More recent figures from the anti-Bolshevist paper, *Pslednija Novosti* in Paris, give the percentage of Jews in the party as 4.34 per cent.

The chief point is that all such prejudiced charges are part of a pattern which persists though it has long ago been proven to be undemocratic. This pattern may be traced back to the Native Americans party, whose program, back in the nineteenth century, called for the elimination of all "foreigners" from office, and whose anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish demonstrations led to riots and death. It is the same sinister pattern followed by Adolf Hitler in his prejudice-inciting campaigns which caused a blackout of civilization in Europe and subsequent systematic massacre on a horrifying scale unprecedented in the world's history. We must be on guard against every lie, every slander which results in setting race against race, group against group—and the best weapon in this fight against fascist hatred is the plain, unvarnished, unprejudiced truth.

One most prevalent charge against the Jews is that they have shirked war service. Some Jews, like some Presbyterians, Catholics and agnostics, may have tried to escape combat service on the plea that their occupation was essential, on the farm, in the factory or in the office. But this attitude is not typical of Jews any more than of Presbyterians, Catholics and agnostics. It just happens that some persons have a tendency to say, when they are cheated by a Jew, that all Jews cheat, when they would not say that being cheated by a Baptist means that all Baptists cheat. The same persons say when a white boy commits a crime that his environment was bad, but when a Negro commits the same crime, he behaved in a manner characteristic of Negroes; or that when a Yankee is unkempt he is an exception, while when an Italian is dirty, that's typical.

The United States Government has not released statistics on the men in service in World War II according to their religions, but we know that although the percentage of Jews in this country in World War I was 3 per cent, the percentage of Jews in the army and navy was 4 and 5 per cent. That was partly because the draft operated more efficiently in the cities of the North and East, where most of the Jews lived, partly because there were fewer Jews in the exempt heavy industries, mining and engineering, and also because of the large number of Jewish volunteers, 18 per cent of the total of Jews in the service. Of the 78 Congressional Medals of Honor, six went to Jews, more than 7 per cent. And Jews on the death rolls were 5 per cent.

Not long ago, you may have heard the alleged joke that runs like this: "The first American soldier to kill a Jap was Michael Murphy, the first American bomber to sink a ship was Colin Kelly, the first American flier to bag a Jap plane was Edward O'Hara, and the first American to get four tires was Abie Cohen," but you may not know that more men bearing the name of Cohen enlisted in World War I from New York City than those of any other name, and that the Cohens are making a name for themselves in this war, too. There's Sergeant Schiller Cohen of the Bronx, one of the most-

decorated flyers in the American services, with thirteen decorations; Captain Marion T. Cohen, of Belmar, New Jersey, one of the first seven men to receive the new Legion of Merit award for exceptionally distinguished service in the Navy; and Cohens who have won Purple Hearts and other awards in battles in all parts of the world, who have been prisoners of the Germans and prisoners of the Japanese.

Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy, a Catholic, has said: "Our action in respect to the Jews may well be considered a measure of our civilization."

It seems elementary, but necessary, to point out that the United States is founded on the principle expressed in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." The United States has been built by men who came from all parts of the world, men of all creeds, colors and tongues, and it can continue to be great only if we remember and respect our time-tested past in moving toward our future. We must keep this in mind as we consider our attitude toward all Americans and toward all other peoples. Henry Wallace has said: "Every Jew-baiter, every Catholic-hater, is a fascist at heart. . . . So are those who cultivate hate and distrust of Britain and Russia." As we eradicate all prejudice against the Jews, we must also guard against attacks made on Negroes; against attacks made on Japanese-Americans by the Hearst press and other papers on the West Coast; against those made on the British and Russians by the Hearst-McCormick-Patterson axis, and those made against Catholics under the guise of fighting fascism. All such tendencies are dangerous now but they will be even more threatening in the future, when we shall be moving through the strained days of readjustment to peace-time production, when jobs, despite all our efforts, will for a certain period at least be insufficient to go around; when the whole world will be out of joint, and it will be wise to aid a starving, dislocated, destroyed Europe, so that we may be aided toward living in a less restless, less chaotic, less dangerous, healthier world. Then those tendencies can divide us. Then another Hitler can use them to produce here the crawling maggots of fascism that we have fought to destroy in Italy, Germany and Japan.

We have been enthroning the material in the name of science far too long, so that we have lost our sense of real values. It's the kind of cynicism which is intellectual dandyism that leads us to measure civilization according to the numbers of bathtubs, automobiles, washing machines and radios in a country, instead of by the intellectual, artistic and spiritual development of the citizenry. It has led us to conclude that a man without modern plumbing is to be disdained, instead of realizing that the real man is not what is outside of him, but what is inside. This kind of attitude has affected our books, our motion pictures, our radio, press and forms of education.

Because we are paving our way with emotional reactions instead of reason, we incline to over-simplifications, fail to make necessary distinctions, and arrive at conclusions that are un-Christian and undemocratic.

Let each man note the prejudices that he has himself, toward Jews, Catholics, Negroes, Japanese-Americans, Russians, British, or any other group of people. Let him begin by realizing that no prejudice against any kind of people as a class is justified in fact. Let each man within a class also seek to be a worthy member of his class. Let all of us seek to work with other people in the nation and with those in other countries, so that we shall not undermine and destroy this new structure of peace we are striving to erect, but shall instead buttress it against the storms of the future.

THE NEGRO AND AMERICA'S UNEASY CONSCIENCE



UNNAR MYRDAL

The three great wars of this country have been fought for the ideals of liberty and equality to which the nation was pledged. As a consequence of all of them the American Negro made great strides toward freedom and opportunity. The Revolutionary War started a development which ultimately ended slavery in all northern states, made new import of slaves illegal and nearly accomplished abolition even in the South. The Civil War gave the Negro Emancipation and Reconstruction in the South—though it was soon followed by restoration of white supremacy. The first World War provided him with his first real opportunity as a worker in northern industry, started the Great Migration out of the South, and began the “New Negro” movement—though the end of the war saw numerous race riots and the beginning of a serious decline in employment opportunities. After the advances on all three occasions there were reactions, but not so much ground was lost as had been won.

And now again, the American Negro is watching for what victory will mean in terms of opportunity and rights for him in his native land. To the white American, too, the Negro problem has taken on a significance greater than it has ever had since the Civil War.

Looking back, two general observations are: *What we usually call “social trends” have their main significance for the Negro’s status because of what is in white people’s minds.* For instance the decreasing relative de-

mand for unskilled work and the change of much dirty and heavy labor to clean and easy labor have dangerous implications for the Negro's employment opportunities. But if these technological and economic trends have disastrous effects on the Negro, the cause of this is the persistency with which white people want to keep him out of skilled and pleasant work. The trend toward mass unemployment in America tends to turn Negro labor into a relief burden. But, again, the concentration of unemployment upon the Negro people is explainable only as the direct and indirect effects of discrimination.

The second observation is this: *The important changes in the Negro problem do not consist in, or have close relations with, "social trends" in the narrower meaning of the term, but are made up of changes in people's beliefs and valuations.*

In the field of *social relations* we have been a slow but visible decrease of discrimination in the South during recent decades. White people were beginning to take cognizance of distinctions in education and class within the Negro community. The entire Jim Crow apparatus was maintained but its motivation was no longer so self-evident. Southern liberals were demanding with increasing courage and determination that the doctrine "separate, but equal" should be followed out in its "equality" aspect as well as in its "separateness" aspect—that segregation should not be utilized as a means of discrimination.

The separation of the two groups in the South was, meanwhile, becoming more and more perfected as the frequency of personal master-servant relations was decreasing and as the segregated Negro institutions and Negro professions were built up. There even seemed to be a growing mental isolation between whites and Negroes. Behind this potentially most dangerous development was not only the exclusionist policy of the whites, but also the sullen dissatisfaction and bitter race pride of the Negroes themselves. They were "withdrawing" themselves as a reaction to the segregation and discrimination enforced by the whites.

In the North the sudden influx of southern Negroes during the Great Migration caused a temporary rise in social discrimination. Since, in spite of this, there was much less of it in the North than in the South the migration meant a decrease of social segregation and discrimination for the Negro people as a whole. It also seemed that, despite the sharp temporary rise on account of the migration, the trend in the North, too, was toward decreasing race prejudice.

In the administration of *justice* there was a definite improvement in the South, even if Negroes in that region are still far from enjoying equality before the law. There was a slow rise in the quality of the police and the courts. Lynching, peonage and other conspicuous aberrations of justice were being stamped out. This development was spurred by the increas-

ing interest and interference in the judicial order of the region shown by the federal courts and other federal agencies and also by the state governments. The activity of such private organizations as the NAACP and the Interracial Commission were also of paramount importance for this development. More fundamentally the prestige of law was rising in the South and people were becoming more law-abiding. These changes were related to a general rise in education of the Southerners and to their fuller participation in the larger American culture.

In the North the Negro continued to enjoy full equality before the law. There was some strain in the North during the Great Migration, sometimes mounting to race riots during which the arm of the law was not always just and impartial. But on the whole the judicial order of the region was upheld and equality in justice was not a major problem.

In the *political* sphere the South continued to disfranchise the Negro. The masses of whites were also kept from political participation. Real issues were kept out of politics and there was a great amount of corruption. But economic and ideological changes, related to the region's rapid industrialization, urbanization and labor unionization, stepped up by the great depression and the New Deal, caused political splits in the southern Democratic party machines. The "Solid South" seemed definitely endangered. The poll tax was under fierce attack in all southern states, and some had already abolished it.

Meanwhile such things as the rise of the price level since the 'nineties and the improved educational level of southern Negroes made the statutory devices to keep Negroes from the polls—by property and literacy requirements as well as by the poll tax—less and less effective. Negro disfranchisement came increasingly to depend upon extra-legal and illegal sanctions. And southern liberals were standing up, not only against the poll tax, but often also against the one-party system and the exclusion of Negro voters from the primaries. Even conservative Southerners were occasionally found to hold the opinion that some time in the future the Negro was going to vote in the South.

In the North the Negro enjoyed uninfringed his right to vote, and the steadily continuing migration to the North meant that the Negro vote was growing.

In the enjoyment of *public services* the Negro was discriminated against severely in the South in blunt repudiation of the Constitution and the state laws. But even in this sphere there was a slow improvement of his status. Negro schools were greatly improved even if they usually still remained inferior. Without question the New Deal was of tremendous importance for the Negro in respect to the share he received of public services. It brought a new kind of public servant to the South, educated and zealous officials who were primarily interested not in "keeping the Negro

in his place" but in encouraging and advancing him. Negroes got a feeling that public authority could be other than arbitrary and suppressive.

In the North public services were, on the whole, granted to Negroes as to other citizens in similar circumstances.

While in all these spheres the trends at the outbreak of the present war were definitely in the direction of a rise in the status of the Negro in America, the same cannot be said about those relating to his occupational status. Some rural Negroes moved to northern and southern cities, increasing unemployment there. Monopoly of jobs by the whites increased during the depression and Negroes did not find any new employment openings. Various national policies, such as the Wages and Hours Law, instituted to stamp out sweatshop conditions, could not avoid hurting the employment opportunities of Negroes since they were marginal workers. Negro unemployment mounted in all cities, particularly in the North, and the Negro workers increasingly became a relief burden. The whole country, and particularly the North, was much more generous toward the Negro in doling out relief to him than in allowing him to work and earn his bread by his own labor.

Meanwhile the new unions in the mass production industries gave Negro workers hope by organizing them together with whites in fields in which Negroes were already working. But with few exceptions they did not open up new industries for Negro employment during the 'thirties; neither did they pave the way for Negroes to rise by promotion from the level of unskilled workers to that of the semi-skilled and skilled. Negro business did not flourish either, and the small gains made in a few professions were quantitatively insignificant. There is no question but that the development in the economic sphere was grave. But there seemed to be good prospects that even the threatening trends respecting the Negro's economic status could have been turned, if the country had got out of the long stagnation in a normal way and had entered a new era of continued industrialization.

What has happened to white opinions on the Negro problem in the span of three generations since Emancipation?

In the South three generations ago white people had for their defense a consistent and respectable theory, endorsed by the church and by all sciences, printed in learned books and periodicals, and expounded by the South's great statesmen in the Capitol at Washington. The Negro's subordinate status was a principle integrated into a whole philosophy of society and of human life. Much of this theory remained through Reconstruction and it was again hailed in the restoration of white supremacy. Indeed, much of it remained until a couple of decades ago. But now it is almost destroyed for upper-class and educated people. Its maintenance among lower-class and uneducated people meets increasing difficulties. *The gradual*

destruction of the popular theory behind race prejudice is the most important of all social trends.

The popular beliefs rationalizing caste in America are no longer intellectually respectable. They live a surreptitious life in thoughts and private remarks. Everybody who has acquired a higher education knows that they are wrong. Most white people with a little education also have a hunch that they are wrong. This makes the prejudiced white man nearly as pathetic as his Negro victim.

The white man is thus in the process of losing confidence in the theory which gave reason and meaning to his way of life. This change is probably irreversible and cumulative. It is backed by the American Creed. The trend of psychology, education, anthropology and social science is toward environmentalism in the explanation of group differences, which means that the racial beliefs which defended caste are being torn away. It also means, by implication, that the white majority group in power is accused of being the cause of the Negro's deficiencies and unhappiness. Authority and respectability no longer support the popular beliefs. There is a considerable time-lag between what is thought in the higher and in the lower social classes. But as time passes the lower social strata also will change their beliefs.

All of this is important. People want to have the society they live in, and their behavior in this society, explained and justified to their conscience. And now their theory is being torn to pieces; its expression is becoming recognized as a mark of ignorance.

On the other side of the caste gulf the development leads to increased bitterness. To the Negro the white man's trouble with his conscience cannot but seem to be insincerity or something worse. The Negro group is being permeated by the democratic and equalitarian values of the American culture. Since at the same time there has been increasing separation between the two groups, Negroes are beginning to form a self-conscious "nation within the nation," defining ever more clearly their fundamental grievances against white America.

America can nevermore regard its Negroes as a patient, submissive minority. Negroes will continually become less well "accommodated." They will have a powerful tool in the caste struggle against white America: the glorious American ideals of democracy, liberty and equality to which America is pledged not only by its political Constitution but also by the sincere devotion of its citizens. The Negroes are a minority, and they are poor and suppressed, but they have the advantage that they can fight wholeheartedly.

The whites of course have all the power, but they are split in their moral personality. Their better selves are with the insurgents. The Negroes do not need any other allies.

This moral process had proceeded far when the Second World War broke out.

World War II has been an ideological war fought in defense of democracy. Moreover in this war the principle of democracy had to be applied explicitly to race. In the internal political struggle before America became involved in the war the isolationists had worked up the idea that there was much to improve at home without trying to improve the rest of the world.

The plight of the Negro sharecropper and also the presence of peonage and lynching were brought up to stress the unsolved problems at home and to win Negro sympathies for the isolationist cause.

For the Negroes this new war carried unpleasant reminiscences of the earlier one. This time, too, the Negro had to struggle desperately to get the right to fight for his country. He also had to struggle to get into the war industries and had only partial success. In World War I, Negroes actually made considerable advances in industrial employment. But this time the nation was well stocked with unemployed whites at the beginning of the defense boom. A technological development had also intervened, decreasing the industrial demand for unskilled labor—the type of jobs for which Negroes are least unwelcome.

Under the threat of a Negro march on Washington, skillfully staged by A. Philip Randolph, the President made a solemn proclamation against discrimination in the defense industries and government agencies and appointed a committee, having both Negro and white members, to see that it was observed. Other branches of the Administration made declarations and issued orders against discrimination. The Republican National Committee resolved that racial discriminations are "wrong under the Constitution" and pledged the opposition party to work to correct them. The national labor unions also lined up for non-discrimination. The Negroes heard and read the kindly promises. But they knew the grim reality.

In the twenty years between the two world wars the general level of education of the American Negroes had become considerably higher, and so had their capacity for democracy. The Negro press had become better equipped, and it reached farther. The Negro organizations had grown in strength. The national Negro leaders had become firmer, and they were more resentful. This time they were not willing cheerfully to postpone their complaints until the war was over.

In World War II there was a "colored" nation on the other side—Japan. And that nation started out by beating the white Anglo-Saxons on their own ground. The smoldering revolt in India against British rule had significance for the American Negroes, and so had other "color" incidents in the world conflict: the wavering sympathies of several native populations in the Dutch and British possessions in the Pacific, the mistrust of Great

Britain among the Arab peoples, the first abandonment of Ethiopia, and the ambiguity of the plans for the colonial chessboard of Africa.

But world politics and the color issue are of secondary importance to the American Negro. He is thoroughly Americanized; his complaint is merely that he is not accepted. What really matters to him is his treatment at home, in his own country.

There is much sullen skepticism, and even cynicism, and vague, tired, angry dissatisfaction among American Negroes today. Their caste status being what it is in America, Negroes would, indeed, not be ordinary human beings if such dissatisfaction and bitterness were not their reaction to all the moral talk about democracy, the Four Freedoms, the American way of life, all the violent denunciations of nazi race hatred and the lack of freedom under totalitarian rule. We should also remember, however, that, even if Negroes are still mainly excluded from work in the manufacturing industries and from employment offering much future prospect, the war boom created a lot of secondary employment for Negroes too. With a little money in his pocket even the poor Negro day laborer or domestic worker feels that he can afford to stiffen himself.

The loyalty of the American Negro in war and peace is, however, proverbial. The only thing Negroes ask for is to be accepted as Americans. The American Constitution is even dearer to them than to their white compatriots. They are more unreservedly anti-fascist. Few American Negroes wanted the Axis powers to win the war. But this is not much of an issue to Negroes, as they, about as much as white Americans, are convinced of the invincibility of their country.

But it is quite common that Negroes felt a satisfaction in the temporary adversities and wanted the war to become as serious a matter as possible to the white people in power. Practically every issue of any Negro newspaper has given proof of this attitude. It must be conceded that Negroes have also some good rational reasons for this feeling. They know of course that, as a northern Negro social scientist explains:

. . . the graver the outside danger to the safety of this country, the more abundant the gains will be likely to be [for the Negroes]. But until such time as this country is actually in grave danger most of the attention given to the problem of [Negro] morale will be that of conjuring up the right type of propaganda to allay their discontent.

A white commentator complained some months ago that the Negro press was something of a fifth column. He received the unanimous and angry answer in all Negro papers that this was exactly contrary to the truth. Negroes stand only for democratic principles, to defend which America has waged war. They are dissatisfied because these principles are ignored in America itself. They are just the opposite of war dodgers and traitors; they prayed to have the right to fight and die for their country

and to work in the war industries, but they were often excluded. They can, with new reason, point to the inconsistency between American ideals and practices. This ideological attack is so clearcut and simple and so obviously to the point that it appeals even to the least-educated Negro.

This simple logic is, of course, apparent to white Americans too. And the whites were on the way, even before the war, to losing their caste theory and their complacency in the face of obvious abuses of the American Creed. They were also stirred up by the war and the great cause of human liberties at stake. In the North the question can be publicly approached in only one spirit, that of the American Creed. The late Wendell Willkie, speaking in July 1942 at the annual conference of the NAACP in Los Angeles, California, had this to say:

Today it is becoming increasingly apparent to thoughtful Americans that we cannot fight the forces and ideas of imperialism abroad and maintain a form of imperialism at home. The war has done this to our thinking. . . . When we talk of freedom and opportunity for all nations the mocking paradoxes in our own society become so clear they can no longer be ignored.

The world conflict and America's exposed position as the defender of the democratic faith is thus accelerating an ideological process which was well under way. A strategic fact of utmost importance is this, that the entire caste order is extra-legal if not actually illegal and unconstitutional. The legal order of the land does not sanction caste but, on the contrary, is framed to guarantee equality and to suppress caste. The only important exceptions are the Jim Crow laws in the southern states. But even they are written upon the fiction of equality.

The whites are aware of the tremendous social costs of keeping up the present irrational and illegal caste system. They have the political power to make caste legal and orderly, whether with Negro consent or without it. But practically never will whites be heard making such proposals, and still less will they seriously discuss and plan for such a change. They cannot afford to compromise the American Creed.

Caste may exist but it cannot be recognized. Instead the stamp of public disapproval is set upon it, and this undermines still more the caste theory by which the whites have to try to explain and justify their behavior. And *the Negroes are awarded the law as a weapon in the caste struggle*. The white man can humiliate the Negro; he can thwart his ambitions; he can starve him; he can press him down into vice and crime; he can occasionally beat him and even kill him; but he does not have the moral stamina to make the Negro's subjugation legal and approved by society. Against that stand not only the Constitution and the laws, which could be changed, but also the American Creed which is firmly rooted in Americans' hearts.

In the North the Creed was strong enough long before the war to secure for the Negro practically unabridged civic equality in all his relations with public authority, whether it was in voting, before the courts, in the school system or as a relief recipient. But he is discriminated against ruthlessly in private relations, as when looking for a job or seeking a home to live in. The white Northerner, in his private dealings with people to whom he does not feel akin, has dangerous traditions derived from the exploitation of new immigrants. But even in those nonpublic spheres, and particularly in the problem of breadwinning, the white Northerner is becoming prepared, as a citizen, to give the Negro his just opportunity. But apparently, as a private individual, he is less prepared to feel that he himself is the man to give the Negro a better chance: in his own occupation, trade union, office or workshop, in his own residential neighborhood or in his church. The social paradox in the North is exactly this—that almost everybody is against discrimination in general but at the same time almost everybody practices discrimination in his own petty personal affairs.

It is the cumulation of all these personal discriminations which creates the color bar in the North and for the Negro causes unusually severe unemployment, crowded housing conditions, crime and vice. About this social process the ordinary white Northerner keeps sublimely ignorant and unconcerned. This aloofness is, of course, partly opportunistic but it can be fought by education. Now when the Negro is increasingly given sympathetic publicity by newspapers, periodicals and the radio and by administrators and public personalities of all kinds, one result is that the white Northerner is gradually waking up and seeing what he is doing to the Negro and is seeing also the consequences of his democratic Creed for his relations with Negroes. The North is getting prepared for a fundamental redefinition of the Negro's status in America. The North will accept it if the change is pushed by courageous leadership. And the North has much more power than the South.

Also working in favor of the Negro is another trend, namely, the concentration of responsibility. Labor relations are coming increasingly to be planned and regulated by broad union policies and by national legislation and administration. With the war over, mass unemployment will be a main problem. Large-scale public intervention will be a necessity. In this endeavor no national administration will dare to allow unemployment to be too much concentrated upon the Negro.

The average white Northerner will probably agree with a policy which holds open employment opportunities for Negroes, because, as we said, he is against economic discrimination as a general proposition. There is also—together with all opportunistic ignorance and unconcernedness—a bit of rational defense for the distance he preserves between his political and his private opinion. In the individual shop where he works or the

residential section where he lives, he sees the danger in admitting a few Negroes, since this will bring an avalanche of Negroes on his shop or his neighborhood. This danger is, of course, due to the fact of the Negro's general exclusion. It is part of the vicious circle that is holding the Negro down.

If government policy prevents general discrimination, however, there will be no avalanche of Negroes on any one white employer or group of employers. The Negroes, who number less than 10 per cent of the population, must be given their chance in private enterprise or be supported by public funds. And the planning and directing agencies will be compelled to make the white public see the problem nationally in order to get public support for the policy they must pursue.

The situation in the South is different. Unlike the white Northerner, who is most inclined to give the Negro equality in public relations and least inclined to do so in private relations, the white Southerner does not differentiate between public and private relations. Moreover he is traditionally and consistently opposed to Negro equality for its own sake, which the Northerner is not. He may be privately much more indulgent than the white Northerner, but he is not so willing to give the Negro equal treatment by public authority. But the Southerner is a good American too.

The ordinary conservative white Southerner has, therefore, a deeper split in his moral personality than has the white Northerner. The air now is filled with reminders of the great cause of democracy and the equality of peoples. His "own Negroes" are making some money, reading the Negro press and getting restless. The NAACP and other protest organizations are fighting ever more daringly in his own cities. In his newspapers he reads how the national leaders come out with blunt denunciations of racial discrimination. He is finding that northern leaders are increasingly getting interested in the poll tax, the white primary, Negro disfranchisement, injustices against Negroes and other peculiar institutions of the South which he guards behind the doctrine of "States' rights."

What is he supposed to do? Give up Jim Crow and so perhaps allow a Negro to marry his daughter; build good schools for Negroes, though the schools are not too good for his own children; punish white invaders of Negro rights, though they otherwise may be perfectly good and upright citizens; relinquish "white supremacy"? Must he retreat from all "southern traditions"? He sees "outside aggression" wherever he turns.

This is an old story and a phase of a mental cycle through which the unfortunate South has often passed before. The fact that this time the white Southerner's caste theory is weaker than ever and does not inspire much of his own intellectual confidence makes his dilemma worse. His emotions on the color issue are less stable also because his personal ties to the Negro group have been decreasing, and racial isolation has been in-

tensified during the last generation. He "knows the Negro" less well than did his father and grandfather, though he continues to pretend that he knows him well because to "know the Negro" is also a southern tradition. Having fewer personal contacts with Negroes he is likely to exaggerate the signs of opposition from the Negroes, for he feels that the Negroes have good reason to develop opposition. The presence in southern communities of Negro soldiers, many from the North, increases his uneasiness.

A prominent white southern liberal described in a letter to the author the mental state of the white South as of the summer of 1942:

... we are in the midst of a situation in the South where we seem to have been thrown back with great losses where we had expected great gains: and . . . the situation in the South may be of the proportions of a crisis greater than we have had in many years. For the first time in my experience the situation is so complex that we do not know how to proceed to next steps. Just a few years ago we almost had unanimity in plans for cooperative arrangements, in which Negroes and whites were enthusiastic and in which representatives of nearly all phases of the South were participants. We had worked into entirely new patterns of fellowship and participation, and there were many evidences that the South was beginning to be proud of this progress. Today, as far as I know, there is practically none of this left. The South is becoming almost unanimous in a pattern of unity that refers to white unity. The thousands of incidents and accidents in the South are being integrated into the old pattern of southern determination against an outside aggression.

Similar to this deeply concerned statement of a liberal white Southerner we may cite the equally troubled view of a Negro clergyman, Dr. J. S. Nathaniel Tross:

I am afraid for my people. They have grown restless. They are not happy. They no longer laugh. There is a new policy among them—something strange, perhaps terrible.

The situation is so critical in the South that fifty southern Negro leaders recently saw fit to gather together, deliberately excluding northern Negroes, and to plead for racial amity. They accepted social segregation but requested the elimination of all other inequalities. This development was made necessary by the fearful backing away of some southern liberals—notably Mark Ethridge, John Temple Graves and Virginius Dabney—from the social segregation issue. The meeting of the southern Negroes served both as an attempt to prevent the racial lines from being drawn more sharply and as a disclaimer of responsibility for violence.

An important element in the situation is that the southern Negroes, if they are attacked, are more prepared to fight this time than they have ever been before. The situation is grave, and the years to come will provide a serious test of the political resourcefulness of white public authori-

ties and of other white and Negro leaders. But regardless of what happens, we do not believe that this is a turn for the worse in race relations in the South. Even if there are going to be serious clashes and even if their short-run effects will be devastating to the Negroes involved and, perhaps, to Negroes in the whole region, we believe that the long-run effect of the present opinion crisis in the South, because it is a catharsis for the whites, will be a change toward increased equality for the Negro. A prominent and conservative Negro social scientist in the South feels that tensions are not necessarily bad and that under certain conditions even race riots may have wholesome effects in the long run. "They stir up people's consciences. If the race situation should ever become fixed, if the Negro were really accommodated, then, and only then, would I despair about a continued great improvement for Negroes. As long as there is friction and fighting, there is hope."

The compromise between North and South has lasted for two generations; it may now be approaching its end, at least relatively. The compromise was not a stable power equilibrium. Signs of its end have been frequent during the 'thirties: a whole set of Supreme Court decisions, the New Deal in the South, the increasing activity of federal agencies to stamp out peonage, the agitation for a federal lynching law and for an abolition of the poll tax by Congress, the repeal of the two-thirds majority rule for the nomination of the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, and so on.

It seems justifiable to predict a growing tension between North and South, one which will not be restricted to the Negro issue. As recourse to civil war is out of the question and as things thus have to be settled by political means, the fact becomes of importance that the white South is not united against a redefinition of the Negro's status. The South has been, and is, changing rapidly and southern liberalism has been coming to be a force though it has practically nowhere held political power and to-day is fearfully timid on the Negro issue. Even the ordinary conservative white Southerner has a deeply split personality. In the short run this can be suppressed and the tension can lead to violent reactions. But in the long run it means that the conservative white Southerner himself can be won over to equalitarian reforms in line with the American Creed.

What has actually happened within the last few years is not only that the Negro problem has become national in scope after having been mainly a southern worry. It has also acquired tremendous international implications, and this is another and decisive reason why the white North is prevented from compromising with the white South regarding the Negro. The situation is actually such that any and all concessions to Negro rights in this phase of the history of the world will repay the nation many times, while any and all injustices inflicted upon him will be extremely costly.

We mentioned in passing that the American Negro could not help observing the color angle of the war. He has obviously got vicarious satisfaction out of this perspective, and he also tested some vague feelings of solidarity and allegiance to the cause of other colored peoples involved in the world conflagration. But this is a minor part of the international implications. The American Negro is thoroughly American in his culture and whole outlook on the world. He is also loyal to America and there is no danger that he will betray it. This is at least certain in the short-range view. How the Negro would react if he were left dissatisfied and if later a new war were to be fought more definitely along color lines is more difficult to predict.

The main international implication is instead that America, for its international prestige, power and future security, needs to demonstrate to the world that American Negroes can be satisfactorily integrated into its democracy. In a sense the war marked the end of American isolation. America has had security behind the two protecting oceans. With this isolation definitely broken, historians will begin to see how it has always greatly determined the development of America. Statesmen will have to take cognizance of the changed geopolitical situation of the nation and carry out important adaptations of the American way of life to new necessities.

A main adaptation is bound to be a redefinition of the Negro's status in American democracy.

It was commonly observed that the mistrust of, or open hostility toward, the white man by colored people everywhere in the world greatly increased the difficulties in the way of the United Nations' winning the war. The treatment of the Negro in America did not make good propaganda for Americans abroad and particularly not among colored nations. Pearl Buck assured her compatriots:

We cannot . . . win this war without convincing our colored allies—who are most of our allies—that we are not fighting for ourselves as continuing superior over colored peoples. The deep patience of colored peoples is at an end. Everywhere among them there is the same resolve for freedom and equality that white Americans and British have, but it is a grimmer resolve, for it includes the determination to be rid of white rule and exploitation and white race prejudice, and nothing will weaken this will.

This is perhaps an exaggeration. It seems more definitely certain that it will be impossible to make and preserve a good peace without having built up the fullest trust and good will among the colored peoples. They will be strong and they are bound to become even stronger as time passes. The whites are likely from now on to become a progressively smaller portion of the total world population. If we except the Russian peoples, who

are still rapidly increasing, the rapid change in proportion stands out still more dramatically.

Another broad trend is almost as certain. The examples of Japan and, more recently, of Russia and China give support to the view that in the future we shall see many backward countries industrialized at a tremendously more rapid rate than were the pioneer Western countries, who had to find out everything for themselves. The same countries illustrate also how backward nations can advantageously use the newly created industrial apparatus for producing war materials.

Particularly as Russia cannot be reckoned on to adhere to white supremacy it is evident from these facts that within a short period the shrinking minority of white people in our Western lands will have to either succumb or find ways of living on peaceful terms with colored people. If white people, for their own preservation, attempt to reach a state in which they will be tolerated by their colored neighbors, equality will be the most they will be strong enough to demand.

History is never irredeemable, and there is still time to come to good terms with colored peoples. Their race pride and race prejudice is still mostly a defensive mental device, a secondary reaction built up to meet the humiliations of white supremacy. This is evident in the case of the American Negro. It probably holds true even for other colored people who have not yet had a taste of power. It should be apparent that the time to come to an understanding on the basis of equality is rapidly running out.

The Negro problem is not only America's greatest failure but also America's incomparably great opportunity for the future. If America should follow its own deepest convictions its well-being at home would be increased directly. At the same time America's prestige and power abroad would rise immensely. The century-old dream of American patriots, that America should give to the entire world its own freedom and its own faith, would come true. America can show that justice, equality and cooperation are possible between white and colored people.

THE FREE WORLD SINGS

Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.

—Shelley

THE FREE WORLD SINGS

ARCHIPELAGO



ILLIAM ROSE BENÉT

Today we think of islands. . . .

“Yellow sand-spots,” the artist said.

“Sea that unbelievable parrot green . . .

and the goonies, the goody-birds, with their deafening
clack-gaggle clattering racket wide-wing-planing
always aloft or braking for a landing!”

Specks the islands in the enormous flow
and welter of the lavish elements. . . .

It's where the world ends
the place for jumping off
the Alexander Selkirk solitude . . .
wings of a dove . . . the sea-fowl in her nest . . .
Robinson Crusoe with his nanny-goat. . . .

And then the first apparent enemy hulls
rising beyond the sea line the vibration
loudening fading of planes . . . the far sea-battling
over the horizon by remote control. . . .

Crash of anti-aircraft whine of torpedo-planes
assault like Midway with their carriers swinging
to dodge the babies from our bomb-bay doors
Waterspouts like whales blowing shot-silk
of sky and sea ripped by the flash and crash
and sound and flame . . .

Aloof the islands lie . . .
Wake that the indomitable four hundred
leathernecks held and held for fourteen days. . . .
Midway the Marshalls spawn-swarm of Micronesia . . .
the Marianas that Magellan found . . .
Our Mindanao Davao musical names . . .
Luzon that held Bataan Corregidor
names more than musketry and cannonade . . .
the spread of equatorial Melanesia
down to Australia and the Coral Sea. . . .

God made big islands too He made Australia . . .
and the Carolines in never-ending June. . . .

But now it is beach-heads held or beach-heads taken.
Fleets now of monster birds with metal wings
and doom-filled bellies and all that endless ocean
studded with island ambush. . . .

Over the surf
of the coral reef the goonies bank and veer
and crawl and cry or shake their mating dance
awkwardly silhouetted against a sun
that rose in red once and that sets in blood
slowly slowly under the long sea line. . . .

Today
far islands that are very near.

PEACE PEACE



Down hits the paw, up sniffs the snout
And scientific fangs reach out . . .
This time when, duly civilized, we spring
To grip of war, this time the missiles sling

Not only over battlefields and camps
But into homes where sanctuary-lamps
Cannot defend a mother and a child.
Thus have the world's most learned forces filed
On earth, in water, through the air,
Professing murder everywhere,
Uncovering man the beast he is
Beneath his jacket of hypocrisies.
However pious may have been his plan,
Mindless metals rule the man
And paralyze the timed approach
He used to make toward thought with horse and coach. . . .
Cancelled the hopeful age
When apes stood up and were his parentage,
He swallows his heart, looses his roars
And fumbles down again upon all fours.
If but these world-wide monkeys might turn back
And mercifully wreck their armored track,
Undo the work of heedless brains,
Uproot the rails, collapse the trains,
Tangle the wires and waves that grow
Telegraph and radio,
Slit the poisonous, obscene
Entrails of the submarine,
Strip the flying-boats of wings
Without which heaven better sings—
Men would lose only speed with which to show
They have not anywhere to go.

Is it too soon to found increase
Of peace in the heart where there is no peace?
Is it too soon for seeing clear
How well we make of science but a spear
Which God and man, together crucified,
Feel probing where the heart is in the side?

Estranged from self and yet
 Not near enough to God,
 Stark on a parapet,
 He views the vacant sod

In which grass grew long since
 And may be growing still.
 He feels his memory wince
 Within his darkened will,

He feels the wish to quicken
 His hands with growing things,
 But people quake, are stricken,
 And not a linnet sings.

Where are the birds whose motion
 Was more than people are?
 Their wings traverse an ocean,
 Their bills are wet with war.

He feels his eyes blood-wet,
 Trying still to have heard,
 Trying not to forget,
 The love-song of a bird.

THE SLEEPER

Once when we broke a loaf of bread
 And shared the honey, Celia said:
 "How simple it should be
 To share existence as the interchanging dust,
 To be akin and kind and to entrust
 All men to one another for their good!
 And why have we not always understood
 And carried to the common enemy

In you and me
This ultimatum of democracy?"

Once you had listened, Celia, to a stream
And lain a long time, silent as a sleeper.
Then came your words: words that still seem
To have been said beyond
The body, words bending with their breath a frond
Of fern beside the stream:
"As evil is yet wider than we dream,
So good is deeper."

THIS WAR

Now comes the grievous moment when one takes
Stern inventory of the grades of men
—Relating to advantage of all sakes—
And dares to face an enemy again,

Whose skull itself advances and whose column
Lifts legs of skeletons yet in their skin.
Now let all flesh assert itself in solemn
Will that it live and that the body win.

Now let all thoughts align themselves if ever
And use their brief dimensions to throw down
These metalled machinations that would sever
Man from the braver self that he has known.

All men are men, I grant you. But some men
Crave to be monsters who subdue their sort.
Body by body let us raise again
All that there is of soul, to be a fort.

■

YOUNGER BROTHERS

R

OBERT P. TRISTRAM COFFIN

Swietlik, Katz, Eligian,
Salinas, Bonk, Skachinske,
Tardif, Wong, DiLaggio,
Koucoules, Levinski!

You are the younger brothers to
Smyth, Prinz, McNutt, O'Leary,
Despeaux, Higgenbotham, Hughes,
Schuyler, Bausch, MacVittie.

You have the same strong house to build
Against war-lords and weather,
And you must go in shirt-sleeves, too,
And sweat and heave together.

My English ancestor had to learn
To smile and get along
With his Huguenot son-in-law,
His grandsons turned out strong.

My grandma had a son half Dutch
When she was brought to bed,
And he brought thrift into his house
When he and Scotland wed.

And now the Mediterranean
Will mate with Russian plains,
Armenia and Ireland
Gather the prairies' grains.

New sons of our bright new dream,
Off with coat and vest!
Prove that common working men
Are equal to the best.

Prove that all men have the right
To hope and get ahead,
Brother Greek and Sister Pole—
Here is your wedding bed!

BREAD AND LOVE

I, Tristram, since my life roots deep in pain
Like ancient Tristram's have the right again
To say the final things, and say them plain,
Being a poet. And I say them now.

I say you people have the right to trust
In certain things that will be, when our wars
Are over, or within them, if they last:
Water, I say, is one. There will always be
Blue water through the branches of some tree
And water high up as a wall behind some houses
And white sails going up, water by roads,
And maybe beasts will drink it under their loads,
Water in forests, and thin deer will drink it,
Or birds will dip it up drop after drop,
Too feverishly beautiful to stop,
Lifting bright beaks to thank whoever made it.
I say there will be hills, and trees will climb them
Gripping the rock with strong and knowing roots,
There will be hills with white clouds, and some fruits.
There will be cows to milk because it is evening
And they were lately big and bland with young,
New calves will totter under a rough tongue,
There will be milk for lambs and colts and others,
There will be fires lit and some songs sung.
Maybe the shapes of houses, cities, classes,
Vehicles, and laws will somewhat change,

But tools will not and mothers leaning to babies,
Giving the breast to them, will never seem strange.
No man's hand will ever be too bony,
Too cold from killing his own kind to take
A small son's hand in it and warm its fingers,
And when a strong man dies, some hearts will ache.
Always there will be some shapes like plows
Opening up furrows, sons got, hay in mows.
I do not think we ever shall finish with trees
Or have enough of honey, lambs, or bees.
I think a brother will be harder, tenderer
On a brother than on other men
And, being so, maybe will have wisdom
To be a brother to some nine or ten
Men who have a different man for father.
I think, too, that young men always will rather
Be with girls than with their kind in May.
There will be bread and love. These things, I say.

AT THE MOON'S ECLIPSE

Now over most of living kind
Creeps the stealthy terror,
Sleepy birds and wakeful dogs
Tremble at the moon's error.

The full calm eye of night shuts to
With an evil lid,
Trees that drink in silvery light
Shudder, feeling it hid.

If I did not know the cause,
As trees do, I should do,
Seeing night's eye so dusked with blood
And shutting evilly to.

But I know this is a game
Of shadow and is brief,

A game foretold with exquisite
Exactness past belief.

Now over the much vaster round
Of the earth, moon's mother,
This night is full of creeping dark
Where brother slays his brother.

On the Volga, along the Rhine,
In the Solomons' day,
Steel and fire, whining death
Wipe all light away.

A thousand men who loved sweet light
Plunge into the dark
Where never moon nor sun will come,
Never the faintest spark.

And no one can tell when this shade
Will slide from lands and seas,
We small men tremble with the birds,
Sad watch-dogs, and the trees.

WHAT TO DO

With apologies to Lyov Tolstoy

T

HEODORE DREISER

Storm
Storm
Storm
War
Want
Misery.

And each asking of the other what to do
And so
Groups
Committees
Government.

In the meantime one
A small-town editor writes the truth about profit and starvation.

And one knocks at a broken door and when it opens hands in a loaf of bread.

And one, step by step, all day long, walks to this laborer and that saying united we stand, divided we fall.

And one, the workers' friend, says Vote, Speak, for you are the Government, By you your leaders rise or fall.

And one, the educator, says to the child, A. B. C. and to the adult, Learn! Know that the world grows smaller!

And one, the minister, says to all, Love thy neighbor as thyself.

And one, the lover of his fellow man says Take, from each according to his ability; Give to each according to his need.

And so from the heart comes the answer
Of him who does and serves
That by degrees,
A new and better world
May be made.

VOICES OF HEROES

Overheard in a Churchyard
Dedicated to the Memory of 1776

HORACE GREGORY

The cemetery stone New England autumn
Restores health to our voices,
Even our faces
Seem to reappear through gliding mist that gathers
In an unshuttered, moonlit, empty room.
We were the heroes, O wives, mothers, daughters!
Of the first war gendered
Within these shores.

Open our graves: you will find nothing there
Unlike our common clay
That blows away,
Or mixed with water serves to build a wall;
But you might well imagine
That earth and air
Are relics of the True, Original Cross,
And that the trampled grass
Holds the imprint of Adam's image on this small hill—
Or you might say,
"Because their bones lie here,
"The bleak earth glows with sunlight from their eyes;
"They were the heroes
"And their voices speak among us at their will."

Yet too much praise leaves much unsaid:
Even in death we were, somehow, more human,
Moving among the shades of things we loved or hated,
Clasping the shadows of pretty girls, of restless women,
Or quarreling with a landlord,
Or gazing with regret at empty bottles,
Or shouldering old rifles,

Or for a hundred years (since we were freed from labor)
Playing at cards with a distrusted neighbor.
It is not true that we were always sad,
Or like evil, unquiet dead misspent our fury
Among cries of death at night in winter storms—
But the earthly spirit that fed our hearts had gone,
Gone with the vanished hope of richer farms,
Or brighter towns, or countless money;
We had learned that there were no stakes to be won,
Even the unnamed, vital essence returned to God.

Now that another war flames in the East
(We can see its fires reflected in the sky
And there are more than rumors in the air)
Remember that we died fighting for what you are—
Better to die
Than to sit watching the world die,
Better to sleep and learn at last
That terror and loss
Have not utterly destroyed us,
That even our naked shades
Still looked and talked like men—
That when we wake,
A little courage has earned our right to speak.
Remember that old wars remain unfinished,
That men fail, fall, and are replenished
As grass grows over earth, our names forgotten,
Or misread, misspelled in ivy-covered stone
With wreaths above our graves in summer's green—
Is that blaze the blaze of lightning from a cloud?
Is that noise the coming of October rain?
We do not fear them; we know that flesh is mortal
And in a world at war, only the wars live on.

THE YOUNG DEAD SOLDIERS

To Richard Myers

A
RCHIBALD MACLEISH

The young dead soldiers do not speak.
Nevertheless they are heard in the still houses.
(Who has not heard them?)

They have a silence that speaks for them at night
And when the clock counts.

They say,
We were young. We have died. Remember us.

They say,
We have done what we could
But until it is finished it is not done.

They say,
We have given our lives
But until it is finished no one can know what our lives gave.

They say,
Our deaths are not ours,
They are yours,
They will mean what you make them.

They say,
Whether our lives and our deaths were for peace and a new hope
Or for nothing
We cannot say.
It is you who must say this.

They say,
We leave you our deaths,

Give them their meaning,
Give them an end to the war and a true peace,
Give them a victory that ends the war and a peace afterwards.
Give them their meaning.

We were young, they say.
We have died.
Remember us.

THE WESTERN SKY

Words for a Song
To Roy Harris

Stand Stand against the rising night
O freedom's land, O freedom's air:
Stand steep and keep the fading light
That eastward darkens everywhere.

Hold Hold the golden light and lift
Hill after hill-top, one by one—
Lift up America O lift
Green freedom to the evening sun.

Lift up your hills till conquered men
Look westward to their blazing height:
Lift freedom till its fire again
Kindles the countries of the night.

Be proud America to bear
The endless labor of the free—
To strike for freedom everywhere
And everywhere bear liberty.

Lift up O land O land lift clear
The lovely signal of your skies.
If freedom darkens eastward here
Here on the west let freedom rise.

IS THERE ANY EASY ROAD TO FREEDOM?

CARL SANDBURG

A relentless man loved France
Long before she came to shame
And the eating of bitter dust,
Loving her as mother and torch,
As bone of his kith and kin
And he spoke passion, warning:
*“Rest is not a word of free peoples—
rest is a monarchical word.”*

A relentless Russian loved Russia
Long before she came to bare agony
And valor amid rivers of blood,
Loving her as mother and torch,
As bone of his kith and kin:
He remembered an old Swedish saying:
“The fireborn are at home in fire.”

A Kentucky-born Illinoian found himself
By journey through shadows and prayer
The Chief Magistrate of the American people
Pleading in words close to low whispers:
*“Fellow citizens . . . we cannot escape history.
The fiery trial through which we pass
Will light us down in honor or dishonor
To the latest generation . . .
We shall nobly save or meanly lose
the last best hope of earth.”*
Four little words came worth studying over:
“We must disenthral ourselves.”
And what is a thrall? And who are thralls?
Men tied down or men doped, or men drowsy?

He hoped to see them
shake themselves loose
and so be disenthralled.

There are freedom shouters.
There are freedom whisperers.
Both may serve.
Have I, have you, been too silent?
Is there an easy crime of silence?
Is there any easy road to freedom?

MYOPIA



MARK VAN DOREN

Pity for them, the coasters
Past premonition's reef
Who then but toss and shudder
In shoals; whence their belief
That all the sea is shallow,
And only sand is grief.

Who coming near, can measure
None but the present threat;
Who do not see the high ground,
The grimmest danger yet:
The tower that must be taken
After the waves forget.

Pity for them, the tremblers
Too far away from truth
To know its drought and hardness;
Indifferent, uncouth;
And how not to have tried it
Crowns all other ruth.

THE TIME IS NOW

S TANLEY YOUNG

The time is now, my brothers.
The vast human event draws
Nearer the castle. Within, the silence
Thickens, and the idle children
Watch with fretful surprise
The tumble of the fondled toys.

Outside, the future waits
Like a sleeping princess for
The strong kiss of legend.
Man, cravened by loneliness,
Circles the monstrous towers
Protesting his small shadow.

In the fields below
The dead wait, too,
The mockery of ruin upon them
Their bones locked in thoughts
Beyond their dying.
They, also, are said to be alone.

This is the fiction of history.

Brother, it is not a far journey
To the man who is like you.
Greet him at the first corner who knows
The moon cannot be comfortable again,
No, nor by love tenderly observed, until
The light sheds down upon a common ground.

I have seen this wish written
Not in the skies but in
The drawn eyes of men.

The time is now.

THIS HISTORY

Down the streets where the flowers are
Evening hurries us home now
Crying peace in the days of damnation
Seeking rest in what the hours allow.

Seeking rest, and the wrong house
Is every house we would enter
Where history is a scratched number
And the memory of last winter.

There is no peace down this blasted street,
No rest, no other place to go
From the work of fools that brought us here
Where our assorted lives must show.

We are the memory-makers now: history
Is only what we remember to defend,
Round and round our monuments
The children will run in the end;

Round and round our monuments
Which no man can dismiss
Whether the world comes to blaze
Or bloom. Remember this.

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